Simple Explanation of Primary/Secondary Causes

[No Other Name]

I was discussing the doctrine of God's decrees with an Arminian and I found myself using an analogy of God as the first cause and man as the secondary cause.

I used a novel to illustrate the relationship between the author and a character. The author creates the scenario for the character to make a choice, and since the author knows everything about the character, the author knows the choice the character will make and knows how the choice will continue the plot as planned by the author.

The author may want a scene of peace for his protagonist or a scene of horrific struggle - and based on previous poor choices made by the protagonist for the instruction of the audience.

He denied this is real choice.

I said it would be bizarre to say that Romeo does not effectually make a choice to kill Tybalt - but he said rather Romeo's "choice" is illusory simply because there is a writer behind the play. That makes no sense to me.

Because we have been with Neo, we know he will take the red pill and "see how far the rabbit hole goes" and are not surprised when he chooses not to take the blue pill and "wake up tomorrow and this is all a dream". W learn later that Cypher regrets taking the red pill and wished for the blue while Neo never shows regret - because they are different characters to communicate different perspectives to the audience. One is selfless and willing to suffer for a greater good and one is selfish and willing to kill others so he can have a better life for himself.

And we do not blame or praise the writers for the *actions* of these characters. Rather whether or not the story is engaging and satisfying.

The analogy of course is not perfect. (Although I still do appreciate objections to fiction as self-praising when stories are told to glorify oneself rather than God).

My interlocutor objected. All of these are characters and none of them make real choices since none of them are real people with real minds.

All too true, I remarked.

Yet the analogy serves best to illustrate the distinction between author and character as an illustration of the distinction between Creator and creature in the area when creatures make choices.

And the analogy serves well since - as you say - characters are not real making the distinction between author and creation massive. The author is indeed real and the character is truly not.

Yet still not even that distinction is as massive as the infinite gulf between Creator and creature in the case of very real humans making very real choices.

I humbly offer my contributions to the discussion for your expert theological analysis. Am I wrong to have slipped into an analogy of author writing characters? Is there some kernel of truth ensconced deep within Berkhof/Bavinck/Turretin/ et al that I overlooked and missed a "hole" in my reasoning?

Thank you all in advance. I am now going to put on protective gear. Please be gracious. My heart is in the right place.

But I really hope I don't need to walk back anything I said. That is probably pride that is talking now hahahaha

 

[John Nyberg]

That is a creative analogy, brother. I think that I would not use the matrix, though. In that movie, Neo is a heroic, expressive individualist who brings about his own destiny. Maybe Narnia is a better example? The children find themselves being wholly (both physically and spiritually) brought in to a real fantasy world. They truly act and make a difference in this world, and yet they are always being guided by Aslan, who is both author and the primary actor in that world. The children, therefore, become kings and queens in light of Aslan's true Royalty. The Witch and her army of reprobate narnians and demonic minions are also truly acting in a true world, and yet their actions are in contrast to the true kingliness of Aslan. Just a thought, I enjoyed reading this post, brother.

 

[No Other Name]

In that movie, Neo is a heroic, expressive individualist who brings about his own destiny.

No, the writers bring about his destiny in the story. (although the writers would sadly agree with you in that your observation is the point they were trying to communicate). But keeping in the analogy as I used it, it is about writer - character interaction.

My point in using Neo was for the choice between red and blue pills is that it directly links to selflessness as being "rewarded" by the writers and selfishness being "punished" by the writers.

This would be analogous to God's decree that Moses choosing to submit to God is rewarded by our covenant Lord and Pharaoh's hardness and refusal to submit as being punished - and deservedly so. The fact that Exodus reports God hardens his heart is - of course - a proof that whatever happens God decrees, but the fact that he also hardens his own heart should be proof enough of his moral responsibility despite being part of God's plan and eternal design for the outcome.

My Arminian brother would object and say that - in my interpretation of the events - with the outcome known by God from eternity, then Moses and Pharaoh are simply puppets on God's strings. I again pointed out no one reacts to fictional characters in that way. Even unreal characters are granted more agency intuitively than real flesh-and-blood humans by Arminians.

