Interesting article on Craig Carter book.

[jwright82]

"Christian Platonism" and Christological Interpretation: A Response to Craig A. Carter, Interpreting Scripture with the Great Tradition - Reformed Faith & Practice

Craig Carter’s Interpreting Scripture with the Great Tradition has deservedly garnered significant attention due to its learned and passionate call for Recovering the Genius of Premodern Exegesis (in the words of the subtitle).[1] With appreciation for Carter’s directness, in response I will...

journal.rts.edu

Interesting article and (review?) of a Craig Carter book. I pretty much agree with most of what he said.

 

[MW]

"Christian Platonism" and Christological Interpretation: A Response to Craig A. Carter, Interpreting Scripture with the Great Tradition - Reformed Faith & Practice

Craig Carter’s Interpreting Scripture with the Great Tradition has deservedly garnered significant attention due to its learned and passionate call for Recovering the Genius of Premodern Exegesis (in the words of the subtitle).[1] With appreciation for Carter’s directness, in response I will...

journal.rts.edu

Interesting article and (review?) of a Craig Carter book. I pretty much agree with most of what he said.

The analysis of the problem is very clear and pointed. The proposed solution is not going to help. A "doxological ontology" still leaves us without a solid understanding of being. It becomes teleological or purpose-oriented and functional or vocation-oriented. From the perspective of classical metaphysics it lacks a "Ground" for possibility and nature. What is it? and What can it be? For humanity to have the function of being God's image-bearers and priests, we must have a nature that is capable of that. What is it about human nature that makes it fit for this purpose? Why can't a rock do the same thing? Platonic or Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics answers these question. We have a rational soul with specific capacities and participate in certain universal forms. These make the teleology possible.

In the end it is vulnerable to the same critique as actualism where being is a contingent event of divine action. Both fail to account for the stable, inherent properties of creation that are preconditions for either divine action or human vocation. Classical Platonic or Aristotelian ontology provides this stability by grounding beings in essences or natures that are real and intelligible.

 

[RamistThomist]

Classical Platonic or Aristotelian ontology provides this stability by grounding beings in essences or natures that are real and intelligible.

And as much as I dislike the current Platonism fad, essences are simply too important to ignore.

 

[jwright82]

The analysis of the problem is very clear and pointed. The proposed solution is not going to help. A "doxological ontology" still leaves us without a solid understanding of being. It becomes teleological or purpose-oriented and functional or vocation-oriented. From the perspective of classical metaphysics it lacks a "Ground" for possibility and nature. What is it? and What can it be? For humanity to have the function of being God's image-bearers and priests, we must have a nature that is capable of that. What is it about human nature that makes it fit for this purpose? Why can't a rock do the same thing? Platonic or Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics answers these question. We have a rational soul with specific capacities and participate in certain universal forms. These make the teleology possible.

In the end it is vulnerable to the same critique as actualism where being is a contingent event of divine action. Both fail to account for the stable, inherent properties of creation that are preconditions for either divine action or human vocation. Classical Platonic or Aristotelian ontology provides this stability by grounding beings in essences or natures that are real and intelligible.

I don't agree with his solution either. But I did enjoy his analysis of the situation because it captured some of my concerns in the whole thing. I'm not trying to rehash an old debate but I came across it and thought it was interesting. I don't have time today to respond anymore. But I just it was good food for thought.

 

[jwright82]

The analysis of the problem is very clear and pointed. The proposed solution is not going to help. A "doxological ontology" still leaves us without a solid understanding of being. It becomes teleological or purpose-oriented and functional or vocation-oriented. From the perspective of classical metaphysics it lacks a "Ground" for possibility and nature. What is it? and What can it be? For humanity to have the function of being God's image-bearers and priests, we must have a nature that is capable of that. What is it about human nature that makes it fit for this purpose? Why can't a rock do the same thing? Platonic or Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics answers these question. We have a rational soul with specific capacities and participate in certain universal forms. These make the teleology possible.

In the end it is vulnerable to the same critique as actualism where being is a contingent event of divine action. Both fail to account for the stable, inherent properties of creation that are preconditions for either divine action or human vocation. Classical Platonic or Aristotelian ontology provides this stability by grounding beings in essences or natures that are real and intelligible.

