Imputation

[Anthony DeNicola]

A question popped into my head that I began to think about, and I was hoping some of you could help me work through it.

On the cross , the sins of the elect were imputed to Christ in which He paid in full . How is then that the elect are born dead in sin ?

He appeased the Fathers wrath and paid for our sin , but the wrath of the Father is still upon us (elect) at birth and we are still in our sins .

sin was actually atoned for but yet elect we’re still dead in sin .


If anyone’s got some good material or anything , that would be awesome . Thanks In advance

 

[Knight]

A question popped into my head that I began to think about, and I was hoping some of you could help me work through it.

On the cross , the sins of the elect were imputed to Christ in which He paid in full . How is then that the elect are born dead in sin ?

He appeased the Fathers wrath and paid for our sin , but the wrath of the Father is still upon us (elect) at birth and we are still in our sins .

sin was actually atoned for but yet elect we’re still dead in sin .


If anyone’s got some good material or anything , that would be awesome . Thanks In advance

This was a question with which I also struggled until I came to understand that the atonement is not pecuniary:

The Problem with a Literal, Pecuniary Atonement

At what point in our lives is the Father's wrath against us propitiated? At what point in our lives are we viewed as righteous in His sight?...

unapologetica.blogspot.com

 

[Ryan&Amber2013]

Good day. We are born dead in sin, because we are not regenerated by the Holy Spirit. We must be born again in order to be made alive. I suppose this explains the "how", but maybe not the "why" you might be looking for.

 

[jwright82]

A question popped into my head that I began to think about, and I was hoping some of you could help me work through it.

On the cross , the sins of the elect were imputed to Christ in which He paid in full . How is then that the elect are born dead in sin ?

He appeased the Fathers wrath and paid for our sin , but the wrath of the Father is still upon us (elect) at birth and we are still in our sins .

sin was actually atoned for but yet elect we’re still dead in sin .


If anyone’s got some good material or anything , that would be awesome . Thanks In advance

In Reformed theology there is an emphasis on union with Christ through the Holy Spirit. Christ lived a perfect life (active obedience) and then suffered and died on the cross for the sins of the elect (passive obedience). But how do these, and other, benefits become ours? Through our union with Christ by the Holy Spirit here and now.
Look up union with Christ online and you'll find all kinds of resources on it. There is a friendly debate between Westminster east/west on this that might interest you, Reformed Forum has done some helpful stuff on this.
I myself don't take a side in it because I can see the point of both sides. It seems to boil down to a matter of emphasis, just my opinion. Hope that helps.

 

[Anthony DeNicola]

This was a question with which I also struggled until I came to understand that the atonement is not pecuniary:

The Problem with a Literal, Pecuniary Atonement

At what point in our lives is the Father's wrath against us propitiated? At what point in our lives are we viewed as righteous in His sight?...

unapologetica.blogspot.com

Thanks a lot for this . What would be the understanding of the atonement contrary to pecuniary

 

[Anthony DeNicola]

In Reformed theology there is an emphasis on union with Christ through the Holy Spirit. Christ lived a perfect life (active obedience) and then suffered and died on the cross for the sins of the elect (passive obedience). But how do these, and other, benefits become ours? Through our union with Christ by the Holy Spirit here and now.
Look up union with Christ online and you'll find all kinds of resources on it. There is a friendly debate between Westminster east/west on this that might interest you, Reformed Forum has done some helpful stuff on this.
I myself don't take a side in it because I can see the point of both sides. It seems to boil down to a matter of emphasis, just my opinion. Hope that helps.

Thanks a lot . I’m going I give the video from reformed forum a watch . But my question isn’t necessarily about the application of the benefits of Christ.

It’s more so that that sin was paid for yet it seem that sin is not paid for as we are under the curse of sin when we are born .

 

[Anthony DeNicola]

Good day. We are born dead in sin, because we are not regenerated by the Holy Spirit. We must be born again in order to be made alive. I suppose this explains the "how", but maybe not the "why" you might be looking for.

I understand that Christ work needs to be applied to the elect in time through the effecual monergistic work of the Spirit .

My question is that in that time that the elect person is born to when the Spirit applies Chrsit work to them , how does it logically play out that sin was paid for yet their still dead in sin .

 

[jwright82]

Thanks a lot . I’m going I give the video from reformed forum a watch . But my question isn’t necessarily about the application of the benefits of Christ.

It’s more so that that sin was paid for yet it seem that sin is not paid for as we are under the curse of sin when we are born .

The benefit only becomes ours in union. Instead of thinking about like that think like this, Christ earned redemption for his people only those united to him are his people. No union no redemption.

 

[MyCrows]

The work of Christ provided full redemption for His elect, which the Holy Spirit would apply to each elect person, by uniting him or her to their savior by grace through faith.

Jesus Christ secured our salvation. Purchased with His own blood the bride whom the Father chose to give him.

The Father's choosing, and Christ's work, guarantees the regeneration and sealing of His people by the Holy Spirit, to be applied to guilty sinners in due time.

 

[Anthony DeNicola]

The work of Christ provided full redemption for His elect, which the Holy Spirit would apply to each elect person, by uniting him or her to their savior by grace through faith.

Jesus Christ secured our salvation. Purchased with His own blood the bride whom the Father chose to give him.

The Father's choosing, and Christ's work, guarantees the regeneration and sealing of His people by the Holy Spirit, to be applied to guilty sinners in due time.

Amen to all that. But, it doesn't really address my question. My question is , how is God elect born in sin yet the sin was paid for. It seems that sin is in 2 places, paid for when imputed to Christ yet still on the elect sinner. Think of Owens double jeopardy argument. That's really the basis of my question.

 

[Anthony DeNicola]

This was a question with which I also struggled until I came to understand that the atonement is not pecuniary:

The Problem with a Literal, Pecuniary Atonement

At what point in our lives is the Father's wrath against us propitiated? At what point in our lives are we viewed as righteous in His sight?...

unapologetica.blogspot.com

In order to not view the atonement as pecuniary, when would you say that our sin is imputed to Christ. It seems that you would have to say that our sin isnt imputed to Christ while He is on the cross rather when we are united with Him.

Let me know if my thinking is flawed, really trying to work through this. To be consistent in a pecuniary view of the atonement would seem that you have to hold to either eternal justification or justification at the cross.

 

[MyCrows]

Amen to all that. But, it doesn't really address my question. My question is , how is God elect born in sin yet the sin was paid for. It seems that sin is in 2 places, paid for when imputed to Christ yet still on the elect sinner. Think of Owens double jeopardy argument. That's really the basis of my question.

If we're looking at the timeline, then how could Abraham and David have had their sins imputed to Christ, who hadn't died yet?

They were elect sinners, who died before the atonement was even made.

Once the Father and the Son had entered into the covenant of grace with one another, it was as if the Lamb was slain "from before the foundation of the world."

1 Peter 1:19 , Revelation 13:8 , Ephesians 1:4

All His elect would benefit from His atoning work, whether future, or past, by being united to Him by faith in their day.

Abraham saw HIs day, and rejoiced in it.

John 8:56

 

[Anthony DeNicola]

Respectfully Mike, I don't see how this is answering my question, if it was as if sin was already paid for before the foundation of the world than it just backs my question up to why Abraham and David were born under the wrath of God.

 

[MyCrows]

Respectfully Mike, I don't see how this is answering my question, if it was as if sin was already paid for before the foundation of the world than it just backs my question up to why Abraham and David were born under the wrath of God.

Because their first birth is their natural birth, but Adam, by the will of the flesh. They inherit their fallen nature from Adam.

I'm sorry if I'm missing the point of your question, maybe someone else has a more concise answer.

 

[MyCrows]

Respectfully Mike, I don't see how this is answering my question, if it was as if sin was already paid for before the foundation of the world than it just backs my question up to why Abraham and David were born under the wrath of God.

