Defining Free Will

[JTB]

What moral law could God be bound to so as to desire Himself to break it? It seems like the proposition is meaningless because the terms are self-contradictory.

Are you saying that since God is the standard for moral goodness, it would be meaningless to speak of the possibility of His acting apart from that standard?

I'm saying that, as the Sovereign determiner of law, He cannot be bound to anything other than His own desire. But sin is any want of conformity or transgression of the law. It would require God to want other than He wants to be both lawgiver and lawbreaker. No amount of power can set aside the nature of thinking (laws of logic) itself.

 

[Confessor]

I'm saying that, as the Sovereign determiner of law, He cannot be bound to anything other than His own desire. But sin is any want of conformity or transgression of the law. It would require God to want other than He wants to be both lawgiver and lawbreaker. No amount of power can set aside the nature of thinking (laws of logic) itself.

The tension you're describing is one of desires, and how it is impossible for God to desire sin. By definition, that would be referring to His moral inability to sin (with which I'd agree), not a natural inability.

I'm not saying He's powerful enough to change His desires in order to make them sinful, by the way. That would imply LFW, as it would entail the precedence of volition to inclinations.

 

[MW]

Well, some sins can be physically grueling to carry out, e.g. a mass murder. It would be physically easier, at least in one case, not to carry that out.

But at any rate, by "natural ability" I mean this: one has the natural ability to carry out an action if he can carry it out when he so desires. Moral ability refers to the actual possession of that desire. (God can never possess a desire to sin; therefore He is morally unable to sin.)

Your first paragraph conflates physical with natural.

Your second paragraph is closer to the distinction between moral and natural because it looks at the natural as a constitutive ability. However, it is confused because it sees "natural" as referring to ability to carry out an action rather than an ability to choose. The discussion is freedom of the "will," which is solely concerned with the power to choose. "Natural" refers to the ability to make choices as a free agent. "Moral" refers to the quality of those choices as judged by God according to the standard of His law. Again, I would say that God has no such ability to choose sin either naturally or morally.

 

[Ron]

We must define the will and then freedom. The will is the simply the faculty of choice, or that by which the mind chooses. One can have a will yet not be able to do what he is disposed to do for many reasons. For instance, one with a will might wish to take a walk in the park but not be able to do so due to physical imprisonment or physical disability. In a word, man has a will but I find nothing free about it since in a philosophical sense, there is no such thing as free will for such freedom implies the power of contrary choice. Liberty is another matter altogether. I discuss liberty below.

From my blog:

The question that always lurks behind the objection to the Edwardsian view of God’s determination of the human will is how can man be morally accountable for choices that are necessary and not free? In other words, if it is true that God knows the future choices of men because he has determined them and that free will is a philosophical surd, then how can man be held responsible for any choices whatsoever? The solution lies in the distinction between ability and liberty.

There are four states of man. (1) Man in the garden prior to the fall; (2) man after the fall yet prior to conversion; (3) converted man; and (4) glorified man. In all four states man does not have free will; for man cannot choose contrary to his is strongest inclination at the moment of choice; nor can man choose contrary to the truth of how he will choose. It is not as if prior to the fall Adam had free will and then lost it with sin, regaining it upon conversion, etc. Neither man nor God ever has free will.The seat of moral accountability is (a) liberty (the ability to choose what one wants), AND (b) the want of being able to choose contrary to how one will. With respect to liberty, man is morally accountable when he has the ability to choose as he wants; which is to say, man is morally accountable when he has liberty to act, which presupposes no prohibitors, whether they be economic, intellectual, physical, etc. Given liberty, it is necessary that man always choose according to his intentions and never contrary to them; for to act contrary to an intention is not to choose but to act irrationally, without intention. Accordingly, man is morally accountable when he has liberty yet no free will.

A man crippled in his legs from birth cannot be held responsible for not running around the back yard with his children. The reason being, he could not do so if he wanted. He has no liberty in other words, which is again the ability to choose as one wants. With respect to coming to Christ, God’s election of reprobates unto damnation does not prohibit them from acting according their desires and intentions. A reprobate does not lack liberty, the ability to act according to his desire or want of desire for Christ. Consequently, the reprobate is not at all like the crippled man who is prevented from running even given a desire to do so; for the crippled man cannot act according to a desire to run, whereas the reprobate can and does act according his intention toward Christ. A reprobate chooses to reject God, yet could embrace God if he so desired; whereas a crippled man cannot run with his children given a desire to do so. The difference is obvious. The reprobate has liberty, whereas the crippled man has none.

