supralapsarian vs infralapsarian

Status
Not open for further replies.
I know you are but what am I?

Seriously, the Scriptures are clear about beings created for different ends to God’s glory. Supra.
 
In Dutch or Voetian orthodoxy it's generally argued that the two positions are only apparently contradictory, and that the writers on each side are actually discussing slightly different matters. This is the conclusion one finds in Junius, Spanheim, Hoornbeeck, and Van Mastricht (vol. 3).
I think that's basically correct. But I also think that Scripture generally opts for infralapsarian language (not always, but often).
 
Any intentional action prioritizes the end before the means. This is as true in the order of the decrees as it is in the intentional actions of rational creatures. What is last in execution is first in intention. Given these fundamental principles, supralapsarianism has to be true.

In my opinion, you simply can't arrive at infralapsarianism when starting with first principles. No infralapsarian theologian that I know of argues that way. They start with a statement of supralapsarianism, tell why they find it untenable (or unpalatable, as may be more often the case), and then present an infralapsarian scheme as an alternative. That's Turretin, Hodge, Boettner, etc.

Supralapsarians, on the other hand, tend to start at first principles and build their theory step by step.
 
Any intentional action prioritizes the end before the means.

To illustrate this principle, let's say you drove to your grandmother's house for Thanksgiving last month. Which came first in the order of your intentions--getting to Grandma's house, or starting your car? What was the goal? Was starting the car an end in itself, and only after you thought of starting your car, you thought of going to Grandma's? Or did you already have Grandma's house in mind when you decided to start the car?

Clearly, the intention of going to Grandma's house came first. Every intention along the way was subject to the ultimate end of going to Grandma's house.
 
TylerRay said:
Any intentional action prioritizes the end before the means.

To illustrate this principle, let's say you drove to your grandmother's house for Thanksgiving last month. Which came first in the order of your intentions--getting to Grandma's house, or starting your car? What was the goal? Was starting the car an end in itself, and only after you thought of starting your car, you thought of going to Grandma's? Or did you already have Grandma's house in mind when you decided to start the car?

Clearly, the intention of going to Grandma's house came first. Every intention along the way was subject to the ultimate end of going to Grandma's house.
Click to expand...
While it's true that the end comes before the means, that doesn't automatically prove either position, because the whole discussion centers around what exactly is the end, and what the means.
 
If I understand correctly (by no means a given), the debate of infralapsarianism vs. supralapsarianism is this:

Did God first decree that men would fall, and then that He would create the world and save some, or did God first decree that He would save some, and then decree the creation of the world and the fall?

I've been told that the infra vs. supra debate isn't about the temporal order of things (i.e. not about which events occurred one before another), but the logical order of things (i.e. about which things God intended primarily).

It appears to me that God's intention was the salvation of the elect and damnation of the reprobate. If this is so, then therefore the fall was the logical means to the end.

As far as I understand things, this makes me a Supralapsarian.
 
Charles Johnson said:
While it's true that the end comes before the means, that doesn't automatically prove either position, because the whole discussion centers around what exactly is the end, and what the means.
Click to expand...
I'd like to see it demonstrated that the infralapsarian scheme is consistent with that principle. To what end was the fall suited as a means, apart from a preceding intention concerning man's end?
 
TylerRay said:
I'd like to see it demonstrated that the infralapsarian scheme is consistent with that principle. To what end was the fall suited as a means, apart from a preceding intention concerning man's end?
Click to expand...
Let me share the quotes from Junius and Spanheim I referenced earlier (I assume you have access to Van Mastricht, vol. 3). I'd be interested in hearing your thoughts.

