Presuppositionalism Q&A

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Post your objections/questions, and I'll answer them to the best of my abilities.

:judge:

Ben,

We are uninformed about such things, and therefore are having trouble grasping exactly what the "presuppositional" apologetic really is.

Would you mind going back to square-one and explaining your foundational premise?


Thank you,
 
1. God created the world
2. Man sinned, and became corrupt through and through.
a. This includes his thinking. He is now at war with God in his thinking, and cannot submit to him.
b. Rom 1 describes this as suppressing the truth. Fallen man knows God, God has not left Himself without witness. He has made himself known to sinful man such that man cannot escape the knowledge of God. But he so does not like God that he suppresses the truth of God in unrighteousness.
3. Sinful man is committed to being the supreme interpreter of reality. That is, he reasons autonomously (as a law unto himself, or as Judges would put it, "everyone as he sees fit".)
4. Presuppositional apologetics recognizes that because of the preceding points, any non-Christian worldview will be in contradiction with itself or at least with reality. So...
5. It shows that the unbeliever cannot account for his actions, his arguments . . . for anything, really.
6. This is NOT to say that unbelievers don't reason. They may do reason and science quite well. But their worldview does not give them warrant for the reason or science that they are doing. So presuppositional apologetics calls them on it, showing them that they act one way (because they live in God's world) while speaking another (denying God).

That's not a very good or complete analysis, but as a nutshell version it's probably okay.
 
1. Why presuppose presuppositional epistemology over common sense?

2. How is presuppositionalism different from platonist epistemology?

3. Does presuppositionalism assume a Kantian epistemology?

I'm asking specific questions in order to better understand the philosophical underpinnings. The description given above assumes a particular epistemology that I am still trying to understand.
 
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Tell me if anything in this thread is not clear.

If the following statement were true there could be no such field as Christian apologetics:

Presuppositionalists believe that, because of contrary presuppositions that permeate to affect one’s entire belief-structure, believers and unbelievers have absolutely no common ground in principle.

What has happened to the imago Dei as providing common ground?
 
1. Why presuppose presuppositional epistemology over common sense?

2. How is presuppositionalism different from platonist epistemology?

3. Does presuppositionalism assume a Kantian epistemology?

1. Because fallen common sense will never arrive at the biblical God. It cannot.

2. This is a big question. But for one thing, Platonism, like all pagan philosophy reasons autonomously and univocally, whereas we reason theonomously and analogically. For another, Plato cannot account for changing particulars. His abstract universals may work well, but as Van Til used to say, it's a highway in the sky. That is, there's no exit ramp from abstract universal to concrete particular. This is hardly an adequate answer to the question, and will probably lead to more questions, but that's what this thread is about, right?

3. No. No. A thousand times, no.

-----Added 6/14/2009 at 10:50:17 EST-----

Imago dei provides an ontological point of contact, but not epistemological common ground.
 
Imago dei provides an ontological point of contact, but not epistemological common ground.

Precisely, so it is incorrect to say there is absolutely no common ground. Further, presuppositionalism requires an ontic foundation for its epistemic claims -- God exists therefore man is rational. Hence the ontological point of contact is fundamental.
 
Philip,

Clark got em for the most part. Additionally,

1. Assuming your view is "common sense" begs the question. I would say that accepting the Bible on its own authority is common sense.

2. In Van Til's Apologetic, Van Til personally shows faults in the epistemologies of many big-time thinkers in the history of philosophy, going from Plato to Aristotle to the rationalists and empiricists to logical positivism, etc.

Otherwise, the singlemost distinctive of presuppositionalist epistemology from all secular philosophies (including Platonic and Kantian philosophy) is that it is not autonomous. It starts with God's interpretation of the world, Biblical philosophy, rather than assuming man has that prerogative.

Rev. Winzer,

As Clark said, it is the ontological point of contact. Remember that I said that on the unbeliever's principles he will have a 100% different worldview. The imago Dei is what provides the points of contact (e.g. belief in universal, immaterial laws of logic) that the Reformed apologist can identify as belonging to the Christian worldview rather than the unbeliever's.
 
As Clark said, it is the ontological point of contact. Remember that I said that on the unbeliever's principles he will have a 100% different worldview. The imago Dei is what provides the points of contact (e.g. belief in universal, immaterial laws of logic) that the Reformed apologist can identify as belonging to the Christian worldview rather than the unbeliever's.

