Eastern Orthodoxy and Original Sin

[Ploutos]

I wouldn't actually argue Palamas accepted total depravity, but it is sufficient to note in C. above, it's useful to show how those whom one's interlocutors hold in high esteem disagree with them. And I think there is more to what Palamas admits than that the effects of [original] sin constitute a mere externality. He writes that the image has been tarnished and the soul has been blacked.

By the way, on the subject of total depravity and human "nature," one of the best responses to EO counter-apologetics on this doctrine is from a commentor buried so deep in Triablogue's history that the search engine even has trouble finding it. It took me weeks to find this, but it is a fantastic response. It helped me to distinguish between "concrete" human nature (e.g. the Son assumed a numerically distinct human body and soul from my own) from "abstract" human nature (e.g. the Son assumed "humanity" insofar as he stands in an exemplification relation to an archetypal, participable, divine idea).

I'm still not convinced. He appears to be talking about the soul being blackened in response to active participation in sin after being tempted. Whether he's talking about Adam's soul or his own or someone else's or even the collective soul of humanity, the idea is that the devil tempts us, we sin, and our soul is blackened.

I am playing devil's advocate here but so far I still think my point stands that he is far from indicating any sort of inherent corruption of the soul apart from our active participation in sin. For me, as a Reformed believer, what he says is largely congruent with what I believe, as far as his statement goes. But from the viewpoint of someone who is already inclined to EO thinking, inclined to see things through an EO lens, inclined therefore to see agreement between EO writers (as I'm inclined to see congruency between an EO and my own beliefs)... I don't see much difficulty reconciling Palamas's statement with the OP. I'm not yet convinced it's the zinger you think it is.

 

[MarrowMan]

I wouldn't actually argue Palamas accepted total depravity, but it is sufficient to note in C. above, it's useful to show how those whom one's interlocutors hold in high esteem disagree with them. And I think there is more to what Palamas admits than that the effects of [original] sin constitute a mere externality. He writes that the image has been tarnished and the soul has been blacked.

By the way, on the subject of total depravity and human "nature," one of the best responses to EO counter-apologetics on this doctrine is from a commentor buried so deep in Triablogue's history that the search engine even has trouble finding it. It took me weeks to find this, but it is a fantastic response. It helped me to distinguish between "concrete" human nature (e.g. the Son assumed a numerically distinct human body and soul from my own) from "abstract" human nature (e.g. the Son assumed "humanity" insofar as he stands in an exemplification relation to an archetypal, participable, divine idea).

Thanks for the link. Definitely helpful. I miss Steve.

 

[Knight]

I'm still not convinced. He appears to be talking about the soul being blackened in response to active participation in sin after being tempted. Whether he's talking about Adam's soul or his own or someone else's or even the collective soul of humanity, the idea is that the devil tempts us, we sin, and our soul is blackened.

I am playing devil's advocate here but so far I still think my point stands that he is far from indicating any sort of inherent corruption of the soul apart from our active participation in sin. For me, as a Reformed believer, what he says is largely congruent with what I believe, as far as his statement goes. But from the viewpoint of someone who is already inclined to EO thinking, inclined to see things through an EO lens, inclined therefore to see agreement between EO writers (as I'm inclined to see congruency between an EO and my own beliefs)... I don't see much difficulty reconciling Palamas's statement with the OP. I'm not yet convinced it's the zinger you think it is.

Well, I won't argue the point further, especially as there are clearer examples of what I am suggesting.

Edit: I intended to embed the following link but am having some difficulty. See here:

https://www.eighthdayinstitute.org/homily-five-on-the-meeting-of-our-lord-god-savior-Jesus-Christ

 

[Ploutos]

Well, I won't argue the point further, especially as there are clearer examples of what I am suggesting.

The first paragraph of your link was a much clearer indication of belief in innate corruption.

Bear in mind that I was playing devil's advocate. We Reformed rightfully - up to a point - read many things in light of our Reformed distinctives. For many people flirting with EO, the decision has already been made and they are simply hesitating out of some characteristically millennial mixture of dishonesty, confusion, commitment phobia, and evasiveness. Because of that they are already reading things through a filter of being "red-pilled" and approaching Western theology with an attitude of prior skepticism. So where it is no great mental leap for me to link your first Palamas excerpt with the OP, I imagine it even easier for someone sympathetic to EO.