Junius says:
"Nevertheless, neither do we dissent from those godly and learned men who state that God contemplated man in predestination before he was created; nor from those who assert that he was considered by God as created and fallen. For we reverently profess what both the latter and the former are truly saying. For we say both. And, just as we do not dissent from either in the substance of the matter, so also they do not disagree with one another, for both constantly and piously affirm (as we also do) that the cause of predestination is God alone, according to the pleasure of his will, and that no cause of predestination is found outside of God, either in man, or anywhere else, and that predestination is not done in time, but from eternity. As it pertains, on the other hand, to the circumstance, by which a man is clothed in one way or another, its consideration does not properly belong to the cause of predestination. Neither, certainly, do they disagree by reason of circumstances in such a way as many judge, for when the latter say that man was considered by God when he predestined as fallen, they do not properly have the cause of election and reprobation in mind, but the order and series of causes from which damnation follows. Secondly, they do not say this to the exclusion of other states of men, but concerning a particular cause, not to be rejected: namely, that the impudence of the flesh, which shamelessly rises up against God, would be more readily curbed, which takes place when we know that all alike were considered as sinners by God when he predestined. When, on the other hand, the former assert that God, in predestining, considered man as not yet created, they do not therefore banish God from the consideration of the fall of man; but they only intend for the cause of all predestination to be found in God, and no cause of it outside of God, in man. In this way, they agree in substance, but their manner of explaining the matter is varied."

Spanheim says,
"Moreover, some ambiguity of this word is to be noted. When this ambiguity goes unobserved, a contradiction is often attributed to orthodox theologians, who nevertheless agree here on the substance. And when it is observed, uneasy disputes on the object of predestination can be resolved. Namely, predestination is sometimes understood according to its genus, and generally, by theologians in theological schools, for the whole decree of God concerning man, in order to his final end, and sometimes according to its species, and specifically, for God’s plan concerning either raising up fallen men, out of freedom and grace, or abandoning and punishing them, out of freedom and justice. In the first sense, it includes even the decree to create man, and to permit the fall. In the second, it is resolved only into election and reprobation.
Hence, the accompanying conciliation of opinions that conflict on this specific manner which are found even among orthodox theologians (some of them make man, who has not yet been created, the object of predestination, and some man indeed created, but not yet fallen, and some both created and fallen) is clear. For the asserters of the first opinion, with a broad understanding of the term ‘predestination,’ include under it even the decree of creating man, the object of which cannot reasonably be created man. The defenders of the second opinion, in one notion of predestination, conjoin the decree of permitting the fall together with the decree concerning fallen man, and its object certainly cannot be fallen man. The promoters of the third opinion strictly understand predestination as the decree either of mercy, or of freedom and justice, concerning fallen man, the object of which quite reasonably is man considered as fallen. Each of these opinions has had, and does have, its supporters from the orthodox doctors of the Reformed Church, and neither they, nor their various, non-adverse opinions, must be contended for with ill-will, since each is true and sound in its sense, and they agree in the foundation; and therefore, they are to be put together harmoniously, and not opposed to one another, as things that differ only in their topic of instruction."
 
Charles Johnson said:
Let me share the quotes from Junius and Spanheim I referenced earlier (I assume you have access to Van Mastricht, vol. 3). I'd be interested in hearing your thoughts.

Junius says:
"Nevertheless, neither do we dissent from those godly and learned men who state that God contemplated man in predestination before he was created; nor from those who assert that he was considered by God as created and fallen. For we reverently profess what both the latter and the former are truly saying. For we say both. And, just as we do not dissent from either in the substance of the matter, so also they do not disagree with one another, for both constantly and piously affirm (as we also do) that the cause of predestination is God alone, according to the pleasure of his will, and that no cause of predestination is found outside of God, either in man, or anywhere else, and that predestination is not done in time, but from eternity. As it pertains, on the other hand, to the circumstance, by which a man is clothed in one way or another, its consideration does not properly belong to the cause of predestination. Neither, certainly, do they disagree by reason of circumstances in such a way as many judge, for when the latter say that man was considered by God when he predestined as fallen, they do not properly have the cause of election and reprobation in mind, but the order and series of causes from which damnation follows. Secondly, they do not say this to the exclusion of other states of men, but concerning a particular cause, not to be rejected: namely, that the impudence of the flesh, which shamelessly rises up against God, would be more readily curbed, which takes place when we know that all alike were considered as sinners by God when he predestined. When, on the other hand, the former assert that God, in predestining, considered man as not yet created, they do not therefore banish God from the consideration of the fall of man; but they only intend for the cause of all predestination to be found in God, and no cause of it outside of God, in man. In this way, they agree in substance, but their manner of explaining the matter is varied."

