chbrooking
Puritan Board Junior
In light of recent discussions, I thought this might help those unfamiliar with what CVT means by knowing ‘analogically’. This, obviously isn’t a full explanation, but hopefully it will be of some usefulness.
CVT uses the term “analogy” often. It’s one of his most radical contributions. But in some ways the term is unhelpful. It’s unhelpful because he means something very different than what Aquinas or Butler meant by the same term.
So what did CVT mean?
God’s revelation is anthropomorphic. Traditionally, theologians have wanted to emphasize the anthropomorphic character of revelation, specifically when Scripture speaks about God. He has an arm, a nose, eyes, passions, etc. These are anthropomorphism -- revelations given to us that are suited to our understanding. But Van Til wants to extend that idea and say that all of revelation is anthropomorphic; it is all suited to our limited capacities as created people.
WCF 7 (Of God’s Covenant with Man) begins, “The distance between God and the creature is so great that although reasonable creatures do owe obedience unto him as their creator, yet they could never have any fruition of Him... but by some voluntary condescension on God’s part which He has been pleased to express by way of covenant.” In order for us to have any blessedness or reward, God had to somehow voluntarily condescend to His creatures. The distance between God and the creature is so great. The difference between who God is and who we are is such that a relationship is not automatic. Rather, God condescends to establish that relationship. God has been pleased to express this condescension by way of covenant. And with that kind condescension comes obligation.
This Creator-creature distinction is crucial and determinative. When Van Til speaks of a dual metaphysic, he is not positing dualism -- two ultimately equal things. There are two things that must be taken into account in terms of our metaphysical understanding. The nature of ultimate reality is dualistic (not dualism) -- Creator and creature. Those have to be postulated and assumed in everything we say. Metaphysics and epistemology having a mutual relationship, we need to apply this to epistemology -- and it is here that Van Til’s teaching becomes so controversial.
The notion of analogical knowledge attempts to argue that there are two kinds of knowledge, just as there are two kinds of existences. The controversy here begins to reach its peak when we try to flesh out exactly what we mean by two kinds of knowledge, when we try to give specific characteristics to two kinds of knowledge.
Knowledge is about truth, so the controversy heats up. The question immediately rises: “Are you affirming a two-truth theory -- in which you can have internal contradiction? Enter the Clark controversy. He was attempting to formulate the difference between the knowledge of God and the knowledge of man. In his attempt, others including John Murray, Ned Stonehouse and Cornelius Van Til, argued that his formulations were dangerous and compromised the incomprehensibility of God. Really, it was a controversy dealing with knowledge and the two different kinds of knowledge -- God’s and the knowledge of creatures.
We need to be aware of the inherent difficulty of talking about the incomprehensibility of God, particularly when we begin discussing what the knowledge of God is like. Scripture does not give us clear teachings on the way God knows. That is because Scripture is suited to what we can understand -- and there is something that we cannot understanding, and that is the mind of God. Vagueness and etheriality surround the very topic. Nevertheless, it is important that we don’t presume at any point that God’s knowledge is like ours. That kind of error looms large in the history of the church; as creatures we are always prone to want to be like God. So we have to be careful.
CVT says, then, that there is at every point a qualitative difference between the knowledge of God and the knowledge of man. The difference is of quality. Gordon Clarke, on the other hand, wanted to maintain that the knowledge of God and the knowledge of man were quantitatively different. Frame notes in his discussion of analogy that those terms are not particularly helpful. Particularly, qualitative is not clear. On the other hand, the terms used in this discussion can be made clear, particularly in the context of this discussion, and should not be thrown out completely.
Qualitative and quantitative can be helpful categories. Qualitative distinctions are about the essence of the thing, the qualities without which a thing would not be what it is. So qualitative distinctions speak to at least two things that are essentially different. What is of the essence of a thing in one case is different from the essence of the thing in another case. There is an essential difference between one thing and the other. Clark says simply that God has more knowledge -- it is a quantitative distinction only. God knows the chair in the same way that we do, but He has infinitely more knowledge than we do of the chair. Those who were working against this position said it has to be more than quantitative, because otherwise we have compromised the incomprehensibility of God -- there is a point in our knowledge that meets in the mind of God. And at that point we would have divine knowledge.