Well, without rehashing old debates (not my intention at all), I cleared my schedule so I can engage. I agree that I find his "positive proposal" a little strange but his criticism and concerns about Craig Carter's book is my reason for posting it.
My main opposition to this whole debate over Carter's work is twofold. His almost, I'm not the only one saying this stuff, philosophical magisterium (my choice of words) of Christian Platonism on the one hand and his very anti-Vantillian response on the other.
Though I completely understand the "logic" behind his critique of Van Til in the service of his larger project, he almost has to critique Van Til to make his argument work. But like the review I posted the alternative picture is almost question begging at best.
So I guess the major question is, is there a way out of this philosophical impasse that the average Christian thinking person can take on these matters? That is I understand the hesitation on both sides in not wanting to be guilty of the extreme consequences being leveled by both sides but both sides do have legitimate concerns.
For one thing, I admire Carter's work (although I have never read his books but only his papers online) but the questions raised against his project are legitimate questions.
So for me the basic answer is, like the paper I posted, we must attend to the ontological implications of scripture as the norming norm of all thought (philosophical included) without falling into the trap of a detailed metaphysics that is "The Christian Metaphysics".
That's what it seems he is trying to do, in my opinion (although I'm not the only one pointing this out), with his proposal. I find myself on the other side of this debate.
Although when you say that basically the Platonic/Aristotelian/Thomistic "answers these questions (largely it seems to me about permanence in creation)" then how does your proposal avoid the pitfalls of Carter's proposal?
For the record I, after thinking about it and doing some study (that I PM Jacob about and he has my permission to share anything I sent him), I don't have any more problems with belief in substances/essences if we locate them within the domain of "descriptive metaphysics". That is the most basic ideas we have about the world because we simply cannot conceive of it in any other way.
That does provide the theological and philosophical pluses of the other side without falling into the extreme consequences of Carter's proposal. Which I don't think anyone wants to do.
That's my way of affirming substances and essences without falling into Nominalism on the other side. We cannot jettison concepts that we cannot think without but we must avoid a philosophical magisterium on the other hand.
Who's your kinda go to person in these contemporary philosophical matters? You know someone who knows the history and situation well enough to provide a philosophy you can agree with on these matters?
My only critical response is that I don't think that the P/A/T proposal is the only way to achieve what you're looking for. As the paper presented (however imperfectly) there are different proposals out there by orthodox thinkers that may or may not fall into the concerns you have about critical receptions of Christian Platonism. I'm not Barthian so I completely agree with your criticism there.
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And as much as I dislike the current Platonism fad, essences are simply too important to ignore.

I agree. As an indispensable part of our conception of reality we cannot fall into a simple Nominalism that can affectively "ignore" essences without serious consequences. But there must be an alternative way for us to engage these questions without the extreme sides taken in this debate.
We have to have, so to speak, a playground where all theologically orthodox people can hash these issues out without the extreme consequences on both sides.

 

[MW]

Although when you say that basically the Platonic/Aristotelian/Thomistic "answers these questions (largely it seems to me about permanence in creation)" then how does your proposal avoid the pitfalls of Carter's proposal?

Our traditional formulations are a Platonic, Aristotelian-Thomistic synthesis. And with Thomas we start to move towards analogy. Thomas fundamentally re-oriented Aristotelian metaphysics within a Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo. The "permanence" of creation is not in competing eternal Forms but in creatures participating by grace in the one eternal Being of God. Likewise, earlier Christian theologians relocated Plato's ideas within God Himself.

The problem is that the Thomistic synthesis requires us to hold up reason as a preamble to faith. This is the type of natural theology that Van Til rejects. We also have some problems with the analogia entis. Reformed theology fixes this with the archetype/ectype distinction.

For the record I, after thinking about it and doing some study (that I PM Jacob about and he has my permission to share anything I sent him), I don't have any more problems with belief in substances/essences if we locate them within the domain of "descriptive metaphysics". That is the most basic ideas we have about the world because we simply cannot conceive of it in any other way.

If you are thinking in terms of human knowledge being ectypal, I think this might work. But it's actual, operational being. "It is what it is." There is a degree of nominalism in this seeing we do not have access to the "essences" of things. That is unavoidable. Even Reid acknowledged it. The idealist concerns are met in the archetype. Divine revelation provides the precondition for realism. So everyone is happy! Not really, but we can dream.

My only critical response is that I don't think that the P/A/T proposal is the only way to achieve what you're looking for. As the paper presented (however imperfectly) there are different proposals out there by orthodox thinkers that may or may not fall into the concerns you have about critical receptions of Christian Platonism. I'm not Barthian so I completely agree with your criticism there.