Spanheim says,
"Moreover, some ambiguity of this word is to be noted. When this ambiguity goes unobserved, a contradiction is often attributed to orthodox theologians, who nevertheless agree here on the substance. And when it is observed, uneasy disputes on the object of predestination can be resolved. Namely, predestination is sometimes understood according to its genus, and generally, by theologians in theological schools, for the whole decree of God concerning man, in order to his final end, and sometimes according to its species, and specifically, for God’s plan concerning either raising up fallen men, out of freedom and grace, or abandoning and punishing them, out of freedom and justice. In the first sense, it includes even the decree to create man, and to permit the fall. In the second, it is resolved only into election and reprobation.
Hence, the accompanying conciliation of opinions that conflict on this specific manner which are found even among orthodox theologians (some of them make man, who has not yet been created, the object of predestination, and some man indeed created, but not yet fallen, and some both created and fallen) is clear. For the asserters of the first opinion, with a broad understanding of the term ‘predestination,’ include under it even the decree of creating man, the object of which cannot reasonably be created man. The defenders of the second opinion, in one notion of predestination, conjoin the decree of permitting the fall together with the decree concerning fallen man, and its object certainly cannot be fallen man. The promoters of the third opinion strictly understand predestination as the decree either of mercy, or of freedom and justice, concerning fallen man, the object of which quite reasonably is man considered as fallen. Each of these opinions has had, and does have, its supporters from the orthodox doctors of the Reformed Church, and neither they, nor their various, non-adverse opinions, must be contended for with ill-will, since each is true and sound in its sense, and they agree in the foundation; and therefore, they are to be put together harmoniously, and not opposed to one another, as things that differ only in their topic of instruction."
Click to expand...
Thank you. I'll need to ponder those quotes a while. I will note, however, that infralapsarian authors such as Turretin, Hodge, and Boettner categorically reject supralapsarianism. Junius and Spanheim may think they are compatible, but Turretin certainly doesn't.

I do have Van Mastricht, and I understand his position to be, that the decree that there would be elect persons and reprobate persons precedes the decree of the fall, but that particular individuals are conceived of as elect or reprobate subsequent to the decree of the fall. I would agree with Vos that this is basically a modified supralapsarian position, insofar as it is guided by the same principles. Pure infralapsarian authors, from what I have seen, basically ignore the principles when they come to this discussion; instead, they focus on poking holes in the supralapsarian scheme.
 
TylerRay said:
Thank you. I'll need to ponder those quotes a while. I will note, however, that infralapsarian authors such as Turretin, Hodge, and Boettner categorically reject supralapsarianism. Junius and Spanheim may think they are compatible, but Turretin certainly doesn't.

I do have Van Mastricht, and I understand his position to be, that the decree that there would be elect persons and reprobate persons precedes the decree of the fall, but that particular individuals are conceived of as elect or reprobate subsequent to the decree of the fall. I would agree with Vos that this is basically a modified supralapsarian position, insofar as it is guided by the same principles. Pure infralapsarian authors, from what I have seen, basically ignore the principles when they come to this discussion; instead, they focus on poking holes in the supralapsarian scheme.
Click to expand...
It is certainly true that many on each side see their position as opposed to the other.
The question, though, is whether they are defining the decree in exactly the same way, and as including the same parts. If not, then they're not really talking about the same thing.
 
Charles Johnson said:
It is certainly true that many on each side see their position as opposed to the other.
The question, though, is whether they are defining the decree in exactly the same way, and as including the same parts. If not, then they're not really talking about the same thing.
Click to expand...
I'm interested in digging into that idea more. Have you read Vos on the subject (from his Dogmatics)? He distinguishes between "the older supralapsarians" and "later supralapsarians." He names Van Mastricht as representative of the latter. I wonder if the school of thought you're describing is identical to what Vos conceives of as the school of the "later supralapsarians."

Edit: I just noticed that he calls Junius a supralapsarian "in part," based on the same passage you quoted above. I find the designation "supralapsarian in part" absolutely hilarious. I think Junius would say he's supra-plus, as opposed to part supra.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
These are not my best arguments. But a few things to offer in the conversation:

I think supra is the correct view: redemption the design of the creation and fall blueprints.