I would not know how to use Narnia as an analogy. The story has an in-universe figure of God that would somehow have an internal analogy stacked upon the external analogy of writer-character interactions. I am unsure how that would work, but I will take your word for it.

 

[JvMill]

with the outcome known by God from eternity, then Moses and Pharaoh are simply puppets on God's strings

Sounds like an open theist, not just an Arminian. An Arminian should affirm God knowing the outcome from eternity.

 

[No Other Name]

Sounds like an open theist, not just an Arminian. An Arminian should affirm God knowing the outcome from eternity.

He has shut down when asked for his own explanation, simply claiming Arminianism. I am now done discussing since that revealed a one-way street of explanation from me and none forthcoming or required from him.

I wouldn't have bothered normally but I went to undergrad Bible college with him so I knew him and was happy to reply to his message on FB.

 

[MyCrows]

I used a novel to illustrate the relationship between the author and a character. The author creates the scenario for the character to make a choice, and since the author knows everything about the character, the author knows the choice the character will make and knows how the choice will continue the plot as planned by the author.

While I disagree with your interlocutor here when he criticizes the choices as not being "real", isn't this example more in line with the idea of God's decrees being akin to foreknowledge of events, rather than what is expressed in the confession?

WCF 3.2

Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions;[1] yet has he not decreed anything because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions.[2]

 

[No Other Name]

God's decrees being skin to foreknowledge of events, rather than what is expressed in the confession?

"skin"?

 

[MyCrows]

Akin.


Autocorrect ugh.

 

[John Nyberg]

I completely jumped ahead and did not deal with your analogy on its own terms, sorry brother! I do like how your analogy emphasizes the greatness of the creator creature distinction. And your biblical example is a perfect one on how man acts according to his nature while God remains the primary cause.

I think the weakness of your analogy lies in the fact that the author is "really real" while the character is "sorta real." A good piece of literature or screen play will be convincing to the audience. They should not be constantly reminding themselves that they are not seeing real events but rather the fictional actions of characters that were written by a real author. They should simply enjoy the story and pretend, for the time, that it is real.

It is true that God is transcendent. The Bible tells is that from the opening pages of Genesis. Yet it is also true that our God is personal and active in the world. He is not simply the author of the story but also the "main character." The Incarnation makes this reality precious and tangible to Christians.

There is an ontological relationship between the creator and the creation that does not exist between a human author and work of fiction. This is why Narnia offers a more intuitive alternative to your analogy by bringing the reader in to a world where the creation has a personal relationship with the creator. The actions of the children (second causes) are free, organic, and uncoerced. Their free actions are also a part of the providential plan that Aslan is personally bringing about for the redemption of Narnia (first cause). The Witch also acts according to her nature in a way that is free, yet not completely free. Her killing of Aslan is also a part of the redemptive plan. Both the Witch and Aslan are both equally real, but not equally free.

 

[No Other Name]

Akin.


Autocorrect ugh.

No problem. For context here in that I was not denying our respective and mutually-agreeing confessions, I started with a quote from Berkhof:

"If you know how a person acts, and what they generally decide to do, then you would be able to say that when presented with situation X, person A will do Y. God decrees that person A will do Y in situation X, because God knows absolutely everything about person A. Predestination is absolute, and man's free agency is absolute. There are not a myriad of possibilities a person "could" choose in any given situation, there is only one possible outcome of every situation. God's decrees are a "map" if you will of what people do and what happens throughout time. Not only does God know everything beforehand (foreknowledge), but He so decrees how things will occur, absolutely (predestination), and this does not violate the free agency of man. Every person does exactly what they want to do in their life. They have no other choice, there is no other "possible" universe or space-time continuum." [emphasis added by me both here and there for his attention]

When he pushed back, that is when I slipped into the author-character analogy:

"Imagine an author is writing a novel and the author creates the scenario for the character to make a choice, and since the author knows everything about the character, the author knows the choice the character will make and knows how the choice will continue the plot as planned by the author."