I don't think it means it was paid for before the foundation of the world. It was an act accomplished in time.

But it was ordained that it would come to pass, even before the foundation of the world.

 

[Deleted member 13126]

This was a question with which I also struggled until I came to understand that the atonement is not pecuniary:

The Problem with a Literal, Pecuniary Atonement

At what point in our lives is the Father's wrath against us propitiated? At what point in our lives are we viewed as righteous in His sight?...

unapologetica.blogspot.com

I have a sensitive question on this topic. I considered PMing you, but rather than that I thought it might be better to ask here for the benefit of all. The original question posed in this thread is an interesting one that has crossed my mind in the past but hasn't particularly troubled me. However, if Owen is right when he states "until at least it be made known to them", is it reasonable to state that there are no elect infants who die in the womb? Spurgeon seemed to take the opposite view, that all infants who die (aborted or otherwise) would go to heaven. Folks reference what David said about his son and other verses to try to piece together a palatable view of where dead infants go.

I don't ask this question lightly. I do realize that it is a sensitive subject. However, I would still be interested in hearing from you or others on this topic.

 

[MyCrows]

I have a sensitive question on this topic. I considered PMing you, but rather than that I thought it might be better to ask here for the benefit of all. The original question posed in this thread is an interesting one that has crossed my mind in the past but hasn't particularly troubled me. However, if Owen is right when he states "until at least it be made known to them", is it reasonable to state that there are no elect infants who die in the womb? Spurgeon seemed to take the opposite view, that all infants who die (aborted or otherwise) would go to heaven. Folks reference what David said about his son and other verses to try to piece together a palatable view of where dead infants go.

I don't ask this question lightly. I do realize that it is a sensitive subject. However, I would still be interested in hearing from you or others on this topic.

I had pondered starting a thread on this, so you're not the only one who was weighing this out.

 

[Knight]

I have a sensitive question on this topic. I considered PMing you, but rather than that I thought it might be better to ask here for the benefit of all. The original question posed in this thread is an interesting one that has crossed my mind in the past but hasn't particularly troubled me. However, if Owen is right when he states "until at least it be made known to them", is it reasonable to state that there are no elect infants who die in the womb? Spurgeon seemed to take the opposite view, that all infants who die (aborted or otherwise) would go to heaven. Folks reference what David said about his son and other verses to try to piece together a palatable view of where dead infants go.

I don't ask this question lightly. I do realize that it is a sensitive subject. However, I would still be interested in hearing from you or others on this topic.

A few points:

The quote you mention from Owen is one he made early in his life, and one of which he may not have realized the full implications. I am no Owen scholar, though.

The spirit of your question, though, seems to be about the nature of faith. I believe I answer your question here and here:

In epistemology, a distinction is made between occurrent and dispositional beliefs. For example, when we sleep, we don't occurrently believe the gospel, but we are disposed to believe it in that if someone were to wake us up and ask us whether we affirmed the gospel, we would occurrently do so.

Likewise, infants may be regenerated before being able to express faith. When they develop the capacity to express what they are taught - e.g. the gospel - then if they have been regenerated, their already present dispositional belief in the gospel can and will be articulated occurrently.

Just so, those in Acts 2:37 appear disposed to do what Peter is about to command. The hearts have been changed, and this is the essence of faith. Such faith will always eventually mature into articulation and occurrent belief in the gospel, but often it starts in incipient or dispositional form.

That's the thing about dispositional beliefs and repentance: because we can't witness dispositions, we don't know if they're there until there is a public confession of faith. Say you have an infant. Do you know he has been regenerated? No. He may grow up and die faithless, he may grow up faithless but later repent and believe, or he may grow up having already been regenerated unto dispositional repentance and belief. The point is, until we see how someone responds to the gospel presented to them, we have no evidence of their regenerative status. Therefore, we shouldn't assume they are regenerated.

Likewise, Peter cannot know whether or not those in Acts 2 have been regenerated unto dispositional repentance and belief. We have the benefit of insider knowledge (Acts 2:37) that Peter could not have known at the time of his command. His duty is to command them to occurrently believe the gospel, for they have the capacity to do so. If they don't, they clearly don't have a right disposition, have not been regenerated, and have not been forgiven. If they do, he doesn't know when they were regenerated (unless divine revelation like Acts 2:37 is provided), nor does he need to know. His focus is only on evangelizing and knowing, by their responsive fruits (public confession of occurrent belief or not), who is a healthy or diseased tree.

There may be (but not always is) a gap between regeneration and occurrent repentance. There is never a gap between regeneration and dispositional repentance (and/or belief).

I wrote pretty extensively on this here under the subsection, "Understanding, Assent, and Dispositions."

 

[Deleted member 13126]

A few points:

The quote you mention from Owen is one he made early in his life, and one of which he may not have realized the full implications. I am no Owen scholar, though.

The spirit of your question, though, seems to be about the nature of faith. I believe I answer your question here and here:





I wrote pretty extensively on this here under the subsection, "Understanding, Assent, and Dispositions."

This is helpful. However, I have just one follow-up question, if I may. A point of clarification, really. Please forgive me for not mincing words and being somewhat direct, it's only my intent for the heart of the question to really be understood. I don't mean to be insensitive to folks who may have lost young ones, had miscarriages, etc. With this in mind:

Dead infants will never go on to believe (on earth). This is quite different from some of the scenarios mentioned above. They will never hear the gospel and repent and believe. In light of Hebrews 9:27 and other such verses:

Without eternal justification, how is it that it can be said an unborn child that dies in the womb would be saved?

 

[Knight]

This is helpful. However, I have just one follow-up question, if I may. A point of clarification, really. Please forgive me for not mincing words and being somewhat direct, it's only my intent for the heart of the question to really be understood. I don't mean to be insensitive to folks who may have lost young ones, had miscarriages, etc. With this in mind:

Dead infants will never go on to believe (on earth). This is quite different from some of the scenarios mentioned above. They will never hear the gospel and repent and believe. Without eternal justification, how is it that it can be said an unborn child that dies in the womb would be saved?

On the contrary, I think infants are capable of saving faith. It's just that such faith is dispositional rather than occurrent. That is, I think infants can be regenerated unto [dispositional] saving faith, in which case they would be justified even while in the womb.

I encourage you to read the section of the blog post I linked to. I wouldn't typically quote myself so shamelessly or extensively, but I think it explicitly addresses your question:

Understanding, Assent, and Dispositions

Suppose an evangelist begins to evangelize peasants but does not begin with 1 Corinthians 15. Can they be saved? Of course. One of Clark's statements I quoted above does hold some potential: "God justifies sinners by means of many combinations of propositions believed." This statement allows that there is a minimum of theological information necessary for a true relationship with our Redeemer, yet this statement can be construed such that it also does not require said minimum to entail a particular doctrine. That is, what the propositions of "the gospel" are that one regenerate person believes and what the propositions of "the gospel" are that another person believes may be equivocal, without overlap. Perhaps there are two sets of propositions, set A and set B, which both suffice to meet whatever minimum Clark has in mind but do not overlap.

Framed this way, I doubt it would present as an attractive option to Clark or most who follow him. If, for Clark, the faith of demons is too minimal, Hebrews 11:6 nevertheless seems to establish theism as a necessary belief for those who are faithful. Can one be saved without believing God is or exists (Hebrews 11:6)? On the other hand, I can't think of any other way in which one could attempt to coherently synthesize Clark's statement about combinations of beliefs and his statement that "There isn’t anything absolutely, no particular doctrine is absolutely necessary for a regenerate person to hold."