Barth was a genius. I dislike critiques that treat him otherwise. His actualism is the only operative possibility. It has its roots in the alternative to Plato and Aristotle in Heraclitus and the Stoics. It is an extreme form of process voluntarism that the Christian tradition "naturally" tends to reject.

 

[jwright82]

Our traditional formulations are a Platonic, Aristotelian-Thomistic synthesis. And with Thomas we start to move towards analogy. Thomas fundamentally re-oriented Aristotelian metaphysics within a Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo. The "permanence" of creation is not in competing eternal Forms but in creatures participating by grace in the one eternal Being of God. Likewise, earlier Christian theologians relocated Plato's ideas within God Himself.

The problem is that the Thomistic synthesis requires us to hold up reason as a preamble to faith. This is the type of natural theology that Van Til rejects. We also have some problems with the analogia entis. Reformed theology fixes this with the archetype/ectype distinction.

Ok. I don't really know what you're getting at here. I agree with the history here. I don't think you're arguing for a philosophical magisterium but my criticism was on Carter's view, which I think does. Since I don't really know what your view is, you'll have to tell me.
By Classical Metaphysics do you mean the sort of "Grand Historical Story" of those classical thinkers and how the West developed, disagreed, and/or changed it for whatever reason? And so we have a kind of big umbrella of unity and disunity in the story but a general story none the less?
And since it's so important to theology and the catholic Christian Tradition, one needs to be very careful in critiquing it lest one end up in heresy. That's a point I agree with but I don't think that one needs to argue the same way that Carter does to make the case. Not saying you're doing that.
If so are there any contemporary philosophical thinkers this side of history (I just noticed that's what contemporary means but I think the mistake is funny so I'll leave it), who deal with the kind questions I've raised that you would recommend? Who at least give a defense of this, and if it's Carter than fine I'll bite the bullet and get his books but I'm not aware of anyone else besides he and his supporters making a similar case but I'm probably just ignorant here, so there's that.

If you are thinking in terms of human knowledge being ectypal, I think this might work. But it's actual, operational being. "It is what it is." There is a degree of nominalism in this seeing we do not have access to the "essences" of things. That is unavoidable. Even Reid acknowledged it. The idealist concerns are met in the archetype. Divine revelation provides the precondition for realism. So everyone is happy! Not really, but we can dream.

Agreed. Look at it like this, to avoid philosophical problems over correspondence of ideas and Idealism conceptual scheme manages that. So when I say we can look at our most general concepts of reality, we can know how things are and what in general exists because (by way of transcendental argument) we cannot even conceive of a reality without those things existing.
So they're really there and we don't have to worry about problems related to "well you can't put a substance/essence under a microscope, so it doesn't exist" (Essentially Hume's critique or at least the Empiricist critique). We're not burdened by that because the interlocutor is the one responsible with providing a conceptual scheme without (which they can't) it?
But since they can't do that then they must exist in some form. Reality constraints our conception of it on a basic level because we exist in reality. Because we must think about reality, like it or not our survival depends on it. Someone can knock William James all they want but following James, if someone doesn't believe the bus coming down the road really exist then their in for a painful correction (that gives reality check a whole new meaning).

Barth was a genius. I dislike critiques that treat him otherwise. His actualism is the only operative possibility. It has its roots in the alternative to Plato and Aristotle in Heraclitus and the Stoics. It is an extreme form of process voluntarism that the Christian tradition "naturally" tends to reject.

Yeah I don't interact much with him TBH but I do agree with you that he was a genius. As possibilities go, I haven't come across him in the philosophical stuff but maybe you have a point. Knudsen's appropriation of Dooyeweerd seems like a possibility (although I don't think he deals much the ontology of individual objects) with it's idea of objects functioning within the law-spheres of creation. Not saying it's right only a possibility.
Michael Horton's work with a "Covenantal Ontology" also seems promising but his criticism of "substance metaphysics" seems so wrapped up in his theological points on the sacraments (don't think anyone will disagree with him there) and justification (which I understand is hotly debated but I have no interest in entering that debate).
I only point those two out because they are orthodox (Knudsen and Horton) and they don't really use or seem to care about substance metaphysics outside of certain theological debates.
One interesting point about Carter's work is that he's right on at least one thing and he does provide a theory for it. He's right that theologians and Christian Philosophers after Kant did seem to walk away from substance metaphysics, which is probably why in contemporary cases it only gets talked about in the mind/body problem.
The only Christian Philosophers I'm aware of that talk about substance is within that debate. Maybe he's right but he's painting with too broad a brush. There's probably multiple reasons why people aren't interested in those old debates and not all of them are heretical in some way.
But he seems to lay it all down at the feet of Kant and Hegel and their lot. Not to mention, however Naturalism fits into that.
So my main criticism is of him being what I am against philosophically and at the same time admiring the genius in his work. I don't think we need a philosophical magisterium in Christian philosophy.
Again I've only read his articles online and his back and forth with people but not his books, so I'll take that criticism if someone wants to level it.