I’ve addressed the matter of the reprobate coming to Christ only because it is the most important choice one makes in his life. However, one should not become confused and think that some real choices are not determined and not according to one’s intentions and, therefore, "free." Some Calvinists wrongly think that reprobates are "free" except with respect to coming to Christ. That is false. No person is free to choose contrary to how he will, whether in the area of the gospel or in common life.

Ron

 

[JTB]

I'm saying that, as the Sovereign determiner of law, He cannot be bound to anything other than His own desire. But sin is any want of conformity or transgression of the law. It would require God to want other than He wants to be both lawgiver and lawbreaker. No amount of power can set aside the nature of thinking (laws of logic) itself.

The tension you're describing is one of desires, and how it is impossible for God to desire sin. By definition, that would be referring to His moral inability to sin (with which I'd agree), not a natural inability.

I'm not saying He's powerful enough to change His desires in order to make them sinful, by the way. That would imply LFW, as it would entail the precedence of volition to inclinations.

The definition of sin contains an aspect that would make it impossible for God to desire it as a metaphysical consideration. Sin is the transgression of what God has Himself established as the standard of conduct. Therefore, for God to desire Himself to sin, would be to desire against His desire to craft a standard for Himself. It basically asserts a contradictory willing in God's nature, which is not respecting of moral character, but of metaphysical or epistemological possibility.

 

[Confessor]

Your first paragraph conflates physical with natural.

You said that sin is an easier choice because it has temporary pleasure, and thereby sin denotes a natural weakness. But is not a temporary pleasure a physical thing?

"Natural" refers to the ability to make choices as a free agent. "Moral" refers to the quality of those choices as judged by God according to the standard of His law. Again, I would say that God has no such ability to choose sin either naturally or morally.

Defined as that, I have no problem with saying God is naturally unable to sin, but I'm not sure how, given that definition of "moral," it is intelligible to speak of moral ability. If we use the word "moral" as it is used in another context, i.e. the judgment of choices, then it doesn't make sense to apply it to an ability. In other words, if the category of natural ability encompasses one's ability to make righteous choices or sinful choices, then there is nothing left to relegate to the purview of moral ability.

And, as I said above, among the actions of which we are incapable, there are some punishable, and some not. What is the distinction that makes sense of this? I contend that natural and moral ability, as I defined above, do this perfectly.

 

[MW]

You said that sin is an easier choice because it has temporary pleasure, and thereby sin denotes a natural weakness. But is not a temporary pleasure a physical thing?

No, it is a state of the mind.

Defined as that, I have no problem with saying God is naturally unable to sin, but I'm not sure how, given that definition of "moral," it is intelligible to speak of moral ability. If we use the word "moral" as it is used in another context, i.e. the judgment of choices, then it doesn't make sense to apply it to an ability. In other words, if the category of natural ability encompasses one's ability to make righteous choices or sinful choices, then there is nothing left to relegate to the purview of moral ability.

This still doesn't grasp what is meant by the distinction. "Natural ability" is an ability to make choices. "Moral ability" is an ability to "choose good," i.e., choices which God judges as good, spiritually and absolutely.

And, as I said above, among the actions of which we are incapable, there are some punishable, and some not. What is the distinction that makes sense of this? I contend that natural and moral ability, as I defined above, do this perfectly.

Well, if you want to make up your own definitions, that is your prerogative, but don't be surprised if no one can follow you.

 

[cih1355]

Free will can mean, "to act according to one's desires." One can be a Calvinist and believe that we have free will in the sense of acting according to one's desires.

Anselm defined free will as "the power of preserving rectitude of will for its own sake." What did he mean by this?

 

[OPC'n]

Everyone's free will plays in a playpen.

 

[Ron]

Confessor,

I think you might be getting a bit ahead of yourself.

"If one has the capability of performing an action when he wants, then he has a natural ability to carry out that action." (I placed your entire quote in italics so I decided to place what you had in italics in bold print.)

Although the capability of performing an action when one wants is a sufficient condition for natural ability, it is not the only the sufficient condition; in fact, it might be misleading to say what you said given where you put the accent. One’s liberty can be restricted due to external physical constraints (such as imprisonment) yet such constraints would not eliminate natural ability, yet your statement above seems to place the accent upon the ability to act upon one's intentions, as if the ability to act upon one's intention is a necessary condition for natural ability. I find the accent a bit misleading, that's all. “When one wants” does not speak to natural ability but to liberty. The man in jail, for instance, has the innate capability of walking in the park, which is to say he has the natural ability to carry out the action. However, his being lock-up precludes such action, but does not take away his natural ability; so it is false that being capable of acting when one wants is the only sufficient condition for natural ability. "When one wants" either muddies the water or implies something false.