“God had our crown in view long before our creation.” Van Dixhoorn, Confessing the Faith, 51.

James Benjamin Green notes a “supralapsarian influence” in the Westminster Standards, A Harmony of the Westminster Presbyterian Standards,
32.
WCF 3:1: God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass:(a) yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin,(b) nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.(c)
(a)Eph 1:11; Rom 11:33; Heb 6:17; Rom 9:15,18. (b)James 1:13,17; 1 John 1:5. (c)Acts 2:23; Matt 17:12; Acts 4:27-28; John 19:11; Prov 16:33.

WCF 3:2: Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions,(d) yet hath He not decreed anything because He foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions.(e)
(d)Acts 15:18; 1 Sam 23:11-12; Matt 11:21,23. (e)Rom 9:11, 13, 16, 18.

Robert Reymond is helpful: https://thereignofchrist.com/supralapsarianism-the-teleological-principle/

Gordon H. Clark says it well here too (https://www.pristinegrace.org/article.php?id=1496):

Supralapsarianism, for all its insistence on a certain logical order among the divine decrees, is essentially, so it seems to us, the unobjectionable view that God controls the universe purposefully. God acts with a purpose. He has an end in view and sees the end from the beginning. Every verse in Scripture that in one way or another refers to God's manifold wisdom, every statement indicating that a prior event is for the purpose of causing a subsequent event, every mention of an eternal, all-embracing plan contributes to a teleological and therefore supralapsarian view of God's control of history.

The connection between supralapsarianism and the fact that God always acts purposefully depends on the observation that the logical order of any plan is the exact reverse of its temporal execution. The first step in any planning is the end to be achieved; then the means are decided upon, until last of all the first thing to be done is discovered. The execution in time reverses the order of planning. Thus creation, since it is first in history, must be logically last in the divine decrees.
 
TylerRay said:
I just noticed that he calls Junius a supralapsarian "in part," based on the same passage you quoted above. I find the designation "supralapsarian in part" absolutely hilarious. I think Junius would say he's supra-plus, as opposed to part supra.
Click to expand...
Interesting. I find it a little strange that a theologian attempting to steer a course between supra and infralapsarianism would end up getting grouped with one or the other by a later theologian.
 
What if the end being considered, is the manifesting of God's glory by the contrasting of His just and holy wrath, with His undeserved mercy toward a fallen humanity? Romans 9:21-23 KJV

1. God desires to manifest His glory.

2. God intends to demonstrate both His wrath, and His mercy.

3. God ordians to create an existence by which these things will come to pass.

4. God ordains creation, and the fall.

5. God elects some to salvation, and leaves some to damnation, considering their fallenness.

God's mercy is shown in contrast to his wrath, as the objects of his saving election are considered as being fallen, just as those who are not the objects of his saving election are also considered.
 
I suppose there is part of me that wants to make that which is archetypal (God in Himself) part of creaturely theology. Since God does not reason discursively, we're trying to create an analogy of His "reasoning process" to determine whether He considered the elect prior to any other decision.

Of course, God does disclose just enough theology by way of analogy to understand something about the Trinity and other things too wonderful for us to completely understand. Perhaps there is a "creaturely utility" in God having disclosed enough to us to understand, in part, what He prioritizes.

That said, I resist attempts at univocal forms of theology where we try to convince ourselves that we understand more than we're able. I obviously am not a fan of systems that try to paint God as more "loving" by thinking about electing people after the Fall. Yet, leaving aside any sentimental emotions about the kind of God we might prefer, even if we were pretty certain about what we can understand, it would not provide the warrant to delve too far into really understanding how God knows and decrees all.
 
Semper Fidelis said:
I obviously am not a fan of systems that try to paint God as more "loving" by thinking about electing people after the Fall.
Click to expand...
I'm not sure that God considering the objects of his saving love, with respect to their fallenness, paints Him as more loving.

To my understanding, the infralapsarian postion is the predominate understanding throughout the history of Calvinistic thought. The view does not put forth the idea that God does the actual electing to salvation after the fall occurs, but that he considers them as fallen, when he ordains them to be vessels of mercy.

