Eastern Orthodoxy and Original Sin

[MW]

I do, but I'm not sure how straightforward the issue is if our nature equally stood or fell in virtue of Adam's moral obedience or disobedience (given that it is through Adam's nature that he obeyed or disobeyed). I'll need to think about it more, and I'd like to see fuller context of De Moor's view.



The point is: does that judicial act of punishment of infants correspond to reality? Are infants punished as participative criminals in sin or not?

It looks like we will have to wait for more of De Moor (!)

It "corresponds" to the reality of the covenant under which they were constituted by God. "Participative," yes, in Hodge's definition of "guilt," which is sufficient for a judgment according to truth.

 

[Knight]

Hosge: "Imputation does not imply a participation of the criminality of the sin imputed."

Hodge: To impute sin, in Scriptural and theological language, is to impute the guilt of sin. And by guilt is meant not criminality or moral ill-desert, or demerit, much less moral pollution, but the judicial obligation to satisfy justice.

I'm struggling to reconcile this with your statement. What sort of "justice" does not take into account criminality and so forth when judging? Again, Hodge rejected Augustinian reatus culpa.

I'll put it this way; what do you think of Murray's analysis of Hodge in the context of the Reformed tradition on pgs. 72-85?

 

[MW]

We dealt with criminality earlier. It's on another page now. "Mea culpa!" That is, I am to "blame." That blame rests on the person who personally committed the sin. And in the case of the imputation of sin to Christ (2 Cor. 5:21) there is no criminality in terms of personal blame.

Of course it is the case that sinners come to participate in blame by their own personal corruption and actual transgressions, but this can only properly be seen as a penal or judicial consequence -- the result of a just judgment going before -- and this must be traced back to federal headship. Otherwise it's a necessity of nature, and my previous comments address that point.

I'll get back to you on Murray. I will also try to get another independent witness in Cunningham if I can dig him out. For the time being I have to finish tonight's study. And it might be a good thing to give the well-cooked steak of this discussion time to rest before we eat it.

 

[yeutter]

The Third Œcumenical Council, the Council of Ephesus Canon 4​

"If any of the clergy should fall away, and publicly or privately presume to maintain the doctrines of Nestorius or Celestius, it is declared just by the holy Synod that these also should be deposed."

Two of my EO friends [one Greek, one Antiochian] tell me that the version of the Council of Ephesus they receive, does not condemn the doctrines of Celestius, but only Celestius as a person, and that he is condemned for fraternizing with Nestorius.

These EO affirm that all men inherit ancestral sin but make a distinction between ancestral sin and original sin.

Does this understanding represent the official understanding of the Greek Church?

 

[Knight]

We dealt with criminality earlier. It's on another page now. "Mea culpa!" That is, I am to "blame." That blame rests on the person who personally committed the sin.

That is Hodge's view, yes. To draw out the implication, on Hodge's view, infants did not personally commit any sins. According to the reasoning in bold, then, they are subjectively blameless, and that means God punishes those who are subjectively blameless.

If that is a fair (albeit brief) summary - and I am by no means the first theologian to note this - I take it to be a reductio of Hodge's position. It's absurd to suppose that covenantal fiat could somehow render just a verdict of guilt or divine punishment upon a blameless person without their consent (e.g. Christ's voluntary sacrifice).

Further, it means God ascribes (imputes) to those who participated in no crime a criminality (sin). Such an ascription would be a lie.

And in the case of the imputation of sin to Christ (2 Cor. 5:21) there is no criminality in terms of personal blame.

I don't think sin is imputed to Christ. This is not in our standards and would come with its own set of problems, I think. To ascribe sin to Christ without qualification is a lie, of course. Or if one suggests it is "our" sins which are imputed to Christ, whose sins, and when would said sins have been imputed to Christ? Surely they are not imputed to Him while He currently reigns on high and as children of wrath daily convert to become sons of God. I also assume we both reject eternal justification.

But if, say, sin was imputed to Christ on the cross, are those who are elect in the NT age born condemned and under divine wrath? That would be ironically suspect to Owen's double jeopardy argument.

Let me be clear: I affirm Christ's righteousness is imputed to us. But insofar as I think union with Christ via the Spirit logically precedes imputation of His righteous to us, this imputation corresponds to reality. The Father really sees Him in us, whereas on the cross, we were not, as yet, in Him.

