Classical Reformed Apologetics

[jwright82]

It does if the "certain belief" in question is an "ultimate belief."

So your saying no ultimate beliefs have any need nor can be called into question for a lack of justification? Even as a methodological strategy?

 

[jwright82]

This also seems to imply the existence of autonomous facts.

 

[RamistThomist]

So your saying no ultimate beliefs have any need nor can be called into question for a lack of justification? Even as a methodological strategy?

That's not entirely the issue. A properly basic belief is one which carries its own warrant-status. That's not to say it is above challenge. It can still be defeated by a defeater.

You're continuing to operate in terms of justification (i.e., meeting internal conditions within one's own mind). I operate in terms of warrant.

 

[Username3000]

If I may add my expertise to this discussion:

 

[jwright82]

That's not entirely the issue. A properly basic belief is one which carries its own warrant-status. That's not to say it is above challenge. It can still be defeated by a defeater.

You're continuing to operate in terms of justification (i.e., meeting internal conditions within one's own mind). I operate in terms of warrant.

I'm operating on a logical basis. Logical analysis demands that certain

That's not entirely the issue. A properly basic belief is one which carries its own warrant-status. That's not to say it is above challenge. It can still be defeated by a defeater.

You're continuing to operate in terms of justification (i.e., meeting internal conditions within one's own mind). I operate in terms of warrant.

But any belief can be logically analyzed for pressupossitons. You know that as well as I do. Even a properly basic belief presupposes reliable cognitive functions. And a person to have them. Call that internal/external or some mix. It's a logical fact.

 

[RamistThomist]

But any belief can be logically analyzed for pressupossitons. You know that as well as I do. Even a properly basic belief presupposes reliable cognitive functions. And a person to have them. Call that internal/external or some mix. It's a logical fact.

Fine, but that's not the same as internalism or justification.

 

[jwright82]

Fine, but that's not the same as internalism or justification.

Than I guess I'm not either one of those.

 

[User20004000]

This will be of interest... Very relevant.

https://www.proginosko.com/2019/06/reforming-apologetics-introduction/

 

[jwright82]

I'm reluctant to adopt adopt the internalism/externalism distinction because it seems useless outside of rhetorical arguments. Practically I think it serves no purpose other than to try and box someone in who doesn't agree with it. It's like saying that if you affirm the classic creeds of Christian history than you must believe in substance metaphysics. Accepting some terminology does mean you must accept the whole thing.
I think that linguistically analyzing these will lead to less confusion about terms. Why is internalism inherently bad? And what if the term is applied to people who don't hold it? If someone is operating within a different vocabulary than the terms doesn't agree with the terms? Than What?
It's like saying Van Til is Kantian because he got his method and form of argumentation from him. But for someone that critiqued Kant endlessly how does that even fit, or make sense? And analytic philosophers have adopted it too.
I don't see how examining one's pressupossitons
Is wrong or I'll advised? No one doubts that we have pressupossitons so I don't see the point in debating it. I've had it work quite well, practicality is no ground to judge a point of view.
Also I don't see how Plantinga gets around the Foundationalist problem by adopting a weaker form of it, Foundationalsm is Foundationalsm. His weaker forms of basic beliefs are still basic beliefs. Changing the vocabulary so no no one can critique him is a bit badly placed. Why must I or anyone accept the vocabulary of Plantinga, or anyone else, to hold a reasonable discussion on epistemology?
Sorry BayouHuegenot. I meant to quote you but I messed up. I look forward to the discussion.
Also a justification of a justification is not used in the same sense. To justify pro-choice or pro-life points of views both sit on one level but to justify the underlying worldview is a deeper level of justification. So one is not tied to one meaning or level of justification, there are varying degrees. Each with a unique situation and epistemic value.

Your argument only holds true if justification must mean the same thing in every application of it, no differences. Look forward to discussing this, been thinking a while.

 

[RamistThomist]

I'm reluctant to adopt adopt the internalism/externalism distinction because it seems useless outside of rhetorical arguments.

It is simply a classification in modern academic debates on epistemology. Adopt it or don't. It really wasn't designed for apologetics but simply a taxonomy for classifying various philosophers.

Practically I think it serves no purpose other than to try and box someone in who doesn't agree with it.

That's also not its point. It's like complaining about an apple because it doesn't unlock doors. Read Audi or Chisholm or any major epistemologist on the background for the discussion.

It's like saying that if you affirm the classic creeds of Christian history than you must believe in substance metaphysics.

You sort of do, since there is the whole "two natures" thing.

Why is internalism inherently bad?

It's not. It's simply a taxonomy. My criticism of internalist accounts is that they are inadequate to confer strong justfication.

