Philosophy and Covenant Theology.

[MW]

So what are my questions, if not theological? If theology answers my questions, why do I still have them? If theology is supposed to answer all questions, then why so much mystery?

Theology has never claimed to answer all questions. It specifically rejects the notion that all questions can be answered; and in rejecting that notion, it has declared the illegitimacy of such questions. So it is a pertinent question you ask, Why do you still have such questions?

 

[Philip]

Ah, so once the dogma has been stated, further questions must cease? No attempt to probe the matter may be entertained? Somehow, this doesn't seem to square with the way in which the Church has historically done theology. There seems to have been too much wrestling with this stuff for this to be the case (I'm primarily thinking of the reading in Athanasius I was doing earlier today).

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Ah, so once the dogma has been stated, further questions must cease?

You're failing to understand the idea of "true theology" as Matthew is presenting it. Here is an excerpt from a paper I wrote that draws from Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics and The Infallible Word:

True theology, both archetypal and ectypal, is knowledge that stands beyond doubt in contrast to the depraved opinion of false theology. Archetypal theology is that theology which God knows “in se” (in Himself) while ectypal theology is true theology that is accommodated to creaturely understanding. True theology is one in its essence, whether it is found in God himself or understood by his creatures. The divisions of this theology into archetypal and ectypal respects the fact that there is not a single species of theology understood by degrees. In other words, God’s understanding and man’s understanding do not merely differ by degree of the same knowledge. Rather, this singular theology is understood absolutely and infinitely by the Creator (archetypal) while finitely and relatively by the creature (ectypal).

Finite truth is grounded in the one, all-encompassing truth of God’s mind: not only theology, but all human knowledge looks to divine knowledge as its source and goal. The archetype is theology in the truest sense, while all ectypal forms only bear a similitude to the archetype. Theology is in intelligent creatures as an image of the Creator. Theology is in God formally and eminently as His essential wisdom. He does not learn things by examining them or reasoning discursively about facts outside Himself but His is a simple intelligence to which all others can only be related by analogy. God knows things in Himself because it is in His essence to know. Creatures must discursively reason knowledge only insofar as they can analogically understand it but can never have knowledge as God has.

The fact of the divine archetype is crucial to the existence of true yet finite human theology. God understands divine things as He completely understands Himself. The secret things belong to Him alone and we do not peer into them nor can we but are to rely upon that which He accommodates to us. This understanding also guards against making the Creator “one of us”. Wisdom, for instance, does not indicate a genus of wise things of which God is one. Rather wisdom is an attribute of God: it is divine wisdom in the sense of being identical with the divine essence in its simplicity and freedom from composition. A creature is said to be wise only insofar as it images the Creator but it can never possess divine wisdom as this is of the essence of God Himself.

Since divine knowledge is uncreated and identical with the essence of God, it must also be understood that it is incommunicable as are all the divine attributes when defined strictly as speaking of God. God does not share His essence with creatures. All that can be naturally communicated to created things of ultimate wisdom are faint images or vestiges. There is no analogical path from the created order to a full knowledge of god. It is thus God himself who is the source, origin, and efficient cause of what we know as true theology. God’s infinite self-knowledge is transmitted to things in the created order. All things receive the imprint of God and finite creatures’ apprehension of revelation rests upon the image of God. As Augustine holds: “God alone is the theologian and we are truly his disciples.”

Though this distinction of knowledge and theology is very complex it should not be viewed as a form of rationalism. The human mind is radically limited and separated from God’s perfect divine wisdom. It has no power of ascent into divine things apart from the help of God. The sovereignty and transcendence of God is preserved and man understands the gracious nature of revelation and that we understand only insofar as God is kind to reveal to His creatures. In short, in contrast to modern notions, man is not independent in his search for truth but all knowledge is fully reliant upon God.

Thus we must understand that all finite theology is ectypal. In noting this limitation, this is not to state that ectypal theology is one set of truths while archetypal is another. Rather, ectypal theology is the same Truth accommodated to creaturely understanding. God accommodates His truth to human capacity. Revelation, whether natural or supernatural, is suited to the present conditions of human knowing. This act of accommodation belongs to God and God determines the form of knowledge that we have of Him. Against any neo-Orthodox notions that God’s “otherness” makes it impossible for God to communicate via human forms, the Scriptures preserve the transcendence of God in knowing things comprehensively while being able, as Creator, to communicate to His creatures. Ectypal theology is not “another Truth” but is, as it were, God lisping truth to us as a father lisps to His child.