"Would you say that this proposition is true? If God desired to sin, [then] He would be powerful enough to carry it out."

If God desired to sin, then he would have sinned already. He would have sinned prior to acting upon the intention, whether he was or wasn’t “powerful enough to carry it out.” Accordingly, the power to carry out the sin is not necessary for sin to occur. It only clouds the issue.

Moreover, the If-then proposition proceeds upon a false premise, that being God having a desire to sin, which is what I believe Joshua and Matthew are driving at. It’s like saying “if a square was round, then the square x”. The antecedent that contemplates God desiring sin, or a square being round, are logically impossible since for God to desire sin would equate to God not being God, which is indeed a contradiction since by definition God cannot become not God - just like a square cannot be round.

Consider the argument:

If God could desire sin, then God could stop being God
It is false that God could stop being God
Therefore, it is false that God could desire sin

Doesn't that give us pause to argue under the premise of "If God desired to sin", then...?

Yours,

Ron

 

[Iconoclast]

Matthew and Ron are correct in their posts. Take the time to re-read them.
Free-will does not exist, but is a false philosophical idea,as if man is somehow neutral and outside of the creation of God.
All facts are created facts.God gives meaning to all things. The under-pinning of this supposed ability in fallen mankind is unbelief and a denial of the biblical revelation as set forth in scripture.
We do not have to give in to the false philosphers of the age try and re-define the world. Read carefully 1Cor 1,and 2.

 

[Confessor]

The definition of sin contains an aspect that would make it impossible for God to desire it as a metaphysical consideration. Sin is the transgression of what God has Himself established as the standard of conduct. Therefore, for God to desire Himself to sin, would be to desire against His desire to craft a standard for Himself. It basically asserts a contradictory willing in God's nature, which is not respecting of moral character, but of metaphysical or epistemological possibility.

I would agree that it is a metaphysical impossibility, for it is not possible, given God's nature, for Him to possess any inclinations to sin. The outworking of God's will, including all His choices from His inclinations, is metaphysical. This is simply to say that the antecedent of the proposition, "If God could desire sin, then He would be powerful enough to carry it out," is impossible, not necessarily that it is unintelligible.

But this raises the question of whether a proposition which is objectively impossible can be intelligible. If we take a proposition the entirety of which is nonsensical, e.g. "Pyrques kib gyjurles," and if we take a proposition with two unresolvable aspects, e.g. "A square circle exists," then we can see a key difference between the two. In the former, not a single thing makes sense; in the latter, the individual concepts make sense, and because they make sense, we can realize that the whole proposition is unintelligible. It would be foolish to say "If a square circle exists, then X," as the entire proposition would be unintelligible due to the antecedent's unintelligibility. Therefore, if the proposition contains two absolutely unresolvable aspects (e.g., a morally perfect Being who can sin), then such a proposition cannot be the antecedent of an intelligible conditional proposition.

So, Joshua, you are absolutely correct that it is simply meaningless to talk about God's desiring to sin -- and if it's meaningless to posit it as an antecedent, then it's meaningless to attempt to deduce things from it, which I was attempting.

This shows that I should have used a glorified saint to make my point. I will presently change the aforesaid question to, "If a glorified saint could sin, then would he be powerful enough to carry it out?" If so, then he has the natural ability to sin; if not, then he does not. (Certainly it is not unintelligible to speak of someone glorified to have the desire to sin, as it is not inconceivable that God could decree such a thing for His glory. Satan fell from heaven.)

-----Added 10/9/2009 at 11:44:58 EST-----

This still doesn't grasp what is meant by the distinction. "Natural ability" is an ability to make choices. "Moral ability" is an ability to "choose good," i.e., choices which God judges as good, spiritually and absolutely.

So moral ability refers to a proper use of one's natural ability?

 

[Philip]

Intelligibility is simply the ability to be understood. Only intelligible things can be possible or impossible. I can't say whether a slithey tove is possible because I don't understand the term and it is therefore unintelligible to me. I can tell you whether a spherical cube exists because I understand what that entails--it's intelligible and I therefore can understand it to be impossible.

Given a malicious omnipotent being, yes he could sin. God is not malicious and therefore cannot sin.