 

[MW]

Ok. I don't really know what you're getting at here. I agree with the history here. I don't think you're arguing for a philosophical magisterium but my criticism was on Carter's view, which I think does. Since I don't really know what your view is, you'll have to tell me.

I agree with the synthesis. It has problems, but I think Reformed developments deal with the problems. Infinite distance between the Creator and the creature, covenantal revelation, etc.

By Classical Metaphysics do you mean the sort of "Grand Historical Story" of those classical thinkers and how the West developed, disagreed, and/or changed it for whatever reason? And so we have a kind of big umbrella of unity and disunity in the story but a general story none the less?

Not really. As I noted in another thread in which you participated, this is the conceptual framework within which we have formulated the biblical doctrines of the Trinity and Christology. It is not up in the air. It is concrete, part of the Reformation heritage, and integrated into our Confessional framework. If someone wants to package that as "the great tradition" for a product they are selling as "Christendom," I am not going to argue. But I would be clear the issue is doctrinal rather than traditional. These are the categories that account for the biblical revelation that we have.

And since it's so important to theology and the catholic Christian Tradition, one needs to be very careful in critiquing it lest one end up in heresy. That's a point I agree with but I don't think that one needs to argue the same way that Carter does to make the case. Not saying you're doing that.
If so are there any contemporary philosophical thinkers this side of history (I just noticed that's what contemporary means but I think the mistake is funny so I'll leave it), who deal with the kind questions I've raised that you would recommend? Who at least give a defense of this, and if it's Carter than fine I'll bite the bullet and get his books but I'm not aware of anyone else besides he and his supporters making a similar case but I'm probably just ignorant here, so there's that.

I would suggest reading the historical theology from someone like Muller. If I hear the word "heresy" that is enough for me to take it seriously.

Agreed. Look at it like this, to avoid philosophical problems over correspondence of ideas and Idealism conceptual scheme manages that. So when I say we can look at our most general concepts of reality, we can know how things are and what in general exists because (by way of transcendental argument) we cannot even conceive of a reality without those things existing.

But they must have essences and natures, whether or not we can know them in and of themselves, even if we can only know them by their properties. That is what our knowledge points to; it is what it is picked up and taken for granted in divine revelation.

So they're really there and we don't have to worry about problems related to "well you can't put a substance/essence under a microscope, so it doesn't exist" (Essentially Hume's critique or at least the Empiricist critique). We're not burdened by that because the interlocutor is the one responsible with providing a conceptual scheme without (which they can't) it?

You have to deal with it. Christ has two natures. There are numerous theological and practical dynamics that revolve around it.

But since they can't do that then they must exist in some form. Reality constraints our conception of it on a basic level because we exist in reality. Because we must think about reality, like it or not our survival depends on it. Someone can knock William James all they want but following James, if someone doesn't believe the bus coming down the road really exist then their in for a painful correction (that gives reality check a whole new meaning).

Yes; everything has a practical end. This is why reformed theologians speak of theology as sapientia, not scientia. But that just means we have to sort out what we mean when we use the verb to be. An actualist, process understanding is not going to work for orthodoxy. The Bible IS the Word of God. Lose the essence of that, and turn it into a process, and you have lost divine revelation as an objective reality.

The rest of your post is about reconstructions. I don't care for them, so I will leave it at that.

 

[jwright82]

I agree with the synthesis. It has problems, but I think Reformed developments deal with the problems. Infinite distance between the Creator and the creature, covenantal revelation, etc.

Ok. I think we may be talking past each other. That's not really what I meant. I was trying to understand where you see things. But I was also sticking with my criticism of Carter's proposal. So I don't know what that synthesis has to do with Carter abusing it, in my opinion?