I also affirm penal substitution, and I reject a pecuniary view of the atonement. I discuss this further here and here if you care to read more. That's just full disclosure.

Of course it is the case that sinners come to participate in blame by their own personal corruption and actual transgressions, but this can only properly be seen as a penal or judicial consequence -- the result of a just judgment going before -- and this must be traced back to federal headship.

In other words, you think imputation and punishment antecedes participation. Okay, well that's exactly why several theologians called Hodge's view of imputation gratuitous.

The idea God can assign a "federal head" to represent other people without a grounding relation between the parties in reality (cf. "natural headship") smacks of an extreme view of divine voluntarism on which God could have decreed a covenant in which He accepted an angelic-incarnational rather than a Christological sacrifice for sinners. After all, why not? This sort of slope becomes slippery quite quickly.

Otherwise it's a necessity of nature, and my previous comments address that point.

You had written: "How can a man receive "ancestral sin" and not be guilty? Surely it is a divine judgment. Otherwise it would have to be seen as a natural necessity, which makes God obliged to a power outside Himself."

God created our nature. Absolute voluntarism and necessitarianism constitute a false dichotomy. God was not necessitated to create our nature such that many propagate out of one (e.g. angels), but given that He freely did so decree, what follows is a divinely ordained and real relation between a federal head and those whom he represents such that what the head, the first Adam, communicates to those represented is that in virtue of which they may be really said to have participated in his sin.

You could question the justice of such a decree, but that's resolvable via ordinary theodicy. The advantage it has is to connect God's judicial declarations of guilt regarding real creatures to their being really culpable (refer back to Augustine's statement in Against Julian), something missing in Hodge.

The Third Œcumenical Council, the Council of Ephesus Canon 4​

"If any of the clergy should fall away, and publicly or privately presume to maintain the doctrines of Nestorius or Celestius, it is declared just by the holy Synod that these also should be deposed."

Two of my EO friends [one Greek, one Antiochian] tell me that the version of the Council of Ephesus they receive, does not condemn the doctrines of Celestius, but only Celestius as a person, and that he is condemned for fraternizing with Nestorius.

These EO affirm that all men inherit ancestral sin but make a distinction between ancestral sin and original sin.

Does this understanding represent the official understanding of the Greek Church?

Ask the about canon 110 of Carthage 419 (which explicitly references "original sin" and was a council at which Augustine was present), whether this council was accepted at Trullo (canon 2), and whether Trullo was accepted in turn by Nicaea II.

 

[MW]

That is Hodge's view, yes. To draw out the implication, on Hodge's view, infants did not personally commit any sins. According to the reasoning in bold, then, they are subjectively blameless, and that means God punishes those who are subjectively blameless.

I'm still working on Murray's critique of Hodge. I might start another thread if that suits you because I can then provide additional testimony to the thread as I dig out quotations from others.

"Imputation" gives them that liability to punishment, an imputation based on federal headship and representation. They are not subjectively blameless in the sense that they are sinless. They are reckoned sinners in Adam., but they are not personally to blame for eating the forbidden fruit. They weren't alive when that happened.

Quote: "It's absurd to suppose that covenantal fiat could somehow render just a verdict of guilt or divine punishment upon a blameless person without their consent (e.g. Christ's voluntary sacrifice)."

There is no "fiat" unless you mean the covenant of works which constitutes Adam the head of the race is a positive appointment. That much is granted; and that is where all the old issues related to headship tend to be fought. But what follows from that point is all "legal," "forensic," etc. Adam is acknowledged as the covenant head of the race; the justness of punishing his posterity has various analogies to justify it in human affairs.

Quote: "Further, it means God ascribes (imputes) to those who participated in no crime a criminality (sin). Such an ascription would be a lie."

This is the issue of "legal fiction." If we deny it we have lost the doctrine of imputation.


Quote: "I don't think sin is imputed to Christ."

I quoted 2 Cor. 5:21. What does "made sin" mean there? He was punished for our sins, i.e., he was made liable to satisfy justice for them. Hodge's definition. Do you deny Christ was punished for our sins? As far as I am aware, the Southern theologians who rejected Hodge's view maintained there was not exact symmetry in the imputation of sin; they did not deny that our sins are imputed to Christ in the sense Hodge explains it.

