RamistThomist
Puritanboard Assessor
Beougher, Timothy K. Richard Baxter and Conversion: A Study of the Puritan Concept of Becoming a Christian. Mentor, 2007.
Timothy Beougher has published a fine introduction to Richard Baxter’s soteriology. Indeed, this should be the introductory text to all secondary literature on Baxter, at least as regards his soteriology. Indeed, one should read this volume prior to reading Packer or Boersma. Building off of key themes in J. I. Packer’s own dissertation on Baxter, Beougher argues that Baxter’s political model forms the key to understanding his soteriology.
Key to Baxter’s theology of conversion, indeed to his whole theology, is his political model. According to Beougher, “Baxter believed the key theme in Scripture was the Kingdom of God, and therefore the idea of the kingdom should be taken as one’s own starting point in constructing a system of theology” (Beougher 38). Kingdoms, quite naturally, have laws and governments. They also have a lord (Dominus) who enacts them.
It is in this idea of “kingdom” that Beougher lays any fault in Baxter’s theology. Baxter, according to Beougher, reinterpreted all of Scripture according to 17th century politics. “Once one works on the principle that political theory (or anything else for that matter) provides the framework from which to view Scripture, the Bible ‘loses’ its ability to judge that framework” (39). Accordingly, this is the reason Baxter’s church today is Unitarian (40).
This seems like a good critique, but Beougher overshoots his mark. Baxter certainly erred in making 17th century society the epistemological framework for salvation. But Anselm did the same thing. In fact, almost every thinker in history did the same thing. Even worse, we all bring frameworks to Scripture. We cannot approach Scripture without a framework (this is the one thing that presuppositionalists get right).
Anthropology
With anthropology Baxter is on safer ground. As with other Reformed thinkers, Baxter holds to concreated holiness. In what appears a nod to Thomas Aquinas, Baxter lays the fault in the garden to a triumph of the will over the intellect. (44).
Elsewhere Baxter expounds something like a faculty psychology (46ff). With intellect and soul, Baxter stresses another faculty: the active power. This appears to be the mode in which man relates to God. If so, it is similar to some Patristic accounts of man’s spirit.
The Antinomian Problem
It was not Baxter’s opposition to the antinomianism in Cromwell’s argument that led to errors in his theology. It was probably combining that with an adherence (of sorts) to Hugo Grotius’s Governmental Theory of the atonement, where “Christ secured a change in God’s law rather than satisfying it” (49).
Not dissimilar from his reliance on Grotius, but not directly indebted to any one thinker, is Baxter’s so-called Amyraldian view of the atonement. So-called, because by his own account he came to his view before he had read Amyraut. Christ died for the whole world as a part of God’s general benevolence (see the political method above) to mankind (54ff).
Justification
Beougher does his utmost to give Baxter a charitable reading regarding justification. Works, for Baxter, “are the prescribed expression of faith” and are “absolutely necessary for justification at the last judgment” (61). Going back to his three faculties of man, true faith “is an act of all three faculties” and “will always result in action” (62). So far one could say Baxter echoes, perhaps not in the best language, the traditional belief that true faith will always lead to works. Beougher is convinced the differences are largely verbal. I am not so sure. And I am not sure Baxter is sure. And that is the real problem. If I cannot understand what you mean by something like justification, the problem is not with me.
On one hand, Baxter can say “No man can say that he is a Co-ordinate Con-cause with Christ in his justification” (73), yet still believe there was a real final justification. Beougher suggests the key lies in the political method: “Judgment is a necessary part of government. Laws are mere shadows if they are not executed” (72). Read thusly, Baxter could simply see the “final justification” as a “vindication.”
The Process of Conversion
Baxter’s remarks on conversion are standard Puritanism. The primary means, not surprisingly, is the word of God. Although conversion is an act of the Spirit, man has a responsibility: he must make use of the means God has given him 81). With the word comes “consideration,” a seeking the knowledge of divine things. The preacher can stimulate consideration “in men’s minds by asking a series of questions” (83).
Consideration will lead to humiliation, yet “Baxter cautions his readers not to mistake the nature and the ends of the work.” Feeling sorry for sin is good, but that is not the same thing as being converted to Christ.
Beougher explains Baxter’s use of the "Practical Syllogism:” “All who manifest the signs of grace have eternal life; you manifest the signs of grace; therefore, you have eternal life” (91). That sounds simple enough, but how do I really know I manifest the signs of eternal life? Baxter says such thinking is antinomian, arguing from uncertainties to certainty. The correct way to argue, according to Baxter, “is from a certain truth, and to say, “I live in ordinary, wilful, henious sin; therefore I am not justified or sincere.” Or one can deny the consequent and then deny the antecedent, and come to the conclusion one is sincere.
Presenting the Gospel
This chapter functions more like a summary of a good evangelist. One should highlight a few helpful suggestions. A good evangelist should expect success (104). To be sure, the Holy Spirit is sovereign, but do not approach the person like you are already defeated.
Conclusion
This is a modified doctoral dissertation. It reads like such, especially with the copious endnotes. That is either a positive or a negative, depending on your attitude. Beougher is mostly sympathetic with his subject and rescues Baxter from most (but not all) charges.