I will offer an alternative to Clark (on this point, at least) that might also both serve to answer a few lingering questions and develop a more robust and consistent understanding of the nature of saving faith. I'll begin by considering a following note that Doug Douma says Clark wrote in the margins of a letter to J. Oliver Buswell:

In several places you accuse me of the Greek fallacy. No doubt I am confused. The problem is extremely complex. But obviously, by the statement of Scripture in Luke 12:47 responsibility is proportional to knowledge. I think the difficulty lies in the fact that I have not made clear what the primacy of the intellect is; and I suppose at this point we pass from unessential details to the main point. Hence your remark exactly at the bottom of p.2 is quite beside the mark. [[Clark has a marginal note here connected to the fourth sentence of the paragraph: Not exactly. Knowledge increases responsibility but responsibility does not depend on personal knowledge because infants are born in sin – guilty.]] (Feb. 9th 1939, To J. Oliver Buswell, Pres. Wheaton College, PCA Archives)

Now, there are other places in which Clark says that "responsibility depends on knowledge" (link; see also many other locations, e.g. link). But the above paragraph balances those places by mentioning an exception. Clark's article here also mentions this same exception when he writes, regarding Romans 1: "In any ordinary sense of the verbs, know, suppress, or hold, infants do not have the truth. They have not even seen stars and stones, much less the effects of sin in disease and death. There may be others than infants too... The text does not explicitly attribute this knowledge to all mankind. At the minimum infants are excluded."

Similarly, as important qualification of Clark's position on the nature of saving faith is his intended audience. He is not writing to infants, so he typically excepts them from a discussion of faith: "Faith, like regeneration, is necessary to salvation, if for the moment we defer discussion of infants, imbeciles, and the insane" (link).

The question, then, becomes whether Clark thought that infants couldn't have faith in any sense. If personal knowledge is not necessary for one to sin... must it be necessary for one to believe? Are infants excluded from a "true relationship to our Creator and Redeemer" because they cannot articulate any "minimum of information"? If nothing else, Clark was sympathetic to the Lutheran argument on this point:

One difficulty in the doctrine of justification by faith alone has to do with infants and imbeciles. Most Christians believe that some who die in infancy are saved, and many believe that all who die in infancy are saved. But if faith is necessary, and if infants are incapable of believing anything, what happens to Calvinistic theology? The usual answer is to deny that faith is universally necessary and that infants and some others are justified without faith. The Lutherans, however, are more consistent. They hold that infants can exercise faith even before birth. Of course, how they can believe the Gospel which they cannot possibly have heard remains a mystery, for the Scripture says, Faith comes by hearing. On the other hand, Lutherans have a powerful point in their favor as they cite the case of John the Baptist, who was filled with the Holy Ghost while yet in his mother’s womb. (What is Saving Faith? 2013, Chapter 14)

To my knowledge, Clark never took issue with the commonly held belief that infants can be justified. Now, Clark did write:

Of course a newly born infant cannot express his faith. No matter, say the Lutherans, infants can and some infants do have faith because some infants are justified and justification is by faith alone. This is an impressive argument; but Presbyterians, thinking of a theological expression of faith, allow other means of justification for the incompetent exceptions such as infants and the insane. (Sanctification, 1992, pg. 68)

While notable, it is not clear to me that Clark here means that infants cannot have faith. Infants, in contrast to Clark's intended audience, cannot "express" faith, to be sure. However, if possession of "faith" simpliciter does not necessarily require the capacity to "express" it, then infants could have faith. Consider:

The positing of innate ideas or a priori equipment does not entail the absurdity of infants’ discoursing learnedly on God and logic. To all appearances their minds are blank, but the blankness is similar to that of a paper with a message written in invisible ink. When the heat of experience is applied, the message becomes visible. Whatever else be added, the important words refer to non-sensuous realities. (Christian Philosophy, 2004, pg. 203)

Even though this statement is not written in the context of salvation, one could easily apply it as follows: among infants who are regenerated, the heat of experience will eventually yield (once they have sufficiently matured) a theological expression of their saving faith. This would mean they could have saving faith as infants, albeit in an incipient form. The word of God is written in invisible ink on their hearts, and the public manifestation and confession of this message will visibly follow, assuming the infants do not die such that they sufficiently develop.

Perhaps it is too much to say that Clark affirmed that infants could have faith. I do think, however, that this position is generally compatible with his views, and it opens up an attractive alternative to his generally understood view on the nature of saving faith that avoids the dual pitfalls of requiring too little or too much theological information of the person saved. The position I am referring to can be outlined as follows (link):

An occurrent belief is a belief one has, considers, entertains, etc. at a given time. A dispositional belief is a belief one would... have under certain circumstances - say, if one asked a person a question about whether or not he believes some proposition.
So let's look at the discussion of essential and nonessential doctrines from a different angle. Does everything one could list that I "would" need to agree with in order to be saved actually need to be an occurrent belief rather than a dispositional one? The answer is negative. When a believer sleeps, he doesn't usually, at least in my experience, actively believe "Jesus died and was raised for my sins." He's disposed to believe that. And we don't become unbelievers when we [occurrently] think something other than "Jesus died and was raised for me." All of this also indicates that even a Scripturalist who sincerely believes that "a person is what he thinks" must take "thinks" in a dispositional sense, so he should have no problem accepting this distinction.

However, in these cases, the actual or occurrent belief that "Jesus died and was raised for my sins" had already occurred at least once prior to my sleeping or thinking about something else. A better question is: do all propositions relating to the gospel need to have been occurrent at some prior time in order for one to be currently disposed to believe all of them? I don't see why. The burden of proof would be on the one who believes this to be the case to explain why.

Of course, I'm not saying one shouldn't entertain actual thoughts about the gospel. Less trivially, we can't know who is disposed to believe what. We have to act based on what we believe to be the case. This bears on the question of whether we should preach the whole counsel of God. I sometimes hear the argument that Christians should just list a minimal amount of propositions needed to be believed for salvation. That way, the audience isn't exposed to what I guess the arguers would call unnecessary potential obstacles to belief.

But in considering the above distinction between occurrent and dispositional beliefs, as witnesses, evangelists, and apologists of God's word, we only become aware that those to whom we are speaking actually were disposed to believe some doctrine when we actually confront them with it to see if they occurrently accept it, reject, or require clarification of it.

If one rejects a non-essential doctrine, while that doesn't necessarily mean the person isn't saved, the situation bears correction and watching. Christians make mistakes, but they should be teachable. It helps when the so-called teachers aren't constantly accusatory and defensive, which seems to be the case in many apologetic discussions. But sometimes, disagreements are never settled. That's just a fact of life we have to deal with. Sanctification is a process.

To the main point. If one rejects an essential doctrine, that's how we know he wasn't disposed to believe it and how we know he can't occurrently believe the gospel. If he accepts the essential doctrine, then we would have prima facie grounds - and here, Scripturalism needs to update its epistemology to account for kinds of justified belief other than infallibilistic - for believing they already had the disposition to believe it.

This point is relevant to cases where certain parts of the gospel may have been left unsaid in an evangelistic encounter, for even as, in that case, we could not have [as strong] grounds for believing that the audience became or were believers - for we would have no evidence of their dispositions toward what was left unsaid - God could know whether He had disposed them to believe. They could be saved after all.

Again, this doesn't discount or discourage us from activity, for we don't have access to this divine knowledge, assuming it is divinely known. We work with what we have. But that it is a possibility at all is of some note in a discussion about what must one "believe" to be saved.

Applied to this discussion, if I don't need to have an occurrent belief in the gospel while I sleep (or even, at times, when I am awake and am focusing on other things) to be counted among the faithful, why should an infant need an occurrent, conscious belief? There doesn't seem to be any reason that an infant couldn't have dispositional beliefs just like a sleeping person can. If this is true, must they have had an occurrent belief in the gospel at least once before they can be counted among the faithful? I don't see good reasons for thinking this. On the contrary, I see many reasons for disbelieving this (see below).