 

[MyCrows]

No problem. For context here in that I was not denying our mutual confessions, I started with a quote from Berkhof:

"If you know how a person acts, and what they generally decide to do, then you would be able to say that when presented with situation X, person A will do Y. God decrees that person A will do Y in situation X, because God knows absolutely everything about person A. Predestination is absolute, and man's free agency is absolute. There are not a myriad of possibilities a person "could" choose in any given situation, there is only one possible outcome of every situation. God's decrees are a "map" if you will of what people do and what happens throughout time. Not only does God know everything beforehand (foreknowledge), but He so decrees how things will occur, absolutely (predestination), and this does not violate the free agency of man. Every person does exactly what they want to do in their life. They have no other choice, there is no other "possible" universe or space-time continuum." [emphasis added by me both here and there for his attention]

When he pushed back, that is when I slipped into the author-character analogy:

"Imagine an author is writing a novel and the author creates the scenario for the character to make a choice, and since the author knows everything about the character, the author knows the choice the character will make and knows how the choice will continue the plot as planned by the author."

I think I might just not be following the analogy as close as I'd like to be able to.

 

[EvanF]

That is my favorite analogy for human freewill in God's sovereign decree. I can't think of anything wrong with it really, except that reality is more complicated in that the author from the beginning has interacted with the characters and became a character himself.

 

[No Other Name]

Yet it is also true that our God is personal and active in the world. He is not simply the author of the story but also the "main character."

Agreed. In most human-authored stories, the protagonist is the hero. In the real world, all stories (ie real-world events) point to God as the hero.

This is why Narnia offers a more intuitive alternative to your analogy by bringing the reader in to a world where the creation has a personal relationship with the creator. The actions of the children (second causes) are free, organic, and uncoerced. Their free actions are also a part of the providential plan that Aslan is personally bringing about for the redemption of Narnia (first cause). The Witch also acts according to her nature in a way that is free, yet not completely free. Her killing of Aslan is also a part of the redemptive plan. Both the Witch and Aslan are both equally real, but not equally free.

I am struggling with Narnia for some reason. It almost seems like keeping the entire story in-universe and having Aslan as the analogy for God would hurt my case since an Arminian could argue with good cause that the children's actions are so free as to be separated from Aslan.

My intuition would be not to stay in-universe and go back to author-character distinction and then appeal to Lewis as the author pre-planning Edmund to fall into the Witch's clutches directly due to his character flaws that Lewis wrote him with for the purpose of Edmund being the traitor and catalyst for the darker chapters of the story.

But I may very well be in the wrong here.

I think I might just not be following the analogy as close as I'd like to be able to.

The analogy is almost tailor-made to fit Berkhof's quote to a T. But that may be a weakness of the analogy. Your not following it may be more on me than on you.
[automerge]1738770927[/automerge]

That is my favorite analogy for human freewill in God's sovereign decree. I can't think of anything wrong with it really, except that reality is more complicated in that the author from the beginning has interacted with the characters and became a character himself.

Good point here.

 

[No Other Name]

From another thread https://puritanboard.com/threads/secondary-causes.15115/

On page 1:

"Just keep in mind that God does not "cause" us to do anything. Also keep in mind that God is in control of everything. Then realize that we can't understand this or how it is compatible, but we must because the Bible presents it as such."

"I disagree. God does indeed cause all things, including the sins of men. The fact that God works out His purposes through secondary causes doesn't diminish one whit from His causality. After all, He does claim to cause whatsoever comes to pass per the Scriptures. Nothing particularly "mysterious" or beyond understanding at all."

"This view is the complete opposite of what, say, Dabney, Hodge, or Berkhof taught. You could be right, but, as far as I know, this is not what Reformed tradition teaches (outside of hyper-calvinism)."