And what if the term is applied to people who don't hold it?

I don't know. What if?

It's like saying Van Til is Kantian because he got his method and form of argumentation from him.

Kant's system is a worldview. Internalism/Externalism aren't. They are taxonomies that deal with justification only within the correspondence theory of truth. They don't deal with coherentism, for example.

Is wrong or I'll advised?

What's the subject in the sentence?

Also I don't see how Plantinga gets around the Foundationalist problem by adopting a weaker form of it, Foundationalsm is Foundationalsm. His weaker forms of basic beliefs are still basic beliefs.

There is a distinction between properly basic beliefs and basic beliefs.

Changing the vocabulary so no no one can critique him is a bit badly placed.

If you read his trilogy you will realize that he has read every text on epistemology. He isn't changing the vocabulary and not a single academic critic of Plantinga ever made that charge.

Why must I or anyone accept the vocabulary of Plantinga, or anyone else, to hold a reasonable discussion on epistemology?

That was never my charge. My charge was that strict internalist accounts fail to confer strong justification. That's it. That doesn't mean their worldview is false. Far from it.

The more practical problem was that endlessly chanting "by what standard" has to confront what Roderick Chisholm called "The Problem of Criterion" and very few presups besides Ronald Nash have ever dealt with that. It also shows that endlessly chanting "By What Standard?" itself doesn't deal with the problems of knowledge.

Also a justification of a justification is not used in the same sense.

I've read about two dozen academic texts on justification. We all know in what sense it is being used.

 

[RamistThomist]

When I brought up internalism, I was never trying to say that "he's an internalist. haha. he's wrong." Rather, I was trying to say that those presups who endlessly chant "By what standard?" "By what standard?" "By what standard?" "By what standard?"

Have themselves to face up to Chisholm's "problem of criterion." That's all. It's not a knock-down argument, but simply noting that the epistemology debate is a bit more complex.

So it's not the same as "Well, van til used Kantian language therefore he is a kantian." Of course not. No one said that. Internalism isn't an evil bogeyman like Kant. My hero in the faith, JP Moreland, is a very strict internalist.

 

[jwright82]

When I brought up internalism, I was never trying to say that "he's an internalist. haha. he's wrong." Rather, I was trying to say that those presups who endlessly chant "By what standard?" "By what standard?" "By what standard?" "By what standard?"

Have themselves to face up to Chisholm's "problem of criterion." That's all. It's not a knock-down argument, but simply noting that the epistemology debate is a bit more complex.

So it's not the same as "Well, van til used Kantian language therefore he is a kantian." Of course not. No one said that. Internalism isn't an evil bogeyman like Kant. My hero in the faith, JP Moreland, is a very strict internalist.

I agree that chanting "by what standard" is obnoxious to say the least. That's why I don't do that. Most acedimic Vantillians don't either.

 

[jwright82]

It is simply a classification in modern academic debates on epistemology. Adopt it or don't. It really wasn't designed for apologetics but simply a taxonomy for classifying various philosophers.


That's also not its point. It's like complaining about an apple because it doesn't unlock doors. Read Audi or Chisholm or any major epistemologist on the background for the discussion.


You sort of do, since there is the whole "two natures" thing.



It's not. It's simply a taxonomy. My criticism of internalist accounts is that they are inadequate to confer strong justfication.


I don't know. What if?


Kant's system is a worldview. Internalism/Externalism aren't. They are taxonomies that deal with justification only within the correspondence theory of truth. They don't deal with coherentism, for example.


What's the subject in the sentence?


There is a distinction between properly basic beliefs and basic beliefs.


If you read his trilogy you will realize that he has read every text on epistemology. He isn't changing the vocabulary and not a single academic critic of Plantinga ever made that charge.


That was never my charge. My charge was that strict internalist accounts fail to confer strong justification. That's it. That doesn't mean their worldview is false. Far from it.

The more practical problem was that endlessly chanting "by what standard" has to confront what Roderick Chisholm called "The Problem of Criterion" and very few presups besides Ronald Nash have ever dealt with that. It also shows that endlessly chanting "By What Standard?" itself doesn't deal with the problems of knowledge.


I've read about two dozen academic texts on justification. We all know in what sense it is being used.