Ectypal theology is also meant to be understood as the perfect form of true theology accommodated to creaturely understanding. It consists of the entire body, natural and supernatural, of knowledge that God has been pleased to reveal to His creatures. Yet, although this true Ectypal theology is revealed, man does not always properly apprehend the things that are revealed to Him. Not only does Sin darken man’s understanding such that he cannot have proper fruition in the natural order nor can he discern spiritual things while unregenerated but even regenerate man is still limited in what he can apprehend of the corpus of God’s truth. God has made our pilgrimage on this earth such that we will not have full happiness and blessedness in His truth but it is one of the things that we are to strive toward as a spiritual discipline as we pursue wisdom and it is also something that the Scriptures reveal that we will see fully only after we have been glorified. Paul reminds believers in 1 Corinthians not to become haughty and arrogant in our knowledge believing we have attained the fullness thereof. While we are sojourners, we know only in part but that imperfect knowledge is sufficient for us to know and be convinced that perfection is not present but is to be some day hoped for. Yet, the hope for perfect knowledge is not that our minds will become co-extensive with God’s own but that, as creatures, we will have the fullness of knowledge that God is able to analogically communicate to His creatures. Even in consummation and in glory we will still be creatures and God will be the Creator.

We have in our midst the perfect human, ectypal theology, but it cannot be perfectly exposited by us – not because of our finitude, but because of our sin and the incompleteness of our sanctification. Our only hope for attaining a saving knowledge of God lies in the fact that Scripture and its perfection is joined to our imperfection according to the fact that we have been united with Christ and that the Holy Spirit is using that perfect Word to transform us by the renewing of our minds.

In contrast to this Biblical form of knowledge, human philosophers do not allow analogical reasoning to understand the world. They start from nature and try to argue for a god who must be finite in nature. It starts with a "mute" universe that has no revelation and makes it revelational only with respect to the autonomous mind of man. No distinction is made between Creator and creature.

Kant's great contribution to philosophy consisted in stressing the activity of the experiencing subject. Kant argued that since it is the thinking subject that itself contributes the categories of universality and necessity, we must not think of these as covering any reality that exists or may exist wholly independent of the human mind. The validity of universals is to be taken as frankly due to a motion and a vote; it is conventional and nothing more.

Plato and Aristotle, as well as Kant, assumed the autonomy of man. On such a basis man may reason univocally (have the same mind as God) and reach a God who is just an extension of the creature or he may reason equivocally and reach a God who has no contact with him at all. Man is left with either God being part of nature (pantheism) or being so transcendent that He cannot get into nature (deism).

We're now left with a world where the scientist supposedly interacts with the physical world and can learn about the world apart from any reference to God and "ministers" who speak about God's revelation that has no reference to history and interaction with the world. Man is fractured intellectually where reason deals with things of the world and faith deals with things that cannot affect reason or the world.

The very idea of Kant's Copernican revolution was that the autonomous mind itself must assume the responsibility for making all factual differentiation and logical validation. To such a mind the God of Christianity cannot speak. Such a mind will hear no voice but its own.

God's revelation in nature, however, was always meant to serve alongside His special revelation. God is a revealing God and the perspicuity of nature is bound up in the fact that He voluntarily reveals. Both natural and special revelation would be impossible if God remained incomprehensible as He is in Himself (archetypal theology). Man cannot penetrate God as He is Himself - he cannot comprehend God. But created man may see clearly what is revealed clearly even if he does not see exhaustively. Man need not have exhaustive knowledge in order to know truly and certainly.

The Psalmist doesn't declare that the heavens possibly or probably declare the glory of God. Paul does not say that the wrath of God is probably revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men. Scripture takes the clarity of God's revelation for granted at every stage of human history. The God who speaks in Scripture cannot refer to anything that is not already authoritatively revelational of Himself for the evidence of His own existence. Everything exists that is His creation.