Then directly after these remarks, we have Rev. Winzer @MW saying:

"The reformed tradition teaches that God is the cause of all things; but there is a difference in the things themselves. God causes actions as actions, not as good or evil. If God causes one man to kill another man, it is the action God causes; the evil belongs solely to the man doing the killing.

This is sometimes distinguished by the terms "natural" and "moral" cause. It only works if the associated idea is also accepted, that morality is itself a product of the divine will."

I think the author analogy works very well here since an author causes actions as actions and the character's moral shortcomings are what makes an evil action evil.

Edmund's betrayal of his siblings is caused by Lewis in his role as plot-planner moving the action along as his own plot calls,

but the motive and objective for self-glory and revenge over perceived wrongs are entirely bound within the character of Edmund himself.

And while it is true that Lewis wrote him that way, it is still just as true that Edmund did not have to betray his siblings. He had means and opportunity to stay with them at the Beavers' house. So Lewis produces the natural cause for Edmund to act immorally so that the question of morality of Edmund's proximate action can be very clear and obvious to even my 8-year-old brain how wrong Edmund is acting, not Lewis, even though the author was the ultimate cause.

If I am stretching this too far beyond what the doctrine allows, please let me know. I am certain Rev. Winzer will when he wakes up later.

 

[MyCrows]

From another thread https://puritanboard.com/threads/secondary-causes.15115/

On page 1:

"Just keep in mind that God does not "cause" us to do anything. Also keep in mind that God is in control of everything. Then realize that we can't understand this or how it is compatible, but we must because the Bible presents it as such."

"I disagree. God does indeed cause all things, including the sins of men. The fact that God works out His purposes through secondary causes doesn't diminish one whit from His causality. After all, He does claim to cause whatsoever comes to pass per the Scriptures. Nothing particularly "mysterious" or beyond understanding at all."

"This view is the complete opposite of what, say, Dabney, Hodge, or Berkhof taught. You could be right, but, as far as I know, this is not what Reformed tradition teaches (outside of hyper-calvinism)."

Then directly after these remarks, we have Rev. Winzer @MW saying:



I agree but Rev. Winzer's comment is put in a way that I never heard before. So at first I scratched my head. So I struggle with this statement apart from the author analogy. The only way this statement makes sense (to my brain) is looking at it in that light.

I think the author analogy works very well here since an author causes actions as actions and the character's moral shortcomings are what makes an evil action evil.

Edmund's betrayal of his siblings is caused by Lewis by moving the action along, but the motive and objective for self-glory and revenge over perceived wrongs are entirely bound within the character of Edmund himself. And while it is true that Lewis wrote him that way, it is still just as true that Edmund did not have to betray his siblings. He had means and opportunity to stay with them at the Beavers' house. So Lewis produces the natural cause for Edmund to act immorally so that the morality of Edmund's action can be very clear and obvious to even my 8-year-old brain how wrong Edmund is acting, not Lewis.

If I am stretching this too far beyond what the doctrine allows, please let me know. I am certain Rev. Winzer will when he wakes up later.

Rev. Winzer has stated in this quote something similar to what was in my mind in my earlier response. That God, as the first cause, is more involved than just by having foreknowledge of sin.

We make a distinction between moral obedience/ disobedience among men, as far as one's conduct according to the law. Two different men can do something that is commanded by the law, but it does not mean that both men did what was required of them morally. One of them may have been led and moved by the Spirit to obedience, while the other acted out of sheer selfishness, even if it is unobservable by us.

 

[No Other Name]

Rev. Winzer has stated in this quote something similar to what was in my mind in my earlier response. That God, as the first cause, is more involved than just by having foreknowledge of sin.

Are you saying my posts and uses of the analogy imply a scenario where God only has simple foreknowledge or only gives bare permission rather than God as ultimate causation?

 

[No Other Name]

Rev. Winzer has stated in this quote something similar to what was in my mind in my earlier response. That God, as the first cause, is more involved than just by having foreknowledge of sin.

