Disputed Discussion?

[py3ak]

In Discussions, v.1, "God’s Indiscriminate Proposals Of Mercy, As Related To His Power, Wisdom, And Sincerity." Dabney writes:

And lest it should be again objected that this picture, however consistent for a ruler of limited powers, is inapplicable to one absolute and almighty, let it be remembered that God is not absolute from the regulative influence of his own attributes; and that, however he may have absolute physical ability to indulge every propension of his nature in execution, he may not have the license of his own wisdom and holiness. And that concurrences may arise in his vast commonwealth to prompt him freely to judge so, has such exceeding probability that it would be a rashness almost insane to dispute it.

Has anyone had the "rashness almost insane" to dispute this essay by Dabney? It seems self-consciously to contain a couple of departures from Reformed Orthodoxy, but I am not aware of any replies, whether coeval with or subsequent to Dabney. It seems to me that the rashness rather lies on the side of asserting that there could be a divine propensity that needed to be regulated by wisdom and holiness.

 

[MW]

Ruben, this was one of Dabney's necessitarian tendencies to which I have drawn attention in past threads. William Cunningham exposes the fallacy and folly of this kind of reasoning:

While we ought never to forget, that in all God does He acts in accordance with all the perfections of His nature; still, it is plain that His moral attributes – if each were fully carried out and operating alone – would lead to different and opposite modes of dealing with His creatures – that while His goodness might prompt Him to confer happiness, His holiness and justice might prompt Him to inflict pain as punishment for sin. His mercy and compassion may be exercised upon some sinners, and His holiness and justice upon others; so that we cannot, from His moral attributes merely, draw any certain conclusions as to whether He would save all sinners, or none, or some; and if some, upon what principles He would make the selection. God’s moral attributes are manifested and exercised in purposing and in bringing to pass the ultimate destiny, both of those who are saved and of those who perish. The one class, to use the language of our Confession, “He predestinates to everlasting life – to the praise of His glorious grace; the other class He passes by, and ordains to dishonour and wrath for their sin – to the praise of His glorious justice.”

It might also be worth pointing out that the necessitarian tendency ultimately "naturalises" special revelation. If human beings are able to predicate what God must and must not do on the basis of His attributes it will follow that the revelation of grace might have been discoverable in "nature," which changes the whole concept of "scriptural light" and "spiritual sight." It is a consolation to know that Dabney looked aghast at developments within the Presbyterian church which moved in this "naturalist" direction.

 

[py3ak]

Thank you, Matthew - I found a couple of those earlier threads and revisited them with profit. For the interested reader:

http://www.puritanboard.com/f15/interesting-r-l-dabny-quote-67187/#post861368

http://www.puritanboard.com/f29/r-l-dabney-systematic-theology-78749/#post996896

http://www.puritanboard.com/f48/best-defense-unlimited-atonement-18731/#post259708

I think I need some additional help in grasping how what you quoted from Cunningham contradicts Dabney's view. What Cunningham said sounds rather similar to bits of Dabney, like this:

Now, having grasped this distinction, we must say that, while God has this liberty of mere option whether or not to execute his affection of pity or reprehension towards any of his own creatures, he has not this liberty of option about having the appropriate affections of his moral nature towards any of them. Is this because an exterior superior agent compels him to feel them? By no means; but because the regulative control of his own immutable perfections absolutely insures the consistent action of his own principles always.
God doubtless felt then a similar moral reprehension for Jacob’s foreseen supplanting falsehood to that which he felt for Esau’s heady self-will. Yet he elected Jacob and passed over Esau. How was that? We are now prepared to answer. Because that moral reprehension, whose natural propension in either case was to righteous rejection, was, in Jacob’s case, overruled by a good and sufficient motive; and because that motive, in Esau’s case having no application, left the moral reprehension to issue naturally and righteously in his rejection.

I suppose it's no surprise that a refutation of Dabney was not attempted. It seems that the practice of technical theology declined not long after, and those who kept it up would probably have had little occasion to take on Dabney specifically.

 

[MW]

Ruben, I will extract one portion of Cunningham's quote just to highlight the main point:

so that we cannot, from His moral attributes merely, draw any certain conclusions as to whether He would save all sinners, or none, or some; and if some, upon what principles He would make the selection.

Does that help?

 

[py3ak]

I think I see - where Dabney is concluding a propension towards this or that from God's moral attributes, Cunningham is saying that we cannot make that deduction. Is that right?

 

[MW]

I think I see - where Dabney is concluding a propension towards this or that from God's moral attributes, Cunningham is saying that we cannot make that deduction. Is that right?

That is the essence of it. Putting it back into its larger context, Cunningham argues that "moral necessity" would lead to conflicting outcomes depending on which moral attribute was the focus. Ultimately it is God's will of decree which determines how He will manifest His moral attributes for His own glory.

 

[py3ak]

Thank you - that's very helpful.