Free Offer

[BertMulder]

It depends on what you mean by offer... Is this an offer in the sense that a dead sinner has hands to accept? Or is it an offer in the sense that the gospel is freely preached and displayed? After all, it is not the preacher's job to save sinners, that is the Holy Spirit's work...

 

[Djmaclean]

One potential danger is to abstract our understand of the free offer per the Westminster Standards from how it was preached. The sermons below are examples from Scotland after the adoption of the Westminster Standards:

http://www.digitalpuritan.net/Digital%20Puritan%20Resources/Durham%2C%20James/The%20Unsearchable%20Riches%20of%20Christ%20%28Ind%20Works%29/%5BJD%5D%20Gospel%20Preparations%20are%20the%20Strongest%20Invitations.pdf

http://www.digitalpuritan.net/Digital%2520Puritan%2520Resources/Gray,%2520Andrew/Twelve%2520Select%2520Sermons%2520(Ind%2520Works)/%5BAG%5D%2520Christ's%2520Mournful%2520Visit%2520to%2520Obstinate%2520Sinners.pdf

Of course, we should equally not abstract such preaching from the wider theological commitments of these men.

 

[py3ak]

These questions are most definitely above my paygrade and are moving further into the philosophical realm (which I am very poorly read in).
I understand that God reveals Himself to us in the Scriptures often in anthropomorphic/anthropopathic terms in gracious condescension to us. This surely goes a long way in helping answer such questions.

Scholastic theology teaches us that God is pure act, and we know for example that there is harmony in all God's attributes and surely this is necessitated by divine simplicity. And we know that God's justice is not in conflict with His love, but these are demonstrated most powerfully in perfect harmony in the cross of the Lord Jesus Christ. Yet from human perspective and as revealed to us in the Scriptures, we see in a sense the choice of God to do as He pleases. This helps to understand God's sovereign choice in electing love but there remains still a deep mystery for us in understanding.

My question for those who deny God's universal love to those predestined to reprobation is why do you suppose that God's particular love for His elect eliminates a universal love for every individual who was made in His image and likeness?

That's also fair, Alex, and I appreciate the acknowledgement. There are at least some defenders of a well-meant offer who seem unable to acknowledge that there are some very serious and rather difficult questions raised around confessing that God does all he pleases while simultaneously asserting that God would be pleased with outcomes he chose not to effect. In Dabney this takes the startling form of indicating that God's desires are regulated by his wisdom and justice, which strikes me as being terribly close to implying two somewhat unfortunate propositions:
1. That some of God's impulses need to be restrained by better principles;
2. That the salvation of a larger number would be unwise and unjust.

I find it much better to acknowledge that "pleased" doesn't always convey the same meaning, as the scholastic distinction of eudokia from euarestia already indicates. So Turretin:

The euarestian is frequently referred to the preceptive will, which is called both that of approbation and that of complacency (as in Rom. 12:2 where the will of God to which we ought to conform is called good and acceptable [eaurestos]; cf. "proving what is acceptable [euareston] unto the Lord," Eph. 5:10); "for this is acceptable [eaureston] unto the Lord," Col. 3:20). In this sense, euarestia indicates the preceptive and approving will by which God declares what is pleasing to himself and what he wills to be done by men; but eudokia indicates the decretive will by which God testifies his good pleasure about the things which he has determined to perform.

(Institutes of Elenctic Theology, III.15.8)

I think your question doesn't include me, because I admire the boldness of Samuel Rutherford in Christ Dying and Drawing Sinners to Himself:

There is a second love and mercy in God, by which he loves all men and angels, yea, even his enemies; makes the sun to shine on the unjust man, as well as the just, and causeth dew and rain to fall on the orchard and fields of the bloody and deceitful man, whom the Lord abhors; as Christ teacheth us, Mat. 5:43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48. Nor doth God miscarry in this love; he desires the eternal being of damned angels and men; he sends the gospel to many reprobates, and invites them to repentance, and, with longanimity and forbearance, suffereth pieces of froward dust to fill the measure of their iniquity; yet does not the Lord's general love fall short of what he willeth to them.

Is the difference that the desire that Moses die is contingent on Moses' disobedience? The offer is a general delight in men repenting and being saved. God hasn't revealed a general delight in Moses' death, but he does have a sincere and well-intentioned desire that disobedience should be punished.

Very nice, it's well observed that there's a contingency present (an actualized contingency, in the case of Moses). There is a sincere and well-intentioned desire that disobedience should be punished; now there is also a sincere and well-intentioned desire that the repentant should live. Is it quite certain that in the latter case you can abstract the contingency from the desire? It seems that's a necessary step in order to reach the point of saying that God wishes or would like people to repent so they will live.

 

[EmilyF]

In Dabney this takes the startling form of indicating that God's desires are regulated by his wisdom and justice, which strikes me as being terribly close to implying two somewhat unfortunate propositions:
1. That some of God's impulses need to be restrained by better principles;
2. That the salvation of a larger number would be unwise and unjust.

I haven't read this, so take my comment with a whole bucket-load of salt, but it is possible (as I have read this in others, if I remember correctly) that he did not mean regulated as in restrained, but that those attributes are the chief ones to be remembered in soteriology.

 

[Afterthought]

While we may distinguish between "free offer" and "well-meant offer" on this board, it has come to my attention that there are many "in the real world" who haven't a clue what is meant by that distinction. I wonder if it is more of a controversy (in those terms) in circles I do not interact with much. It is indeed an unfortunate choice of words: those who deny the "well-meant offer"--in the sense that God intends to save all sinners but won't--heartily affirm that the free offer is well meant, i.e., if any repent and take Christ, they will indeed be saved!