Of course, to speak of a quantitative difference is to assume a qualitative difference. One is infinite, the other finite. That is qualitative. So qualitative is coterminus with quantitative, but it says more. Clark wants to say less, Murray & Van Til demand we say more.
CVT: God’s thoughts are creatively constructed; ours are receptively reconstructed. That’s part of what Van Til is saying about the essential difference. The point is our utter dependence in knowledge on God’s knowledge. God’s knowledge is always independent and ours is never at any point and in any way independent.
The typical Romanist view is that our knowledge and God’s knowledge is on a straight line. If we just had more of it we would have the mind of God. But since we affirm the simplicity of God, that God is without body, parts, or passions -- that is, God is not composed of things -- Van Til says that God’s thinking and His being are co-terminus. He thinks what He is and He is what He thinks. God being simple, therefore, any knowledge that god has is essentially who God is. God is not a person upon whom knowledge has been heaped. As if He somehow and sometime picked up knowledge. Rather, God is what He thinks. This is not true of creatures. But if we don’t affirm this we say that there is God over here, and truth over there. Truth is eternal and unchangeable; but it does not have its own independent status. Of course Augustine and most Christian philosophy thought that it did, that truth has an eternal, immutable quality apart from God.
But because of divine simplicity, if there is any one point that is identical in our minds to the mind of God, it is identical at that point with God, and at that point we are God. And because of simplicity, if at that point, then at every point. You cannot separate the knowledge of God from the being of God.
So what we as creatures have is God’s revelatory knowledge. That is a crucial distinction. What we have is what God has revealed. In a creaturely way, anthropomorphically, suited to us as creatures. But what is in His mind we cannot know, because we are essentially different.
This does not lead to skepticism because we have a suitable message given to an appropriate receptor.
Part of the problem comes when we say that the reference point, which is identical, is in the mind rather than in the thing. This is what Clark did and this is why he thought Van Til’s formulation leads to skepticism. But this is not so if the reference point for reality lies in the thing rather than in the mind. God and I have two different kinds of knowledge of a chair, but there is only one chair. The point of reference is in the created thing; and that created thing was in the mind of God eternally, immutably, infinitely. At some point, God created it. This is true even of concepts, which are created by God. The mercy of God is something accommodated to our knowledge, but it is not something that is known by God.
The nature of how we know is dependent. Dependent on God’s condescending revelation. We don’t have an analogy of the truth, but we have real truth, which is essentially analogical. There is still truth, and that is absolute truth -- not just metaphors -- and we have it. But it is analogical. We don’t have truth as God has it. The real truth that we have we receive analogically from God.
God knows everything but He knows as God. He does not know in a creaturely, time-conditioned, anthropomorphic way.
But now in the Incarnation God does know as man? Perhaps, but we must be careful not to use the mystery of the Incarnation to understand the mystery of the mind of God -- that leads down the road to heresy. The reason we have the Incarnation is because knowledge is analogical. God goes to ultimate extremes in revealing to man. It is the quintessential ‘stoop’. The Son of God humiliating Himself to become man.
The issue in this discussion is on the mode of knowledge. God was never ignorant of anything. Including our emotions, our actions, our pain -- all of it is there in eternity, exhaustively, incomprehensibly... and now taking place in history. What we have to say is that God and man know the same truths -- but they know them differently.
We need to avoid two errors: 1) the glorification of our ability to know; and 2) skepticism.
So where does the rubber meet the road in all this?
Classical apologists want us to affirm logic in a way that it has been traditionally affirmed -- an ultimate, eternal, immutable presupposition. But, if we think analogically, we can affirm logic, but only as created. It is limited, and created, and revelatory. It is not identical to the mind of God. Nor is it something that God is subject to or alongside of.
