modal argument against free will

[steven-nemes]

I'll check it out tomorrow. I can't now.

 

[Ron]

I don't know what it is about your argument, Ron, but I don't like it--maybe the fact that a consequence of it is that every fact about the world is a necessary truth.

There is something else I also don't understand.

If God could have made a different world had he wanted to, then it is not necessary that he wants to make a world with X, and if it is not necessary that he wants to make a world with X, then it is not necessary that he foreknows X.

gWX = God wants to make a world with X
gKX = God knows X

[](gWX -> gKX)
gWX
∴ []gKX

Clearly that's not right.

Steve, it does not follow that if God could have made a different world had he wanted to, that therefore it was not necessary that we wanted this world. That would be like saying that if I wanted I could have chosen x, therefore, my inclination of y wasn't necessary. The antecedent speaks to liberty and the consequent speaks to metaphysical ability. Moreover, the "if" of the antecedent doesen't imply pure contingency and not necessity. At best it implies logical possibility and liberty.

Also, God had liberty to choose contrary to this world, yet given that he chose this world, it does not follow that he would not necessarily know x.

Finally, rather than lament over what I wrote, you might wish to offer a construct that does not involve LFW. If you can't, then you must allow LFW for all creatures, which if you do will of course destroy God's omniscience.


Ron

P.S. I'm away this weekend starting last night so any posting will be on the fly, if at all.

 

[steven-nemes]

It doesn't follow from the fact that I believe God has libertarian free will that I therefore believe that humans have free will, or even can have free will. And I'm not convinced that if humans have LFW, then God's omniscience is destroyed. I'd like to see that argument.

Steve, it does not follow that if God could have made a different world had he wanted to, that therefore it was not necessary that we wanted this world. That would be like saying that if I wanted I could have chosen x, therefore, my inclination of y wasn't necessary.The antecedent speaks to liberty and the consequent speaks to metaphysical ability. Moreover, the "if" of the antecedent doesn't imply pure contingency and not necessity. At best it implies logical possibility and liberty.

If God has compatibilist free will, then necessarily, if he chooses to do X, then X was his strongest inclination at that moment. If those factors which determine his inclinations, like his goodness and wisdom and so on, are necessary, which they are, then his inclination also is necessary. If his inclination is necessary, then his creating this world is necessary. If his creating this world is necessary, then his knowing every fact about this world is necessary, and every fact about the world therefore is necessary also.

I am saying if God has compatibilist free will, it is not even logically possible that he want to do other than he did.

Also, God had liberty to choose contrary to this world, yet given that he chose this world, it does not follow that he would not necessarily know x.

If God necessarily chose this world, then he did not have liberty, because he was not capable of wanting anything other than this world.

 

[Ron]

It doesn't follow from the fact that I believe God has libertarian free will that I therefore believe that humans have free will, or even can have free will. And I'm not convinced that if humans have LFW, then God's omniscience is destroyed. I'd like to see that argument.

Steve, it does not follow that if God could have made a different world had he wanted to, that therefore it was not necessary that we wanted this world. That would be like saying that if I wanted I could have chosen x, therefore, my inclination of y wasn't necessary.The antecedent speaks to liberty and the consequent speaks to metaphysical ability. Moreover, the "if" of the antecedent doesn't imply pure contingency and not necessity. At best it implies logical possibility and liberty.

If God has compatibilist free will, then necessarily, if he chooses to do X, then X was his strongest inclination at that moment. If those factors which determine his inclinations, like his goodness and wisdom and so on, are necessary, which they are, then his inclination also is necessary. If his inclination is necessary, then his creating this world is necessary. If his creating this world is necessary, then his knowing every fact about this world is necessary, and every fact about the world therefore is necessary also.

I am saying if God has compatibilist free will, it is not even logically possible that he want to do other than he did.

Also, God had liberty to choose contrary to this world, yet given that he chose this world, it does not follow that he would not necessarily know x.

If God necessarily chose this world, then he did not have liberty, because he was not capable of wanting anything other than this world.

Steve,

I pointed out several errors in your post that preceded your last post. Rather than deal with those errors you simply moved on to make new assertions. (It's tedious to try to interact with moving targets.) Those other assertions make several new blunders, like not appreciating what a logical possibility is, which is not to appreciate what a possible world is (let alone a feasible world); nor do you understand how liberty differs from metaphysical ability, a monstrosity indeed in such a discourse as this one you want to involve yourself with. Moreover, to speak of God having "compatibilist free will" is not to appreciate what compatibilist free will means. The term strictly pertains to creaturely choices and its relationship to God's decree, and may not be philosophically applied to God's choices! Finally, if LFW is a philosophical surd due to the notion of pure contingency, then not even God can have it. You said that God having LFW doesn't imply that we do. Well, if God's will can be purely contingent (allowing for the philosphical surd), then there would be no reason to believe that such an alleged attribute is not a communicable attribute! After all, its either an essential property for morally relevant choices (for all persons with a will) or it is not.