I have found Jonathan Edwards to be helpful when I've tried explaining these things to others in his distinction between thing and event ("that the thing should come to pass"). It is a reassuring thought as well, especially to those who have suffered injustice, that although God decrees all things and is pleased to decree them to happen (the event), he decrees some events that he is displeased with in themselves (the thing).

"There is no inconsistency or contrariety between the decretive and preceptive will of God. It is very consistent to suppose that God may hate the thing itself, and yet will that it should come to pass. Yea, I do not fear to assert that the thing itself may be contrary to God's will, and yet that it may be agreeable to his will that it should come to pass, because his will, in the one case, has not the same object with his will in the other case. To suppose God to have contrary wills towards the same object, is a contradiction; but it is not so, to suppose him to have contrary wills about different objects. The thing itself, and that the thing should come to pass, are different, as is evident; because it is possible that the one may be good and the other may be evil. The thing itself may be evil, and yet it may be a good thing that it should come to pass. It may be a good thing that an evil thing should come to pass; and oftentimes it most certainly and undeniably is so, and proves so."

 

[jfhutson]

There is a sincere and well-intentioned desire that disobedience should be punished; now there is also a sincere and well-intentioned desire that the repentant should live. Is it quite certain that in the latter case you can abstract the contingency from the desire?

That the repentant should live isn't a desire in the sense we're talking about here but a promise of the covenant. It's assured by his word, unlike the desire behind the offer, which is not part of the decretive will.

I don't think you abstract the contingency from the desire, but repentance and faith are included together in the desire. He desires that men in general live (and thus that they repent, because he has already decreed that repentance is the way to salvation). Murray admits that "desire" isn't the most accurate or "felicitous" word for this, but that God does have a "disposition of lovingkindness on the part of God pointing to the salvation to be gained through compliance with the overtures of gospel grace."

 

[py3ak]

That the repentant should live isn't a desire in the sense we're talking about here but a promise of the covenant. It's assured by his word, unlike the desire behind the offer, which is not part of the decretive will.

I don't think you abstract the contingency from the desire, but repentance and faith are included together in the desire. He desires that men in general live (and thus that they repent, because he has already decreed that repentance is the way to salvation). Murray admits that "desire" isn't the most accurate or "felicitous" word for this, but that God does have a "disposition of lovingkindness on the part of God pointing to the salvation to be gained through compliance with the overtures of gospel grace."

That's very well stated, John, and I appreciate you taking up the case of Moses. I can no longer say that advocates of the well-meant offer don't address that.

Indeed, we are on quite firm ground with regard to the repentant living. However, I'm not sure that substituting disposition for desire really advances the cause very much. Is there some special nuance to the term? Otherwise, we wind up with the idea that a general tendency is not realized because of some special circumstance. The disposition to lovingkindness is not realized because of ______________. You probably see where this raises a number of issues, depending on how one fills in the blank.

I haven't read this, so take my comment with a whole bucket-load of salt, but it is possible (as I have read this in others, if I remember correctly) that he did not mean regulated as in restrained, but that those attributes are the chief ones to be remembered in soteriology.

Perhaps that was his meaning, but if so the illustration drawn from General Washington was an unfortunate one; as in Washington there was a conflict between his personal preferences and his official duty, love and justice could not both come to equally full expression.

 

[jfhutson]

However, I'm not sure that substituting disposition for desire really advances the cause very much. Is there some special nuance to the term? Otherwise, we wind up with the idea that a general tendency is not realized because of some special circumstance. The disposition to lovingkindness is not realized because of ______________. You probably see where this raises a number of issues, depending on how one fills in the blank.

If you keep going in the section of Turretin you quoted earlier to paragraph XI, "For the approbation of anything is not forthwith his volition, nor if I approve of a thing, should I therefore immediately will it. So that it is less properly called the will of God." I think approving, or in that section where he says "agreement of a thing with the nature of God," better fits a disposition than desire, but it seems possible to say one desires something and mean the same thing as that he approves it. I desire cut grass, I approve of it, it agrees with my nature as a person who loves order. One might even improperly say that it is generally my will that the grass be kept short. But I have not even willed to cut my grass today (because of the rain). Now I just filled in the blank for myself, but I don't think we can do that with the secret will of God.

If I did will to cut the grass, and had not done it, things would be different. I would not ascribe that kind of thing to God.

 

[py3ak]

If you keep going in the section of Turretin you quoted earlier to paragraph XI, "For the approbation of anything is not forthwith his volition, nor if I approve of a thing, should I therefore immediately will it. So that it is less properly called the will of God." I think approving, or in that section where he says "agreement of a thing with the nature of God," better fits a disposition than desire, but it seems possible to say one desires something and mean the same thing as that he approves it. I desire cut grass, I approve of it, it agrees with my nature as a person who loves order. One might even improperly say that it is generally my will that the grass be kept short. But I have not even willed to cut my grass today (because of the rain). Now I just filled in the blank for myself, but I don't think we can do that with the secret will of God.

If I did will to cut the grass, and had not done it, things would be different. I would not ascribe that kind of thing to God.

All very prudently observed. If there is no defense of incomplete volitions in God, a recognition that we can't assign causes to the will of God, and a recognition that it is less proper to speak of a disposition as will, we really have shaved away a good deal of what is perhaps inconsiderate rhetoric in defense of the well-meant offer. At this point, the question becomes: is this well-meant quality something different from euarestia?