CVT uses the term “analogy” often. It’s one of his most radical contributions. But in some ways the term is unhelpful. It’s unhelpful because he means something very different than what Aquinas or Butler meant by the same term.
So what did CVT mean?
God’s revelation is anthropomorphic. Traditionally, theologians have wanted to emphasize the anthropomorphic character of revelation, specifically when Scripture speaks about God. He has an arm, a nose, eyes, passions, etc. These are anthropomorphism -- revelations given to us that are suited to our understanding. But Van Til wants to extend that idea and say that all of revelation is anthropomorphic; it is all suited to our limited capacities as created people.
WCF 7 (Of God’s Covenant with Man) begins, “The distance between God and the creature is so great that although reasonable creatures do owe obedience unto him as their creator, yet they could never have any fruition of Him... but by some voluntary condescension on God’s part which He has been pleased to express by way of covenant.” In order for us to have any blessedness or reward, God had to somehow voluntarily condescend to His creatures. The distance between God and the creature is so great. The difference between who God is and who we are is such that a relationship is not automatic. Rather, God condescends to establish that relationship. God has been pleased to express this condescension by way of covenant. And with that kind condescension comes obligation.
This Creator-creature distinction is crucial and determinative. When Van Til speaks of a dual metaphysic, he is not positing dualism -- two ultimately equal things. There are two things that must be taken into account in terms of our metaphysical understanding. The nature of ultimate reality is dualistic (not dualism) -- Creator and creature. Those have to be postulated and assumed in everything we say. Metaphysics and epistemology having a mutual relationship, we need to apply this to epistemology -- and it is here that Van Til’s teaching becomes so controversial.
The notion of analogical knowledge attempts to argue that there are two kinds of knowledge, just as there are two kinds of existences. The controversy here begins to reach its peak when we try to flesh out exactly what we mean by two kinds of knowledge, when we try to give specific characteristics to two kinds of knowledge.
Knowledge is about truth, so the controversy heats up. The question immediately rises: “Are you affirming a two-truth theory -- in which you can have internal contradiction? Enter the Clark controversy. He was attempting to formulate the difference between the knowledge of God and the knowledge of man. In his attempt, others including John Murray, Ned Stonehouse and Cornelius Van Til, argued that his formulations were dangerous and compromised the incomprehensibility of God. Really, it was a controversy dealing with knowledge and the two different kinds of knowledge -- God’s and the knowledge of creatures.
We need to be aware of the inherent difficulty of talking about the incomprehensibility of God, particularly when we begin discussing what the knowledge of God is like. Scripture does not give us clear teachings on the way God knows. That is because Scripture is suited to what we can understand -- and there is something that we cannot understanding, and that is the mind of God. Vagueness and etheriality surround the very topic. Nevertheless, it is important that we don’t presume at any point that God’s knowledge is like ours. That kind of error looms large in the history of the church; as creatures we are always prone to want to be like God. So we have to be careful.
CVT says, then, that there is at every point a qualitative difference between the knowledge of God and the knowledge of man. The difference is of quality. Gordon Clarke, on the other hand, wanted to maintain that the knowledge of God and the knowledge of man were quantitatively different. Frame notes in his discussion of analogy that those terms are not particularly helpful. Particularly, qualitative is not clear. On the other hand, the terms used in this discussion can be made clear, particularly in the context of this discussion, and should not be thrown out completely.
Qualitative and quantitative can be helpful categories. Qualitative distinctions are about the essence of the thing, the qualities without which a thing would not be what it is. So qualitative distinctions speak to at least two things that are essentially different. What is of the essence of a thing in one case is different from the essence of the thing in another case. There is an essential difference between one thing and the other. Clark says simply that God has more knowledge -- it is a quantitative distinction only. God knows the chair in the same way that we do, but He has infinitely more knowledge than we do of the chair. Those who were working against this position said it has to be more than quantitative, because otherwise we have compromised the incomprehensibility of God -- there is a point in our knowledge that meets in the mind of God. And at that point we would have divine knowledge.