 

[Confessor]

Although the capability of performing an action when one wants is a sufficient condition for natural ability, it is not the only the sufficient condition; in fact, it might be misleading to say what you said given where you put the accent. One’s liberty can be restricted due to external physical constraints (such as imprisonment) yet such constraints would not eliminate natural ability, yet your statement above seems to place the accent upon the ability to act upon one's intentions, as if the ability to act upon one's intention is a necessary condition for natural ability.

I would say the ability to act upon one's intention is a necessary condition for natural ability. If I intend to arise from my bed in the morning, but I am actually chained down, then I don't have the natural ability to arise; I am constrained from without.

I find the accent a bit misleading, that's all. “When one wants” does not speak to natural ability but to liberty. The man in jail, for instance, has the innate capability of walking in the park, which is to say he has the natural ability to carry out the action. However, his being lock-up precludes such action, but does not take away his natural ability; so it is false that being capable of acting when one wants is the only sufficient condition for natural ability. "When one wants" either muddies the water or implies something false.

How does a man in jail have the natural ability of walking in the park? Does that mean that, if he were in the park and desired to walk, he could? If so, what if I said that a man with no legs had the natural ability to walk in the park, provided he had legs and desired to walk? It seems the only distinction between the two is that one of them is belonging directly to the man's body while one isn't, but that seems an arbitrary divide. And if the divide is arbitrary, then your definition of natural ability as so distinct from liberty is, in my estimation, nonsense, for it would basically say that just about anything has the natural ability to do just about anything, e.g. "My dog has the natural ability to fly, because if she had hollow bones and wings (etc.), and if she wanted, then she could fly."

I would contend that natural ability and liberty are not so different. They are pieces of the same puzzle. If one is capable of doing X when one desires to do X, then one has the natural ability to do X. And if one is performing X when he desires to perform X, then he is performing X with liberty. Therefore, to have natural ability to perform an action is requisite to perform an action; and to perform an action when desiring to perform the action is liberty.

If God desired to sin, then he would have sinned already.

I actually would dispute this. Seeing as this is a separate topic, I'll keep it brief. First, keep in mind that there is a distinction between internal sins (lust, covetousness, etc.) and desires to sin; one can desire to do a sin, internal or external, without effecting that desire. Second, and more importantly, desires to sin are necessary in order to undergo temptation; Jesus underwent temptation; ergo etc.

Moreover, the If-then proposition proceeds upon a false premise, that being God having a desire to sin, which is what I believe Joshua and Matthew are driving at. It’s like saying “if a square was round, then the square x”. The antecedent that contemplates God desiring sin, or a square being round, are logically impossible since for God to desire sin would equate to God not being God, which is indeed a contradiction since by definition God cannot become not God - just like a square cannot be round.

Consider the argument:

If God could desire sin, then God could stop being God
It is false that God could stop being God
Therefore, it is false that God could desire sin

Doesn't that give us pause to argue under the premise of "If God desired to sin", then...?

Well, the mere fact that the antecedent is false does not imply that the antecedent cannot be used to convey intelligible (and therefore, possibly truthful) propositions -- as your syllogism itself proves. For how could you show such a syllogism if the first premise were wholly unintelligible? I conceded to Joshua above that it would be foolish to proceed from such an unintelligible antecedent, but, even after writing my reply to Joshua so soon, I am questioning this. If the antecedent, "If God could desire sin," is unintelligible, then why is the proposition, "If God could desire sin, then God could stop being God" intelligible? If that proposition, containing the supposedly unintelligible antecedent, is true, then why cannot other propositions containing the same antecedent be true?

I would say this goes back to the two propositions I mentioned earlier, "Pyrques kib gyjurles," and, "A square circle exists." Squares and circles are intelligible concepts, yet they are contradictory; therefore attempting to merge them leads to unintelligibility. For now, I realize that it has something to do with the fact that parts of the proposition are intelligible, and these parts have to be distributed in the syllogism in such a way in order to retain the intelligibility of the propositions as whole, but at the moment I have worked my brain in grinding out all the details of this thread, so I'm gonna take a pass right now.

-----Added 10/10/2009 at 12:10:06 EST-----

Intelligibility is simply the ability to be understood. Only intelligible things can be possible or impossible.

These short sentences are immensely helpful.

 

[Ask Mr. Religion]

While responsibility presupposes accountability, accountability does not presuppose ability or freedom. Indeed, free will has absolutely nothing to do with responsibility. Instead, accountability simply presupposes one who is in a position to demand accountability, ergo the One who is not responsible to anyone, God.

AMR

 

[Ron]

Confessor,

I'm going to pass on trying to work through all that you wrote. I find it somewhat confused.