Of course, the circumstances under which the person who is disposed to believe the gospel would be able to express said belief would presuppose he or she sufficiently matures or develops such that they are able to express the belief. That just means we must qualify our description of what the "certain circumstances" are under which dispositional belief could be evidenced. No evidence of dispositional belief can be had where there is not the capacity for expression of said belief; but absence of evidence for saving faith is need not always be viewed as evidence of absence of saving faith.
In a number of ways, this dovetails nicely with Scripture. Romans 10:14-17 does not need to imply that only persons with developed consciousnesses can have faith. Infants are just as in need of hearing the gospel as any other sinner, but if, for example, the Holy Spirit uses parents to regenerate a child in the womb or in infancy, they are also just as capable of believing - in a dispositional sense - this gospel in which they have been raised (2 Timothy 3:15). That John the Baptist leapt in the womb has already been mentioned. Other evidences for infant faith would include Psalm 22:9 and Matthew 21:16, which ascribe actions of "trust" and "praise" to nursing infants. Finally, if it impossible to please God apart from saving faith (Hebrews 11:6), are we to believe infants are excepted from the rank of the faithful? Is the author of Hebrews allowing for exceptions, or is it not rather the case that to such infants belong the kingdom of heaven (Matthew 19:14) precisely because they have a childlike faith, one completely dependent on Jesus and contributing no merits of one's own to the ground of one's justification before the Father?

Of course, parents won't necessarily know or see more robust evidence of their children's faith until such a time as their children are capable of articulation. But the ignorance of parents does not cut against the potential of saving faith in their children. On the contrary, it should stir the parents to better disciple their children so that they as parents can be assured that their children have been made by God to be good trees after all.
Relatedly, this helps answer why our evangelical witness does not need to follow a programmatic method, such as repeating 1 Corinthians 15 on autopilot. The question which should be asked is whether a person is disposed to or would affirm the gospel as presented in 1 Corinthians 15 under certain circumstances (if they were asked), not whether they actually believe it at a given moment in time (such as when they are asleep). In this sense, Clark may be right after all that persons can be justified by faith in any variety of biblical propositions, if "faith" be taken in an occurrent sense. That is, all believers are disposed to believe in a single, definitive set of content ("the gospel"), but not all may consciously or occurrently believe said content at the same time.

As mentioned in the lengthy quote above, this does not make evangelism a free-for-all of teaching whatever propositions randomly come to mind. A goal of the evangelist should be to confirm the faith of the person to whom he is witnessing. As mentioned, Scripture indicates some propositions which ought to be believed (e.g. theism, Hebrews 11:6; monotheism, James 2:19; solus Christus, John 14:6; etc.). Clark is right that we ought to preach the whole counsel of God, yet one may prioritize communication of certain propositions adapted to various situations. For example, one who is already a monotheist yet struggles to understand the Trinity should discuss Scriptures which illustrate the deity of Christ. In this sense, evangelism can be viewed as pragmatic and situational, although the content of the gospel [which the faithful are continuously disposed to believe] is definitive.
To some, this initially might sound strange. Parents should tell infant children about the gospel when they can't talk or understand? But if we think about it, that's precisely the means by which our children normally learn to talk or understand: parents talk to their children all the time - not just about the gospel - even though they don't know how to talk. Speech is creative in divine activity (Genesis 1), and this is imaged in our speaking as images of God to images of God. Parents ectypally create understanding and speech in their children by speaking to them just as God archetypally [re]creates us by speaking His word to us.

While it would be too much to attempt to prove in a post like this, I also think nonverbal communication has an understated role in teaching. Many people have the intuition that a mother cuddling her infant implicitly communicates to her infant, "you are safe and cared for," "I love you," "I have compassion on you" (Isaiah 49:15), or some such proposition. Naturally, one can mistake an inference based on nonverbal communication; perhaps my silent gesture of cranking a film reel by hand during a game of Pictionary is mistakenly interpreted by another as the reeling in of a fish. For one who understands and accepts Clark's core epistemology, this would come as no surprise, but nor should it prevent us from suggesting that communication can and does occur nonverbally. Mistaken inference can occur when one attempts to verbally communicate just as it can when one attempts to nonverbally communicate (e.g. sign language). But no one - presumably not even the most ardent disciple of Clark - would deny that humans verbally communicate.

Just as it is possible to understate the role of nonverbals in human communication, it is equally possible to overstate it. While giving cold water to little ones may be behavior due to one's being a disciple of Christ - and an act for which one will be rewarded - Matthew 10:42 does not suggest that one can infer another's kind actions are the result of being a disciple of Christ apart from verbal communication. Even where verbal communication is present, such evidence for that person being a good tree is, as has been said, fallible.

In any case, all human-to-human communication is embodied, occurring through physical means. As a result, communication is intertwined in subtle ways that we don't quite understand. Sometimes, nonverbal communication facilitates understanding in cases in which it would otherwise be impossible, like if someone is deaf. On the other hand, sometimes, it can facilitate misunderstanding (e.g. tone of voice or inflection would imply something different than a text message would convey using the same words). Difficulties in developing an empirically grounded epistemology - verbal or nonverbal, examples and difficulties of which easily could be multiplied - are apologetic evidence for why we must have a revealed epistemology for full assurance of knowledge (link). What is being proposed here is an augmentation to a Scripturalist view of the means of communication and understanding (which relate to evangelism and fallible knowledge of the salvation of other), not of a robust epistemology.

Returning to the topic at large, in the final analysis, let us now try to outline a proper, finely tuned understanding of the nature of saving faith. If infants, imbeciles, or the insane can be counted as true believers, what do each have in common with a person whose cognitive faculties have developed to the extent that they can also express or articulate their faith? A helpful analogy from Clark might be made between faith and knowledge:

Mode and object: the mode of knowing, as I use the word, is simply the psychological activity of the knower. The object is what the knower knows. An answer to the question, How do you know, would state the mode of your knowing. An answer to the question, What do you know, would state the object. And so far throughout all the discussion I have failed to see any reason for introducing any other element; in particular the third element that has been introduced is simply unintelligible to me. (Feb 20, 1946, To Ed Clowney, WTS Archives)

Faith or belief also has modes and objects - this makes sense since faith sometimes is knowledge. Faith or belief involves understanding, assent, and trust. The objects of understanding and assent are propositions, whereas the objects of trust are persons. These objects are objective or external: you and I can have the same objects of faith at the same time without conflation of our distinct persons. The mode of faith - the psychological activity of the believer - is subjective or internal, for my psychological activity is not yours.

How it is that one's subjective, psychological activity is directed towards understanding of, assent to, or trust in these objects is always ultimately determined by God and never morally neutral. Men were created with an understanding and direction or orientation towards submission to truth and God. When Adam fell, all fell in Adam in that we participated in sin (cf. traducianism, link). From conception, then (Psalm 51:5, Romans 1-8), our wills are now oriented towards rebellion to truth and God. We often lack understanding to the extent that as unrepentant sinners, if we accept any truth, it is not for the right reasons - it is unsound, being ultimately grounded in false premises. We do not trust God.

God works to reorient our wills towards truth and Himself again through the regenerative work of the Spirit - infants as well as fully mature men and women. This regenerative work is monergistic. This does not require the activity of our will; on the contrary, that which reorients our will is God's activity alone. Due to sin, synergy or cooperation between God and man now can only take place on the prior ground of monergism. Faith, since it entails the involvement of our wills, is one example of such a synergy. This particular activity "completes" the union of ourselves to Christ that the Spirit's regenerative work "began," although there is no temporal distinction between the two (since, at regeneration, one is at least immediately disposed to belief in the gospel; that is, the causal relation between regeneration and saving faith does not entail a time at which one was regenerate yet an unbeliever). And, as was mentioned earlier, no synergistic activity is the meritorious ground upon which we are viewed as righteous.

