RamistThomist
Puritanboard Assessor
Oliphint, K. Scott. Thomas Aquinas. Presbyterian & Reformed.
P&R’s Great Thinkers Series has many excellent books in them. This is not one of them. Strangely enough, despite its many errors, it is worth getting. It is relatively inexpensive and is filled with numerous passages from Richard Muller’s Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics. That is why you should get this book. You should also read Richard Muller’s critique of this book as you work through it.
I do not want to give a point-by-point analysis, since such analyses tend to turn into essays. I will simply state Oliphint’s reading of Aquinas in light of the current discussions of Aquinas. In conclusion, I will call attention to some problematic areas of Oliphint’s thought.
Pros
In terms of clarity, it is well-written and can be read in a few sittings. Even if Oliphint gets most of his subject wrong, at least he introduces readers to Aquinas, provided they move on to better sources. Oliphint also has several other strengths. He is aware of the thorny problems that modal logic and analytic philosophy have raised for metaphysics. Indeed, he has capitalized on them elsewhere (cf. Reasons for Faith).
Introduction
To his credit, Oliphint is not shy on where he stands: There can be no rapprochement between the Reformation and Thomism: “significant aspects of Thomas’s thought…cannot be incorporated” into Reformed theology (Oliphint 22). That is ominous, but we quickly move to better material: the distinction between the principle of existence and the principle of knowledge. He ends the chapter with a summary of Aquinas’s life.
The Foundation of Knowledge
Oliphint reads Thomas as saying that natural reason provides the structure of knowledge upon which special revelation provides the superstructure. Is that a fair reading of Thomas? Maybe. Muller has criticized Oliphint’s reading of the Praeambula Fidei. The reader can judge who is correct.
Oliphint has a long section on Aquinas’s reading of John 1:9 and whether God’s existence is self-evident. The best thing to do is simply read Richard Muller’s critique of this section.
Metaphysics
Oliphint has a very good section on metaphysics–not necessarily Thomas’s metaphysics, for I do not think he is a good reader of Thomas, but on modal metaphysics. Ironically, Oliphint came very close to some important discussions the Reformed Scotists of the Utrecht School have on freedom and necessity. For Oliphint, following, of all people, Muller, there is the necessity of the consequence, which is a hypothetical necessity, and the necessity of the consequent thing, an absolute necessity. For the former, a condition can be attached to it and it will still remain a necessity. This move, which Oliphint understandably cannot develop here, offers some fascinating suggestions for free human choices.
What does the above have to do with Thomas Aquinas? I do not know. It was a worthwhile section, though.
Criticisms
Oliphint’s section on Aquinas’s doctrine of simplicity was like a small cloud the size of a man’s hand. Whether one thinks he did a good job here, these were the views that would later get him in trouble–and not just from Thomists. On another note, he called the Luis de Molina a Thomist. I…um…yeah, I got nothing.
Conclusion
This volume will remain a black mark on this series. That is unfortunate. If you want a decent exposition of Thomas’s thought, do no get a Van Tillian to write it. By the same standard, I cannot be trusted to write a sympathetic survey of Van Tillianism, and no publisher should ask me to do that.
P&R’s Great Thinkers Series has many excellent books in them. This is not one of them. Strangely enough, despite its many errors, it is worth getting. It is relatively inexpensive and is filled with numerous passages from Richard Muller’s Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics. That is why you should get this book. You should also read Richard Muller’s critique of this book as you work through it.
I do not want to give a point-by-point analysis, since such analyses tend to turn into essays. I will simply state Oliphint’s reading of Aquinas in light of the current discussions of Aquinas. In conclusion, I will call attention to some problematic areas of Oliphint’s thought.
Pros
In terms of clarity, it is well-written and can be read in a few sittings. Even if Oliphint gets most of his subject wrong, at least he introduces readers to Aquinas, provided they move on to better sources. Oliphint also has several other strengths. He is aware of the thorny problems that modal logic and analytic philosophy have raised for metaphysics. Indeed, he has capitalized on them elsewhere (cf. Reasons for Faith).
Introduction
To his credit, Oliphint is not shy on where he stands: There can be no rapprochement between the Reformation and Thomism: “significant aspects of Thomas’s thought…cannot be incorporated” into Reformed theology (Oliphint 22). That is ominous, but we quickly move to better material: the distinction between the principle of existence and the principle of knowledge. He ends the chapter with a summary of Aquinas’s life.
The Foundation of Knowledge
Oliphint reads Thomas as saying that natural reason provides the structure of knowledge upon which special revelation provides the superstructure. Is that a fair reading of Thomas? Maybe. Muller has criticized Oliphint’s reading of the Praeambula Fidei. The reader can judge who is correct.
Oliphint has a long section on Aquinas’s reading of John 1:9 and whether God’s existence is self-evident. The best thing to do is simply read Richard Muller’s critique of this section.
Metaphysics
Oliphint has a very good section on metaphysics–not necessarily Thomas’s metaphysics, for I do not think he is a good reader of Thomas, but on modal metaphysics. Ironically, Oliphint came very close to some important discussions the Reformed Scotists of the Utrecht School have on freedom and necessity. For Oliphint, following, of all people, Muller, there is the necessity of the consequence, which is a hypothetical necessity, and the necessity of the consequent thing, an absolute necessity. For the former, a condition can be attached to it and it will still remain a necessity. This move, which Oliphint understandably cannot develop here, offers some fascinating suggestions for free human choices.
What does the above have to do with Thomas Aquinas? I do not know. It was a worthwhile section, though.
Criticisms
Oliphint’s section on Aquinas’s doctrine of simplicity was like a small cloud the size of a man’s hand. Whether one thinks he did a good job here, these were the views that would later get him in trouble–and not just from Thomists. On another note, he called the Luis de Molina a Thomist. I…um…yeah, I got nothing.
Conclusion
This volume will remain a black mark on this series. That is unfortunate. If you want a decent exposition of Thomas’s thought, do no get a Van Tillian to write it. By the same standard, I cannot be trusted to write a sympathetic survey of Van Tillianism, and no publisher should ask me to do that.