Not really. As I noted in another thread in which you participated, this is the conceptual framework within which we have formulated the biblical doctrines of the Trinity and Christology. It is not up in the air. It is concrete, part of the Reformation heritage, and integrated into our Confessional framework. If someone wants to package that as "the great tradition" for a product they are selling as "Christendom," I am not going to argue. But I would be clear the issue is doctrinal rather than traditional. These are the categories that account for the biblical revelation that we have.

Again I think we're talking past each other because I don't disagree with anything you wrote. But I don't see what that has to do with Carter's proposal? Or with his apparent philosophical magisterium? That's what I was focusing on.
It may be I'm being confusing because I've rethought my position from the last time we interacted about this. I was wrong on many issues but not on the issues I have with Carter's proposal. That has not changed, only been refined.

I would suggest reading the historical theology from someone like Muller. If I hear the word "heresy" that is enough for me to take it seriously.

I don't have Muller, been on my to do list for some time. I have read Heiko Oberman, I have one of his books (fantastic BTW). Thanks for the recommendation, been meaning to get his work for some time. Oberman is pretty good too, if you haven't already read him.

But they must have essences and natures, whether or not we can know them in and of themselves, even if we can only know them by their properties. That is what our knowledge points to; it is what it is picked up and taken for granted in divine revelation.

I said the same thing in a more contemporary philosophical context. I even gave a TA for their existence. If I was confusing about something then please let me know and I'll explain. But I said they do exist.
If I don't say they exist in exactly the same way you do, then that's an honest philosophical disagreement we can have and talk about. I think you add more to it than I would.

You have to deal with it. Christ has two natures. There are numerous theological and practical dynamics that revolve around it.

Again I'm confused. The part you were responding to was the other half of the TA. The burden of proof is on the person denying the existence of substances and essences as basic parts of our shared conceptual scheme. For clarification I'm just using P. F. Strawson's work that brought metaphysics back into Analytical Philosophy.
Also I never said Christ doesn't have two nature's, so I don't know what I have to deal with. He has two nature's that actually exist in the one person of the Son by virtue of the incarnation exactly as the creeds and confessions say. Those are real things not imaginary.
Again I rethought my position, so that may be the confusion. Perhaps I should have started with that. But my issues with Carter's proposal is what I'm concerned with.

Yes; everything has a practical end. This is why reformed theologians speak of theology as sapientia, not scientia. But that just means we have to sort out what we mean when we use the verb to be. An actualist, process understanding is not going to work for orthodoxy. The Bible IS the Word of God. Lose the essence of that, and turn it into a process, and you have lost divine revelation as an objective reality.

Yeah maybe I should have been upfront about the TA for substances and essences that I was giving because I think that was confusing. It seems you divided up the argument and so that made it confusing.
The "actualist" part, I never advocated that to my knowledge on this site. If you see it as an either/or than ok but I never advocated it but I did provide alternatives by orthodox thinkers.

The rest of your post is about reconstructions. I don't care for them, so I will leave it at that.

Ok. Well that's a response to your either/or response of "there's this or actualist Barthian thinking." Once you show that there's alternatives by orthodox thinkers that cuts across that problem. You can disagree with the alternatives but they are there. Again never advocated for actualism.
So I don't think we're communicating on the same page and I don't see what any of this has to do with Carter.
I've changed my mind on some things and refined my thinking, maybe that's why there's confusion here. My issues remain but I've refined my language and delivery to better get across what I'm saying.
I have issues with an apparent philosophical magisterium that Carter seems to impose on the Christian. It's a criticism of his book that I posted and commented on.

 

[MW]

Ok. I think we may be talking past each other. That's not really what I meant. I was trying to understand where you see things. But I was also sticking with my criticism of Carter's proposal. So I don't know what that synthesis has to do with Carter abusing it, in my opinion?

I think you might be right. But I sense this is your inclination to be open to philosophise whereas I am dogmatising (using that word in terms of systematic theology, not a personal disposition). I appreciate your philosophical openness but there are certain points where theology has used philosophy in its service, and these function like "sinews" in the body of divinity. Without them the system breaks down. So that is expressing my concern, which likely is a different concern to yours.

Carter's methodology is problematic more than anything else. He seems to use terms like "Christian Platonism" ambiguously, and shifts between wide and narrow definitions. The wide one could include all kinds of things whereas a narrow one is Augustinian. So the entire Great Tradition gets funnelled into his specific views. I believe philosophical theologians have taken him to task for this.

Again I think we're talking past each other because I don't disagree with anything you wrote. But I don't see what that has to do with Carter's proposal? Or with his apparent philosophical magisterium? That's what I was focusing on.
It may be I'm being confusing because I've rethought my position from the last time we interacted about this. I was wrong on many issues but not on the issues I have with Carter's proposal. That has not changed, only been refined.