Essentially, then, saving faith is one's reorientation towards [the gospel] truth and God [incarnate and triune]. Just as an unregenerate [infant et al.] has a rebellious disposition towards truth and God [even if he is not able to consciously express this], a regenerate [infant et al.] has a submissive and accepting disposition towards truth and God [even if he is not yet able to consciously express this]. Again, one's will - in its activity or its disposition, direction, or orientation - is never morally neutral. We are rational, moral creatures, and our moral makeup, while mutable, is always determined (ultimately by God) towards falsehoods or truth, good or evil, God or sin. In this way, sola fide still applies to infants et al.

No doubt, there is a better way to argue for what position I have been proposing. I do think, however, that it does the job of showing how the traditional, Reformed categories for the components of faith (understanding, assent, and trust) are coherent and in line with Scripture and how categories in contemporary epistemology can be useful to explain how God actually saves people.

 

[Deleted member 13126]

On the contrary, I think infants are capable of saving faith. It's just that such faith is dispositional rather than occurrent. That is, I think infants can be regenerated unto [dispositional] saving faith, in which case they would be justified even while in the womb.

I encourage you to read the section of the blog post I linked to. I wouldn't typically quote myself so shamelessly or extensively, but I think it explicitly addresses your question:

I see. I'll give it a read. To my mind, this 'dispositional faith'* position might also be applied to, say, indigenous people who never hear the gospel (if taken to its logical conclusion). So I can't say I find the position to be persuasive, especially in light of Romans 10:13-14. But, to your point, I did not thoroughly and carefully read the blog post in its entirety - I thought it would be better to skim it and quickly ask a follow up question while I knew you were still online.

I'll go back through the article and read it more carefully! Thanks for weighing in.

 

[Knight]

I see. I'll give it a read. To my mind, this 'dispositional faith'* position might also be applied to, say, indigenous people who never hear the gospel (if taken to its logical conclusion). So I can't say I find the position to be persuasive, especially in light of Romans 10:13-14. But, to your point, I did not thoroughly and carefully read the blog post in its entirety - I thought it would be better to skim it and quickly ask a follow up question while I knew you were still online.

I'll go back through the article and read it more carefully! Thanks for weighing in.

You are correct about an analogy being possible for indigenous people and how Romans 10 is a relevant question. I address Romans 10:

In a number of ways, this dovetails nicely with Scripture. Romans 10:14-17 does not need to imply that only persons with developed consciousnesses can have faith. Infants are just as in need of hearing the gospel as any other sinner, but if, for example, the Holy Spirit uses parents to regenerate a child in the womb or in infancy, they are also just as capable of believing - in a dispositional sense - this gospel in which they have been raised (2 Timothy 3:15). That John the Baptist leapt in the womb has already been mentioned. Other evidences for infant faith would include Psalm 22:9 and Matthew 21:16, which ascribe actions of "trust" and "praise" to nursing infants. Finally, if it impossible to please God apart from saving faith (Hebrews 11:6), are we to believe infants are excepted from the rank of the faithful? Is the author of Hebrews allowing for exceptions, or is it not rather the case that to such infants belong the kingdom of heaven (Matthew 19:14) precisely because they have a childlike faith, one completely dependent on Jesus and contributing no merits of one's own to the ground of one's justification before the Father?

Of course, parents won't necessarily know or see more robust evidence of their children's faith until such a time as their children are capable of articulation. But the ignorance of parents does not cut against the potential of saving faith in their children. On the contrary, it should stir the parents to better disciple their children so that they as parents can be assured that their children have been made by God to be good trees after all...

While it would be too much to attempt to prove in a post like this, I also think nonverbal communication has an understated role in teaching. Many people have the intuition that a mother cuddling her infant implicitly communicates to her infant, "you are safe and cared for," "I love you," "I have compassion on you" (Isaiah 49:15), or some such proposition. Naturally, one can mistake an inference based on nonverbal communication; perhaps my silent gesture of cranking a film reel by hand during a game of Pictionary is mistakenly interpreted by another as the reeling in of a fish. For one who understands and accepts Clark's core epistemology, this would come as no surprise, but nor should it prevent us from suggesting that communication can and does occur nonverbally. Mistaken inference can occur when one attempts to verbally communicate just as it can when one attempts to nonverbally communicate (e.g. sign language). But no one - presumably not even the most ardent disciple of Clark - would deny that humans verbally communicate.

Just as it is possible to understate the role of nonverbals in human communication, it is equally possible to overstate it. While giving cold water to little ones may be behavior due to one's being a disciple of Christ - and an act for which one will be rewarded - Matthew 10:42 does not suggest that one can infer another's kind actions are the result of being a disciple of Christ apart from verbal communication. Even where verbal communication is present, such evidence for that person being a good tree is, as has been said, fallible.

In any case, all human-to-human communication is embodied, occurring through physical means. As a result, communication is intertwined in subtle ways that we don't quite understand. Sometimes, nonverbal communication facilitates understanding in cases in which it would otherwise be impossible, like if someone is deaf. On the other hand, sometimes, it can facilitate misunderstanding (e.g. tone of voice or inflection would imply something different than a text message would convey using the same words). Difficulties in developing an empirically grounded epistemology - verbal or nonverbal, examples and difficulties of which easily could be multiplied - are apologetic evidence for why we must have a revealed epistemology for full assurance of knowledge (link). What is being proposed here is an augmentation to a Scripturalist view of the means of communication and understanding (which relate to evangelism and fallible knowledge of the salvation of other), not of a robust epistemology.

The salvation of indigenous people is a possibility I do not discount, although Romans 10 certainly indicates that the church should not count on it. That is, even if indigenous people could possess dispositional saving faith, it is nevertheless incumbent upon missionaries to bring such faith to occurrent maturity. Otherwise, for all the missionary knows, such people are lost.

On the other hand, I admit it might be the case that in no sense can it be said that [certain] indigenous people hear the gospel, in which case, for those people, they cannot even have dispositional saving faith.

The entire framework of the questions about infants have been about possibilities. So, too, I am comfortable not pushing the matter too far when it comes to indigenous peoples.

 

[Knight]

In order to not view the atonement as pecuniary, when would you say that our sin is imputed to Christ. It seems that you would have to say that our sin isnt imputed to Christ while He is on the cross rather when we are united with Him.

Let me know if my thinking is flawed, really trying to work through this. To be consistent in a pecuniary view of the atonement would seem that you have to hold to either eternal justification or justification at the cross.

Our sins are imputed to us for so long as we remain unbelievers. We are considered or regarded as guilty sinners under God's just condemnation, for so we are.

I think one question which will help to frame your question is to ask how Christ was considered or regarded on the cross. So framed, I think it becomes clear that our sins were not imputed to Christ. In fact, sin was never imputed to Christ. Not on the cross, not ever. There are a few reasons I think this:

1. I'll focus on the idea that "our" sin could have been imputed to Christ. Such a statement could still be implicitly treating the atonement as pecuniary, as if something about Christ's satisfaction for sin would have been different had God decreed a different number of elect [believers] - "our" sins vs. "theirs." The particularity of the atonement is due to its application - which, in turn, is a function of divine intention - not due to something about the nature of Christ's sacrifice which would have been different if there had been more or less elect [believers]:

Now Christ is a true substitute. His sufferings were penal and vicarious, and made a true satisfaction for all those who actually embrace them by faith. But the conception charged on us seems to be, as though Christ's expiation were a web of the garment of righteousness to be cut into definite pieces and distributed out, so much to each person of the elect, whence, of course, it must have a definite aggregate length, and had God seen fit to add any to the number of elect, He must have had an additional extent of web woven. This is all incorrect. Satisfaction was Christ's indivisible act, and inseparable vicarious merit, infinite in moral value, the whole in its unity and completeness, imputed to every believing elect man, without numerical division, subtraction or exhaustion. Had there been but one elect man, his vicarious satisfaction had been just what it is in its essential nature. Had God elected all sinners, there would have been no necessity to make Christ's atoning sufferings essentially different. Remember, the limitation is precisely in the decree, and no where else. It seems plain that the vagueness and ambiguity of the modern term "atonement," has very much complicated the debate. This word, not classical in the Reformed theology, is used sometimes for satisfaction for guilt, sometimes for the reconciliation ensuing thereon; until men on both sides of the debate have forgotten the distinction. The one is cause, the other effect. The only New Testament sense the word atonement has is that of katallagh, reconciliation. But expiation is another idea. Katallagh is personal. Exilasmo is impersonal. Katallagh is multiplied, being repeated as often as a sinner comes to the expiatory blood. Exilasmo is single, unique, complete; and, in itself considered, has no more relation to one man's sins than another. As it is applied in effectual calling, it becomes personal, and receives a limitation. But in itself, limitation is irrelevant to it. Hence, when men use the word atonement, as they so often do, in the sense of expiation, the phrases, "limited atonement," "particular atonement," have no meaning. Redemption is limited, i. e., to true believers, and is particular. Expiation is not limited. (link, Dabney, Systematic Theology, pgs. 808-809)

2. Christ was never considered or regarded by the Father as guilty. He was always the Son in whom the Father was well pleased. Therefore, Christ was never considered or regarded by the Father as a sinner. Therefore, it cannot be the case that the Father imputed sin to Christ's account. Our God is a God of truth.

Make no mistake, I believe Christ bore the wrath of the Father and took the penalty that was owed to sinners (such as us). But the justice of God does not require that Christ is therefore viewed as if He were a sinner, much less that He actually was one. Rather, the voluntary agreement (covenant of Redemption) between the Father and Son was sufficient for the latter to undertake to provide satisfaction for sin.

 

[Deleted member 13126]

You are correct about an analogy being possible for indigenous people and how Romans 10 is a relevant question. I address Romans 10:



The salvation of indigenous people is a possibility I do not discount, although Romans 10 certainly indicates that the church should not count on it. That is, even if indigenous people could possess dispositional saving faith, it is nevertheless incumbent upon missionaries to bring such faith to occurrent maturity. Otherwise, for all the missionary knows, such people are lost.

On the other hand, I admit it might be the case that in no sense can it be said that [certain] indigenous people hear the gospel, in which case, for those people, they cannot even have dispositional saving faith.

The entire framework of the questions about infants have been about possibilities. So, too, I am comfortable not pushing the matter too far when it comes to indigenous peoples.

Thanks for interacting with this very difficult topic, and thanks for blogging. This is great. I've been edified. I've gone back through and tried to do justice to your post.

One question right off the top I have is that when you state:

"The salvation of indigenous people is a possibility I do not discount, although Romans 10 certainly indicates that the church should not count on it."

Why would we contrariwise count on the salvation of infants who die in the womb, if the same logic applies to both them and the indigenous?

Follow on questions and thoughts continue from here based on the blog post and previous reply from you. Everything in quotes is from something you said or quoted. Everything after is my response, in case you would like to help sharpen my understanding further.

"Knowledge increases responsibility but responsibility does not depend on personal knowledge because infants are born in sin - guilty."

I would probably grant this, but unlike sin, I believe that biblically speaking, hearing and responding to the gospel in faith and repentance does seem to be a responsibility which does indeed depend upon personal knowledge.

"The question, then, becomes whether Clark thought that infants couldn't have faith in any sense."

This seems like an absurd question to ask. How would we argue this from an absence of evidence and why?

"Lutherans have a powerful point in their favor as they cite the case of John the Baptist, who was filled with the Holy Ghost while yet in his mother’s womb. (What is Saving Faith? 2013, Chapter 14)"

Why shouldn't the case of John the Baptist be uniquely understood? That is to say, why should we not regard John the Baptist as an exceptional case? If Luke 1:15b is not exceptional and applies to all elect infants (filled with the Holy Ghost, even from his mother's womb), why wouldn't the rest of Luke 1:15 apply (being great in the sight of the Lord and drinking neither wine nor strong drink)? Why wouldn't Matthew 11:11 apply to all men also? Clearly John the Baptist is being set apart in the gospels as a unique forerunner of the Lord Jesus Christ, Elijah who was and is to come (if we can receive it).

An unborn child that is not yet developed to the extent that it can think thoughts (at whatever point in time that happens developmentally) can't think anything, let alone express anything. So I don't find the possession of 'faith' simpliciter to be compelling.

I don't know much about Clark, but so far I find the arguments put forward unconvincing.

Regarding dispositional faith, in the case of dead infants, can we say 'one would... have under certain circumstances have this belief'? They're dead. There is no world that exists in which those certain circumstances will ever be true. How can we consider that a door might be open which the Lord has firmly shut?

From the point that you begin to discuss what happens when a believer sleeps, they've already believed, they've already heard the gospel. So, with respect, I believe this to be a very weak argument for the salvation of infants.

You then write what you say is a better question:

"do all propositions relating to the gospel need to have been occurrent at some prior time in order for one to be currently disposed to believe all of them?"

To this I write: How does Romans 10:13-14 read to you?

The goal posts seem to move when the quesiton gets reframed, from 'some prior time' to 'if I don't need it when I sleep'.

You write here:

"Applied to this discussion, if I don't need to have an occurrent belief in the gospel while I sleep (or even, at times, when I am awake and am focusing on other things) to be counted among the faithful, why should an infant need an occurrent, conscious belief?"

You rightly state:

"If this is true, must they have had an occurrent belief in the gospel at least once before they can be counted among the faithful?"

Again, how does this theory square with Romans 10:13-14 and other such verses? You seem to pass by it when you write:

"Romans 10:14-17 does not need to imply that only persons with developed consciousnesses can have faith."

You then go on to, in my humble opinion, perhaps conflate 'childlike faith' with what could, if stretched, be rewritten as 'dead infantile faith'. Is this not the case?

You then go on to deal with 1 Corinthians 15 and mention that they don't need to believe it at a given moment in time. Again, I can't see how your theory wouldn't make the tent much bigger to include folks of all ages who die before they're presented with the gospel, as long as they would've believed it if they'd heard it. This leaves us with no real assurance at all.

You later go on to write:

"faith or belief involves understanding, assent, and trust"

Yet infants who die in the womb have none of these things.

You then write that:

"From conception, then (Psalm 51:5, Romans 1-8), our wills are now oriented towards rebellion to truth in God."

So I still fail to see how this changes for the allegedly elect infant who dies in the womb. How does this become reoriented without eternal justification?

Was I also eternally regenerated in such a case? So, if I died in my rebellious years, rejecting the Lord Jesus Christ when presented with the gospel, wanting to live my own life, etc., was I, by your reasoning, actually saved (even if outwardly I should have died in my sins and I inwardly rejected the Lord despite some disposition)?

Curious to hear your thoughts, Sir! Blessings to you.

 

[Deleted member 13126]

Our sins are imputed to us for so long as we remain unbelievers.

Surely this must mean occurrently unbelievers and not dispositionally unbelievers, no? If so, why is it different for us than for infants who die in the womb? I ask this with respect to your position, as my position would not presently hold to things being the same for infants in the womb as us. If by this statement you mean that our sins are imputed to us for so long as we remain unbelievers dispositionally, then when is our disposition changed? When are we regenerated?

 

[Knight]

Thanks for interacting with this very difficult topic, and thanks for blogging. This is great. I've been edified. I've gone back through and tried to do justice to your post. Everything in quotes is from something you said or quoted. Everything after is my response, in case you would like to help sharpen my understanding further.

"Knowledge increases responsibility but responsibility does not depend on personal knowledge because infants are born in sin - guilty."

