Reforming Apologetics

Status
Not open for further replies.

yeutter

Puritan Board Senior
I realize that Dr. J. V. Fesko's book Reforming Apologetics: Retrieving the Classic Reformed Approach to Defending the Faith. has already been reviewed.
I am posting this to bring your attention to another lengthy, thoughtful, helpful review of Fesko's book has been posted by Dr. Marco Barone.
 
Marco sent me the link. He's a good guy. Here's an expanded version of what I told him:

  1. If Van Tillians would commit to the distinction between the order of being and the order of knowing, many of their surface-level disagreements with classicals would disagree. And it doesn't threaten anything in the Van Tillian system.
  2. I'm no longer really a critic of the TAG. I'm convinced that maybe four people on the planet understand it, so nothing is gained by "refuting" it. And I don't think I am smart enough to refute it.
  3. Fesko's book functions better as prolegomena than apologetic methodology. That is where he is successful. Compare the prolegomena of Turretin, Shedd, Hodge, and every Reformed thinker until Kuyper--and even Kuyper at parts--with the traditional arguments, and you can see the conclusion I'm making.
  4. Apropos of (3), I think Fesko overplayed his hand on specifically rebutting Van Til. At this point I no longer try to rebut Van Til. Evidently, none of his critics has ever understood him. I just point people to the Reformed scholastics.
  5. As much as I hate the term "worldview," there is no getting around its usage.
  6. Fesko had a good chapter on Aquinas, and his chapter on Calvin, especially his calling attention to the Neo-Orthodox formatting of the Battles version, is good.
 
I realize that Dr. J. V. Fesko's book Reforming Apologetics: Retrieving the Classic Reformed Approach to Defending the Faith. has already been reviewed.
I am posting this to bring your attention to another lengthy, thoughtful, helpful review of Fesko's book has been posted by Dr. Marco Barone.
Amazing review, thanks for sharing. I find myself in agreement with the reviewer. Very fair to both sides of the discussion.
 
The inclusion of Dooyeweerd is a strange one because he didn't like apologetics to my knowledge. So outside of the interactions of the two men (Dooyeweerd and Van Til) in "Jerusalem And Athens" book, why discuss him?
I haven't read this book so maybe he gives a reason but unless someone is writing on that exchange or Robert Knudsen's relationship to the two, why include him?
Also my obligatory rant against "TAG" is appropriate here. Van Til never used that acronym, to my knowledge, so why did any Vantillian start it is beyond me?
It's horrible and open to easy criticism by anyone, really one argument?
But if transcendental is taken in a philosophical sense, see Bahnsen's Van Til reader book on this, as a method of argumentation than a lot of the confusion goes away. BTW in philosophy it's almost always taken this way.
Also William Edgar, Knudsen, and I believe Oliphant uses it this way as well (see their respective lectures on Apologetics at the WTS media archive website).
They don't say it the way I say it but they use similar words to convey the same idea about the transcendental method of argumentation. For contemporary uses of the same method applied to different things see James Anderson and Christopher Watkins' work.
I mean really when atheist's love the acronym then you got a problem in presentation. Defining it as a method solves most of the confusion that dreadful acronym caused.
[automerge]1753729816[/automerge]
Marco sent me the link. He's a good guy. Here's an expanded version of what I told him:

  1. If Van Tillians would commit to the distinction between the order of being and the order of knowing, many of their surface-level disagreements with classicals would disagree. And it doesn't threaten anything in the Van Tillian system.
  2. I'm no longer really a critic of the TAG. I'm convinced that maybe four people on the planet understand it, so nothing is gained by "refuting" it. And I don't think I am smart enough to refute it.
  3. Fesko's book functions better as prolegomena than apologetic methodology. That is where he is successful. Compare the prolegomena of Turretin, Shedd, Hodge, and every Reformed thinker until Kuyper--and even Kuyper at parts--with the traditional arguments, and you can see the conclusion I'm making.
  4. Apropos of (3), I think Fesko overplayed his hand on specifically rebutting Van Til. At this point I no longer try to rebut Van Til. Evidently, none of his critics has ever understood him. I just point people to the Reformed scholastics.
  5. As much as I hate the term "worldview," there is no getting around its usage.
  6. Fesko had a good chapter on Aquinas, and his chapter on Calvin, especially his calling attention to the Neo-Orthodox formatting of the Battles version, is good.
I agree with points 2-6, for point 2 see my last response "rant". I'm confused by point 1 though, could you please unpack that so that I may better understand your point. Thanks.
 
I agree with points 2-6, for point 2 see my last response "rant". I'm confused by point 1 though, could you please unpack that so that I may better understand your point. Thanks.
Van Tillians sometimes say, "Without the existence of God, you can't prove anything." That is very true. Sproul said the same thing. That is the order of being. We start with God in the order of being. Van Tillians will then move from that point to say "Unless you presuppose God, you can't account for anything." In other words, God must also be first in the order of knowing. That isn't immediately clear why it is so. My self-consciousness doesn't start with God for the obvious fact that I am not God.
 
I realize that Dr. J. V. Fesko's book Reforming Apologetics: Retrieving the Classic Reformed Approach to Defending the Faith. has already been reviewed.
I am posting this to bring your attention to another lengthy, thoughtful, helpful review of Fesko's book has been posted by Dr. Marco Barone.

