Kant's ethics - good will?

[Claudiu]

I'm reading Immanuel Kant's "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals" and I have some questions (mostly coming from Section I):

How does Kant understand the concept of a good will? Is it possible, for instance, that someone of naturally sympathetic temperament might also have a good will, in Kant’s sense? What does Kant mean when he says that the good will is good without limitation? Should we accept Kant’s conclusion that the good will is good without limitation?

-Section I
-Some material that might be helpful

 

[Philip]

How does Kant understand the concept of a good will? Is it possible, for instance, that someone of naturally sympathetic temperament might also have a good will, in Kant’s sense?

Short answer: yes. Kant would say that a person's will is good if he would do the right thing because it is right regardless of whether he wanted to. The important thing for Kant is that one do the right thing simply because it is the right thing.

What does Kant mean when he says that the good will is good without limitation?

He means that it is good regardless of all other factors (emotions, etc).

Should we accept Kant’s conclusion that the good will is good without limitation?

Absolutely not. The trouble is that Kant is, I think, too concerned with right action and so neglects right character and right living. We shouldn't do the right thing because it is right: we should do the right thing out of love for God and our neighbor. Kant is right that for someone naturally inclined to vice, doing virtuous acts will be inherently morally superior, but it's much better to be virtuous than to be vicious. For the Christian, our life is to be based on love, and that love, from God and for God, works itself out in right action.

I've heard the difference between Kantian and Christian ethics described thusly: suppose a husband gets flowers for his wife. She says "You shouldn't have." If he is a Kantian, his response (if he's honest) would be "it's my duty to give flowers from time to time" (if it's not duty, according to Kant, then it's not right). On the other hand, the response that a Christian (or any decent human being) would give is, "It's because I love you and I know you like flowers." Duty is very often the wrong motivation.

 

[Claudiu]

How does Kant understand the concept of a good will? Is it possible, for instance, that someone of naturally sympathetic temperament might also have a good will, in Kant’s sense?

Short answer: yes. Kant would say that a person's will is good if he would do the right thing because it is right regardless of whether he wanted to. The important thing for Kant is that one do the right thing simply because it is the right thing.

I don't know if that's correct. I thought that "wanting to" (volition) does play a role in Kant's definition of a good will. He says that

"a good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself and, regarded for itself, is to be valued incomparably higher than all that could merely be brought about by it in a favor of some inclination and indeed, if you will, of the sum of all inclinations." 4:394

It seems like merely doing the right thing is not enough, but that one must will the right thing.

Kant himself explores the question of what it is for a will to be good in the first section of the
Groundwork (pp. 397-9). He approaches the question through a consideration of various ways in
which one might be led to perform an action which is in accord with duty. The main possibilities
considered are (i) the case in which one is led to do the dutiful action out of an indirect inclination
(the shopkeeper, p. 397); (ii) the case in which one is led to do the dutiful action out of a direct or
immediate inclination (the sympathetically constituted agent, p. 398); and (iii) the case in which one
does the dutiful action out of duty, without any direct or indirect inclination or desire to perform the
action, and perhaps even in the face of competing inclinations or desires (the friend of mankind who
has lost her sympathetic feelings, p. 398).

Kant’s conclusion is that actions have moral value only when they resemble case (iii), in which we
know that the action is done from the motive of duty rather than out of (direct or indirect)
inclination.

By saying that

Kant would say that a person's will is good if he would do the right thing because it is right regardless of whether he wanted to. The important thing for Kant is that one do the right thing simply because it is the right thing.

is to say that the action, and not the will (volition), determines the good will. This seems contrary to what Kant is saying.

 

[Philip]

is to say that the action, and not the will (volition), determines the good will. This seems contrary to what Kant is saying.

I suppose I forgot that he makes that distinction. In any case, the action must be willed because of duty. And again, the problem is that Kant has nothing to say about a right ordering of the affections and the virtues in a person. He has regard for the motives for right action, but forgets about having a right life. The only "wanting to" that Kant would allow to be proper is "I want to do the right thing because it's the right thing."

 

[Claudiu]

The Preface to Section I reads:

"So what gives a morally good action its value is the motivation behind it, the principle on the basis of which it is chosen or, in Kantian terms, willed."

In light of what you said about Kant being "too concerned with right action and so neglects right character and right living," how can we apply that to the moral worth of an action? Say, is an action morally worthy not only when it is done for the sake of duty, but also as a natural outflow (for lack of better terms) of right character and right living? To me this would be a more intuitive, practical and an even stronger claim than what Kant is making. He seems to say that as long as an action if done for the sake of the duty, never mind how reluctant, it is good. I, on the other hand, want to say that the heart has a role too, i.e. we actually want to act and not only because it is what the law requires. I don't know how to better articulate what I have in mind. Do you see, somewhat, where I'm getting at?

 

[Philip]

I think I see what you're trying to say: it may be intuitively true that a person acting virtuously from virtuous motives after a long struggle with vice produces inherently more praiseworthy acts. But it's also true that in general it's better not to struggle with vice at all, but to have a right ordering of affections from the get-go. It's better to enjoy virtue and not to enjoy vice: to act out of love for God and others rather than out of a sense of "But it's my duty, darn it!"

A Christian ethic is not simply about producing good actions, but good persons.

 

[Claudiu]

Thanks Philip!

Where's Reformed Thomist? I'm curious to see what an Aristotelian/Aquinas response to Kant would be.

 

[Philip]

Probably similar, actually. Most modern virtue theorists draw heavily on both.

 

[Claudiu]

Another question:

Kant says,

"For in order that an action should be morally good, it is not enough that it conform to the moral law, but it must also be done for the sake of the law, otherwise that conformity is only very contingent and uncertain; since a principle which is not moral, although it may now and then produce actions conformable to the law, will also often produce actions which contradict it." Groundwork p.390

Is Kant right to suggest that only the motive of duty can non-contingently produce actions that conform to the law? I want to say no. It seems like it's incompatible within Kant's view to say that there is a formation of character through habit (which is what I was trying to say earlier). How could Aristotle (who holds to the formation of character through habit) respond to Kant who doesn't allow for inclinations?

 

[Philip]

Again, the problem is that Kant is too concerned with actions and not enough with affections or with persons.