It is no easier for sinners to accept God in nature than it is for them to accept Him in Scripture. The two are inseparable in their clarity. We need the Holy Spirit to understand both. Man must be a Christian to study nature in a proper frame of mind no less than he needs the same understanding to properly apprehend the Scriptures. Modern man is truly darkened in the futility of his thinking because he does not begin by bowing the knee before God before he seeks to understand himself and the world around him.

 

[Philip]

Rich, I'm not denying what you write. I'm asking whether faith can seek understanding. I'm asking whether, if after coming up with a doctrinal statement I still have questions, I'm just supposed to play the mystery card and go no further, or whether you would say it's appropriate to continue to probe the doctrine further.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Rich, I'm not denying what you write. I'm asking whether faith can seek understanding. I'm asking whether, if after coming up with a doctrinal statement I still have questions, I'm just supposed to play the mystery card and go no further, or whether you would say it's appropriate to continue to probe the doctrine further.

I won't speak for Matthew but what he is saying is that true theology reveals only some things. Philosophy can be used as a handmaiden or tool for the person who can seek to understand what has been revealed but it can't get any further then what theology reveals as defined above. That is to say that God has not chosen to reveal all things and the creature who stands under God's authority should not be in a posture of putting his hand on his hips and declaring that he refuses to be bound to true theology.

Now, that said, there is certainly a sense in which the Reformed have always maintained that our apprehension of true theology is always imperfect. We ought to be seeking greater understanding and I certainly believe that a Christian man can refine prior understandings to get at a clearer apprehension of true theology.

I guess the idea of "probing further" depends upon the stance of the person attempting to probe. Is the person a worshiper of God who desires to understand true theology more deeply or is he one that is fundamentally dissatisfied with the limits that God has placed on what has been revealed? If, for instance, true theology leaves certain questions unanswered, it is inappropriate for the creature to autonomously decide that further questions must me insisted upon. If, however, there is a dependence upon revelation and he believes earlier formulations of true theology do not accord with true theology then that may be an entirely different matter.

The point Matthew made to begin with, which I agree with, is that true theology does not raise questions but it reveals what is true. We have no knowledge without true theology because it encompasses everything that God has revealed by special and general revelation.

 

[Philip]

The point Matthew made to begin with, which I agree with, is that true theology does not raise questions but it reveals what is true. We have no knowledge without true theology because it encompasses everything that God has revealed by special and general revelation.

I guess that I find that whenever I read theology, I come away with more questions than I started with. What is revealed puzzles me more than it did when it was hidden.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Philip,

You're equivocating now. You stated that you agreed with what I wrote above. True theology is archetypal and ectypal. The latter is all truth that has been revealed by God, which is accomodated to creaturely capacity.

You are redefining theology as the stuff you have read. That is not the same thing. A book with theology in it is not, by definition, all that is meant by true theology. A book written by Rob Bell, for instance, has lots of theology but very little of it is true. Even the most exhaustive book on theology, written by the godliest saint this side of glory, will never be coextensive with true theology as defined above.

I would also note that true theology is revealed by God and our lack of apprehension is not a defect in the revelation itself but in the man whose mind is not yet completely sanctified.

 

[Philip]

But even after reading the Scriptures, I always have more questions: there is more to be discovered. Even truths that I know (like the Trinity) leave me with questions---I still wrestle. I'm not saying that this makes revelation imperfect---I am merely suggesting that it does not answer all possible questions---indeed, it raises many questions. The theology is true, but it isn't easy. I speak mainly for myself when I say that I would have far fewer questions and far less ambiguity did I not have Scripture guiding my questioning.

 

[jwright82]

I'm not saying it does: I'm saying that putting things in the context of Covenant only makes things more complicated, not less. I'm currently involved in a discussion over the law, and I'll tell you right now that some of the things God tells the people to do and holds them responsible for don't make a whole lot of sense to me. I believe them because they're true, but holding them to be true means that I have to live with a lot of ambiguity.

I see your point. Yes there is a lot of mystery that we cannot comprehend but the point is looking at this avoids specific problems that result from looking at it in abstract terms. There is much more that needs to be explained here but it is a good start in the right direction, I think.

---------- Post added at 11:01 AM ---------- Previous post was at 10:54 AM ----------

I said absolute responsibility, not absolute freedom. Secondly, covenant highlights the distinction---I don't see how it resolves the problem.