I would probably grant this, but unlike sin, I believe that biblically speaking, hearing and responding to the gospel in faith and repentance does seem to be a responsibility which does indeed depend upon personal knowledge.

"The question, then, becomes whether Clark thought that infants couldn't have faith in any sense."

This seems like an absurd question to ask. How would we argue this from an absence of evidence and why?

"Lutherans have a powerful point in their favor as they cite the case of John the Baptist, who was filled with the Holy Ghost while yet in his mother’s womb. (What is Saving Faith? 2013, Chapter 14)"

Why should the case of John the Baptist be uniquely understood? If Luke 1:15b is not exceptional and applies to all elect infants (filled with the Holy Ghost, even from his mother's womb), why wouldn't the rest of Luke 1:15 apply (being great in the sight of the Lord and drinking neither wine nor strong drink)? Why wouldn't Matthew 11:11 apply to all men also? Clearly John the Baptist is being set apart in the gospels as a unique forerunner of the Lord Jesus Christ, Elijah who was and is to come (if we can receive it).

An unborn child that is not yet developed to the extent that it can think thoughts (at whatever point in time that happens developmentally) can't think anything, let alone express anything. So I don't find the possession of 'faith' simpliciter to be compelling.

As a point of clarification, in that post, as with many others, I interact with Gordon Clark as a theological foil. His thoughts are interesting, but they are not always my own. The purpose of certain questions I ask or lines of reasoning I make is to draw out inferences. Perhaps I am not always clear, however.

For instance, you ask "How would we argue this from an absence of evidence and why?" But the point of the section was to show that infants can be filled with the Holy Spirit. Perhaps I did not make this clear, but can one be filled with the Holy Spirit yet remain displeasing to God? Rather, do not those who belong to the Spirit also belong to Christ (Romans 8:9-11)? Cumulatively, I would think this would imply that infants have faith (Hebrews 11:6).

Regarding dispositional faith, in the case of dead infants, can we say 'one would... have under certain circumstances have this belief'? They're dead. There is no world that exists in which those certain circumstances will ever be true. How can we consider that a door might be open which the Lord has firmly shut?

I'm confused. Before one can be dead, one must first be alive. Why can't infants have been regenerated unto [dispositional] faith before they died?

You then write what you say is a better question:

"do all propositions relating to the gospel need to have been occurrent at some prior time in order for one to be currently disposed to believe all of them?"

To this I write: How does Romans 10:13-14 read to you?

The goal posts seem to move when the quesiton gets reframed, from 'some prior time' to 'if I don't need it when I sleep'.

You write here:

"Applied to this discussion, if I don't need to have an occurrent belief in the gospel while I sleep (or even, at times, when I am awake and am focusing on other things) to be counted among the faithful, why should an infant need an occurrent, conscious belief?"

You rightly state:

"If this is true, must they have had an occurrent belief in the gospel at least once before they can be counted among the faithful?"

Again, how does this theory square with Romans 10:13-14 and other such verses? You seem to pass by it when you write:

"Romans 10:14-17 does not need to imply that only persons with developed consciousnesses can have faith."

I asked: "do all propositions relating to the gospel need to have been occurrent at some prior time in order for one to be currently disposed to believe all of them?"

Later, I wrote: "...must they have had an occurrent belief in the gospel at least once before they can be counted among the faithful? I don't see good reasons for thinking this. On the contrary, I see many reasons for disbelieving this (see below)."

Among such reasons, I include:

"...if, for example, the Holy Spirit uses parents to regenerate a child in the womb or in infancy, they are also just as capable of believing - in a dispositional sense - this gospel in which they have been raised (2 Timothy 3:15). That John the Baptist leapt in the womb has already been mentioned. Other evidences for infant faith would include Psalm 22:9 and Matthew 21:16, which ascribe actions of "trust" and "praise" to nursing infants. Finally, if it impossible to please God apart from saving faith (Hebrews 11:6), are we to believe infants are excepted from the rank of the faithful? Is the author of Hebrews allowing for exceptions, or is it not rather the case that to such infants belong the kingdom of heaven (Matthew 19:14) precisely because they have a childlike faith, one completely dependent on Jesus and contributing no merits of one's own to the ground of one's justification before the Father?"

In the above, I am not, as you suggesting, conflating childlike faith with death infantile faith. Rather, I am arguing what I tried to clarify above: if regeneration is unto faith, and infants are regenerated, then infants have faith, at least in some sense. What I then did was try to elaborate in what sense it is possible that infants could have faith (dispositionally, not occurrently).

You then go on to deal with 1 Corinthians 15 and mention that they don't need to believe it at a given moment in time. Again, I can't see how your theory wouldn't make the tent much bigger to include folks of all ages who die before they're presented with the gospel, as long as they would've believed it if they'd heard it. This leaves us with no real assurance at all.

As I said in my last reply, it could make the "tent bigger." As for what you say about assurance, you will have to define your terms. Once you do, read the following, and you will probably see that we agree:

An ideal sort of assurance is assurance that is doxastically justified (link, link, link) in that such justification pertains to our beliefs - specifically, ones intentionally grounded in sound premises through reflective access or self-awareness of one's occurrent beliefs. This can only be had by those whose cognitive faculties have developed to an extent that they can occurrently believe the gospel. It is in this way that one can intentionally connect epistemology and soteriology: Paul calls believers to full assurance (Colossians 2:2). We cannot imagine this to mean an assurance which is only or is merely available.

Nevertheless, that is a useful distinction. Infants or those whose faith are dispositional "have" propositional justification for assurance in that the propositions relevant to their dispositional beliefs could be justified (in principle) even if they occurrently do not believe or have doxastic justification (at least not in a way that is conscious or intentional to someone like an infant). In this way, due to the beliefs to which they are disposed, regenerate infants et al. have the capacity for doxastic justification even though they will not be doxastically justified until they occurrently believe. Since the beliefs or knowledge or faith they have is in its most incipient, undeveloped, or basic form, this will be reflected in the sort of assurance which can be ascribed to them.

Etc.

You later go on to write that 'faith or belief involves understanding, assent, and trust', yet infants who die in the womb have none of these things.

That is only true if understanding, assent, and trust can only be understood as occurrent mental states, which I dispute.

You then write that:

"From conception, then (Psalm 51:5, Romans 1-8), our wills are now oriented towards rebellion to truth in God."

So I still fail to see how this changes for the allegedly elect infant who dies in the womb. How does this become reoriented without eternal justification?

If they are regenerated unto dispositional faith before they die, they would be justified at that point, not eternally.

Surely this must mean occurrently unbelievers and not dispositionally unbelievers, no? If so, why is it different for us than for infants who die in the womb? If by this statement you mean that our sins are imputed to us for so long as we remain unbelievers dispositionally...

No. I dispute that one who has dispositional faith ought to be categorized as an unbeliever. Again, if I sleep, I can only believe in a dispositional sense. If I am not to be considered an unbeliever in that scenario, I fail to see why an infant ought to be considered an unbeliever if said infant has been regenerated unto dispositional faith.

...when is our disposition changed? When are we regenerated?

Yes.

Was I also eternally regenerated in such a case?

No. As I said, we are conceived in sin. I just think it is possible for the infant to be regenerated while in the womb (before death, if that happens).

So, if I died in my rebellious years, rejecting the Lord Jesus Christ when presented with the gospel, wanting to live my own life, etc., was I, by your reasoning, actually saved (should I have died in my sins)?

No. If you reject the gospel, obviously you don't have faith in any sense (neither dispositional nor occurrent).

 

[Deleted member 13126]

As a point of clarification, in that post, as with many others, I interact with Gordon Clark as a theological foil. His thoughts are interesting, but they are not always my own. The purpose of certain questions I ask or lines of reasoning I make is to draw out inferences. Perhaps I am not always clear, however.