Now it would be interesting to see how such a person processes the cognitive dissonance of the much clearer statements in the homily you linked.

 

[MW]

Is there debate within EO over creationism and traducianism?

 

[Knight]

Is there debate within EO over creationism and traducianism?

I think it's left as more of an open question than actually debated. From Michael Pomazansky's Orthodox Dogmatic Theology:

The origin of the souls.

How the soul of each individual man originates is not fully revealed in the word of God; it is "a mystery known to God alone" (St. Cyril of Alexandria), and the Church does not give us a strictly defined teaching on this subject. She decisively rejected only Origen's view, which had been inherited from the philosophy of Plato, concerning the pre-existence of souls, according to which souls come to earth from a higher world. This teaching of Origen and the Origenists was condemned by the Fifth Ecumenical Council.

However, this conciliar decree did not establish whether the soul is created from the souls of a man's parents and only in this general sense constitutes a new creation of God, or whether each soul is created immediately and separately by God, being joined at a definite moment to the body which is being or has been formed.

In the view of certain Fathers of the Church (Clement of Alexandria, John Chrysostom, Ephraim the Syrian, Theodoret), each soul is created separately by God, and some of them refer its union with the body to the fortieth day after the body's formation. (Roman Catholic theology is decisively inclined toward the view that each soul is separately created; this view has been set forth dogmatically in several papal bulls, and Pope Alexander VII linked with this view the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Most Holy Virgin Mary.)

In the view of other teachers and Fathers of the Church (Tertullian, Gregory the Theologian, Gregory of Nyssa, Macarius the Great, Anastasius the Presbyter), both soul and body receive their beginning simultaneously and mature together; the soul proceeds from the souls of the parents just as the body proceeds from the bodies of the parents. In this way "creation" is understood here in a broad sense as the participation of the creative power of God which is present and essential everywhere, for every kind of life. The foundation of this view is the fact that in the person of our forefather Adam, God created the human race: "He hath made of one blood all nations of men" (Acts 17:26). From this it follows that in Adam the soul and body of every man was given in potentiality. But God's decree is brought into reality in such a way that God holds all things in His hand: "He giveth to all life, and breath, and all things" (Acts 17:25). God, having created, "continues to create."

St. Gregory the Theologian says, "Just as the body, which was originally formed in us of dust, became subsequently the current of human bodies as has not been cut off from the first-formed root, in one man including others — so also the soul, being inbreathed by God, from that time comes together into the formed composition of man, being born anew, and from the original seed (St. Gregory evidently means here a spiritual seed) being imparted to many and always preserving a constant form in mortal members … Just as the breath in a musical pipe produces sounds depending upon the width of the pipe, so also the soul, appearing powerless in an infirm body, becomes manifest as the body is strengthened and reveals then all its intelligence" (Homily 7, "On the Soul"). St. Gregory of Nyssa has the same view.

In his diary, St. John of Kronstadt has this observation: "What are human souls? They are all one and the same soul, one and the same breathing of God, which God breathed into Adam, which from Adam until now is disseminated to the whole human race. Therefore all men are the same as one man, or one tree of humanity. From this there follows the most natural commandment, founded upon the unity of our nature: ‘Thou shall love the Lord thy God (thy Prototype, thy Father) with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength; and thy neighbor (for who is closer to me than a man who is like me and of the same blood with me?) as thyself’ (Luke 10:27). There is a natural need to fulfill these commandments" (My Life in Christ).

 

[MW]

I think it's left as more of an open question than actually debated. From Michael Pomazansky's Orthodox Dogmatic Theology:

Interesting. I've only read from secondary sources, mostly systematics, which speak of the East as creationist. If there are traducians among them it would be strange if they didn't hold to some form of original sin.

 

[Knight]

Interesting. I've only read from secondary sources, mostly systematics, which speak of the East as creationist. If there are traducians among them it would be strange if they didn't hold to some form of original sin.

In short, they are less interested in the mode of transmission and more interested in that which is transmitted.