Well your rigth it doesn't resolve th eproblem per se but it provides a more concrete context to work this out as much as we can. You know as well as I do that philosophy has always wrestled with trying to connect the abstract with the concrete. This seems to be a way to connect those. But you are right there is much philosophical work that needs to be done and if I do any in this area I will shhot it your way. Do you see any problems with this method not connecting the abstract with the concrete issues? I'm asking for your opinion not trying to start a debate with you. You understand philosophy better than most so you might be able see things that I havn't, thats why I ask. Thanks for input.

---------- Post added at 11:05 AM ---------- Previous post was at 11:01 AM ----------

The concern I have with modern attempts to recast systematics according to covenant theology is that I see folks claiming a "Biblical" approach for themselves while claiming that the older forms are philosophical.

That's what I was thinking. If it's Horton's covenant theology that is the lens by which he advocates interpreting philosophy, then one needs to reconsider the utility of such an idea.

Good point but I do not think that Oliphint is on board with him and he advocates the same thing.

---------- Post added at 11:28 AM ---------- Previous post was at 11:05 AM ----------

Rich, I'm not denying what you write. I'm asking whether faith can seek understanding. I'm asking whether, if after coming up with a doctrinal statement I still have questions, I'm just supposed to play the mystery card and go no further, or whether you would say it's appropriate to continue to probe the doctrine further.

I won't speak for Matthew but what he is saying is that true theology reveals only some things. Philosophy can be used as a handmaiden or tool for the person who can seek to understand what has been revealed but it can't get any further then what theology reveals as defined above. That is to say that God has not chosen to reveal all things and the creature who stands under God's authority should not be in a posture of putting his hand on his hips and declaring that he refuses to be bound to true theology.

Now, that said, there is certainly a sense in which the Reformed have always maintained that our apprehension of true theology is always imperfect. We ought to be seeking greater understanding and I certainly believe that a Christian man can refine prior understandings to get at a clearer apprehension of true theology.

I guess the idea of "probing further" depends upon the stance of the person attempting to probe. Is the person a worshiper of God who desires to understand true theology more deeply or is he one that is fundamentally dissatisfied with the limits that God has placed on what has been revealed? If, for instance, true theology leaves certain questions unanswered, it is inappropriate for the creature to autonomously decide that further questions must me insisted upon. If, however, there is a dependence upon revelation and he believes earlier formulations of true theology do not accord with true theology then that may be an entirely different matter.

The point Matthew made to begin with, which I agree with, is that true theology does not raise questions but it reveals what is true. We have no knowledge without true theology because it encompasses everything that God has revealed by special and general revelation.

Philip does raise a good point about mystery though. I agree with you and I liked your paper to. But there is in philosophy certian logical fallacies that can be raised against simply throwing the "mystery card" up, which would seem to indicate a misues of logic and reason. I have read Calvin, Berkhof, Bavinck, and Turretin all argue for exactly the same thing that you and Matthew are arguing for but I know of nowhere where someone lays out a theology and/or philosophy of mystery to distinguish between legitimate mystery and illigitimate mystery. Do either one of you (or anyone else) know of a resource to help resolve that problem?

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Do either one of you (or anyone else) know of a resource to help resolve that problem?

I do not. The example for me that immediately comes to mind is the hypostatic union in the Person of Christ. Special revelation that deals with the full humanity and full deity of Christ is not great and this limits how far we can penetrate into the truth. The definition of Chalcedon, for instance, defines the relationship by negation as much as it defines it by positive statements and there's not much more that can be attained through logical inference. In this example, are we willing to submit to the amount of revelation God has given us and infer by GNC what He has given us or are we dissatisifed by what we can infer from the Scriptures and decide to strike out on our own through speculation and using our reason in an autonomous fashion? I believe that, where revelation stops, the pious puts his hand over his mouth.

That is not to say that it is perhaps possible to infer more from special revelation than has been inferred to date but I do believe that even when we attain to the perfect apprehension of the truth on this subject in glory we will still be left with some of the same creaturely limitations. That's the difference between piety and rationalism, which says that the limits of revealed truth are contradictions because the autonomous human mind cannot reconcile what has been revealed. Whenever I listen to JW, Islamic, or other cults attack the idea I see them failing to bow the knew to true theology and it's futile to argue them into the point by philosophy which depends on human authority for its validity. Our starting point is true theology that begins with God's revelation and we reason from there. Their starting point is false theology, which begins in idolatry.