The second sentence denies what the third sentence affirms. Either the unbeliever believes in universal laws of logic or he does not. One cannot have it both ways. Certainly the unbeliever cannot account for his belief on the basis of his worldview, but the fact remains that he still holds the belief, which means that his worldview is not 100% different.
 
1. You misunderstood my question, Clark. I wasn't asking apologetic methods, but in terms of a theory of knowledge. What is our criterion for knowledge? Is it reasonable certainty, or indubitability?

2. In terms of a theory of knowledge, Plato said that knowledge must meet two criteria: it must be justified, and it must be true. Does presuppositionalism hold to such an epistemology?

3. Van Til and Clark have no problem using Kant when arguing against classical apologetics, so is there an inconsistency here?

chbrooking said:
Imago dei provides an ontological point of contact, but not epistemological common ground.

What is meant by epistemological common ground? In plain language it would seem to mean knowledge held in common by two or more people regardless of professed presupposition. In other words, it's common presupposition.
 
As Clark said, it is the ontological point of contact. Remember that I said that on the unbeliever's principles he will have a 100% different worldview. The imago Dei is what provides the points of contact (e.g. belief in universal, immaterial laws of logic) that the Reformed apologist can identify as belonging to the Christian worldview rather than the unbeliever's.

The second sentence denies what the third sentence affirms. Either the unbeliever believes in universal laws of logic or he does not. One cannot have it both ways. Certainly the unbeliever cannot account for his belief on the basis of his worldview, but the fact remains that he still holds the belief, which means that his worldview is not 100% different.

The world he lives in is the same; the God whose image he bears is the same. He cannot help acting to some degree in conformity with the world God made and put him in. But his worldVIEW is wholly at odds with this.
 
As Clark said, it is the ontological point of contact. Remember that I said that on the unbeliever's principles he will have a 100% different worldview. The imago Dei is what provides the points of contact (e.g. belief in universal, immaterial laws of logic) that the Reformed apologist can identify as belonging to the Christian worldview rather than the unbeliever's.

The second sentence denies what the third sentence affirms. Either the unbeliever believes in universal laws of logic or he does not. One cannot have it both ways. Certainly the unbeliever cannot account for his belief on the basis of his worldview, but the fact remains that he still holds the belief, which means that his worldview is not 100% different.

If he were consistent in his unbelieving principles, he would not believe in the laws of logic. But they are retained in him because the imago Dei cannot be eradicated.

Also, keep in mind Rev. Winzer that we can speak of different ontologies. Although it is an ontological fact that the unbeliever bears the image of God, this is only the case on a Biblical presupposition.
 
I apologize for misunderstanding. Yes, knowledge is justified true belief. But presuppositionalism shows that a non-believer cannot justify his belief. This is precisely where the attack is focussed.

By reasonable certainty do you mean probable-ness? We would argue that the nonbeliever cannot even arrive at reasonable certainty because they cannot account for reason. But indubitably, the Christian God exists, and the proof is the impossibility of the contrary.

The thing is, Kant and classical apologetics are arguing in the same arena, with the same autonomous footing beneath them, so it is quite fair to use Kant to critique classical apologetics.
 
Mr. Rush,

Tell me if anything in this thread is not clear.

Ben



Being a newcomer, seeing you offer a Q and A, I hoped for a direct and simple answer, but thanks for this much.

I will start plowing through it all . . .:hunter:

I think Ben believes that the opening post of that thread is as simple and direct as he can be.

CT

Uh . . .

So Ben simply denies the obligatory powers and demands of natural law?

He could have said so, but perhaps he thinks if too simply put, it appears weird?
 
The world he lives in is the same; the God whose image he bears is the same. He cannot help acting to some degree in conformity with the world God made and put him in. But his worldVIEW is wholly at odds with this.

I don't think his view is wholly at odds, otherwise a believer could not identify for the unbeliever what the unbeliever regards as unknown, Acts 17.
 
The unbeliever of Romans 1 seems fully able to know many things about God...can we call this a common ground?
 
If he were consistent in his unbelieving principles, he would not believe in the laws of logic. But they are retained in him because the imago Dei cannot be eradicated.

Then one should not speak of the noetic effects of the fall as if the fall eradicated the imago Dei and left believers and unbelievers with no common ground.
 
Being a newcomer, seeing you offer a Q and A, I hoped for a direct and simple answer, but thanks for this much.

I will start plowing through it all . . .:hunter:

I think Ben believes that the opening post of that thread is as simple and direct as he can be.

CT

Uh . . .

