Free Will

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Taylor

Puritan Board Post-Graduate
Here is a quote I saw posted on the glorious gathering of theological minds which we call "Facebook":

God created things which had free will. That means creatures which can go wrong or right. Some people think they can imagine a creature which was free but had no possibility of going wrong, but I can't. If a thing is free to be good it's also free to be bad. And free will is what has made evil possible. Why, then, did God give them free will? Because free will, though it makes evil possible, is also the only thing that makes possible any love or goodness or joy worth having. A world of automata—of creatures that worked like machines—would hardly be worth creating. The happiness which God designs for His higher creatures is the happiness of being freely, voluntarily united to Him and to each other in an ecstasy of love and delight compared with which the most rapturous love between a man and a woman on this earth is mere milk and water. And for that they've got to be free.
Of course God knew what would happen if they used their freedom the wrong way: apparently, He thought it worth the risk. (...) If God thinks this state of war in the universe a price worth paying for free will—that is, for making a real world in which creatures can do real good or harm and something of real importance can happen, instead of a toy world which only moves when He pulls the strings—then we may take it it is worth paying.

—C.S. Lewis, "Case for Christianity"

Source

I just want to focus in on one aspect of this quote: Lewis' implicit definition of love. He seems to say here that true love can only exist when it is free to do otherwise. Is it a legitimate argument (in response to this) to say that in our glorified bodies—in which we will indeed be incapable of not loving God (a belief which Lewis surely held)—our love for God will not be true love?

Again, I understand—even burn with frustration—at Lewis' utterly conter-biblical understanding of God's sovereignty (which makes me think this may be an early Lewis writing). However, I am only concerned with his definition of love.
 
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You're right. If that is what qualifies as human freedom, I guess the glorified saints in heaven do not serve God with such freedom, and thus do not really love him. The detractor would retort, I am sure, that they had previously made a decision, which they had the freedom to make, to accept Christ and eternal salvation. This, however, still fails by their criterion they have set.

To me, it is a strange thing-- not to believe in freedom of contrary choice-- but to go as far as to say that one of those contrary choices most be evil for it truly to be freedom.
 
I don't even know what to say about that quote. It appears (rather blatantly) that this person doesn't have a high view of the sovereignty of God. As for the lewis comment - I generally like him, but I also recognize that Lewis is not without his flaws. Piper and Keller are pretty big cheerleaders of Lewis, but I think we need to have a balanced approach to Lewis and recognize that he said some good things and some not so good things.

Side note. That person used a pretty bad straw man argument when they said that a world of automata would hardly be worth creating. We don't believe that men function like machines.
 
I just realized that I did not attribute the quote. The quote I provided is directly from Lewis' "Case for Christianity." I will make that clearer in the OP.
 
So then why did God give Adam and Eve the ability to sin? Lewis here is attempting to give one possible reason why God would allow evil. That said, the language of "risk" in the quote is problematic on a number of levels.

As for the other question, that of whether saints in glory will be able to sin, Lewis's The Great Divorce is a thought experiment where he considers what it is for people to love in glory. His answer is that the choices that people make in life begin to affect their being until they become either conformed into the image of Christ or begin to lose their humanity. Now as a Calvinist I would add that the indwelling of the Spirit and the new birth are what enable and undergird these choices.

Finally, we have to remember that whatever sort of freedom we have, it is not incompatible with God's absolute sovereignty. It just may be that we don't have an adequate enough understanding of either one.
 
That's unfair Tom.

As the saying goes in their camp, "God, in His Sovereignty, gave man free will". It does not take away from God's Sovereignty.

The quicker the reformed realise this, the better for the body of Christ.
 
(Side Note: A more thorny question would be why God created anything at all. If we ascribe traditional aspects to God, it is not merely a world of automatons that would "hardly be worth creating" but a world of free-willed creatures as well. I honestly cannot be certain that free will adds (or would add) anything to the glory of God.)