That is a thoughtful piece but not lengthy. It offers counterpoints without going into details.

Like the reviewer I don't see anything in Fesko that helps apologetics move forward. We are stuck with naive categories of thought that have proved disastrous for Reformed theology. Nothing has been "retrieved" because there is no attempt to offer a systematic presentation that can be brought back into operation.

Van Til's presuppositionalism engages with concrete theological categories in the reformed tradition. His system looks more like retrieval.
 
Van Tillians sometimes say, "Without the existence of God, you can't prove anything." That is very true. Sproul said the same thing. That is the order of being. We start with God in the order of being. Van Tillians will then move from that point to say "Unless you presuppose God, you can't account for anything." In other words, God must also be first in the order of knowing. That isn't immediately clear why it is so. My self-consciousness doesn't start with God for the obvious fact that I am not God.
Ok so without the truth of Christian Theism metaphysically then no epistemological situation can exist to know anything? Presupposing the way you seem to be using it bifurcates the two. Where for me they are one in the same along with ethics. Different perspectives on the same thing. I can see by bifurcating the two the picture gets confusing.
If presupposing is merely a bare epistemological statement than you'd be correct. Thanks for unpacking.
 
Ok so without the truth of Christian Theism metaphysically then no epistemological situation can exist to know anything? Presupposing the way you seem to be using it bifurcates the two. Where for me they are one in the same along with ethics. Different perspectives on the same thing. I can see by bifurcating the two the picture gets confusing.
If presupposing is merely a bare epistemological statement than you'd be correct. Thanks for unpacking.

You summarized my view accurately. Of course, where we disagree is on whether metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology are the same thing (albeit with different perspectives).
 
Van Tillians sometimes say, "Without the existence of God, you can't prove anything." That is very true. Sproul said the same thing. That is the order of being. We start with God in the order of being. Van Tillians will then move from that point to say "Unless you presuppose God, you can't account for anything." In other words, God must also be first in the order of knowing. That isn't immediately clear why it is so. My self-consciousness doesn't start with God for the obvious fact that I am not God.

"Self-consciousness" is itself a conflation of the two orders. Your existence as a "self" implies participation in being; you did not create yourself; you are contingent. Your awareness of being a "self" requires an implicit grasp of truth, identity, and relation, as when you distinguish "I" from "not-I".

This mirrors the classical doctrine that "to be" and "to be true" are convertible. In self-consciousness, being and knowing are inextricable; just as, for Van Til, the order of being and the order of knowing are inseparable.

Your self-consciousness depends on a framework beyond itself. You did not create existence, logic, or identity. These are "given," pointing to a transcendent source. Transcendentally, your self-awareness already depends on God’s existence to even have a coherent "self" to reflect upon.

This is why Van Til insists that unbelievers "suppress the truth," Rom. 1:18: they use God’s preconditions for knowledge while denying their source.

Aquinas has his own parallels to this: the mind knows itself by knowing objects, and in doing so, implicitly affirms its participation in being and truth, which terminate in God. For Aquinas, natural reason can partially know truth apart from grace. For Van Til, even that partial knowledge is borrowed from theistic presuppositions.

Van Til is correct. There are no brute facts. There is no brute self-consciousness. The Cartesian "I" is already relational and is dependent on not-self. The "think" assumes logic, which assumes divine rationality.

No rational person can articulate self-consciousness without borrowing from theism.
 
"Self-consciousness" is itself a conflation of the two orders. Your existence as a "self" implies participation in being; you did not create yourself; you are contingent. Your awareness of being a "self" requires an implicit grasp of truth, identity, and relation, as when you distinguish "I" from "not-I".

This mirrors the classical doctrine that "to be" and "to be true" are convertible. In self-consciousness, being and knowing are inextricable; just as, for Van Til, the order of being and the order of knowing are inseparable.

Your self-consciousness depends on a framework beyond itself. You did not create existence, logic, or identity. These are "given," pointing to a transcendent source. Transcendentally, your self-awareness already depends on God’s existence to even have a coherent "self" to reflect upon.

This is why Van Til insists that unbelievers "suppress the truth," Rom. 1:18: they use God’s preconditions for knowledge while denying their source.

Aquinas has his own parallels to this: the mind knows itself by knowing objects, and in doing so, implicitly affirms its participation in being and truth, which terminate in God. For Aquinas, natural reason can partially know truth apart from grace. For Van Til, even that partial knowledge is borrowed from theistic presuppositions.

Van Til is correct. There are no brute facts. There is no brute self-consciousness. The Cartesian "I" is already relational and is dependent on not-self. The "think" assumes logic, which assumes divine rationality.

No rational person can articulate self-consciousness without borrowing from theism.
I think I can go with most of that. I took the "self-conscious" line from Sproul.
 
You summarized my view accurately. Of course, where we disagree is on whether metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology are the same thing (albeit with different perspectives).
Fair enough. I wouldn't go so far as to say there the same thing but perhaps a la Dooyeweerd different aspects of the same thing. But I most certainly agree we can't lump so close together to be "merely different" or only linguistic differences.
So I imagine the small difference between us, the only real difference is one of methodology. We choose two different methods based on our slightly different perceptions of things. As you know I don't have Van Til's problem with different methods.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top