Quote: "To ascribe sin to Christ without qualification is a lie, of course. Or if one suggests it is "our" sins which are imputed to Christ, whose sins, and when would said sins have been imputed to Christ? Surely they are not imputed to Him while He currently reigns on high and as children of wrath daily convert to become sons of God. I also assume we both reject eternal justification."

I reject eternal justification as an "act." The sins of the elect were imputed to Christ decretively from eternity, Rev. 13:8 AV, and He bare our sins in His own body on the tree, 1 Pet. 2:23. He was justified in the Spirit, 1 Tim. 3:16, hence released from the liability; and so raised for our justification, Rom. 4:25.

Quote: "But if, say, sin was imputed to Christ on the cross, are those who are elect in the NT age born condemned and under divine wrath? That would be ironically suspect to Owen's double jeopardy argument."

This is all pretty basic stuff. I find it hard to believe you would enter into discussions on this matter as if it were debatable. As an "act," we are justified by faith. These things are all connected in the covenant of grace.

Quote: "Let me be clear: I affirm Christ's righteousness is imputed to us. But insofar as I think union with Christ via the Spirit logically precedes imputation of His righteous to us, this imputation corresponds to reality. The Father really sees Him in us, whereas on the cross, we were not, as yet, in Him."

That is all true; but all this is only possible because of Christ's headship in the covenant of grace. Without that positive appointment nothing He did could be done for us. So that headship logically precedes union.

Quote: "God created our nature. Absolute voluntarism and necessitarianism constitute a false dichotomy. God was not necessitated to create our nature such that many propagate out of one (e.g. angels), but given that He freely did so decree, what follows is a divinely ordained and real relation between a federal head and those whom he represents such that what the head, the first Adam, communicates to those represented is that in virtue of which they may be really said to have participated in his sin."

We are back to the De Moor/Hoornbeek distinction. All natural headship provides is the communication of human nature. It does not provide that the nature shall be good or evil. Moral headship is required for that, and that is a positive appointment.

 

[Knight]

If, in the future, you wish for me to reply on the Murray thread as a follow-up to anything I say below, I leave it to your discretion to split your next response accordingly.

On Hodge's definition, to impute means to ascribe. Your admission that Hodge's view of imputation entails fiction concedes my points, does it not? On your and Hodge's view, God is making ascriptions in accordance with reality. God is ascribing blame to those who are subjectively blameless.

If I am not misunderstanding you (please correct me if so), I regard this as wicked and unbiblical, and I do not use such language loosely. The wages of sin is death, not the wages of a fictitious ascription of sin. The soul that sins, it shall die, not the soul to which God fictitiously ascribes sin:

...since this transgression was not merely personal, as were those which followed it, but common, and, in a sense, belonging to the nature, it hence appears that the dogma of the Pelagians and Remonstrants is to be rejected, — that 'the sin of Adam was so alien to us that it could not be called ours'; for by God it could not be imputed to us justly, unless it was in some manner ours, since 'the soul that sinneth, it shall die'— Ezek. xviii. 4."

Your suggestion that there is no alternative to fictional imputation is question-begging. Additionally, it is dangerous. For example, I have rejected Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy because of the availability of an alternative to what you are suggesting. According to your reasoning, their apologists would be correct to label Reformed theology as nominalistic. I repeat, this is dangerous.

The first and last Adams are inversely parallel: pertaining to the spirit of the first Adam, by natural generation we are born out of him and his (and "our") sin. By contrast, pertaining to the Spirit of the last Adam, in regeneration we are born into Him and His righteousness (et al.). Death to life. Works to grace.

The first Adam is the eternally ordained head of the covenant of works, members of which have been eternally ordained but are existentially produced by generation. The last Adam is the ordained head of the covenant of grace, members of which have been eternally ordained but are existentially produced by regeneration. The question is less about how whether the heads are ordained and more about how the body is related to the head.