Given their commitments to conciliarism (e.g. they must accept the Council of Carthage in 419 given their acceptance of Nicaea II and Trullo), the most "consistent" of them will verbally state some kind of acceptance of original sin. But because they reject original guilt, laymen and even bishops will sometimes reject any version of original sin. Pomazansky again:

Some Orthodox Christians have mistakenly defended the Augustinian notion of "original guilt" — that is, that all men have inherited the guilt of Adam's sin — and others, going to the opposite extreme, have denied altogether the inheritance of sinfulness from Adam. Fr. Michael rightly points out, in his balanced presentation, that from Adam we have indeed inherited our tendency towards sin, together with the death and corruption that are now part of our sinful nature, but we have not inherited the guilt of Adam's personal sin.

My own explanation for this is alluded to in an earlier post and more clearly outlined on pages 125ff. of Andrew Louth's defense of EO in Original Sin and the Fall: Five Views, which reads as follows:

The doctrine of the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary is not accepted by the Orthodox Church. Yet, as Meyendorff has observed, “the Mariological piety of the Byzantines would probably have led them to accept the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of Mary as it was defined in 1854, if only they had shared the Western doctrine of original sin.” But exempting the Virgin Mary from original sin must mean exempting her from the effects of the fall; in some way she is separated from the rest of the human race, who experience the fallen state through participating in (being guilty of) original sin. Paintings of the immaculate conception, depicting the Virgin Mary raised up, on the moon, or borne up by putti, seem to emphasize her separation from the rest of humanity. In contrast, the Byzantine liturgical texts (though plundered for the Latin feast of the immaculate conception) see Mary as part of humanity, in particular the crowning glory of the Old Testament church, emphasizing that she belongs to the Jewish race: “the beauty of Jacob,” as she is called in one of the liturgical hymns. Although confessed as sinless, the Virgin is not regarded as exempt from the consequences of sin. She lived in a sinful world and suffered temptation as we all do. For if her Son was “tested as we are, yet without sin” (Heb 4:15), she can hardly have been exempt. Maybe here original sin meets its reductio ad adsurdum, if it means that the Savior and his mother must be considered free from original sin, for they were not exempt from the struggle against temptation that is part of the fallen human lot.

Louth is rejecting the Augustinian understanding of original sin insofar as it entails original guilt, not original sin as such (he prefers the terminology of "ancestral" sin, as do some other EO). Original guilt would mean that Mary was guilty. So when someone like Pomazansky says, "The Most Holy Virgin was born as subject to the sin of Adam together with all mankind, and with him she shared the need for redemption," what he means is not that Mary was guilty before God - for EO, that would only be the case if her own actions were sinful - but that Adam's sins have conveyed negative consequences (e.g. mortality, passions) to all Adam's progeny except Christ and from which they are in need of "salvation."

EO I have read who try to accept original guilt within their larger framework - and I've seen a few try it - all fail to engage this point. For example, see here (a painful, bungling mess in which the EO apologists even reference Pomazansky but ignore what he says above - one of these EO apologists has since defected to Roman Catholicism) or here (one commentator, Symeon, takes fellow EO apologists to task on the historicity of the doctrine as such but fails to consider the implications regarding the EO view of Mary).

 

[MW]

How can a man receive "ancestral sin" and not be guilty? Surely it is a divine judgment. Otherwise it would have to be seen as a natural necessity, which makes God obliged to a power outside Himself. I suppose they would then have to hold to some sort of "ransom to the devil" theory.

I wonder if those who reject Augustinian original sin among the EO also hold to universal salvation.

 

[RamistThomist]

I wonder if those who reject Augustinian original sin among the EO also hold to universal salvation.

Strictly speaking, at least on a formal level, they don't. Individually, many do, or at least they leave open that possibility.

 

[MW]

Strictly speaking, at least on a formal level, they don't. Individually, many do, or at least they leave open that possibility.

That accords with what I am seeing. But online it seems to be everywhere. Is this a generational shift, an apologetical strategy, or a specific EO school gaining the ascendancy?

 

[Laborer for the Lord]

I suppose they would then have to hold to some sort of "ransom to the devil" theory.