Cheers,

Ron

 

[CharlieJ]

Back on track

OK, at least before all the arguments about God and such, Ben was simply stating the view of mainstream Reformed philosophy (of which I'm aware) since Edwards. The natural vs. moral distinction is useful in distinguishing between the Reformed concept of free will vs. libertarian free will. (It can be confusing because the unregenerate's sinful "nature" does not at all pertain to "natural ability" but rather to "moral ability.")

For anyone interested, the seeds of this idea (though not the clear technical language) are visible in Calvin, and perhaps in a few before him. I recommend reading "Free Will" in Paul Helm's John Calvin's Ideas. He is very good at addressing Calvin in his own context, yet also assessing Calvin's ideas from the categories of modern analytic philosophy.

 

[Dao]

. . . Pre-enlightenment: Freedom is the ability to do what is good in the sight of God.

Post-enlightenment: Freedom is the natural ability to do what one pleases, whether that be good or evil. . . .

Enlightenment is a funny word. Being an instructor of a Chinese alternative medicines, their philosophies had taken me to many la la lands until I sensed the animated force that keeps man alive and living . One of my schools are called the "School of Sudden Enlightenment" and was trained by well known so-called-masters in China. Man has this animated energy that makes them a living being or alive as compared to dead things. One school teaches a sort of "surrender" to the natural forces barely known to man. A type of free will plays a lot into this. Many claims it's cultic and from the demons but I rather explore all explanation of human slaved free will as much as possible. So far, I've learned that God is in control of all things including every will of men. I, also, learned that God doesn't control of all things including every will of men. As some state here on this site, "it's a mystery!, we may never learn why both "God controls and God doesn't control" until we become enlightened or go "Ah ha! I see now"
As the cult-like Taoist said," We can't talk about the Tao (an impersonal god) cause we don't have the language to understand it. They say if you describe the Tao, you don't understand what it is.
There is a form, (movements) that I teach, that allows man to surrender to the forces or an invisible natural magnetic fields of earth and I believe God uses our environments to cause us to do things according to His Own Will. This surrender allows us to observe the forces that controls us. In other Words, free will is a man-made philosophy that doesn't really exist.
What I wrote here may sound from la la land but it's from my deep search to explain the works of Charismatic Pentecostal movements and many other healing arts. Theres a lot of historical explanations of "freewill" in many countries that are unfamiliar to us. As many Christians calls a Taoist, demonic, one Taoist said this:

" The perfect Tao is without difficulty, save that it avoids picking and choosing. Only when you stop liking and disliking will all be clearly understood. A split hair's difference, and heaven and earth are set apart! If you want to get the plain truth, be not concerned with right and wrong. The conflict between right and wrong is the sickness of the mind."

Perhaps we might want to stop liking or disliking whether we have free will or not and allow God to say, "I'm in control"

 

[Philip]

Charlie, the libertarian incompatibilist definition says that free will is not choosing in accordance with desires, but choosing in a wholly unconditioned manner--which is absurd (I think the concept of Burridan's Ass is a good reality check).

Edwards is distinguishing between the philosophical concept of freedom, apart from moral categories, and the theological concept, which is all about the moral distinctions. One is a philosophy of mind that actually helps to clarify God can foreordain and humans still be held morally responsible.

Enlightenment refers to the philosophical movement of the 18th century that I have been known to term "Endarkenment."

 

[CharlieJ]

Charlie, the libertarian incompatibilist definition says that free will is not choosing in accordance with desires, but choosing in a wholly unconditioned manner--which is absurd (I think the concept of Burridan's Ass is a good reality check).

Edwards is distinguishing between the philosophical concept of freedom, apart from moral categories, and the theological concept, which is all about the moral distinctions. One is a philosophy of mind that actually helps to clarify God can foreordain and humans still be held morally responsible.

Enlightenment refers to the philosophical movement of the 18th century that I have been known to term "Endarkenment."

Yes, I agree with all you wrote. Did I say something wrong?

 

[Philip]

I thought you said that the second definition is libertarian, but now that I reread, I see I was mistaken. As it is, I think we've just clarified each other.

 

[jandrusk]

I think that Paul makes it very clear that all are either in bondage to sin or to righteousness and therefore the will is not free for either one outside these two contexts. I guess you have to define what you mean by "free"? I kind of liken this to a computer being able to generate a random number; a computer can never truly generate a random number without providing a seed to make even more random. So I think with the natural depraved man his enslavement to sin will never let him choose otherwise unless God intervenes.