Christ indeed suffered "for" our sins - He was a sin offering. But "for" is teleological, not transactional. The same people for whom Christ's sacrifice is intended are the same people to whom Christ's sacrifice will be applied, although when these two things happen are different (intent = eternal; application = upon conversion). Some of this is "basic" stuff in which we are agreement, but what I'm getting at is that I'm still puzzled about when, on your or Hodge's view, "our" were imputed to Christ. You mention we are justified by faith - of course, this is true. But are you saying that at the time we come to faith, our sins are then ascribed to Christ, not at the time of the cross? Did God fictionally ascribe our sin to the Son?

If I haven't made it explicit, I am a traducianist. In post 30, I linked to a critique of Eastern Orthodoxy in which one such apologist equivocates between concrete and abstract or exemplified humanity. I consider Adam to be natural head not only on that he communicates "humanity" to his progeny in terms of an exemplification relation an archetypal, participable, divine idea, but also in that we inherit his spirit.

In simple terms, the essence of postlapsarian humanity remains the same as prelapsarian humanity. On the other hand, the concrete spirit each of us (aside from the virgin-born Son) is morally corrupt because it is that same spirit which participated in the original sin. True, we did not personally exist when Adam's sin was committed. But that has never been the contention of the realist (link).

A few follow-ups:

1. Do you agree Hodge's position is not Augustinian insofar as Hodge rejects reatus culpa?

2. This is probably the most important question I will ask: are you an absolute voluntarist? To be concrete, what are your thoughts on the following by Greg Bahnsen (with which I am in entire agreement)?

God’s volition[/B], that is to say his expressed will, saying “Thou shalt not murder” is based upon who he is—the kind of God he is and that is unchanging. So, the character of God is the basis of Christian morality, not simply the revelation of God or threats of eternal punishment if we should be murderers and so forth.

 

[MW]

I am giving up on the quote function. It is impossible to manage in an exchange of points.

First, legal fiction is not a fiction, it's a real thing. But it's legal. Without it we cannot be at the same time sinner and justified, or, in other words, be justified by an alien righteousness. It is necessary to speak of something as forensic. Yes, we are nominalists, according to their definition of realism. We can't fight them on that. We oppose them on the basis that Scripture speaks of sin and righteousness in terms of law, nomos, from which we derive the word nominalism.

Secondly, there is a reality that accompanies the legal. The issue is the proper relation of the real and the forensic. We have already been over this. Natural headship only allows for the communication of nature, not its quality of being good or evil. The moral headship is necessary for the latter. You need to address this point.

Thirdly, as soon as you quote Ezek. 18, the soul that sins shall die, you have yielded the ground to Hodge. You are now required to state in what sense sin can be imputed at all. It can't be imputed so as to nullify personal culpability. Hence the necessity of distinguishing reatus (guilt).

Fourthly, if you deny Christ bearing sin is transactional we are left without imputation at all. Our discussion about immediate and mediate imputation was beside the point.

Fifthly, If you are a traducian, and you hold original sin in a realist sense, and that it is so by necessity of nature, you are culpable for all the sins of all your forbears. This does not bring us to the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's first sin. Why are we even having this discussion? Is it a mere intellectual exercise for you?

Lastly, your most important question is conflated. There is moral and positive law. Moral, commanded because good; positive, good because commanded. The character of God is the basis of Christian morality, or more accurately, the relation of the creature to the nature of God. But God's actions towards the creature, while grounded in the morality of that relation, is the result of "dispensation," and that is not unchangeable. If it were unchangeable sin and punishment would be unchangeable and we would all be damned.

 

[Knight]

Nominalism is a theory in which "ideas are mere names without any corresponding reality." Take the statement that "God justifies the ungodly." Are the objects of justification "ungodly"? According to that in reality which they have worked on their own, yes. Does that render God's "justification" of them a legal fiction? According to that in reality which the Christ who is in union with them worked on His own, no. God is not ascribing something to someone which has no correspondence to or grounding in reality. Just so with Adamic imputation of sin, as we are also really united to him insofar as our spirits were traduced out of his.

To rephrase the criticism, then, the wages of sin is death, not the wages of an ascription of sin "without any corresponding reality." God judges truthfully.

Natural headship only allows for the communication of nature, not its quality of being good or evil. The moral headship is necessary for the latter. You need to address this point.