While there are criticisms there are also valid points from an historical-theology point of view. I wouldn't like to see it all discarded with a dismissive rejection of all things Carterian.

I don't have Muller, been on my to do list for some time. I have read Heiko Oberman, I have one of his books (fantastic BTW). Thanks for the recommendation, been meaning to get his work for some time. Oberman is pretty good too, if you haven't already read him.

Muller and Oberman are at the top of their class on the historical ideas involved. From my perspective, at least, which again will have a dogmatics focus.

I said the same thing in a more contemporary philosophical context. I even gave a TA for their existence. If I was confusing about something then please let me know and I'll explain. But I said they do exist.

OK. I missed that. That is on me. Sorry. I have been flicking between different things. I wouldn't think a TA is going to give us anything "substantive" that we can lay hold of and say "IS" means "THIS." You now have a claim about thought and language. It is agnostic on whether God "IS" in the classical sense. Substance seems to have an organising role in our experience. So you might be able to use it as a shield, but it does not function as a sword. Good defensively; not that good for positive affirmation and assimilation.

Again I'm confused. The part you were responding to was the other half of the TA. The burden of proof is on the person denying the existence of substances and essences as basic parts of our shared conceptual scheme. For clarification I'm just using P. F. Strawson's work that brought metaphysics back into Analytical Philosophy.
Also I never said Christ doesn't have two nature's, so I don't know what I have to deal with. He has two nature's that actually exist in the one person of the Son by virtue of the incarnation exactly as the creeds and confessions say. Those are real things not imaginary.
Again I rethought my position, so that may be the confusion. Perhaps I should have started with that. But my issues with Carter's proposal is what I'm concerned with.

Again, OK. But can you get to the truth of the two natures using descriptive metaphysics? You have something grammatically correct within the "language game" of Christian theology. But how do you show it corresponds to reality? As that point you might have to step outside the bounds of descriptive metaphysics into something that approaches closer to the realm of faith where theology is discussed.

The "actualist" part, I never advocated that to my knowledge on this site. If you see it as an either/or than ok but I never advocated it but I did provide alternatives by orthodox thinkers.

Not an either/or. Obviously your linked article wants to take us to some kind of "functional" ontology that is not actualist. But it lacks the appeal of actualism, which is a well-rounded theory integrating process and event. From my perspective actualism has more internal coherence. It can be rejected outright under an either/or choice. The others are a mishmash.

I have issues with an apparent philosophical magisterium that Carter seems to impose on the Christian. It's a criticism of his book that I posted and commented on.

We are agreed on that. In using philosophical concepts there is no requirement to buy into a philosophical system. At the same time neither are we obliged to grow discontent with philosophical frames of reference that have worked quite well.

 

[jwright82]

I think you might be right. But I sense this is your inclination to be open to philosophise whereas I am dogmatising (using that word in terms of systematic theology, not a personal disposition). I appreciate your philosophical openness but there are certain points where theology has used philosophy in its service, and these function like "sinews" in the body of divinity. Without them the system breaks down. So that is expressing my concern, which likely is a different concern to yours.

I actually completely agree with you, philosophy in the service of theology. I believe I've advocated that for some time but that's immaterial to this discussion. I just want dialogue on philosophy to be accurate but philosophy must be in the service of theology. I'm aware that I have gone overboard with my "philosophical bent" from time to time, I'm trying to rectify that.
But we completely agree on philosophy in the service of theology.

Carter's methodology is problematic more than anything else. He seems to use terms like "Christian Platonism" ambiguously, and shifts between wide and narrow definitions. The wide one could include all kinds of things whereas a narrow one is Augustinian. So the entire Great Tradition gets funnelled into his specific views. I believe philosophical theologians have taken him to task for this.

Again can't agree more and they have, some better than others. I for one don't like the ones who want to tinker with Classical Theism for their critique. I don't think we should be tinkering with that because it's the almighty one we speaking of. I think theology and philosophy by Christians should be done with reverence and fear and trembling before the "Holy God Himself".

While there are criticisms there are also valid points from an historical-theology point of view. I wouldn't like to see it all discarded with a dismissive rejection of all things Carterian.

I wouldn't either. I would like to see more work done in this area personally. I'm trying now to push for a way past this online debate. I think if all sides agree on the fundamentals of creedal and confessional Reformed Christian theology then it becomes an in-family squabble.