 

[Philip]

is looking at this avoids specific problems that result from looking at it in abstract terms.

Such as? We haven't solved anything except (possibly) an existential concern. The tension is still there---we haven't explained it away.

Do you see any problems with this method not connecting the abstract with the concrete issues?

Honestly, the only places where I've seen this tension have been in addressing problems that weren't really terribly interesting anyway (the problem of wholes and parts, for instance: interesting logically, sure, but no practical use, so why bother?). The problem of responsibility and sovereignty was already pretty practical and concrete to begin with.

In this example, are we willing to submit to the amount of revelation God has given us and infer by GNC what He has given us or are we dissatisifed by what we can infer from the Scriptures and decide to strike out on our own through speculation and using our reason in an autonomous fashion?

I suppose you and I have been (possibly) talking at cross-purposes here, if this is all that you mean. I'm merely speaking of probing what has been revealed further.

 

[jwright82]

Such as? We haven't solved anything except (possibly) an existential concern. The tension is still there---we haven't explained it away.

Well when we look at this issue from purely abstract ways we have a problem with connecting it to concrete reality. Is this issue best resolved by libertarianism or determinism? Or some mixture of the two? And how do these relate to our concrete experience?

The manifold problems associated with these viewpoints are well known to both of us in the history of philosophy. So does viewing things covenantly escape these problems? I would say yes, if we must relate the abstract and the concrete to make sense of things than philosophy has failed. But it is in within the covenant of creation that we are allowed creaturly freedom under and in submission to creatorly freedom. God has bounded himself covenantly to us, he can flood the world anytime he likes but he has pledged not to do so in covenant to us. We are creatures who excersize historical levels of freedoin a covenant with God. So my freedom than is realized in my own history, concretely speaking.

Honestly, the only places where I've seen this tension have been in addressing problems that weren't really terribly interesting anyway (the problem of wholes and parts, for instance: interesting logically, sure, but no practical use, so why bother?). The problem of responsibility and sovereignty was already pretty practical and concrete to begin with.

If it was so common sense than we would have never raised the problem to begin with. Wittgenstien's problem was demonstrated twice in his life with his two periods of philosophy. Twice he sought to resolve the problems of philosophy by showing them to be in essence foolish and twice he was shown to be wrong by philosophers using his "end of philosophy" philosophy to pursue philosophical problems. If anyone starts out on the logical analysis, unless logic is stupid in making sense of reality (which would imply reason as well), they will end up exactly where philosophers are today.

 

[Philip]

Well when we look at this issue from purely abstract ways we have a problem with connecting it to concrete reality. Is this issue best resolved by libertarianism or determinism? Or some mixture of the two? And how do these relate to our concrete experience?

They relate in very obvious ways---indeed, so obvious as to make libertarianism and hard determinism clearly absurd. I just don't see this tension, frankly, so your solution seems extraneous.

The manifold problems associated with these viewpoints are well known to both of us in the history of philosophy.

The problems come when you take one and not the other of the horns of the dilemma. That's all there is to it.

If it was so common sense than we would have never raised the problem to begin with.

On the contrary: we have two common-sense intuitions that seem as if they should conflict. The problem arises from common sense, not from a lack of it. The parcticality of the problem is plain.

 

[jwright82]

They relate in very obvious ways---indeed, so obvious as to make libertarianism and hard determinism clearly absurd. I just don't see this tension, frankly, so your solution seems extraneous.

Than common sensecly resolve them rather than just assert the whole question ridiculous upfront (without ever providing any answer).

The problems come when you take one and not the other of the horns of the dilemma. That's all there is to it.

Than abstractly show a middle ground that relates it to the concrete reality?

On the contrary: we have two common-sense intuitions that seem as if they should conflict. The problem arises from common sense, not from a lack of it. The parcticality of the problem is plain.

Than resolve them, if you can do better than me than do so?

 

[Philip]

Than common sensecly resolve them rather than just assert the whole question ridiculous upfront (without ever providing any answer).