I'm not trying to be dogmatic in my presentation of my ideas here, this is actually something I have been pondering for a few weeks now. Just trying to work my way through it.
 
Last edited:
MyCrows said:
I'm not sure that God considering the objects of his saving love, with respect to their fallenness, paints Him as more loving.

To my understanding, the infralapsarian postion is the predominate understanding throughout the history of Calvinistic thought. The view does not put forth the idea that God does the actual electing to salvation after the fall occurs, but that he considers them as fallen, when he ordains them to be vessels of mercy.

I'm not trying to be dogmatic in my presentation of my ideas here, this is actually something I have been pondering for a few weeks now. Just trying to work my way through it.
Click to expand...
I wasn't accusing the infra position as entailing what I noted. I was simply stating that, regardless of where one falls down, we can't claim that one position makes God more loving than another. I think that many theological positions are more informed by sentiment than Scripture - both the infra and supra are good positions. I'm only stating how some are motivated.
 
Semper Fidelis said:
I wasn't accusing the infra position as entailing what I noted. I was simply stating that, regardless of where one falls down, we can't claim that one position makes God more loving than another. I think that many theological positions are more informed by sentiment than Scripture - both the infra and supra are good positions. I'm only stating how some are motivated.
Click to expand...
I follow you. And I agree completely.

I don't think either system is necessarily unbiblical, but as of now I am leaning toward infra seeming to have more root in what has been revealed in scripture.
 
Charles Johnson said:
Let me share the quotes from Junius and Spanheim I referenced earlier (I assume you have access to Van Mastricht, vol. 3). I'd be interested in hearing your thoughts.

Junius says:
"Nevertheless, neither do we dissent from those godly and learned men who state that God contemplated man in predestination before he was created; nor from those who assert that he was considered by God as created and fallen. For we reverently profess what both the latter and the former are truly saying. For we say both. And, just as we do not dissent from either in the substance of the matter, so also they do not disagree with one another, for both constantly and piously affirm (as we also do) that the cause of predestination is God alone, according to the pleasure of his will, and that no cause of predestination is found outside of God, either in man, or anywhere else, and that predestination is not done in time, but from eternity. As it pertains, on the other hand, to the circumstance, by which a man is clothed in one way or another, its consideration does not properly belong to the cause of predestination. Neither, certainly, do they disagree by reason of circumstances in such a way as many judge, for when the latter say that man was considered by God when he predestined as fallen, they do not properly have the cause of election and reprobation in mind, but the order and series of causes from which damnation follows. Secondly, they do not say this to the exclusion of other states of men, but concerning a particular cause, not to be rejected: namely, that the impudence of the flesh, which shamelessly rises up against God, would be more readily curbed, which takes place when we know that all alike were considered as sinners by God when he predestined. When, on the other hand, the former assert that God, in predestining, considered man as not yet created, they do not therefore banish God from the consideration of the fall of man; but they only intend for the cause of all predestination to be found in God, and no cause of it outside of God, in man. In this way, they agree in substance, but their manner of explaining the matter is varied."

Spanheim says,
"Moreover, some ambiguity of this word is to be noted. When this ambiguity goes unobserved, a contradiction is often attributed to orthodox theologians, who nevertheless agree here on the substance. And when it is observed, uneasy disputes on the object of predestination can be resolved. Namely, predestination is sometimes understood according to its genus, and generally, by theologians in theological schools, for the whole decree of God concerning man, in order to his final end, and sometimes according to its species, and specifically, for God’s plan concerning either raising up fallen men, out of freedom and grace, or abandoning and punishing them, out of freedom and justice. In the first sense, it includes even the decree to create man, and to permit the fall. In the second, it is resolved only into election and reprobation.
Hence, the accompanying conciliation of opinions that conflict on this specific manner which are found even among orthodox theologians (some of them make man, who has not yet been created, the object of predestination, and some man indeed created, but not yet fallen, and some both created and fallen) is clear. For the asserters of the first opinion, with a broad understanding of the term ‘predestination,’ include under it even the decree of creating man, the object of which cannot reasonably be created man. The defenders of the second opinion, in one notion of predestination, conjoin the decree of permitting the fall together with the decree concerning fallen man, and its object certainly cannot be fallen man. The promoters of the third opinion strictly understand predestination as the decree either of mercy, or of freedom and justice, concerning fallen man, the object of which quite reasonably is man considered as fallen. Each of these opinions has had, and does have, its supporters from the orthodox doctors of the Reformed Church, and neither they, nor their various, non-adverse opinions, must be contended for with ill-will, since each is true and sound in its sense, and they agree in the foundation; and therefore, they are to be put together harmoniously, and not opposed to one another, as things that differ only in their topic of instruction."
Click to expand...
Just trying to wrap my head around Junius' possition.
Does it go: God decrees the salvation of the elect - for that purpose, he decrees creation, the fall, and redemption - in this, he chooses to create more people, who will be damned?
I am almost certain the above is either outright wrong or at the very least partial, but phrasing it like this maybe someone can find out where I misunderstood him and clarify things.
 