Muller and Oberman are at the top of their class on the historical ideas involved. From my perspective, at least, which again will have a dogmatics focus.

Fair enough. And I'll make sure to get Muller.

OK. I missed that. That is on me. Sorry. I have been flicking between different things. I wouldn't think a TA is going to give us anything "substantive" that we can lay hold of and say "IS" means "THIS." You now have a claim about thought and language. It is agnostic on whether God "IS" in the classical sense. Substance seems to have an organising role in our experience. So you might be able to use it as a shield, but it does not function as a sword. Good defensively; not that good for positive affirmation and assimilation.

Well TA works like backing someone into a corner and saying like Strawson "you can't deny individual objects exist and continue to talk as though there's individual objects, you're contradicting yourself". So the "is" results from the fact that they can't think or talk about things in other ways because those things are real and cannot be denied upon pain of self-contradiction.
It's positive because of self-contradiction, they assume it to deny it. The self-contradiction proves the point because they can't get rid of it. But in their argument they rely on the thing their trying to deny, self-contradiction.
I understand this is lofty philosophical stuff and it is highly debated amongst philosophers but it does have a logical formula that works.

Again, OK. But can you get to the truth of the two natures using descriptive metaphysics? You have something grammatically correct within the "language game" of Christian theology. But how do you show it corresponds to reality? As that point you might have to step outside the bounds of descriptive metaphysics into something that approaches closer to the realm of faith where theology is discussed.

Because we're talking about reality. A reality that is one of a kind. We can't talk about it any other way because that's the way it is. I'm not sure descriptive metaphysics is up to the task of matters of faith but your point is a good one.
I guess I'd say that I'm still Augustinian in that "faith precedes understanding". But you're right I have to think about that.

Not an either/or. Obviously your linked article wants to take us to some kind of "functional" ontology that is not actualist. But it lacks the appeal of actualism, which is a well-rounded theory integrating process and event. From my perspective actualism has more internal coherence. It can be rejected outright under an either/or choice. The others are a mishmash.

Well I posted it not so much for it's positive contributions but it's negative contributions, probably should have made that clear (my apologies). But I don't think it's Dooyeweerd's thinking he's referring to, so I guess maybe things "function" in a doxological sense (and I don't think Dooyeweerd would disagree with that TBH).

We are agreed on that. In using philosophical concepts there is no requirement to buy into a philosophical system. At the same time neither are we obliged to grow discontent with philosophical frames of reference that have worked quite well.

Well we agree there but I get the sneaking suspicion that it's going overboard in some people's thoughts, not yours. I mean why state things the way he does and go after Van Til. It's clear to some that there's more on the table for him.
To be honest the philosophical stuff I was most influenced by was about avoiding unnecessary problems (Pragmatism and Wittgenstein) to get to a point. If something is an unnecessary problem than rule it out and move on.
That said I rely on Strawson because he makes the most sense to me in avoiding unnecessary problems. For Strawson and myself the whole link of my thoughts about the world, to my language about the world, to the way things are seems like an unnecessary thing to be concerned about.
If you understand what I'm talking about than I don't need some philosophical theory to explain it. They're all connected by way of a TA for the necessity of such things, because you can't think, speak, or act in any other way. So dividing the process up into different questions seems unnecessary to me, I could be wrong of course, because it works from the beginning to the end and we continue to survive without such a theory.
I agree that we should not abandon the old ways completely, don't think I've ever said that.

 

[MW]

Well we agree there but I get the sneaking suspicion that it's going overboard in some people's thoughts, not yours. I mean why state things the way he does and go after Van Til. It's clear to some that there's more on the table for him.

Yes, fully agree. I enjoy Van Til because he was dealing with problem areas fully recognised in the great tradition, and he had a way of showing how the Reformed faith is needed to resolve them, whereas Romanists, Arminians, neo-orthodox, and liberals carry the problems into extremes.

The rest I'm content to leave. You are free to explore it in your way, which is useful in its place. It is good to have wings to fly; one just needs to have feet to be able to land. My only concern was to address the theological ramifications of the linked article. Where do we land? Functional ontologies leave us up in the air.

 

[jwright82]

Yes, fully agree. I enjoy Van Til because he was dealing with problem areas fully recognised in the great tradition, and he had a way of showing how the Reformed faith is needed to resolve them, whereas Romanists, Arminians, neo-orthodox, and liberals carry the problems into extremes.