We make a distinction between moral obedience/ disobedience among men, as far as one's conduct according to the law. Two different men can do something that is commanded by the law, but it does not mean that both men did what was required of them morally. One of them may have been led and moved by the Spirit to obedience, while the other acted out of sheer selfishness, even if it is unobservable by us.

Amen. If you mean this only as a guard to my posts while you are still unsure of how to follow, then thank you and I am well warned.

But if you mean that I failed to account for this in my posts, then I am confused since I am fairly certain I have accounted for the full range of Reformed thought re: doctrines of decrees and providence. And if that is so, I would love to be shown where I failed to account for it. Thank you.

 

[MyCrows]

Are you saying my posts and uses of the analogy imply a scenario where God only has simple foreknowledge or only gives bare permission rather than God as ultimate causation?

At my first reading of them, that's what I thought, but that may have been my deficiency.

 

[No Other Name]

Rev. Winzer has stated in this quote something similar to what was in my mind in my earlier response. That God, as the first cause, is more involved than just by having foreknowledge of sin.

We make a distinction between moral obedience/ disobedience among men, as far as one's conduct according to the law. Two different men can do something that is commanded by the law, but it does not mean that both men did what was required of them morally. One of them may have been led and moved by the Spirit to obedience, while the other acted out of sheer selfishness, even if it is unobservable by us.

Also, I edited Post # 14 and hope that it is clearer now for you and everyone else.

I truly am looking to be sharpened here. Either to just let this line of thinking go or make it sharper for our future use in teaching these doctrines.

God bless you. All of you.

 

[Jack K]

An Arminian's typical objection to the sovereignty of God in salvation is that it turns man into a puppet in God's puppet show. An analogy that turns man into a fictional character in God's novel/movie is not going to help allay that concern. They're pretty much the same thing.

Your analogy asserts God's sovereignty, so you've defended an essential part of the doctrine of God. But the Arminian's concern is more with the doctrine of man. The doctrine of man says we are spiritual beings who can truly know God and exercise dominion over the earth. We are moral and rational, with real (not fictional) responsibility for our actions. We are immortal and bodily creatures who occupy real space and time. And believers are sons of God who occupy honored places at his table, not imaginary places at his keyboard. The character-in-a-book/movie analogy is pretty far removed from this, so that I don't think I would use it.

Similar to, say, the Trinity, I suspect the interaction of these doctrines is a deep mystery we explore while knowing that our ability to comprehend is limited. It is not very suitable to the use of simple analogies.

 

[No Other Name]

An Arminian's typical objection to the sovereignty of God in salvation is that it turns man into a puppet in God's puppet show.

He said this.

He said that with God decreeing our actions, then no one has any choice at all. He said if I would have just said we have no choice, he would respect that. Not agree, but would respect my honesty.

As it is, I was arguing choice in much the same way Sproul and Gerstner demonstrated in "Silencing the Devil" series. That we all have choice, our choices are limited, and we always choose what we want given those limits. The fact that we ultimately will do what God decreed doesn't negate the fact that we had agency to choose X or Y.

That is when I quoted Berkhof's quote I posted earlier and then,

his disagreement on that point launched me (almost instinctively) into the author-character analogy:
trying to illustrate ultimate - proximate causation with ultimate causer only causing action as an action and proximate causing action as a moral agent.

I am beginning to think I did not carry well the day for our confessions.

But thank you for a very helpful post.

 

[johnmo]

If you know how a person acts, and what they generally decide to do, then you would be able to say that when presented with situation X, person A will do Y.

I don't know the answer, but if the secondary cause is "how a person acts," how is contingency not taken away if it is how Berkhof describes above? I think contingency means the possibility of having been otherwise.

I think the classic Reformed explanation would not say that for a person with free will, "when presented with situation X, person A will do Y." I think unredeemed men are limited from doing good, but they could still do Y or Z sinful things. I don't know how to square that with the decree, but how does Berkhof define contingency differently if he agrees with the Confession?

 

[MW]

If the idea is simply to show how everything can be ordained and all the actors are free, this is a good illustration. It helpfully points out a scenario where an overruling hand determines events while the characters genuinely will according to their own inclinations as if there were no overruling hand.