So Ben simply denies the obligatory powers and demands of natural law?

He could have said so, but perhaps he thinks if too simply put, it appears weird?

Rather, he denies the ability of sinful man to interpret natural revelation aright. And he makes that denial with biblical warrant.
 
As Clark said, it is the ontological point of contact. Remember that I said that on the unbeliever's principles he will have a 100% different worldview. The imago Dei is what provides the points of contact (e.g. belief in universal, immaterial laws of logic) that the Reformed apologist can identify as belonging to the Christian worldview rather than the unbeliever's.

The second sentence denies what the third sentence affirms. Either the unbeliever believes in universal laws of logic or he does not. One cannot have it both ways. Certainly the unbeliever cannot account for his belief on the basis of his worldview, but the fact remains that he still holds the belief, which means that his worldview is not 100% different.

If he were consistent in his unbelieving principles, he would not believe in the laws of logic. But they are retained in him because the imago Dei cannot be eradicated.

Also, keep in mind Rev. Winzer that we can speak of different ontologies. Although it is an ontological fact that the unbeliever bears the image of God, this is only the case on a Biblical presupposition.


It is the case because of Creation. Creation is Revelation. It is clear in this context and rationally defensible in this context. This is why an unbeliever is held accountable in the context of a clear general revelation. The Bible need not be presupposed for this to be reality.
 
1. You misunderstood my question, Clark. I wasn't asking apologetic methods, but in terms of a theory of knowledge. What is our criterion for knowledge? Is it reasonable certainty, or indubitability?

2. In terms of a theory of knowledge, Plato said that knowledge must meet two criteria: it must be justified, and it must be true. Does presuppositionalism hold to such an epistemology?

3. Van Til and Clark have no problem using Kant when arguing against classical apologetics, so is there an inconsistency here?

1. I'd say reasonable certainty. I'm not a Clarkian, and the infallibilist constraint seems artificial and leads to skepticism.

2. That is not an epistemology. It is a small subset of epistemology which has no bearing on presuppositions. It's like asking, "Did you and that unbeliever agree that you had eggs for breakfast this morning?"

Anyway, in Van Til's Apologetic Bahnsen classifies knowledge as justified, true belief. The example he uses against the notion of knowledge as only true belief is this one: suppose someone says he believes that the president during the 1980's had the initials R.R. because he believed the president's name was Robert Robertson (Bahnsen used another name :)). He would not really know in that case that the president's initials were R.R.

3. What do you mean they "used" Kant? Employed transcendentalism? It's not wrong to use some concepts made throughout the history of philosophy; the entire apologetic is against autonomous reasoning as a presupposition.

What is meant by epistemological common ground?

In principle, the unbeliever has an entirely different worldview from the believer (no epistemological common ground). In practice, the unbeliever is actually made in the image of God as a being in God's creation (tons of metaphysical common ground).
 
If he were consistent in his unbelieving principles, he would not believe in the laws of logic. But they are retained in him because the imago Dei cannot be eradicated.

Then one should not speak of the noetic effects of the fall as if the fall eradicated the imago Dei and left believers and unbelievers with no common ground.

No EPISTEMOLOGICAL common ground. We do not have an archimidean point of agreement on the basis of which to argue. But we do live in the same world, and bear the same God's image. That's why the unbeliever is living in contradiction.
 
The unbeliever of Romans 1 seems fully able to know many things about God...can we call this a common ground?

Yes, but it would be a common ground in practice and not in principle. Unbelieving worldviews deny that they have this knowledge.
 
I think Ben believes that the opening post of that thread is as simple and direct as he can be.

CT

Uh . . .

So Ben simply denies the obligatory powers and demands of natural law?

He could have said so, but perhaps he thinks if too simply put, it appears weird?

Rather, he denies the ability of sinful man to interpret natural revelation aright. And he makes that denial with biblical warrant.

Really?

If this were true, how could reprobates possess the necessary knowledge to willingly and actively suppress Godly truth?
 
If he were consistent in his unbelieving principles, he would not believe in the laws of logic. But they are retained in him because the imago Dei cannot be eradicated.

Then one should not speak of the noetic effects of the fall as if the fall eradicated the imago Dei and left believers and unbelievers with no common ground.

The unbeliever believes he is not made in the image of God and therefore the worldviews do not have common ground (epistemological) at that point.



And thanks, Beth.

-----Added 6/14/2009 at 11:26:34 EST-----

sorry Ben, cross posting with you.

No prob, I consider us a tag team. :D
 
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