For instance, you ask "How would we argue this from an absence of evidence and why?" But the point of the section was to show that infants can be filled with the Holy Spirit. Perhaps I did not make this clear, but can one be filled with the Holy Spirit yet remain displeasing to God? Rather, do not those who belong to the Spirit also belong to Christ (Romans 8:9-11)? Cumulatively, I would think this would imply that infants have faith (Hebrews 11:6).



I'm confused. Before one can be dead, one must first be alive. Why can't infants have been regenerated unto [dispositional] faith before they died?



I asked: "do all propositions relating to the gospel need to have been occurrent at some prior time in order for one to be currently disposed to believe all of them?"

Later, I wrote: "...must they have had an occurrent belief in the gospel at least once before they can be counted among the faithful? I don't see good reasons for thinking this. On the contrary, I see many reasons for disbelieving this (see below)."

Among such reasons, I include:

"...if, for example, the Holy Spirit uses parents to regenerate a child in the womb or in infancy, they are also just as capable of believing - in a dispositional sense - this gospel in which they have been raised (2 Timothy 3:15). That John the Baptist leapt in the womb has already been mentioned. Other evidences for infant faith would include Psalm 22:9 and Matthew 21:16, which ascribe actions of "trust" and "praise" to nursing infants. Finally, if it impossible to please God apart from saving faith (Hebrews 11:6), are we to believe infants are excepted from the rank of the faithful? Is the author of Hebrews allowing for exceptions, or is it not rather the case that to such infants belong the kingdom of heaven (Matthew 19:14) precisely because they have a childlike faith, one completely dependent on Jesus and contributing no merits of one's own to the ground of one's justification before the Father?"

In the above, I am not, as you suggesting, conflating childlike faith with death infantile faith. Rather, I am arguing what I tried to clarify above: if regeneration is unto faith, and infants are regenerated, then infants have faith, at least in some sense. What I then did was try to elaborate in what sense it is possible that infants could have faith (dispositionally, not occurrently).



As I said in my last reply, it could make the "tent bigger." As for what you say about assurance, you will have to define your terms. Once you do, read the following, and you will probably see that we agree:



Etc.



That is only true if understanding, assent, and trust can only be understood as occurrent mental states, which I dispute.



If they are regenerated unto dispositional faith before they die, they would be justified at that point, not eternally.



No. I dispute that one who has dispositional faith ought to be categorized as an unbeliever. Again, if I sleep, I can only believe in a dispositional sense. If I am not to be considered an unbeliever in that scenario, I fail to see why an infant ought to be considered an unbeliever if said infant has been regenerated unto dispositional faith.



Yes.



No. As I said, we are conceived in sin. I just think it is possible for the infant to be regenerated while in the womb (before death, if that happens).



No. If you reject the gospel, obviously you don't have faith in any sense (neither dispositional nor occurrent).

Thanks for going through these and responding. Your position makes more sense to me now, although, admittedly, I still find it to be wholly unpersuasive, for reasons I mention related to John the Baptist as an exceptional or unique case. It's certainly comforting to hope that all infants go to heaven (Spurgeon) or at least elect infants (others such as yourself, which is either my position also in some nuanced sense, or closer to my actual position), but I believe in every case we provide such comfort, we are arguing from an absence of evidence and in hope, very similar to the hope some have for indigenous peoples (whom I believe when they die not hearing the gospel are in no way saved).

 

[Knight]

Thanks for going through these and responding. Your position makes more sense to me now, although, admittedly, I still find it to be wholly unpersuasive, for reasons I mention related to John the Baptist as an exceptional or unique case. It's certainly comforting to hope that all infants go to heaven (Spurgeon) or at least elect infants (others such as yourself, which is either my position also in some nuanced sense, or closer to my actual position), but I believe in every case we provide such comfort, we are arguing from an absence of evidence and in hope, very similar to the hope some have for indigenous peoples (whom I believe when they die not hearing the gospel are in no way saved).

I think the several Scriptures I mentioned which talk about infants evidence more than you are giving credit for. But if nothing else, one must still account for that case of John the Baptist what the implications are of his regeneration in the womb. If such means that he also possessed faith - which, as I've argued, would seem to have to be the case, given Romans 8 and Hebrews 11 - in turn, that would either mean John had occurrent thoughts in the womb or that common assumptions about the nature of faith require revisiting.

 

[Anthony DeNicola]

Our sins are imputed to us for so long as we remain unbelievers. We are considered or regarded as guilty sinners under God's just condemnation, for so we are.

I think one question which will help to frame your question is to ask how Christ was considered or regarded on the cross. So framed, I think it becomes clear that our sins were not imputed to Christ. In fact, sin was never imputed to Christ. Not on the cross, not ever. There are a few reasons I think this:

1. I'll focus on the idea that "our" sin could have been imputed to Christ. Such a statement could still be implicitly treating the atonement as pecuniary, as if something about Christ's satisfaction for sin would have been different had God decreed a different number of elect [believers] - "our" sins vs. "theirs." The particularity of the atonement is due to its application - which, in turn, is a function of divine intention - not due to something about the nature of Christ's sacrifice which would have been different if there had been more or less elect [believers]:



2. Christ was never considered or regarded by the Father as guilty. He was always the Son in whom the Father was well pleased. Therefore, Christ was never considered or regarded by the Father as a sinner. Therefore, it cannot be the case that the Father imputed sin to Christ's account. Our God is a God of truth.

Make no mistake, I believe Christ bore the wrath of the Father and took the penalty that was owed to sinners (such as us). But the justice of God does not require that Christ is therefore viewed as if He were a sinner, much less that He actually was one. Rather, the voluntary agreement (covenant of Redemption) between the Father and Son was sufficient for the latter to undertake to provide satisfaction for sin.

This seems to undermine all that I’ve ever heard preached on and taught about the atonement from reformed theologians.

It seems your denying imputation of sin to Christ and denying that He paid for our sins .

What was Christ paying for on the cross ?


Col 2:14- canceling the record of debt that stood against us with its legal demands. This he set aside, nailing it to the cross.



1 Peter 2:4 - Christ paid for our sins in His body

2 Cor 5:21 - He was made sin

Galatians 3:13 - Became a curse

1 Peter 3:18 - Suffered once for sins

 

[Knight]

This seems to undermine all that I’ve ever heard preached on and taught about the atonement from reformed theologians.

It seems your denying imputation of sin to Christ and denying that He paid for our sins .

What was Christ paying for on the cross ?


Col 2:14- canceling the record of debt that stood against us with its legal demands. This he set aside, nailing it to the cross.



1 Peter 2:4 - Christ paid for our sins in His body

2 Cor 5:21 - He was made sin

Galatians 3:13 - Became a curse

1 Peter 3:18 - Suffered once for sins

I explicitly affirmed that Christ took upon Himself the penalty for sin. That is not the same thing as sin being imputed to Christ's account.

Please define how you are using the word "imputation." I have already outlined that I think it means "consider," "regard," "reckon," etc. If you agree with that, ask yourself if Christ was literally considered, regarded, or reckoned to be a sinner by the Father. The verses you cite do not address this question... unless you think Christ was somehow literally made sin? See pg. 440ff. of Samuel Baird's The Elohim Revealed (link) for how he interprets 2 Corinthians 5:21. Note how he begins:

It may be said, that the Lord Jesus Christ was regarded and treated as a sinner. To this proposition, however, we most emphatically except. He was regarded and treated no otherwise, than as being precisely what he was, the Father's spotless Son, the spontaneous substitute, the vicarious sacrifice for sinners. But, that he was regarded and treated by the Father as a sinner, — Never! So far the reverse, that, whilst fulfilling his atoning work, he had the repeated attestation of the Father, that he was the beloved Son, in whom he was well pleased.