In explicating my acceptance of traducianism, I already did. I even specified that "the concrete spirit each of us (aside from the virgin-born Son) has is morally corrupt because it is that same spirit which participated in the original sin." I'm not sure if you missed this or why you consider it an insufficient response. Perhaps you could restate the issue in other terms so I can see whether or not it is begging the question against realism.

Thirdly, as soon as you quote Ezek. 18, the soul that sins shall die, you have yielded the ground to Hodge. You are now required to state in what sense sin can be imputed at all. It can't be imputed so as to nullify personal culpability. Hence the necessity of distinguishing reatus (guilt).

Please elaborate? I could interpret you as objecting that if those who propagated from Adam did not participate in Adam's sin as persons, then why are we judged as persons. Is this your point? Samuel Baird provides an answer:

Since, in general, every kind of obligation implies the exercise of some kind of efficiency and since the moral nature is the only principle of moral efficiency, in a person, it follows, that all moral obligations must lay hold of the nature; else are they altogether nugatory and void. Furthermore, we have seen the ultimate principle of all moral obligation to be, conformity to God. We have seen man's moral nature to have been formed for the express purpose of being God's likeness; especially, in his moral attributes, — in knowledge, righteousness and holiness. Since, therefore, it is evident that nothing which is extrinsic or formal can be in the moral likeness of that holy and incomprehensible Spirit, it follows, that all obligation — as it implies a requirement to conform to the moral likeness of God — must address that, from which only the features of that likeness can flow, — the nature of the agent. The same conclusion results from yet another line of thought. The attributes, by which a moral agent is capable of recognising, appreciating and fulfilling the obligations which are addressed to him, are reason, conscience and the will. But these, although existent in the spiritual substance of the moral agent, are not parts of it, but characteristics of the nature, which dwells in the substance. Hence, as the claims of the Creator not only appeal to the nature, but are cognizable by it alone, it is manifest that upon it their obligations rest.

Whilst, thus; all moral obligations arise out of the constitution of the nature, and lay hold, essentially, upon it, the subject against which they are enforced, is the person in which the nature subsists; and this for evident reasons. It is only in the form of a person that a moral nature can subsist. All that is proper to the person, or in any way characteristic of it as such, grows out of the nature, and is designed and constructed as a means for the activity of the nature; so that the person is but the nature embodied in a form adapted to its efficient action. It is the organization through which the nature may meet its responsibilities, by performing the duties demanded of it. Since, therefore, the nature can neither exist, nor, therefore, be responsible, neither recognise nor satisfy its responsibilities, but as it is embodied in a person; and since to it, as thus embodied, the obligations which rest upon it, are for this reason by God addressed, it follows that persons are the immediate and only subjects of moral law and responsibility. The nature comprehends all the forces which are proper to the person in which it subsists. Among these are not only included those of which obligation or obedience may be supposed, but those susceptibilities upon which may be predicated the realization of suffering, the endurance of punishment. There is, therefore, nothing in the person of which exemption can be imagined, as apart from the nature. Were it possible to take away the nature and yet the person remain; — were it possible to suppose any other forces proper to the person than all its proper forces, — then would there be room for the conception, that the person might be irresponsible for the nature and have a responsibility distinct from it. But so long as it is true, that the moral nature is that which makes the person what it is in all moral respects; and that the only existence of the nature is in the person; it will follow, that the attempt to separate the obligations of the nature and of the person is absurd and preposterous. The person is bound under the responsibilities which attach to the nature as subsisting therein; and can be held to no others than such as arise thence. The form of the obligation is, indeed, modified by the accidents of the person; but such accidental forms are always capable of resolution into general principles, which attach essentially to the nature. Every accidental form, which, in the varying circumstances of life, our duties assume, is capable of being reduced to the one principle of love, — to the one duty of conformity with the likeness of Him of whom it is testified, that God is love; and unless the given duty be performed through the activity of a principle of love, springing in the nature, and thence breathing through the soul, it is not performed at all.

To put it in my own words, persons don't exist apart from natures, nor vice versa. Persons enhypostatize natures. Our participation in Adam's sin is in virtue of that spirit we inherit from him - our own, numerically distinct, concrete spirit, yet that same spirit which participated in the original sin. There is no "impersonal" spirit or aspect of concrete nature which could be punished.