I'm not sure that this is possible. As I said before: Covenant theology leaves the answer just as ambiguous as anything else does.

Than abstractly show a middle ground that relates it to the concrete reality

As I said, both horns of the dilemma are rooted in reality: one has to hold them together. Am I entirely sure how to resolve it? No.

I think you are asking Covenant theology to do something it was never meant to do.

 

[jwright82]

I'm not sure that this is possible. As I said before: Covenant theology leaves the answer just as ambiguous as anything else does.

Well completly resolvable, no. But able to avoid the problems of complete abstraction, yes. The line of mystery for me is God's revelation, does he reveal to us exactly how they relate? No, but the idea of covenant alows us to relate them historicaly. We have creaturly freedom that is limited.

As I said, both horns of the dilemma are rooted in reality: one has to hold them together.

How? Where are they rooted?

Am I entirely sure how to resolve it? No.

I think you are asking Covenant theology to do something it was never meant to do.

Well the sort faith reason dualism you are suggesting is more trouble than its worth. Theology is primarary to our understanding of the rest of reality. If our very existance is covenantal than that is primarary. Theology does matter to the rest of the sciences.

 

[Philip]

No, but the idea of covenant alows us to relate them historicaly. We have creaturly freedom that is limited.

Ok, fine---not a terribly interesting solution, though: I already knew this.

How?

Implications: determinism or freedom, if taken alone, will lead to obviously absurd conclusions. Granted, this hasn't kept philosophers from doing this.

Well the sort faith reason dualism you are suggesting is more trouble than its worth.

I'm not suggesting faith-reason dualism, simply pointing out that the problem of sovereignty and responsibility is beside the point of covenant theology. Indeed, I would argue that covenant theology makes the relationship between the two much more complex.

 

[jwright82]

Ok, fine---not a terribly interesting solution, though: I already knew this.

But ho wdo you relate them historically without the covenant?

Implications: determinism or freedom, if taken alone, will lead to obviously absurd conclusions. Granted, this hasn't kept philosophers from doing this.

Exactally, they have used abstract notions to describe the relationship and arived at nothing as a result. Lets try a more theological starting point and see where we go.

I'm not suggesting faith-reason dualism, simply pointing out that the problem of sovereignty and responsibility is beside the point of covenant theology. Indeed, I would argue that covenant theology makes the relationship between the two much more complex.

It makes it more complex only if theology isn't true. It is only within a faith/reason distinction that such a failing argument can be made. The reason I say that is this. In the faith/reason distinction there are things true of faith that are unrelated to things true of reason. So the fact that every single human is in some covenant relationship with God is absolutly irrelivant to everyday human experience because theology by its nature can have no bearing on the world of reason, or the distinction goes away. But Van Til correctly pointed out that this is false because it makes theology pointless to everyday life because it is of the faith part. But if theology is true than it affects every aspect of reality.

I mean why would the matters of faith not matter to everyday life? Well if they do than you are in hot water with your distinction. What we believe in religion orients our entire theoretical lives.

 

[Brandon1]

Well I understand that this thread has moved on, but there are very important questions about the philosophical nature of covenant theology. Every textbook I've read on the Reformation indicates that the philosophical school of Nominalism (most notably Scotus) was essential to the development of the Reformation. I think if we want to do philosophical inquiry into the philosophical moorings of covenant theology, we should explore its relation to nominalism.

 

[Philip]

Every textbook I've read on the Reformation indicates that the philosophical school of Nominalism (most notably Scotus) was essential to the development of the Reformation.

I think you're thinking William of Ockham (or Occam). Johannes Duns Scotus is known for realism about universals (not a terribly interesting problem, in any case).

But ho wdo you relate them historically without the covenant?

Why do we need to?

Exactally, they have used abstract notions to describe the relationship and arived at nothing as a result. Lets try a more theological starting point and see where we go.

But we can do this with any concrete scenario, not just with covenant. We can talk about freedom and determinism in terms of what I had for breakfast this morning. You can't get much more concrete than my breakfast.

It makes it more complex only if theology isn't true. It is only within a faith/reason distinction that such a failing argument can be made.

Not at all: if theology is true, then it means that there are more factors to be considered, more considerations that we will have. It makes the situation much more complex.