It's funny that you should mention that, as one of the first church fathers who espoused such a ransom theory of the atonement also happened to be a universalist; of course, we both know that I am speaking of Origen. In a similar vein, I think a far more interesting observation is how the underlying metaphysical framework of Platonism and especially Neo-Platonism inherent in Eastern Orthodox theology, from Pseudo-Dionysius to Maximus to Palamas, effectively undermines the doctrines of man and of original sin. All postlapsarian defects of human character are assumed to be simply a consequence of man being 'embodied'. At the same time, they view the incarnation as a sort of "ontological redemption" all its own; man's lowly, earthly nature is made partaker of the divine, heavenly nature via union with Christ and the uncreated divine energies that mediate Him, which the Orthodox strictly define as benefits of membership into their exclusive faith communion. The upshot of all this is an under-appreciation of the effects of sin, and consequently of the necessity and nature of the obedience of Christ and the atonement. Sure, it still has its place, but the emphasis is really 'theosis' through ascetic devotional exercises, performance of ceremonial rites, meditation, and other such monkery. Even faith itself becomes an implicit thing as demonstrated by one's participation in the church's liturgy.

It saddens me greatly when I hear of formerly evangelical and even Reformed believers being ensnared by what they believe to be the "ancient ways", when in reality it is as superstitious as Papism, but with even less correct doctrine. EO is, in my humble opinion, simply Buddhism wearing Christian garb.

 

[Knight]

How can a man receive "ancestral sin" and not be guilty? Surely it is a divine judgment. Otherwise it would have to be seen as a natural necessity, which makes God obliged to a power outside Himself. I suppose they would then have to hold to some sort of "ransom to the devil" theory.

I wonder if those who reject Augustinian original sin among the EO also hold to universal salvation.

It may surprise you, but some Reformed theologians have taught the same. Charles Hodge, for example, writes that "Imputation does not imply a participation of the criminality of the sin imputed" (Hodge, Theology, Vol. II, p. 194). His is a minority position, though, as admitted by Fesko and Murray; link). That is, he (and EOs) might accept reatus poenae but not reatus culpa. The latter is Augustinian. See Against Julian (link), and check against the Latin:

You demand I explain 'how the Devil dares to claim for himself infants created in Christ, that is, in His power.' You must answer, if you can, how the Devil openly, not obscurely, claims infants harassed by unclean spirits. If you say they have been delivered up to him, we both see the torment; you must say what deserves it. We both perceive the punishment; but you who say that nothing deserving of punishment is contracted from parents, while we both confess God is just, must prove, if you can, that there is in infants guilt (culpam) deserving such punishment (poenam). Do you not realize this is part of the heavy yoke upon the children of Adam from the day of their coming out of their mother's womb until the day of their burial in the mother of all?

This is why I favor Samuel Baird's understanding of original sin, which falls into what George P. Hutchinson classifies as the "Realist School" in his excellent thesis which is fair to all "schools," The Problem of Original Sin in American Presbyterianism (which I've probably recommended half a dozen times on this board in the past year ).

While I think Romanides is looked at as fringe amongst EOs, his claim that "The presuppositions of the Greek Fathers precluded any notion of universal inherited guilt of original sin" (link) seems to be a common EO perspective. It's been a while since I read his book, but I recall Chrysostom in particular was mentioned. Whether this is defensible is more than I can say.

That Augustine was at the Council of Carthage (419) leads me to suppose that its statement in Canon 110 that "even infants, who could have committed as yet no sin themselves, therefore are truly baptized for the remission of sins" is Augustinian. The concept of "remission" itself seems to imply reatus culpa. But this is less of a concern to me insofar as it suffices to note their Mariology has problematically dictated their anthropology.

 

[MW]

It may surprise you, but some Reformed theologians have taught the same. Charles Hodge, for example, writes that "Imputation does not imply a participation of the criminality of the sin imputed" (Hodge, Theology, Vol. II, p. 194). His is a minority position, though, as admitted by Fesko and Murray; link). That is, he (and EOs) might accept reatus poenae but not reatus culpa. The latter is Augustinian. See Against Julian (link), and check against the Latin:

Are you sure you have the correct reference for Hodge? I am seeing that statement in Theological Essays, where immediate imputation is being argued against mediate imputation of the school of Saumur. In the page on Systematic Theology he defines it as "the judicial obligation to satisfy justice."