Well as far as theories of truth and Van Til you should consult the Bahnsen reader 158 to 177.
As far as my point on the senses of the use of justification. It was in response to an earlier comment you made about justifiers of justifiers of justifiers, which implies an endless string of justifiers in the argument on into infinity. Which I found very good. But if I understand the argument correctly this would be a serious problem for the pressupossitional argument, unless justifier is being used in two different senses. A justifier of a belief seems quite different from a justifier of a justifier, Apple's and oranges.
It's like saying an ethical statement is exactly the same as a metaethical statement. Since the referent is different in both statements there not the same. An ethical statement is about what is right or wrong and we how we ought to behave. Metaethical statements are about the nature of ethics itself.
The pressupossitional argument is like this. Warrent operates within the various worldviews that everyone has and therefore is a universal tool we all share. An atheist is warranted to not believe in God due to the existence of evil.
But warrent is not something the pressupossitionalist is worried about. An atheist can be warranted all day long but (and here's the first level of the argument) 100% of the arguments I've seen from evil rest on faulty notions and descriptions of God ( his nature, his realation to creation, etc.) and therefore there argument is worthless. There not talking about the same person we confess.
The second deeper problem is, warrent addmited, there complaints rest on the existence of ethical norms to complain about God with. And since no form of atheism can produce a solid foundation for ethics, they in a sense have nothing to complain about (as an apologetical method). They can be warranted all day long but once the foundation for ethics is challenged they have a deeper problem.

 

[RamistThomist]

A justifier of a belief seems quite different from a justifier of a justifier, Apple's and oranges.

They are the same, since the justifier of a justifier is itself a justifier of a belief in a justifier.

Warrent operates within the various worldviews that everyone has and therefore is a universal tool we all share. An atheist is warranted to not believe in God due to the existence of evi

Maybe he is. Maybe he isn't. Simply having warrant doesn't solve anything. Warrants can be defeated by defeaters (of course; the defeaters themselves can be defeated).

But warrent is not something the pressupossitionalist is worried about.

That's not the point. Warrant isn't one of those things that anyone "worries" about.

An atheist can be warranted all day long but (and here's the first level of the argument) 100% of the arguments I've seen from evil rest on faulty notions and descriptions of God ( his nature, his realation to creation, etc.) and therefore there argument is worthless.

That's what I've been trying to say for several months. Any warrant can be challenged by a defeater. THat's simply the nature of human conversation. Most defeaters, though, are pretty weak.

The second deeper problem is, warrent addmited, there complaints rest on the existence of ethical norms to complain about God with.

Even classical apologists acknowledge this.

They can be warranted all day long but once the foundation for ethics is challenged they have a deeper problem.

That's literally the definition of a defeater.

My argument was never--not once--"If you have warrant, that's all you need." I never said that. Plantinga never said that. Warrant is simply another angle to view the justification debate. That's it.

 

[jwright82]

They are the same, since the justifier of a justifier is itself a justifier of a belief in a justifier.


Maybe he is. Maybe he isn't. Simply having warrant doesn't solve anything. Warrants can be defeated by defeaters (of course; the defeaters themselves can be defeated).


That's not the point. Warrant isn't one of those things that anyone "worries" about.


That's what I've been trying to say for several months. Any warrant can be challenged by a defeater. THat's simply the nature of human conversation. Most defeaters, though, are pretty weak.


Even classical apologists acknowledge this.


That's literally the definition of a defeater.

My argument was never--not once--"If you have warrant, that's all you need." I never said that. Plantinga never said that. Warrant is simply another angle to view the justification debate. That's it.

Than what's with my method of apologetics? Not a belief about a justifier of belief seems to be needlessly stretching the terms. And what about my analogy to ethical verses metaethical statements? Surely ethical statements are not the same as metaethical statements.

 

[RamistThomist]

Than what's with my method of apologetics? Not a belief about a justifier of belief seems to be needlessly stretching the terms.

You probably know your method better than I know your method. My only point about bringing internalism up is that the question "By What Standard" simply doesn't square with any treatment of epistemology that has already dealt with iterative skepticism.

You might say, "academic van tillians don't talk like that." That's great. Those guys aren't the debaters, either. Sye Ted is.

 

[jwright82]

You probably know your method better than I know your method. My only point about bringing internalism up is that the question "By What Standard" simply doesn't square with any treatment of epistemology that has already dealt with iterative skepticism.

You might say, "academic van tillians don't talk like that." That's great. Those guys aren't the debaters, either. Sye Ted is.

Yeah I don't like that guy. I had an old friend show me his videos and than got mad when I said I wouldn't debate like that. Something like not going for the jugular and allowing unbelief to stand. I reminded him that some of the best debates I've won, and I've lost a lot, were through subtle and indirect methods. Not being rude. These people aren't just unbelievers they're primarily human beings and ought to be treated as such.
Plus it always amazes me when adults can't tell the difference between when to be firm and when to be gentle. I have no problem being firm but only if the conversation calls for it.