But analogies break down, and this one is bound to break down at some point. Writing a book doesn't cause anything to happen in the book. So there is no interaction between primary and secondary causes.

When we call God the primary cause we mean that He causes everything that happens. There is concursus between Him and the secondary causes but in such a way that He is not the "author" of sin. Bringing in an analogy that makes Him the actual "author" is not going to help understand how this works.

 

[MyCrows]

Also, I edited Post # 14 and hope that it is clearer now for you and everyone else.

I truly am looking to be sharpened here. Either to just let this line of thinking go or make it sharper for our future use in teaching these doctrines.

God bless you. All of you.

I'm not trying to put you into a camp into which neither of us subscribe to. I'm just trying to better understand where you are going with the analogy.

For me, I have a tendency to over analyze analogies, and read more into them than is meant to be there.

 

[johnmo]

There are lots of quotes here, but I think this one from Twisse gets at my concern about contingency most clearly. I am still not settled on how to think about the decree and free will, but I am leaning against the deterministic explanation given by Berkhof.

And albeit God has determined that these particular sinful acts (instance the particular outrages committed against the holy Son of God by Herod, Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles and people of Israel) shall come to pass by his permission; yet seeing withal He has ordained them to come to pass contingently, that follows that they shall come to pass in such a manner as joined with a possibility of not coming to pass; otherwise they should come to pass not contingently but necessarily.”

 

[MW]

There are lots of quotes here, but I think this one from Twisse gets at my concern about contingency most clearly. I am still not settled on how to think about the decree and free will, but I am leaning against the deterministic explanation given by Berkhof.

I cannot find the explanation from Berkhof. As it appears in this thread it doesn't sound like Berkhof to me.

 

[pgwolv]

I cannot find the explanation from Berkhof. As it appears in this thread it doesn't sound like Berkhof to me.

I think it is quoted from here, which seems an interpretation made by the poster in that thread.

 

[MW]

I think it is quoted from here, which seems an interpretation made by the poster in that thread.

That clears it up. I don't think Berkhof would state it in these terms. He definitely wouldn't agree that "man's free agency is absolute." It is the decree that establishes free agency.

 

[pgwolv]

I think we should consider Berkhof's own words. In his systematic theology, the closest sections I could get to the what the quote was trying to summarise was the following (I underlined the most relevant parts, as I saw them).

From

Part One: The Doctrine of God​

The Being of God​

VII. The Communicable Attributes​

(God as a Personal Spirit)

B. Intellectual Attributes.​

1. THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.
b. Its extent.

There is one question, however, that calls for special discussion. It concerns God’s foreknowledge of the free actions of men, and therefore of conditional events. We can understand how God can foreknow where necessity rules, but find it difficult to conceive of a previous knowledge of actions which man freely originates. The difficulty of this problem led some to deny the foreknowledge of free actions, and others to deny human freedom. It is perfectly evident that Scripture teaches the divine foreknowledge of contingent events, I Sam. 23:10-13; II Kings 13:19; Ps. 81:14,15; Isa. 42:9; 48:18; Jer. 2:2,3; 38:17-20; Ezek. 3:6; Matt. 11:21. Moreover, it does not leave us in doubt as to the freedom of man. It certainly does not permit the denial of either one of the terms of the problem. We are up against a problem here, which we cannot fully solve, though it is possible to make an approach to a solution. God has decreed all things, and has decreed them with their causes and conditions in the exact order in which they come to pass; and His foreknowledge of future things and also of contingent events rests on His decree. This solves the problem as far as the foreknowledge of God is concerned.