Timothy Beougher has published a fine introduction to Richard Baxter’s soteriology. Indeed, this should be the introductory text to all secondary literature on Baxter, at least as regards his soteriology. Indeed, one should read this volume prior to reading Packer or Boersma. Building off of key themes in J. I. Packer’s own dissertation on Baxter, Beougher argues that Baxter’s political model forms the key to understanding his soteriology.
Key to Baxter’s theology of conversion, indeed to his whole theology, is his political model. According to Beougher, “Baxter believed the key theme in Scripture was the Kingdom of God, and therefore the idea of the kingdom should be taken as one’s own starting point in constructing a system of theology” (Beougher 38). Kingdoms, quite naturally, have laws and governments. They also have a lord (Dominus) who enacts them.
It is in this idea of “kingdom” that Beougher lays any fault in Baxter’s theology. Baxter, according to Beougher, reinterpreted all of Scripture according to 17th century politics. “Once one works on the principle that political theory (or anything else for that matter) provides the framework from which to view Scripture, the Bible ‘loses’ its ability to judge that framework” (39). Accordingly, this is the reason Baxter’s church today is Unitarian (40).
This seems like a good critique, but Beougher overshoots his mark. Baxter certainly erred in making 17th century society the epistemological framework for salvation. But Anselm did the same thing. In fact, almost every thinker in history did the same thing. Even worse, we all bring frameworks to Scripture. We cannot approach Scripture without a framework (this is the one thing that presuppositionalists get right).
Anthropology
With anthropology Baxter is on safer ground. As with other Reformed thinkers, Baxter holds to concreated holiness. In what appears a nod to Thomas Aquinas, Baxter lays the fault in the garden to a triumph of the will over the intellect. (44).
Elsewhere Baxter expounds something like a faculty psychology (46ff). With intellect and soul, Baxter stresses another faculty: the active power. This appears to be the mode in which man relates to God. If so, it is similar to some Patristic accounts of man’s spirit.
The Antinomian Problem
It was not Baxter’s opposition to the antinomianism in Cromwell’s argument that led to errors in his theology. It was probably combining that with an adherence (of sorts) to Hugo Grotius’s Governmental Theory of the atonement, where “Christ secured a change in God’s law rather than satisfying it” (49).
Not dissimilar from his reliance on Grotius, but not directly indebted to any one thinker, is Baxter’s so-called Amyraldian view of the atonement. So-called, because by his own account he came to his view before he had read Amyraut. Christ died for the whole world as a part of God’s general benevolence (see the political method above) to mankind (54ff).
Justification
Beougher does his utmost to give Baxter a charitable reading regarding justification. Works, for Baxter, “are the prescribed expression of faith” and are “absolutely necessary for justification at the last judgment” (61). Going back to his three faculties of man, true faith “is an act of all three faculties” and “will always result in action” (62). So far one could say Baxter echoes, perhaps not in the best language, the traditional belief that true faith will always lead to works. Beougher is convinced the differences are largely verbal. I am not so sure. And I am not sure Baxter is sure. And that is the real problem. If I cannot understand what you mean by something like justification, the problem is not with me.
On one hand, Baxter can say “No man can say that he is a Co-ordinate Con-cause with Christ in his justification” (73), yet still believe there was a real final justification. Beougher suggests the key lies in the political method: “Judgment is a necessary part of government. Laws are mere shadows if they are not executed” (72). Read thusly, Baxter could simply see the “final justification” as a “vindication.”
The Process of Conversion
Baxter’s remarks on conversion are standard Puritanism. The primary means, not surprisingly, is the word of God. Although conversion is an act of the Spirit, man has a responsibility: he must make use of the means God has given him 81). With the word comes “consideration,” a seeking the knowledge of divine things. The preacher can stimulate consideration “in men’s minds by asking a series of questions” (83).
Consideration will lead to humiliation, yet “Baxter cautions his readers not to mistake the nature and the ends of the work.” Feeling sorry for sin is good, but that is not the same thing as being converted to Christ.
Beougher explains Baxter’s use of the "Practical Syllogism:” “All who manifest the signs of grace have eternal life; you manifest the signs of grace; therefore, you have eternal life” (91). That sounds simple enough, but how do I really know I manifest the signs of eternal life? Baxter says such thinking is antinomian, arguing from uncertainties to certainty. The correct way to argue, according to Baxter, “is from a certain truth, and to say, “I live in ordinary, wilful, henious sin; therefore I am not justified or sincere.” Or one can deny the consequent and then deny the antecedent, and come to the conclusion one is sincere.
Presenting the Gospel
This chapter functions more like a summary of a good evangelist. One should highlight a few helpful suggestions. A good evangelist should expect success (104). To be sure, the Holy Spirit is sovereign, but do not approach the person like you are already defeated.
Conclusion
This is a modified doctoral dissertation. It reads like such, especially with the copious endnotes. That is either a positive or a negative, depending on your attitude. Beougher is mostly sympathetic with his subject and rescues Baxter from most (but not all) charges.