If "criminality" is defined as Hodge defines it, I agree with him. But guilt as liability to punishment remains as the basis of imputation, and it is only on this account of immediate imputation that we can properly account for the corruption of the human race.

 

[MW]

At the same time, they view the incarnation as a sort of "ontological redemption" all its own; man's lowly, earthly nature is made partaker of the divine, heavenly nature via union with Christ and the uncreated divine energies that mediate Him, which the Orthodox strictly define as benefits of membership into their exclusive faith communion.

One speaker said, It is a whole different ballpark; only to be corrected by another, No, sir, it is a whole different ballgame.

 

[Knight]

Are you sure you have the correct reference for Hodge? I am seeing that statement in Theological Essays, where immediate imputation is being argued against mediate imputation of the school of Saumur. In the page on Systematic Theology he defines it as "the judicial obligation to satisfy justice."

If "criminality" is defined as Hodge defines it, I agree with him. But guilt as liability to punishment remains as the basis of imputation, and it is only on this account of immediate imputation that we can properly account for the corruption of the human race.

It may depend on the edition, or I may have just misremembered the page number. Here, for example, one can find it on page 181.

The question is not immediate imputation, for realists accept immediate imputation. Baird accepts it, to take one example. And John Murray, who was no realist, agreed:

It is not necessary to discuss the question whether Edwards was a realist in his view of the Adamic union. The realist as well as the federalist holds to immediate imputation and the point at issue is not affected by the question of Edwards' affinities on that other issue." (John Murray, The Imputation of Adam's Sin, pg. 56)

The question is, as Robert Landis puts it, whether or not the imputation of Adam's sin is gratuitous.

 

[Knight]

It is not the topic of this thread, but I will offer just one more comment from a contemporary analysis of Hodge's view. From C. N. Wilborn's essay "Charles Hodge, the Sin Problem, and History" in Charles Hodge: American Reformed Orthodox Theologian, he concludes:

Was Hodge accurate when he averred that he had introduced no new ideas nor attempted to improve upon the tradition? In charity we think he honestly thought so. Is there reason to doubt that he maintained a position consistent with “old Calvinists” on the issue of federalism and transmission of Adam’s sin? There is, we think, good reason to doubt his consistency. Did he overreach in claiming a number of post-Reformation representatives in support of his views? We have shown good reason to say so. And, finally, was Muller’s supposition accurate that Hodge made no formal or virtually no dogmatic alterations to Reformed Orthodoxy? That little word “virtually” may be the saving virtue in the statement. Yet, Hodge did alter Reformed ideas at points.

 

[MW]

It may depend on the edition, or I may have just misremembered the page number. Here, for example, one can find it on page 181.

Unless I'm living in a parallel virtual universe, that link just came up with Theological Essays, not Systematic Theology.

Quote: "The question is not immediate imputation, for realists accept immediate imputation. Baird accepts it, to take one example. And John Murray, who was no realist, agreed."

I don't doubt that a "realist" with respect to original sin might accept immediate imputation as the legal basis for his realism. But in most cases they have asserted that the real connection with Adam is the basis for the imputation, which is "mediate" imputation.

I have no desire to clear Hodge just for the sake of it, but on this point he was right. There is no natural reason why the corruption of our first parents should be conveyed to their posterity. It is only as an act of divine judgment that it can be properly accounted for, and that act of divine judgment must proceed on the basis of guilt, i.e., liability to punishment. Any other view of it makes man an unfortunate victim of his environment, and even tends to impugn the Creator for making man under such unfortunate and unavoidable circumstances.

 

[Knight]

Unless I'm living in a parallel virtual universe, that link just came up with Theological Essays, not Systematic Theology.

Quote: "The question is not immediate imputation, for realists accept immediate imputation. Baird accepts it, to take one example. And John Murray, who was no realist, agreed."

I don't doubt that a "realist" with respect to original sin might accept immediate imputation as the legal basis for his realism. But in most cases they have asserted that the real connection with Adam is the basis for the imputation, which is "mediate" imputation.