Fourthly, if you deny Christ bearing sin is transactional we are left without imputation at all. Our discussion about immediate and mediate imputation was beside the point.

I deny pecuniary atonement, as I made clear a few posts ago and even provided a link for clarity. That link also evidenced that Owen changed his own mind on that issue. And your conclusion is a non sequitur.

For the third time now will I ask: when do you think God ascribed our sin to the Son?

Fifthly, If you are a traducian, and you hold original sin in a realist sense, and that it is so by necessity of nature, you are culpable for all the sins of all your forbears. This does not bring us to the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's first sin. Why are we even having this discussion? Is it a mere intellectual exercise for you?

I would usually try to ignore pejorative insinuations, but I just got through stating that "I have rejected Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy because of the availability of an alternative to what you are suggesting." So no, my reflection on this subject has not been due to "mere intellectual exercise."

Adam's first sin is what corrupted the nature which we inherit from him. That said, I have spent little time speculating on your question. It is not as if we would be any more condemned if it were true. On the other hand, it may be that Adam's original sin somehow severed his connection to his progeny in any further respect. Realists don't necessarily reject federal headship, after all (even if we think it is grounded in "natural headship" qua traducianism). Again, though, this is speculative.

Lastly, your most important question is conflated. There is moral and positive law. Moral, commanded because good; positive, good because commanded. The character of God is the basis of Christian morality, or more accurately, the relation of the creature to the nature of God. But God's dispensations towards the creature, while grounded in the morality of that relation, is the result of "dispensation," and that is not unchangeable. If it were unchangeable sin and punishment would be unchangeable and we would all be damned.

I'm not sure what I've conflated. In fact, I believe I agree with you. May I then ask, is it conceivable that God could lie? Would we agree that the character of God is such that He could never speak falsely?

 

[MW]

How does God justify the ungodly if it is not a legal fiction? They are not righteous. They are unrighteous in themselves. For you to deny this you would have to think that union with Christ somehow makes us righteous first and then God justifies us on that basis. If you need the reality to exist before God can impute it you are already in the Roman camp. This is not reformed.

As for your traducianism, the same spirit has participated in every act of every forbear. This is not imputation of Adam's first sin at all. You are wasting time talking about imputation. If your spirit existed in Adam you have pre-existence -- your participation in his sin does away with any organic union because you are one and the same spirit. The only way to escape this is by making spirit divisible or by turning to trichotomy or some other nonsensical theory.

On Ezek 18, the soul that sins shall die. According to your theory we all must die. There is no way of transferring guilt. There could be no substitute to take the liability to punishment, and so there could be no salvation.

I told you when God imputed sin to the Son. Go back and read what I wrote.

The conflation is an inability to distinguish moral and positive. Bahnsen and the theonomists generally fail to distinguish between precept and sanction. Everything pertaining to God's dealing with man is positive so far as dispensation is concerned, notwithstanding the moral nature of the created order, WCF 7.1. If everything were moral and unchangeable you could not have a covenant of grace.

 

[Knight]

How does God justify the ungodly if it is not a legal fiction? They are not righteous. They are unrighteous in themselves. For you to deny this you would have to think that union with Christ somehow makes us righteous first and then God justifies us on that basis. If you need the reality to exist before God can impute it you are already in the Roman camp. This is not reformed.

I've already answered that question several times, as recently as the first paragraph in my last post. Baird, in replying to Hodge's review of his book The Elohim Revealed:

If the imputation of Christ's righteousness be founded in a real inbeing in him, wrought by the uniting power of his Spirit in regeneration, — if it is thus that we are brought within the provisions of the covenant of grace to our justification, it follows, (we will venture the word,) incontestahly, that the imputation to us of Adam's sin, is founded in a real inlieing in him, by natural generation, by virtue of which we come under the provisions of the covenant of works, to our condemnation... Thus, then, stands the case. — The doctrine that we are clothed with Christ's righteousness by being ingrafted into his mystical person, is ignored and excluded in the reviewer's own exposition and argument ; — as stated clearly in The Elohini Revealed, it is by him persistently confounded with the Romish doctrine of infused righteousness; logical consistency demands its rejection from his system ; and by his disciples it is in terms repudiated and derided. He may refuse to be held responsible for their representations. They, however, none the less truly exhibit the logical result and actual effect of his teachings.