More to the point, I wonder if Lewis would assert that reformed folks believe that the saved do not love God. If grace is cannot be resisted and is not a choice our love of God would not be genuine, under his definition. Of course Lewis effectively sidesteps all discussion of denominations and traditions in his writing so we cannot really know.
 
"God, in His Sovereignty, gave man free will".

I've heard this more than a few times. The problem with that argument it is that 1) it is not an argument and 2) we can use that argument to support anything. For example, "God, in his sovereignty, made a square circle," or, "God, in his sovereignty, lied about this one thing," or, to take an actual argument used by homosexuals, "God, in his sovereignty, has guided the Church into a better and more loving understanding of the homosexual union."

It just doesn't work. In essence, the argument says, "God, in his sovereignty, abdicated his sovereignty." This is not possible. To truly accept this argument would be to say that God, in his sovereignty, gave up some of his omniscience. I find no other way around this because (and I am fully on board with James White here) in order for man to be truly free, God simply cannot know his actions ahead of time. Either God knows everything future, or man is totally free; it cannot be both.

All that to say this: God by his sovereignty "giving man free will" is, I believe, an irreconcilable contradiction within God himself. Of course, the Arminian will say this is a mystery, but then condemn us for saying absolute divine sovereignty and human responsibility is a mystery.
 
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"God, in His Sovereignty, gave man free will".

All that to say this: God by his sovereignty "giving man free will" is, I believe, an irreconcilable contradiction within God himself. Of course, the Arminian will say this is a mystery, but then condemn us for saying absolute divine sovereignty and human responsibility is a mystery.

You are supposing your view on the Arminian. Condemnation is a rather harsh term used there. I do understand your point, and it is one I have held to for many years. So I am not coming from a viewpoint that does not understand that.

But again, two accounts on our Arminian brothers have been speculative as well as unfair in their treatment.
 
But again, two accounts on our Arminian brothers have been speculative as well as unfair in their treatment.

I disagree. I have received very harsh and condescending treatment at times for chalking the Scriptural truths of absolute divine sovereignty and human responsibility up to mystery. I was an Arminian for the majority of my life, and my entire family—my own wife included—remains Arminian. I do not think I am being unfair. Critical is not unfair. Just because an Arminian would respond differently with some sort of nuance does not make our assessments unfair, and certainly not speculative. I am speaking from personal experience.
 
While the comment "Arminianism, elevating free will above God's sovereignty" may be simplistic, I do not believe it is altogether unfair. Although this comment is surely the intention of no Arminian, many an Arminian would argue that the highest aim of God is to maintain creaturely freedom because, just as Lewis himself said above, love that is not free to do otherwise is not true love. So, yes, the comment may be simplistic, but I don't think it is altogether unfair. It is a legitimate (and grave) criticism of Arminianism. I do, however, appreciate your implicit admonition to evenhandedness.

Of course, this is not the topic of my question in the OP, and since I grant that my contention with Mr. Le Roux is a matter of personal opinion on my part, I would like to remain on topic.
 
What precisely do we mean by "free will"? As I understand it at least some form of freedom is necessary for moral responsibility. When we talk about "bondage of the will" are we asking the same question?
 
Here is a quote I saw posted on the glorious gathering of theological minds which we call "Facebook":

God created things which had free will. That means creatures which can go wrong or right. Some people think they can imagine a creature which was free but had no possibility of going wrong, but I can't. If a thing is free to be good it's also free to be bad. And free will is what has made evil possible. Why, then, did God give them free will? Because free will, though it makes evil possible, is also the only thing that makes possible any love or goodness or joy worth having. A world of automata—of creatures that worked like machines—would hardly be worth creating. The happiness which God designs for His higher creatures is the happiness of being freely, voluntarily united to Him and to each other in an ecstasy of love and delight compared with which the most rapturous love between a man and a woman on this earth is mere milk and water. And for that they've got to be free.
Of course God knew what would happen if they used their freedom the wrong way: apparently, He thought it worth the risk. (...) If God thinks this state of war in the universe a price worth paying for free will—that is, for making a real world in which creatures can do real good or harm and something of real importance can happen, instead of a toy world which only moves when He pulls the strings—then we may take it it is worth paying.