As for your assertion that creaturely LFW might be compatible with God's omniscience, I destroy that idea in a previous post (above) that I'll link you to below. The short answer is that might and would counterfactuals are contradictory and proponents of LFW who want to mantain divine omniscience demand both - that something that truly might not occur (due to LFW) truly will occur (a precondition for omniscience). If something is free in the LFW sense (i.e. purely contingent), then it defies a truth value, yet foreknowledge of such choices presuppoes the truth of the outcome, hence the contradiction! That is the achilles heal of Arminianism. Consistent Arminianism leads to Open Theism, which means that if man has LFW God is not omniscient.

Young man, your posture conveys that you are no longer seeking; so I see no point in arguing against your position any longer. I already know what I believe.

http://www.puritanboard.com/f50/modal-argument-against-free-will-53524/#post693604

Blessings,

Ron

 

[Confessor]

And I'm not convinced that if humans have LFW, then God's omniscience is destroyed. I'd like to see that argument.

LFW mandates that the essence of freedom is the power of contrary choice, i.e., the power to choose contrary to how one actually does, all other things being equal. This means that one would have the power not to do what God has foreknown from all eternity, which is an absurdity. If all other things, including God's foreknowledge, are equal, then there is only one course of action; other courses, given God's foreknowledge, are impossible. Therefore, LFW and divine omniscience are contradictory.

Steve, it does not follow that if God could have made a different world had he wanted to, that therefore it was not necessary that we wanted this world. That would be like saying that if I wanted I could have chosen x, therefore, my inclination of y wasn't necessary.The antecedent speaks to liberty and the consequent speaks to metaphysical ability. Moreover, the "if" of the antecedent doesn't imply pure contingency and not necessity. At best it implies logical possibility and liberty.

If God has compatibilist free will, then necessarily, if he chooses to do X, then X was his strongest inclination at that moment. If those factors which determine his inclinations, like his goodness and wisdom and so on, are necessary, which they are, then his inclination also is necessary. If his inclination is necessary, then his creating this world is necessary. If his creating this world is necessary, then his knowing every fact about this world is necessary, and every fact about the world therefore is necessary also.

I am saying if God has compatibilist free will, it is not even logically possible that he want to do other than he did.

Steven, you did not note the distinction Ron made between possibilities. Sometimes we discuss possibilities in terms of what is logically conceivable, and sometimes we discuss possibilities also taking into account the metaphysical and causal antecedents. For instance, we might talk about God predestining the entire human race to hell. We conceive of this, and we can discuss it intelligibly -- it is possible in the sense that is logically consistent. However, if we take God's nature into the equation, we realize that an instantiation of such a possible world is not possible -- in the sense that God would never want to make such a world. God's mercy would not be demonstrated in such a world.

Therefore, our present world is the only possible world when we understand that it is metaphysically interconnected with God's being, but it is not the only possible world when we discuss it as detached from its requisite metaphysical antecedent.

We often talk about possibilities as detached from requisite metaphysical antecedents anyway, e.g. when we talk about how we might have ordered something different from a restaurant, or answered differently on a test, or said something different to another person. But in each of those situations we are clearly talking about what is possible not taking metaphysical antecedents into consideration; we are discussing what we would have freely chosen if we had so desired...which leads to the next point:

Also, God had liberty to choose contrary to this world, yet given that he chose this world, it does not follow that he would not necessarily know x.

If God necessarily chose this world, then he did not have liberty, because he was not capable of wanting anything other than this world.

Make sure not to beg the question in favor of LFW. To say that God necessarily chose a certain option is not to say that God had no liberty. To (paraphrasingly) borrow from the Jonathan Edwards quote above, if it is no impingement on God's goodness to say that He cannot possibly sin, then it is no impingement on His wisdom to say that He cannot possibly choose a world that is less than perfect.

Liberty has to do with acting in accord with one's inclinations, not the power of contrary choice. God therefore had liberty to choose contrary to this world in the sense that if He wanted He could have chosen a different world.

 

[steven-nemes]

I don't understand how the "had he wanted" clause even helps. It would not be possible for God to want other than he did. It is like saying, "God could have done otherwise, you know, had he not been God..."

That is fine, I don't mind not discussing God's free choice and so on. If it is so clear that I don't understand what is going on, that's fine, I'll trust your judgment on it. The fact of the matter is that if God necessarily foreknows X, where X is any fact at all about this world, then X is a necessary fact which is beyond absurd.