I reject the entire discussion. The decree is a seamless whole with no before and after. All discussions of the question I have ever seen wind up using temporal language, even while arguing until they're blue in the face that it is a logical order. Dabney told us that the question should never have been asked, and I agree with him. Of course God elected people contemplated as fallen, since He elected them for salvation. Of course the end was always in view. My opinion is that both positions have an element of truth, but are wrong in what they deny. I think the whole discussion falls foul of Deuteronomy 29:29, and that it enters into a discussion of things not revealed.
 
greenbaggins said:
I reject the entire discussion. The decree is a seamless whole with no before and after. All discussions of the question I have ever seen wind up using temporal language, even while arguing until they're blue in the face that it is a logical order. Dabney told us that the question should never have been asked, and I agree with him. Of course God elected people contemplated as fallen, since He elected them for salvation. Of course the end was always in view. My opinion is that both positions have an element of truth, but are wrong in what they deny. I think the whole discussion falls foul of Deuteronomy 29:29, and that it enters into a discussion of things not revealed.
Click to expand...
I was trying to say the same thing above. It seems that way to me, but I'm willing to be shown that if something by way of analogy is revealed, then it might help us understand something of the character of God on a creaturely level. That said, I haven't ever been persuaded that the conversation yields much more than men "GNC'ing" way more than they possibly can, given that God is God, and we aren't.
 
Sam Jer said:
Just trying to wrap my head around Junius' possition.
Does it go: God decrees the salvation of the elect - for that purpose, he decrees creation, the fall, and redemption - in this, he chooses to create more people, who will be damned?
I am almost certain the above is either outright wrong or at the very least partial, but phrasing it like this maybe someone can find out where I misunderstood him and clarify things.
Click to expand...
I don't think Junius (at least in that excerpt) intends to lay out an order of decrees, per se.
He just intends to make two points:
1) It is true that, in the decree to save men, narrowly considered, they are considered as fallen and in need of a Savior (as infralapsarians claim).
2) It is true that man is not reprobated for his sin. The only cause of election and reprobation is God's good pleasure. Which is the point supralapsarians tend to seek to defend.

If one wants an "order of decrees" (or "of causes"), as it were, Van Mastricht lays out the following, included in "election, more broadly so-called":
1. The purpose of manifesting mercy
2. The intention to create those who are going to be elected, and of their fall, in order to have men in whom, or in whose gracious salvation, to manifest mercy
3. The election of persons, in whom to illustrate this mercy
4. The predestination of means by which God brings the elect to mercy.
Only the latter two belong to election, strictly so-called (i.e. how the term is used in Eph. 1:4)
 
Status
Not open for further replies.

Similar threads

P
  • Locked
Supralapsarian or infralapsarian?
Replies
8
Views
3K
Bladestunner316
Bladestunner316
D
  • Locked
Infralapsarian/Supralapsarianism
2 3
Replies
87
Views
18K
Arch2k
A
JM
  • Locked
5% Supralapsarian?
Replies
15
Views
4K
JM
JM
Mathias321
  • Locked
Supralapsarian - am I the minority?
Replies
26
Views
6K
Ask Mr. Religion
Ask Mr. Religion
A
  • Locked
Is this statement uniquely supralapsarian?
Replies
3
Views
2K
au5t1n
A
Back
Top