Eric, is emotion unreasonable, necessarily? It seems to me that Hume is arguing that emotion is inherently irrational, whereas I don't think it is. One cannot reason unless one is affected in such a way as to do so. Reason is not the slave of the passions, as Hume claims, but neither are passions supposed to be the slave of reason.
I very much agree with you. And in fact, it is impossible to make reason the slave of passions, or passions the slave of reason. Man's will always includes both passions and reason. To put it all in simpler terms, a man is said to act solely upon his 'passions' when he acts in order to satisfy the 'now' or the 'immediate'. He 'feels' a certain way, and acts immediately in order to satisfy that feeling as soon as possible, regardless of the consequences. On the other hand, a person is said to act 'reasonably' or 'logically' when they patiently refrain from satisfying immediate cravings in order to ensure that they do things 'properly', or rather, they focus on the long term rather than the short term. Passions are not in themselves evil, and neither is reason. Both are enslaved to sin, and are tools of a sinful nature.
On the basis that there may well be. Just because one cannot think of a third option does not mean there isn't one. The burden would lie on you to show that these are the only two possible options.
Why is there a burden? Could I not simply say that 'it just is'? This burden placed upon me is artificial, and not something I recognize.
Not really. When examining terms like "knowledge" we have to account for its ordinary usage as valid. Philosophy is not supposed to improve ordinary language. This is another problem I have with Hume: he's an elitist. Think of it this way: would your use of the word make sense to one of your relatives who hasn't studied philosophy.
Ok, but the very term 'ordinary use' suggests that it is based on how humans, in general, use it. This is a very subtle Ad Populum argument. For if a particular use of a term was rare, it would not longer be considered 'ordinary'. I agree that Hume is an elitist. I don't like the man, and I don't think he is right. The only thing that I think he is useful for is showing how the unbeliever cannot account for anything. The unbeliever must simply assume that things 'just are', and call it a day. God is staring him right in the face, but he would rather throw up his hands and say 'it just is' rather than acknowledge God as he ought.
As for my relatives, are you talking about the word 'knowledge'? Well, if I suspected that a word would not make sense to my relatives, I would clarify it with them so that we are on the same page. To talk about a sensitive/deep/difficult subject while assuming that everyone uses the same meaning of a word that you do is plainly silly and arrogant. One must make it very clear what one is talking about, even to one's relatives.
As for Philosophy 'improving' ordinary language, I think it should rather seek to clarify it rather than improve it. Common street jargon is often very fluid, has multiple meanings, and usually has a different meaning every year. Words are created that used to never be words. Other words mean completely different things. Sometimes this is the result of simple laziness or lack of education, other times it is a cultural thing. We should ALWAYS seeks to be clear and precise in how we use terms. For this reason Philosophy, rather than improving ordinary language, should seek to encourage people to be more clear about what they are saying. We should become aware that certain words have a wide range of meanings, and so we must be clear when we enter into a serious discussion with another person.
As an example, I recently came across a thinker who claimed that there can't be philosophical theories because theories have to be testable. My critique is that this just doesn't reflect the way we use the word: for example, how would you test music theory? Political theory? Even in science, multiverse and string theories are untestable in principle.
I agree. We can't test historical theory either. What happened in the past cannot be reproduced. I completely agree with your critique of this thinker you came across. One could even say that our 'theory of creation' or 'theory of God' is untestable. To demand that everything be testable is to demand utter silliness.
Ok---they are in violation of Occam's Razor and there's no evidence for it, therefore I have no reason to accept their hypothesis.
Ok, but a person might ask you to justify your belief in Occam's Razor. Why is Occam's Razor correct? Don't you see how important it is to justify your position? You first justified your position by appealing to Occam's Razor. Now you need to justify your appeal to Occam's Razor.
Could God have created spherical cubes in three dimensions, then? Your explanation only sidesteps the question. Could God will the creation of spherical cubes? Can God contradict Himself or His will? If the answer to this last question is "no" then it seems that at least the law of non-contradiction is contained in the Divine Nature.
I have already covered this in my section on omnipotence and God's will. I ask that you read it again. Any discussion of God's 'ability' to do something must include his 'will' to do it or not. I believe that God is good, has a perfect will, and is perfectly consistent and logical. I agree with you that the law of non-contradiction is a way to describe a part of God's nature, and how God has reflected or revealed that nature in the universe. But this just proves my point. One cannot speak of this 'law of non-contradiction' as a necessary truth without simultaneously declaring that it is God who is necessary. To speak of 'necessary' truths without reference to God is to attempt to separate a part of God's nature from himself.
That would be an exercise in futility since such a position is an example of Russell's teapot. Let's say that I claim that I've seen a teapot in the asteroid belt through my telescope. And so you point the telescope toward the spot and see nothing. Then I claim "it must have moved." Basically I have a position that can account for everything despite the fact that it is wildly implausible. What you haven't done in the case of the Matrix is to get past my initial plausibility threshold.
But how do you define plausibility? Wildly implausible according to who?
No he doesn't because he doesn't know the context. W.V.O. Quine has called this the "indeterminacy of translation." Say I'm trying to learn a tribal language and am with a tribesman and we see a rabbit cross the path and he says "Gavagai." Now he might very well mean "rabbit," but he might just as well have meant "food," "animal crossing the path," "sacrifice," or even "thing that we worship."
Well, it seems then that you didn't offer a very good scenario. You never said that the persons cannot read each other's body language, or point to external objects. You yourself should know that only about 10% of communication is the words themselves, while the rest is body language and tone (and perhaps some other things). You failed to address my answer to your scenario. Why can't a person point to his thumb and speak one word? Then the other person, seeing the reference to the thumb, speaks a different word. Now they realize that they are talking about the same thing but using different words. As an example I would refer to the movie Dances With Wolves, where the union soldier is able to bridge the gap between him and the Indian by comparing each other's word for 'buffalo'.
Except that the unbeliever has, in essence, created his own language.
I disagree. The language is the same, but the unbeliever refuses to acknowledge what it is saying (or even who the author is). It is exactly like when both a believer and unbeliever read the Bible. The believer reads God's judgments in the Old Testament and sees a demonstration of God's justice and wrath, for his glorification. An unbeliever sees God as a mass-murderer and wicked being that finds pleasure in committing atrocity. Both have read the same words, and know what events/actions they describe. Yet one of them recognizes God as the final authority on what is right and wrong, true or false. The other takes this authority upon himself and then turns and judges God.