—C.S. Lewis, "Case for Christianity"

Source

I just want to focus in on one aspect of this quote: Lewis' implicit definition of love. He seems to say here that true love can only exist when it is free to do otherwise. Is it a legitimate argument (in response to this) to say that in our glorified bodies—in which we will indeed be incapable of not loving God (a belief which Lewis surely held)—our love for God will not be true love?

Again, I understand—even burn with frustration—at Lewis' utterly conter-biblical understanding of God's sovereignty (which makes me think this may be an early Lewis writing). However, I am only concerned with his definition of love.

That is a good response to Lewis's argument.

Lewis assumes that freedom is the ability to do both good and evil. I don't think freedom should be defined like that. God has freedom, but He does not have the ability to do evil.

There are different ways that freedom is defined. Freedom can be defined as acting according to one's desires or doing something voluntarily.
 
So then why did God give Adam and Eve the ability to sin? Lewis here is attempting to give one possible reason why God would allow evil. That said, the language of "risk" in the quote is problematic on a number of levels.

Do you think the reason is that God wanted to show that He can love people who don't deserve it or that God wanted to display all of His attributes?
 
What did Anselm mean when he taught that freedom or free will is the power to preserve rectitude of will for the sake of that rectitude itself? What do you think of that definition?
 
What did Anselm mean when he taught that freedom or free will is the power to preserve rectitude of will for the sake of that rectitude itself? What do you think of that definition?

To be honest, I do not possess near the fortitude of intellect to be able to dialogue with someone such as Anselm. I would have to really think upon this statement to even be able to correctly understand what he is saying, then perhaps I might make remark. Who knows how many hours of reflection it took to arrive at that definition? How much more will it take to wrestle with it myself?

My question is what he means by the phrase "for the sake of that rectitude itself." You seem to have read Anselm. Could you perhaps expound on what you think about it? Perhaps then I will be better equipped to respond.

Thanks, brother.
 
In fairness to Lewis, this quote is part of his attempt to answer the philosophical problem of evil. He is employing his own form of the classic free will defense, and so when he uses the term "automata" what he is referring to is a world in which creatures were incapable of committing evil acts. His conclusion here may indeed be wrong, but we should not read too much into this statement. It is unlikely that he had anything like the reformed view of sovereignty in mind when he wrote this.
 
Do you think the reason is that God wanted to show that He can love people who don't deserve it or that God wanted to display all of His attributes?

Those are possible reasons. I actually wouldn't presume to know the full answer. The incarnation and resurrection give us some insight, but still leave a lot of questions and a lot of room for faith.

What did Anselm mean when he taught that freedom or free will is the power to preserve rectitude of will for the sake of that rectitude itself? What do you think of that definition?

Certainly that's a good definition of moral freedom (i.e. freedom from sin) but in terms of modern analytic debates it doesn't settle the question of what freedom to choose is.

There are different ways that freedom is defined. Freedom can be defined as acting according to one's desires or doing something voluntarily.

That's certainly Edwards' definition, and has a long history, but I've found it less satisfactory as time has gone on. For one thing there's the problem of Buridan's Ass (his donkey, not his posterior) which cannot decide between two equally desirable bales of hay and so starves. For another, this seems to be a kind of reductionism akin to modern materialist construals of determinism.

Lewis assumes that freedom is the ability to do both good and evil. I don't think freedom should be defined like that. God has freedom, but He does not have the ability to do evil.

Certainly that's true of Divine Freedom, but I don't know that creaturely freedom is necessarily analogous in this regard.

To be honest, I do not possess near the fortitude of intellect to be able to dialogue with someone such as Anselm.

Well don't let that stop you. Anselm is among the clearest and most concise thinkers you'll ever encounter. And his treatise on Free Will is very short (though I can't seem to track down the version that used to be at CCEL).
 