But now the question arises, Is the predetermination of things consistent with the free will of man? And the answer is that it certainly is not, if the freedom of the will be regarded as indifferentia (arbitrariness), but this is an unwarranted conception of the freedom of man. The will of man is not something altogether indeterminate, something hanging in the air that can be swung arbitrarily in either direction. It is rather something rooted in our very nature, connected with our deepest instincts and emotions, and determined by our intellectual considerations and by our very character. And if we conceive of our human freedom as lubentia rationalis (reasonable self-determination), then we have no sufficient warrant for saying that it is inconsistent with divine foreknowledge. Says Dr. Orr: “A solution of this problem there is, though our minds fail to grasp it. In part it probably lies, not in denying freedom, but in a revised conception of freedom. For freedom, after all, is not arbitrariness. There is in all rational action a why for acting — a reason which decides action. The truly free man is not the uncertain, incalculable man, but the man who is reliable. In short, freedom has its laws — spiritual laws — and the omniscient Mind knows what these are. But an element of mystery, it must be acknowledged, still remains.”[Side-Lights on Chr. Doct., p. 30.]

From

Part One: The Doctrine of God​

The Works of God​

I. The Divine Decrees in General​

C. The Nature of the Divine Decrees.​

3. THE DECREE RELATES TO BOTH GOD AND MAN.

But while the decree pertains primarily to the acts of God Himself, it is not limited to these, but also embraces the actions of His free creatures. And the fact that they are included in the decree renders them absolutely certain, though they are not all effectuated in the same manner. In the case of some things God decided, not merely that they would come to pass, but that He Himself would bring them to pass, either immediately, as in the work of creation, or through the mediation of secondary causes, which are continually energized by His power. He Himself assumes the responsibility for their coming to pass. There are other things, however, which God included in His decree and thereby rendered certain, but which He did not decide to effectuate Himself, as the sinful acts of His rational creatures. The decree, in so far as it pertains to these acts, is generally called God’s permissive decree. This name does not imply that the futurition of these acts is not certain to God, but simply that He permits them to come to pass by the free agency of His rational creatures. God assumes no responsibility for these sinful acts whatsoever.

From

Part One: The Doctrine of God​

The Works of God​

I. The Divine Decrees in General​

D. The Characteristics of the Divine Decree.​

5. IT IS UNCONDITIONAL OR ABSOLUTE. This means that it is not dependent in any of its particulars on anything that is not part and parcel of the decree itself. The various elements in the decree are indeed mutually dependent but nothing in the plan is conditioned by anything that is not in the decree. The execution of the plan may require means or be dependent on certain conditions, but then these means or conditions have also been determined in the decree. God did not simply decree to save sinners without determining the means to effectuate the decree. The means leading to the pre-determined end were also decreed, Acts 2:23; Eph. 2:8; I Pet. 1:2. The absolute character of the decree follows from its eternity, its immutability, and its exclusive dependence on the good pleasure of God. It is denied by all Semi-Pelagians and Arminians.

6. IT IS UNIVERSAL OR ALL-COMPREHENSIVE. The decree includes whatsoever comes to pass in the world, whether it be in the physical or in the moral realm, whether it be good or evil, Eph. 1:11. It includes: (a) the good actions of men, Eph. 21:0; (b) their wicked acts, Prov. 16:4; Acts 2:23; 4:27,28; (c) contingent events, Gen. 45:8; 50:20; Prov. 16:33; (d) the means as well as the end, Ps. 119:89-91; II Thess. 2:13; Eph. 1:4; (e) the duration of man’s life, Job 14:5; Ps. 39:4, and the place of his habitation, Acts 17:26.

7. WITH REFERENCE TO SIN IT IS PERMISSIVE. It is customary to speak of the decree of God respecting moral evil as permissive. By His decree God rendered the sinful actions of man infallibly certain without deciding to effectuate them by acting immediately upon and in the finite will. This means that God does not positively work in man “both to will and to do,” when man goes contrary to His revealed will. It should be carefully noted, however, that this permissive decree does not imply a passive permission of something which is not under the control of the divine will. It is a decree which renders the future sinful act absolutely certain, but in which God determines (a) not to hinder the sinful self-determination of the finite will; and (b) to regulate and control the result of this sinful self-determination. Ps. 78:29; 106:15; Acts 14:16; 17:30.