But if theology is true than it affects every aspect of reality.

Yes indeed: it makes it so much more complex and uncomfortable. This is exactly the point that I am making: with theology in the picture, we have much more ambiguity to live with.

 

[jwright82]

Well I understand that this thread has moved on, but there are very important questions about the philosophical nature of covenant theology. Every textbook I've read on the Reformation indicates that the philosophical school of Nominalism (most notably Scotus) was essential to the development of the Reformation. I think if we want to do philosophical inquiry into the philosophical moorings of covenant theology, we should explore its relation to nominalism.

I know that nominalism influenced Luther but I don't know about Calvin? But if Covenant Theology is essentially biblical than how would nominalism relate to that?

---------- Post added at 09:32 AM ---------- Previous post was at 09:18 AM ----------

Why do we need to?

Well we certainly cannot ultimatly relate them. But a bare historical understanding of human freedom and divine soviergnty tells us nothing because there is no way to look into history alone and settle the issue. But the idea of the covenant makes a personal relation between the two parties involved rather than a merely abstract relation bewteen two entities. Hyper-Calvinism and Arminianism are both wrong because they use abstract ideas to make sense out of this relation.

But we can do this with any concrete scenario, not just with covenant. We can talk about freedom and determinism in terms of what I had for breakfast this morning. You can't get much more concrete than my breakfast.

How in the world would that even make sense out of it? The divine isn't even present except in an abstract way.

Not at all: if theology is true, then it means that there are more factors to be considered, more considerations that we will have. It makes the situation much more complex.

Theology is not just some section of reality, like God has his little section in the church and that is it. Theology is primary because we live in creation, it can be no other way. This world is not nuetral but creation. So our theology primes the rest of our search for knowledge and understanding the world. If you regect this than you regect the fact that creation is creation, it seems to me.

Yes indeed: it makes it so much more complex and uncomfortable. This is exactly the point that I am making: with theology in the picture, we have much more ambiguity to live with.

Certianly but only those areas that God has not revealed himself to us but only autonomous reason would take offence to that. But you cannot just set theology aside and hope to do a better job at answering the questions of creation.

 

[Philip]

But the idea of the covenant makes a personal relation between the two parties involved rather than a merely abstract relation bewteen two entities.

Implications? This isn't a terribly interesting observation, I'm afraid.

How in the world would that even make sense out of it?

Very simply: we can talk about the processes through which I came to eat grits rather than eggs: we can talk about limitation of options, we can talk about all of my tastes and rational beliefs that went into the decision.

Theology is primary because we live in creation, it can be no other way. This world is not nuetral but creation. So our theology primes the rest of our search for knowledge and understanding the world. If you regect this than you regect the fact that creation is creation, it seems to me.

I'm not rejecting this: I'm affirming it. I'm saying that because I have to acknowledge creation as creation, it means that stuff's more complicated.

Certianly but only those areas that God has not revealed himself to us but only autonomous reason would take offence to that. But you cannot just set theology aside and hope to do a better job at answering the questions of creation.

But this is the point I'm making: the God who is revealed is more mysterious than one who is concealed. The more I know of God the less I understand, and the more I understand, the less I realize I know. As I said, revelation makes things more complicated, not less. I'm not advocating autonomy at all.

 

[jwright82]

Implications? This isn't a terribly interesting observation, I'm afraid.

It has the implication of saying that we avoid the problem of trying to get to a personal understanding from an impersonal abstract source.

Very simply: we can talk about the processes through which I came to eat grits rather than eggs: we can talk about limitation of options, we can talk about all of my tastes and rational beliefs that went into the decision.

Sure but you will just keep begging the bigger questions of the ultimate relation of these two ideas.

I'm not rejecting this: I'm affirming it. I'm saying that because I have to acknowledge creation as creation, it means that stuff's more complicated.

Fair enough but it is problimatic in a different way. There is mystery there but it is a good mystery. The problems for the non theological understanding is that it is false and not therefore a good mystery.

But this is the point I'm making: the God who is revealed is more mysterious than one who is concealed. The more I know of God the less I understand, and the more I understand, the less I realize I know. As I said, revelation makes things more complicated, not less. I'm not advocating autonomy at all.

Fair enough, I agree with you here.