I tentatively dip my toe into this vast and deep ocean, and express a thought that arises from the encounter. If God has determined all things, then from the supralapsarian position ( which I espouse),the fall was predestinated. Would not the terminology be rather, free choice instead of free will? I would agree with Henry in that the allowance of evil was in order to demonstrate that God is love, and without the conquering of evil we would never experience the height nor depth of the sacrificial love of our our blessed Redeemer. He loved us without a cause when we hated Him without a cause.
 
It should be acknowledged that any exercise of God's power towards the finite creature is going to be a limitation of His power. Hence the distinction between absolute and ordained power. That being the case, there is no difficulty with conceding that God does in fact limit His sovereignty whilst exercising full sovereign dominion over all things. When God is said to leave man to the freedom of his own will, we can grant a self-determining power to man in the moral scheme of things, whilst at the same time affirming that the individual man is but one among a multitude of secondary causes which are governed by God to bring to pass His eternal purpose. At every point man is consciously alive to the fact that his choices are his own, and yet he also feels that he is but a small speck on the canvas of life, and exists dependently upon One greater than himself as well as interdependently on other creatures.
 
Rev. Winzer, where did you acquire not only such clarity of thought but also clarity of expression?

Thank you for your thoughts on this matter.
 
It should be acknowledged that any exercise of God's power towards the finite creature is going to be a limitation of His power. Hence the distinction between absolute and ordained power. That being the case, there is no difficulty with conceding that God does in fact limit His sovereignty whilst exercising full sovereign dominion over all things. When God is said to leave man to the freedom of his own will, we can grant a self-determining power to man in the moral scheme of things, whilst at the same time affirming that the individual man is but one among a multitude of secondary causes which are governed by God to bring to pass His eternal purpose. At every point man is consciously alive to the fact that his choices are his own, and yet he also feels that he is but a small speck on the canvas of life, and exists dependently upon One greater than himself as well as interdependently on other creatures.

Very good articulation here and worth keeping.

I find that the quote in the OP is pretty consistent with modern man's conception that his knowledge of reality is univocal with the Creator's (if he even conceives of one). That is, he starts with the idea that his knowledge of his will (and all facts for that matter) must be found within the limits of human reason. It needs to be formed philosophically and, to his mind, what the "good" is. Add to this the modern therapeutic mind where the greatest good is that man would feel good about himself and, consequently, that God would feel good about Him, all Scriptural Revelation must bow before the throne of man's esteem about himself.

Consider the fairly typical notion that God is some all-loving, all-powerful Being as they typical starting point. What it means to be "all-loving" is first philosophically conceived. If I can reason what love and freedom are then, by modern man's conviction that God thinks just like *me*, then God has the same view of what love and freedom are. I then construct how it all fits together and read back into the Scriptures things that don't directly contradict what I've arrived at philosophically. Notice the method, for instance of William Lane Craig, who finds Molinism "theologically fruitful" not because he's started with an theology that can be exegeted from the text but because he begins with the notion that "love demands x" and Molinism is a way to preserve that philosophical principle while being able to find verses that *seem* to support this conception.

I have to say that determinining, within the bounds of human reason, how free will "works" to be a fool's errand because I don't believe we can begin to understand God's Creation before we've bowed the knee to Him in dependence upon His Revelation. It's quite plain to me that the Scriptures teach human responsibility and culpability even as they are enslaved to their sin. I then see, in the Scriptures, that man's in-created happiness and true liberty can only be found in worship and service to the Creator. God is gracious to send the only Mediator between God and man in whom we are freed from sin's dominion and empowered, in Him, to obey and glorify God.

This is too simple, however, and will never satisfy those who believe that man has the right to determine, first, whether God is worthy of their worship before they'll decide to come up with some philosophical argument to let him off the hook for His transgression against their human right to be loved and accepted on their own terms.
 
Paradox.

Free Will <-> Gods sovereignty.

Trust in the Lord with all your heart and lean not on your own understanding. Proverbs 3.
My BRAIN is to small to understand this properly so I will ask GOD one day. ;-)
 
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