Of course, to speak of a quantitative difference is to assume a qualitative difference. One is infinite, the other finite. That is qualitative. So qualitative is coterminus with quantitative, but it says more. Clark wants to say less, Murray & Van Til demand we say more.
CVT: God’s thoughts are creatively constructed; ours are receptively reconstructed. That’s part of what Van Til is saying about the essential difference. The point is our utter dependence in knowledge on God’s knowledge. God’s knowledge is always independent and ours is never at any point and in any way independent.
The typical Romanist view is that our knowledge and God’s knowledge is on a straight line. If we just had more of it we would have the mind of God. But since we affirm the simplicity of God, that God is without body, parts, or passions -- that is, God is not composed of things -- Van Til says that God’s thinking and His being are co-terminus. He thinks what He is and He is what He thinks. God being simple, therefore, any knowledge that god has is essentially who God is. God is not a person upon whom knowledge has been heaped. As if He somehow and sometime picked up knowledge. Rather, God is what He thinks. This is not true of creatures. But if we don’t affirm this we say that there is God over here, and truth over there. Truth is eternal and unchangeable; but it does not have its own independent status. Of course Augustine and most Christian philosophy thought that it did, that truth has an eternal, immutable quality apart from God.
But because of divine simplicity, if there is any one point that is identical in our minds to the mind of God, it is identical at that point with God, and at that point we are God. And because of simplicity, if at that point, then at every point. You cannot separate the knowledge of God from the being of God.
So what we as creatures have is God’s revelatory knowledge. That is a crucial distinction. What we have is what God has revealed. In a creaturely way, anthropomorphically, suited to us as creatures. But what is in His mind we cannot know, because we are essentially different.
This does not lead to skepticism because we have a suitable message given to an appropriate receptor.
Part of the problem comes when we say that the reference point, which is identical, is in the mind rather than in the thing. This is what Clark did and this is why he thought Van Til’s formulation leads to skepticism. But this is not so if the reference point for reality lies in the thing rather than in the mind. God and I have two different kinds of knowledge of a chair, but there is only one chair. The point of reference is in the created thing; and that created thing was in the mind of God eternally, immutably, infinitely. At some point, God created it. This is true even of concepts, which are created by God. The mercy of God is something accommodated to our knowledge, but it is not something that is known by God.
The nature of how we know is dependent. Dependent on God’s condescending revelation. We don’t have an analogy of the truth, but we have real truth, which is essentially analogical. There is still truth, and that is absolute truth -- not just metaphors -- and we have it. But it is analogical. We don’t have truth as God has it. The real truth that we have we receive analogically from God.
God knows everything but He knows as God. He does not know in a creaturely, time-conditioned, anthropomorphic way.
But now in the Incarnation God does know as man? Perhaps, but we must be careful not to use the mystery of the Incarnation to understand the mystery of the mind of God -- that leads down the road to heresy. The reason we have the Incarnation is because knowledge is analogical. God goes to ultimate extremes in revealing to man. It is the quintessential ‘stoop’. The Son of God humiliating Himself to become man.
The issue in this discussion is on the mode of knowledge. God was never ignorant of anything. Including our emotions, our actions, our pain -- all of it is there in eternity, exhaustively, incomprehensibly... and now taking place in history. What we have to say is that God and man know the same truths -- but they know them differently.
We need to avoid two errors: 1) the glorification of our ability to know; and 2) skepticism.
So where does the rubber meet the road in all this?
Classical apologists want us to affirm logic in a way that it has been traditionally affirmed -- an ultimate, eternal, immutable presupposition. But, if we think analogically, we can affirm logic, but only as created. It is limited, and created, and revelatory. It is not identical to the mind of God. Nor is it something that God is subject to or alongside of.