It does not surprise me that you are in this conversation repeating Hodge's own misrepresentations of Baird, perhaps without even realizing it. Does the Father see those whom He justifies "in themselves" or "in Christ"?

As for your traducianism, the same spirit has participated in every act of every forbear. This is not imputation of Adam's first sin at all. You are wasting time talking about imputation.

It is not fictional imputation, you mean. Do you think Paul meant for the Corinthians to fictionally impute him as a servant of God (1 Cor 4:1)?

If your spirit existed in Adam you have pre-existence -- your participation in his sin does away with any organic union because you are one and the same spirit. The only way to escape this is by making spirit divisible or by turning to trichotomy or some other nonsensical theory.

Offspring are multiplied out of Adam, not divided from him. The latter is indeed a weakness in Shedd's realism.

On Ezek 18, the soul that sins shall die. According to your theory we all must die. There is no way of transferring guilt. There could be no substitute to take the liability to punishment, and so there could be no salvation.

Are you implying I think Christ's soul was traduced? You would be incorrect.

EDIT: I do agree guilt cannot be transferred, by the way. But it can be forgiven - with real grounds for the forgiveness (Romans 3:25-26).

I told you when God imputed sin to the Son. Go back and read what I wrote.

Well, you skipped over an earlier, clarifying question I asked: "You mention we are justified by faith - of course, this is true. But are you saying that at the time we come to faith, our sins are then ascribed to Christ, not at the time of the cross? Did God fictionally ascribe our sin to the Son?"

In fact, you've skipped over points and questions that would be inconvenient for your theory to address, such as that

"The wages of sin is death, not the wages of an ascription of sin "without any corresponding reality." God judges truthfully."

Or:

"The soul that sins, it shall die, not the soul to which God fictitiously ascribes sin."

Or:

"Do you agree Hodge's position is not Augustinian insofar as Hodge rejects reatus culpa?"

Or:

"May I then ask, is it conceivable that God could lie? Would we agree that the character of God is such that He could never speak falsely?"

 

[MW]

Logical order is not chronological order. We're united to Christ first; we believe in Christ to be justified. But the gift of justification itself depends on the prior righteousness of Christ being wrought for us, not in us. Yes, I make the same observation as Hodge. This is the reformed position on justification. Baird has gone astray and is leading you astray.

How is "spirit" multiplied out of Adam? To avoid Shedd's errors you will have to have recourse to irrational theories. Shedd at least knew what he was talking about from a philosophical perspective.

On Ezek. 18, if guilt can't be transferred we are guilty, that means we are liable to be punished for sin, there is no pardon for sin. As I observed, you take away all hope. We are damned.

I only skipped over things that are irrelevant to the point at hand. It had nothing to do with being inconvenient. You keep raising side issues that are not germane to the main point. Yes, obviously the wages of sin is death. But I take death to mean what the old theologians say, natural, spiritual, and eternal. Within spiritual death is depravity of nature. In other words, it is a punishment for sin. But this is the very point we are debating. So to discuss it is a petitio principii.

How can I agree Hodge's point is not Augustinian when there is no agreement on Augustine in the literature, or where there is agreement it is only to say that Augustine is not clear? This is just another irrelevant question.

Of course God cannot lie. Your questions suggest to me that you don't understand the parameters of the issues you are raising. Traditional debates between voluntarists and necessarians obviously have answers for these kinds of questions. If you were apprised of this you wouldn't ask such questions. They are irrelevant.

 

[Knight]

Logical order is not chronological order. We're united to Christ first; we believe in Christ to be justified. But the gift of justification itself depends on the prior righteousness of Christ being wrought for us, not in us. Yes, I make the same observation as Hodge. This is the reformed position on justification. Baird has gone astray and is leading you astray.

No one is suggesting that the ground of justification is something "wrought" in us. But the ground of justification is Christ in us. Let's take an example from the Larger Catechism:

"Justifying faith is a saving grace, wrought in the heart of a sinner by the Spirit."

Is faith the ground of justification? No. Nevertheless, it is wrought in us. Just so with regeneration, and the Christ whose work is the sole ground of justification is not "in us" unless these instrumental causes occur.