I have no desire to clear Hodge just for the sake of it, but on this point he was right. There is no natural reason why the corruption of our first parents should be conveyed to their posterity. It is only as an act of divine judgment that it can be properly accounted for, and that act of divine judgment must proceed on the basis of guilt, i.e., liability to punishment. Any other view of it makes man an unfortunate victim of his environment, and even tends to impugn the Creator for making man under such unfortunate and unavoidable circumstances.

Correct. I had intended to quote from his Theological Essays, not his Systematic Theology.

I believe you misunderstand "mediate imputation." Hutchinson summarizes mediate imputation through the lens of Henry B. Smith: "Native corruption is not a penal consequence of the guilt of Adam's sin" (The Problem of Original Sin in American Presbyterianism, pg. 25). See also John Murray, The Imputation of Adam's Sin, pg. 42:

The name particularly associated with the doctrine of mediate imputation is that of Josua Placaeus (Josué de la Place) of the Reformed school at Saumur. He was understood to have taught that original sin consisted simply in the depravity derived from Adam and did not include the imputation of the guilt of Adam’s first sin... Immediate and antecedent imputation, he contended, must be distinguished from mediate and consequent. The former takes place immediately and is not mediated by hereditary corruption; the latter takes place mediately and is mediated by this corruption. In the former case the imputation of Adam’s first sin precedes corruption in the order of nature and is reckoned to be the cause of corruption; in the latter case the imputation of the first sin follows hereditary corruption and is reckoned to be the effect.

This is obviously not what realists with respect to original sin thought, and it is unfortunate that this misrepresentation is still present in Reformed thought. The authors I reference do an excellent job of explicating - if not defending - the realist view as it actually is.

 

[ReformedChristian]

Robert Morey wrote a book on Eastern Orthodoxy I am about to read it. Also Joshua Schooping wrote a book on EO, also check out Ancient Paths TV's documentary.

 

[MW]

I believe you misunderstand "mediate imputation."

According to the unapologetica link: "opponents of the view don't seem to understand it." Being an opponent of the view I suppose that puts me in that category. I'm inclined to think that it is not a case of misunderstanding but of simple dissent to an error.

 

[Knight]

According to the unapologetica link: "opponents of the view don't seem to understand it." Being an opponent of the view I suppose that puts me in that category. I'm inclined to think that it is not a case of misunderstanding but of simple dissent to an error.

I wrote that post, and while the mere fact you are an opponent to the view doesn't necessitate your misrepresentation, your seeming unwillingness to just admit an error in representing the realist view is all too common.

Edit: from C. N. Wilborn's essay "Charles Hodge, the Sin Problem, and History" in Charles Hodge: American Reformed Orthodox Theologian: "While mediate imputation denied both imputed guilt and liability to punishment for that guilt, realism retained liability to punishment for Adam’s first sin
Again, it is important to remember that Hodge still replaced imputed guilt with liability to punishment, however, which was likely why he still found affinities with Edwards’ realism." (pg. 210)

Again, Murray and Wilborn are not realists. But at least they characterize the position correctly on this point.

 

[MW]

I wrote that post, and while the mere fact you are an opponent to the view doesn't necessitate your misrepresentation, your seeming unwillingness to just admit an error in representing the realist view is all too common.

Your "belief" is not "proof," so why should I "admit" to an error? Would you like to demonstrate the error? I have granted that a realist position does not necessitate mediate imputation, and yet it is a fact that realists in general revert to that position. Then I am told you believe I misunderstand mediate imputation. You will need to demonstrate this rather than call for me to admit it as if you must be infallible in your beliefs.

 

[Knight]

Your "belief" is not "proof," so why should I "admit" to an error? Would you like to demonstrate the error? I have granted that a realist position does not necessitate mediate imputation, and yet it is a fact that realists in general revert to that position. Then I am told you believe I misunderstand mediate imputation. You will need to demonstrate this rather than call for me to admit it as if you must be infallible in your beliefs.

To summarize, I will repeat my citation of John Murray for the benefit of the reader who wants to know what mediate imputation actually is: "the imputation of the first sin follows hereditary corruption and is reckoned to be the effect." Is this what the realist believes? As Murray himself (who wasn't a realist!) wrote, "The realist as well as the federalist holds to immediate imputation."

