Thoughts on the epistemic internalism/externalism issue. 1.) Is this an either or situation or is both and possible? 2.) Is knowledge either entirely subjective or entirely objective or a mixture of both? 3.) Van Til described human knowledge as analogical, meaning derivative of the original knowledge of God. 4.) If the Christ of Scripture is the starting point of justified true knowledge, Christ is external, the Scriptures are external. 5.) In monergistic regeneration, God the Holy Spirit (external) transforms the internals of man, the heart, mind, soul, and the will to be in union with Christ. In this union between God and man the (external) Spirit of God comes to indwell (internal) in a man. Considering these short points, I do not see how this is an either or situation. I found a quote to share, thought you might find it interesting:
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Internalism and Externalism
One evident weakness of Van Til’s epistemological arguments is that he nowhere supplies an
analysis of knowledge or displays much awareness of distinctions now commonplace in contemporary epistemology: foundationalism versus coherentism, justification versus warrant, overriding defeaters versus undercutting defeaters, and so on.
Van Til should not be judged too harshly for this, since such epistemological niceties were not brought to prominence until near the end of his career.
I would suggest however that one recent distinction in particular has significant implications for many of his arguments, namely, the distinction between
internalist and
externalist conditions of knowledge. An
internalist condition (of justification or warrant) is one to which a person has “introspective access”; in other words, the person can ascertain whether or not the condition is fulfilled with respect to a particular belief simply by reflecting internally on his or her own mental states. For example, consider the following necessary condition of epistemic warrant:
(W1) S’s belief that
p is warranted only if S is aware of some reason
q for thinking
p to be true.
W1 is an internalist condition, since it requires that the knower be subjectively aware of some warrant-relevant factor. In contrast, an
externalist condition is one that does not require any subjective awareness on the part of the knower, such as the following:
(W2) S’s beliefs that
p is warranted only if S’s belief that
p was formed by reliable (i.e., truth-conducive) cognitive processes.
Note that W2 does not require S to be
aware that his belief was reliably formed; it only requires that his belief
was reliably formed.
Now one of the central debates in contemporary epistemology concerns whether there are any necessary
internalist conditions of knowledge. Generally speaking, “internalists” say yes, while “externalists” say no.58 Whether there are necessary internalist conditions of knowledge (and, if so, of what kind) has deep implications for what sort of truths can be known, how they can be known, and by whom. As one might expect, Plantinga is well aware of this debate; having entered into the fray in his
Warrant series, he takes a self-consciously externalist position. Moreover, his epistemological arguments reflect a sensitivity to the distinction between internalist and externalist conditions. Van Til’s arguments do not, however, and his statements of them often seem to assume (at points where specificity might be significant) an internalist perspective that tends to weaken the arguments. For instance, after summarizing the argument from induction, Van Til writes the following:
Even non-Christians presuppose [the truth of Christian theism] while they verbally reject it. They need to presuppose the truth of Christian theism in order to account for their own [scientific] accomplishments.59
What does Van Til mean by “presuppose” here? Is the idea simply that if the truth of Christian theism is a precondition of scientific knowledge then a person is
implicitly assuming its truth by engaging in science (or claiming to have scientific knowledge)? Or is it that for a person to have scientific knowledge, not only must Christian theism be true but that person must also stand in some positive epistemic relation towards its truth — by either
knowing it,
believing it, or
accepting it? The latter interpretation clearly involves a stronger claim but consequently requires rather more by way of argument. It is easier to show that inductive reasoning has as necessary conditions (i) the uniformity of nature, and (ii) the good design of our cognitive faculties by a being that knows and ensures that nature is uniform, than it is to show that (i), (ii),
plus our believing or knowing (i) and (ii), are all necessary conditions. 60
Another example of the relevance of the internalist/externalist distinction pertains to Van Til’s argument from the unity of knowledge. The argument appears to posit a precondition of knowledge that involves a mixture of internalist and externalist considerations: a person S can know some fact
p only if either (a) S knows how every other fact bears on knowing
p (an internalist condition) or (b) the epistemic faculties employed by S in knowing
p have been constructed by some other person G who knows how every other fact bears on knowing
p (an externalist condition). 61 Whatever the answers here and elsewhere, it is evident that Van Til’s arguments would benefit from a dose of disambiguation with respect to this important distinction."
James N. Anderson Calvin Theological Journal 40 (2005) p. 70-72
"On the other hand the theistic conception which underlies and forms the foundation of the conception of absolute biblical authority does not entertain a false antithesis to begin with. The very foundation of the concept of biblical authority is that because of God’s absolute self-consciousness man’s self-conscious activity is always derivative and man’s constructive activity operates in the field of God’s original constructive activity. Hence absolute authority was man’s daily meat and drink when his mind was normal. It was only because of the entrance of sin in the heart of man that it was necessary for this authority of God to come to man in an externally mediated form. But this externally mediated form was necessary because of an ethical and not because of a metaphysical separation between God and man. Accordingly it was necessary that the ethical alienation should be removed in order that the original metaphysical relation should be able to function normally again." - Van Til, A Survely of Christian Epistemology Chapter 13 The Starting Point of Christian Theistic Epistemology
"It is necessary, however, to think of this revelation of God to man as originally internal as well as external. Man found in his own makeup, in his own moral nature, an understanding of and a love for that which is good. His own nature was revelational of the will of God. But while thus revelational of the will of God, man’s nature, even in paradise, was never meant to function by itself. It was at once supplemented by the supernatural, external and positive expression of God’s will as its correlative. Only thus can we see how basic is the difference between the Christian and the non-Christian view of the moral nature of man in relation to ethical questions" - Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, Chapter 4
In light of all this, I think Van Til would consider the internalist or externalist debate a false dilemma.