The rest I'm content to leave. You are free to explore it in your way, which is useful in its place. It is good to have wings to fly; one just needs to have feet to be able to land. My only concern was to address the theological ramifications of the linked article. Where do we land? Functional ontologies leave us up in the air.

Fair enough my friend.

 

[RamistThomist]

Echoing the criticism from the article, Carter and the Great Tradition on an ambiguity between "thick" and "thin" Platonism. On one hand, if you believe in natures and universals, then they claim you. But that isn't very helpful. In analytic philosophy, anyone who believes in abstract objects like numbers and sets might be called a Platonist. Carter has something else in mind. He means Augustine. By itself, that doesn't seem too problematic. Everyone in the West means Augustine.

But then comes the shift. Now we mean the more contended parts of the Great Tradition (lectio divina, etc). I can't go there. I commend Carter for his good work against heterodox teachings like ESS, but I can't go any further than that.

Speculation: what if we Platonism got rid of Forms and replaced it with Set Theory?

 

[jwright82]

Echoing the criticism from the article, Carter and the Great Tradition on an ambiguity between "thick" and "thin" Platonism. On one hand, if you believe in natures and universals, then they claim you. But that isn't very helpful. In analytic philosophy, anyone who believes in abstract objects like numbers and sets might be called a Platonist. Carter has something else in mind. He means Augustine. By itself, that doesn't seem too problematic. Everyone in the West means Augustine.

But then comes the shift. Now we mean the more contended parts of the Great Tradition (lectio divina, etc). I can't go there. I commend Carter for his good work against heterodox teachings like ESS, but I can't go any further than that.

Speculation: what if we Platonism got rid of Forms and replaced it with Set Theory?

I read some books on Godel and they make the claim that he was a "Platonist in the house of the Formalist's". Apparently he was a short time member of the Vienna Circle. He just kept his mouth shut, he preferred to let his arguments do the debating for him.
As far as set theory goes, didn't Frege and Russell make similar arguments to that affect? That's very interesting and it probably moves past much of the criticism of Platonism because it's recasting the problem.
Yeah I think that's always been my greatest hang up with Carter, "if you accept this than you must accept this and this and this". I'm just sitting there like "no I don't". He's good where he's good but there's a movement mentality, like Frame correctly identified for Vantillian's, at play and an us vs them view that may not be the most helpful thing.
Great response man.

 

[jwright82]

Echoing the criticism from the article, Carter and the Great Tradition on an ambiguity between "thick" and "thin" Platonism. On one hand, if you believe in natures and universals, then they claim you. But that isn't very helpful. In analytic philosophy, anyone who believes in abstract objects like numbers and sets might be called a Platonist. Carter has something else in mind. He means Augustine. By itself, that doesn't seem too problematic. Everyone in the West means Augustine.

But then comes the shift. Now we mean the more contended parts of the Great Tradition (lectio divina, etc). I can't go there. I commend Carter for his good work against heterodox teachings like ESS, but I can't go any further than that.

Speculation: what if we Platonism got rid of Forms and replaced it with Set Theory?

Would that set theory basically be a more Aristotelian metaphysics, locating the essence or permanence of a thing in reality instead of some higher realm? The distinction between the Forms as located in the mind of God and the created examples would be a nice improvement.
Also Godel's work really is only about the created examples, so it only really applies to the human created things we call math and logic. One question though would set theory be up to the task of explaining the richness of created reality? Just thinking out loud.

 

[RamistThomist]

Would that set theory basically be a more Aristotelian metaphysics, locating the essence or permanence of a thing in reality instead of some higher realm? The distinction between the Forms as located in the mind of God and the created examples would be a nice improvement.

It's more Platonic than Aristotelian. Aristotle would be the forms (sets?) within the thing itself. I'm not doing that. Plato would see Sets as eternal and uncreated, and that's problematic, too. Traditional theism put them in the mind of God and that's probably where I'm going, but that raises other issues as well.

 

[jwright82]

It's more Platonic than Aristotelian. Aristotle would be the forms (sets?) within the thing itself. I'm not doing that. Plato would see Sets as eternal and uncreated, and that's problematic, too. Traditional theism put them in the mind of God and that's probably where I'm going, but that raises other issues as well.

Yeah, I always leaned Platonic after studying Godel, ironically, about mathematics. I locate them in the mind of God like you. That's just never been relevant to our discussions before. I also always had a soft spot for Augustine, again just never relevant.