I've not argued that a mere belief constitutes proof. Then again, I have not merely been stating my beliefs, and I would encourage you to engage the scholars I've cited who explain what "mediate imputation" actually is. You haven't commented on any of them.

1. Are these scholars just stating "beliefs" without evidence, do you think?

None of the scholars I've cited think that mediate imputation has anything to do with one who holds that a "real connection with Adam is the basis for the imputation." But this is what you said in post 48: "in most cases they [realists] have asserted that the real connection with Adam is the basis for the imputation, which is "mediate" imputation."

This definition you provide would mean that Placaeus didn't even accept mediate imputation! How absurd! This is why I believe you misunderstand the issue. If you think the scholars I cite are wrong:

2. Where do you find your definition for "mediate imputation" in any scholarly literature?
3. Also, to which understanding of mediate imputation - the definition you provide or the definition the scholars I cite provide - are you suggesting that "it is a fact" realists "revert" to? I am unclear on this point.

 

[MW]

1. Are these scholars just stating "beliefs" without evidence, do you think?

Relevance? At what point do any of these scholars demonstrate I am in error? I have granted what they affirmed. My statement about the real connection with Adam is supported by Murray. In the chapter on the nature of imputation he has a section on mediate imputation. I will just go through the roll call of names:

Josua Placaeus and the Saumur school.
Campegius Vitringa, Hermann Venema, and J. F. Stapfer.
New England theologians of the eighteenth century.
Samuel Hopkins.
Nathanael Emmons.
Timothy Dwight.
Nathaniel W. Taylor.
Jonathan Edwards is disputed.
New school theology in the Presbyterian Church in the nineteenth century. Henry B. Smith.

My statement (quoted by you): "in most cases they [realists] have asserted that the real connection with Adam is the basis for the imputation, which is "mediate" imputation."

Murray: "Mediate imputation does maintain that the sin of Adam was imputed to posterity, that posterity was involved in Adam’s sin, and that the sin of the one man Adam was the sin of all. And the question is whether this involvement is directly based upon the relation which Adam sustained to posterity or whether it is mediated through the inheritance from Adam of a corrupt nature.

Is this a definition you can agree on? Or has Murray "misunderstood" it?

 

[Knight]

Relevance? At what point do any of these scholars demonstrate I am in error? I have granted what they affirmed. My statement about the real connection with Adam is supported by Murray. In the chapter on the nature of imputation he has a section on mediate imputation. I will just go through the roll call of names:

Josua Placaeus and the Saumur school.
Campegius Vitringa, Hermann Venema, and J. F. Stapfer.
New England theologians of the eighteenth century.
Samuel Hopkins.
Nathanael Emmons.
Timothy Dwight.
Nathaniel W. Taylor.
Jonathan Edwards is disputed.
New school theology in the Presbyterian Church in the nineteenth century. Henry B. Smith.

Please refer to pages 24-36 of Murray's book on "The Realist View." Do you see any of these names in that section? No. None of these persons are realists. So what is your point in naming them?

Recall that in post 48, you replied to the following statement I made: "The question is not immediate imputation, for realists accept immediate imputation. Baird accepts it, to take one example. And John Murray, who was no realist, agreed."

You replied: "I don't doubt that a "realist" with respect to original sin might accept immediate imputation as the legal basis for his realism. But in most cases they have asserted that the real connection with Adam is the basis for the imputation, which is "mediate" imputation."

This whole conversation has been about what realists think and untangling your mistake that realists might or do hold to mediate imputation.

Murray: "Mediate imputation does maintain that the sin of Adam was imputed to posterity, that posterity was involved in Adam’s sin, and that the sin of the one man Adam was the sin of all. And the question is whether this involvement is directly based upon the relation which Adam sustained to posterity or whether it is mediated through the inheritance from Adam of a corrupt nature.

Is this a definition you can agree on? Or has Murray "misunderstood" it?

Of course I agree with Murray here. It is no different than what I already quoted from him, that "the imputation of the first sin follows hereditary corruption and is reckoned to be the effect."

This is completely different than the definition of mediate imputation you provided earlier. You said: "the real connection with Adam is the basis for the imputation, which is "mediate" imputation."