Thank you for clarifying union precedes justification. That means our sins are imputed to us until such a time as this union, for unbelievers are not the blessed man of Romans 4:8. That means our sins were not imputed to Christ on the cross on pain of the double payment objection. That means our sins are imputed to Him while in heaven. Reductio ad absurdem.

Now, if you want to equivocate on the meaning of "imputation" in the context of Christ, please define what you mean if not "ascription." But in that case, though, we are no longer able to parallel the first to last Adam in terms of "imputation," and what I said in my previous paragraph will stand in terms of the normal meaning of the word.

How is "spirit" multiplied out of Adam? To avoid Shedd's errors you will have to have recourse to irrational theories. Shedd at least knew what he was talking about from a philosophical perspective.

I already said I am not given to speculation on this point. There is no need. God could easily have ordained this as possible without my knowing the mechanics thereof.

On Ezek. 18, if guilt can't be transferred we are guilty, that means we are liable to be punished for sin, there is no pardon for sin. As I observed, you take away all hope. We are damned.

This is false. Guilt is dealt with when Christ is in us. That is why the elect are not ipso facto justified at the time of Christ's sacrifice. A sacrifice requires application for atonement to be effected, and that which occurs at the time of application is precisely why it is unnecessary to suggest such a horror as that Christ was ever ascribed guilty by His own Father. You say that God cannot lie, yet this is evidently double-speak..

I only skipped over things that are irrelevant to the point at hand. It had nothing to do with being inconvenient. You keep raising side issues that are not germane to the main point. Yes, obviously the wages of sin is death. But I take death to mean what the old theologians say, natural, spiritual, and eternal. Within spiritual death is depravity of nature. In other words, it is a punishment for sin. But this is the very point we are debating. So to discuss it is a petitio principii.

Do you think newly conceived infants participated in sin in any sense?

How can I agree Hodge's point is not Augustinian when there is no agreement on Augustine in the literature, or where there is agreement it is only to say that Augustine is not clear? This is just another irrelevant question.

As if consensus were relevant to you? If it were, you wouldn't be foolishly defending that Hodge is in alignment with his predecessors against scholarly consensus. Or do you know of a single scholar who thinks Hodge accepted reatus culpa?

By the way, I cited Augustine's acceptance of culpam in this thread and the other. How is that not clear?

Of course God cannot lie. Your questions suggest to me that you don't understand the parameters of the issues you are raising. Traditional debates between voluntarists and necessarians obviously have answers for these kinds of questions. If you were apprised of this you wouldn't ask such questions. They are irrelevant.

To be frank, I would have thought a reverend would be more humble than this. I do not have every answer to the many questions related to this subject.

Your credibility was lost when you thought Hodge was in alignment with the the Reformed tradition in his rejection of reatus culpa and then refused to admit that you were wrong.

 

[MW]

The ground of justification is not Christ in us. Anyone who knows the reformed doctrine of justification knows this. Faith goes out of oneself to Christ and receives an alien righteousness. You are deceived if you are looking within yourself for righteousness.

Justifying FAITH is wrought in the sinner. This is the faith that receives Christ and His righteousness offered in the gospel, as the Larger Catechism goes on to teach. The faith is within. The righteousness is without.

Our sins were imputed to Christ on the cross. Scripture says, He bare our sins on the tree. This is sometimes called virtual justification. But we are not actually justified until we believe in Him.

Imputation means reckoning to his account. Standard definition. It applies to Adam's guilt imputed to his posterity and to Christ's righteousness imputed to the elect.

You might not be given to speculate on the point of how the spirit multiplies, but you need to be sure that a spirit can multiply. Spirits are indivisible. They can't multiply. You would also need to work out how your spirit consciously and volitionally sinned in Adam. This is all nonsense, of course, because the whole theory is ridiculous.

Ezek. 18 again. If the soul that sins shall die, and you are a sinner, you must die for your sins. Christ can't do it for you in any sense if you do not make a distinction between personal sin and its liability to punishment.

As for being a reverend, since when does that require a person to run from the field of contention? 1 Thess. 2:2, "we were bold in our God to speak unto you the gospel of God with much contention." I have interacted with you on the basis of your arguments. Perhaps you could return the favour. Resorting to moral manipulation is no way to debate a point.