From

Part One: The Doctrine of God​

The Works of God​

I. The Divine Decrees in General​

E. Objections to the Doctrine of the Decrees.​

1. IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE MORAL FREEDOM OF MAN. Man is a free agent with the power of rational self-determination. He can reflect upon, and in an intelligent way choose, certain ends, and can also determine his action with respect to them. The decree of God however, carries with it necessity. God has decreed to effectuate all things or, if He has not decreed that, He has at least determined that they must come to pass. He has decided the course of man’s life for him.[Cf. Watson, Theological Institutes, Part II, Chap. XXVIII; Miley, Systematic Theology II, pp. 271 ff.] In answer to this objection it may be said that the Bible certainly does not proceed on the assumption that the divine decree is inconsistent with the free agency of man. It clearly reveals that God has decreed the free acts of man, but also that the actors are none the less free and therefore responsible for their acts, Gen. 50:19,20; Acts 2:23; 4:27,28. It was determined that the Jews should bring about the crucifixion of Jesus; yet they were perfectly free in their wicked course of action, and were held responsible for this crime. There is not a single indication in Scripture that the inspired writers are conscious of a contradiction in connection with these matters. They never make an attempt to harmonize the two. This may well restrain us from assuming a contradiction here, even if we cannot reconcile both truths.

Moreover, it should be borne in mind that God has not decreed to effectuate by His own direct action whatsoever must come to pass. The divine decree only brings certainty into the events, but does not imply that God will actively effectuate them, so that the question really resolves itself into this, whether previous certainty is consistent with free agency. Now experience teaches us that we can be reasonably certain as to the course a man of character will pursue under certain circumstances, without infringing in the least on his freedom. The prophet Jeremiah predicted that the Chaldeans would take Jerusalem. He knew the coming event as a certainty, and yet the Chaldeans freely followed their own desires in fulfilling the prediction. Such certainty is indeed inconsistent with the Pelagian liberty of indifference, according to which the will of man is not determined in any way, but is entirely indeterminate, so that in every volition it can decide in opposition, not only to all outward inducements, but also to all inward considerations and judgments, inclinations and desires, and even to the whole character and inner state of man. But it is now generally recognized that such freedom of the will is a psychological fiction. However, the decree is not necessarily inconsistent with human freedom in the sense of rational self-determination, according to which man freely acts in harmony with his previous thoughts and judgments, his inclinations and desires, and his whole character. This freedom also has its laws, and the better we are acquainted with them, the more sure we can be of what a free agent will do under certain circumstances. God Himself has established these laws. Naturally, we must guard against all determinism, materialistic, pantheistic, and rationalistic, in our conception of freedom in the sense of rational self-determination.

The decree is no more inconsistent with free agency than foreknowledge is, and yet the objectors, who are generally of the Semi-Pelagian or Arminian type, profess to believe in divine foreknowledge. By His foreknowledge God knows from all eternity the certain futurition of all events. It is based on His foreordination, by which He determined their future certainty. The Arminian will of course, say that he does not believe in a foreknowledge based on a decree which renders things certain, but in a foreknowledge of facts and events which are contingent on the free will of man, and therefore indeterminate. Now such a foreknowledge of the free actions of man may be possible, if man even in his freedom acts in harmony with divinely established laws, which again bring in the element of certainty; but it would seem to be impossible to foreknow events which are entirely dependent on the chance decision of an unprincipled will, which can at any time, irrespective of the state of the soul, of existing conditions, and of the motives that present themselves to the mind, turn in different directions. Such events can only be foreknown as bare possibilities.

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Let us all also consider this a lesson that we should make sure that we consult primary sources before using quotes, especially in our theological debates.

 

[No Other Name]

Let us all also consider this a lesson that we should make sure that we consult primary sources before using quotes, especially in our theological debates.

Let us please also consider the very real case where a member like myself has no access to a primary source, but uses a quote from another member in a thread where that other member was never corrected by anyone nor even addressed by anyone.

I do not make any excuse for my own self though.