At the risk of sounding like a broken records, your statement here is incorrect. Do you still think this?

Again, Murray is saying that mediate imputation view means that the "basis for imputation" is the corrupt nature one inherits. None of the realists Murray lists accepted this. Do you deny this?

Likewise, none of those whom Murray lists as members of the mediate imputation view regarded one's "real connection with Adam" as the "basis for imputation." Rather, the basis is "hereditary corruption," of which imputation is regarded to be "the effect." Do you deny this?

Are the realist position and mediate imputation position distinct or overlapping? Murray, Hutchinson, Wilborn, et al. distinguish them. So no, you do not agree with these scholars.

 

[MW]

Ryan, I can see where you are coming from now. You have taken my statements and understood them as if I were initially engaging with the particular issue you have addressed in your blogpost. I was originally dealing with the EO issue in terms of "ancestral sin," as quoted from Lowth. After that point we have engaged on the issue of your blogpost and the two have been conflated while I have still attempted to deal with the initial problem raised by ancestral sin. As I have failed to follow you in the precise point you were making I apologise. I assumed the realism in my comments on connection with Adam. That is my fault for not parsing the issue properly. I take your point about Murray dealing with realism and mediate imputation separately.

All that said, I still stand with Hodge. If I were to directly address Baird, without getting sidetracked by the idea of "ancestral sin," and granting him the position that he is teaching immediate imputation, we end up with the following emphasised statement in your blogpost: "we are, at the bar of God, held to have sinned in him because the nature that is in us flowed to us from him."

I may contrast this with his own quotation of De Moor quoting Hoornbeek on p. 507:

"This man stood as the root, the source, the head, the fountain, of the whole nature; and this by a double title, — as the natural head from whom the whole nature was to be propagated, (Acts xvii. 26 ; Gen. ii.) — and as the moral head, in whose obedience or disobedience our universal nature stood or fell in an equal fortune with his. From the former is derived our nature; from the latter, its moral attitude. From the one it is that we are men ; from the other, that we are such men, whether good or evil."

By our natural head we derive our nature, our whole nature. But it is by our moral head that we stand or fall, or are good and evil. Baird makes the latter depend on the former. De Moor and Hoornbeek make conveyance depend on natural headship while our standing depends on moral headship.

I hope we can continue to discuss this and keep the original idea of ancestral sin out of it as this is going to confuse the issue for me.

 

[Knight]

I have only wanted to stress that Reformed realists did not hold to mediate imputation. It is a completely distinct position. If we agree on that, then we can leave that issue aside as well as what EOs think.

I recall asking someone who is translating De Moor on this board about Baird's citation of him. Unfortunately, I believe he said that he hasn't gotten to it yet.

If some (infants) die and are liable to punishment for sins for which they are not culpable - infants who have not participated in a crime, as Hodge puts it - that is the same as saying that God could punish the innocent for no other reason than that it is His good pleasure. Robert Landis was exactly right to focus on the deviation of Hodge from yhe Reformed tradition on this point, making the imputation of Adam's sin gratuitous.

 

[MW]

I recall asking someone who is translating De Moor on this board about Baird's citation of him. Unfortunately, I believe he said that he hasn't gotten to it yet.

He is up to creation. So we will have to wait a little longer. Do you grant the distinction I observed between Baird and De Moor/Hoornbeek?

Quote: "making the imputation of Adam's sin gratuitous."

That is precisely the opposite of Hodge's point. Infants dying proves a judicial act concerning them, as per Rom. 5:12-14.

 

[Knight]

He is up to creation. So we will have to wait a little longer. Do you grant the distinction I observed between Baird and De Moor/Hoornbeek?

I do, but I'm not sure how straightforward the issue is if our nature equally stood or fell in virtue of Adam's moral obedience or disobedience (given that it is through Adam's nature that he obeyed or disobeyed). I'll need to think about it more, and I'd like to see fuller context of De Moor's view.

Quote: "making the imputation of Adam's sin gratuitous."

That is precisely the opposite of Hodge's point. Infants dying proves a judicial act concerning them, as per Rom. 5:12-14.

The point is: does that judicial act of punishment of infants correspond to reality? Are infants punished as participative criminals in sin or not?