RamistThomist
Puritanboard Assessor
Junius, Franciscus. The Mosaic Polity. Tr. Rester, Todd. CLP Grand Rapids, MI: CLP Academic, 2015.
I have long criticized theonomists for their ignorance of Reformed teaching on natural law. To be fair, however, if they were to start with this volume they might end up even more lost. If Junius is strong and clear in the big picture, he gets lost in the details. In order to make headway with this volume, one needs to be familiar not only with Aristotle, but with basic philosophical categories that were common until modernity: genus, species, and ends. Little of what Junius says will make sense if those are not understood.
Divided into some thirty-odd theses, Junius identifies the nature of law and the place of the Mosaic code in it. That seems clear enough. What is not always clear, however, is to what degree the Mosaic code is applicable today.
Law, for Junius, is the ordering of reason to the common good. The genus is ordering and the species is reason. From this definition he divides law into eternal and natural. One is tempted to create a Ramist chart of his definitions, and that works to an extent. But there are difficulties. Natural law is separate from eternal law, yet it also participates in eternal law. The Mosaic law on one hand is an application of natural law, yet since it comes from God it seems to be divine. I think the solution is to ignore the problems that arise in the particulars. Junius is strong enough on the big picture and that is what we should focus on.
Since the Mosaic law is from God, it is perfect in origin but imperfect in mode. It has mutable and immutable parts. It is immutable concerning common notions and eternal reason. It is mutable regarding ceremonies, circumstances, and particular determinations. What parts then remain? If one can find, for example, an analogy of right between the Mosaic code and today’s laws, then that remains.
Natural law, on the other hand, advenes to nature and exists in time, though participating in God. The natural law, as it pertains to society, can be subdivided into common notions and particular determinations. The common notions, known to our Puritan forebears as “koinia ennoia,” are what they sound like. They remain constant throughout the ages. The particular determinations are the applications unique to this or that society.
Evaluation
Junius perhaps raises more questions than he answers. Structuring his argument around various theses was wise, but even then he sometimes made his task more difficult than was necessary. A good thesis is short, having a proposition and making a claim. Some of Junius’s theses ran to near-paragraph length. Even more, some of his theses seemed to summarize earlier points. Again, the best way to deal with such communicative difficulties is to ignore them and focus on the big picture. He succeeds in answering what law is. And even if he is not always clear where the Mosaic ends and the natural begins, he is clear in his use of natural law terminology, and that can prove most instructive to the reader.
I have long criticized theonomists for their ignorance of Reformed teaching on natural law. To be fair, however, if they were to start with this volume they might end up even more lost. If Junius is strong and clear in the big picture, he gets lost in the details. In order to make headway with this volume, one needs to be familiar not only with Aristotle, but with basic philosophical categories that were common until modernity: genus, species, and ends. Little of what Junius says will make sense if those are not understood.
Divided into some thirty-odd theses, Junius identifies the nature of law and the place of the Mosaic code in it. That seems clear enough. What is not always clear, however, is to what degree the Mosaic code is applicable today.
Law, for Junius, is the ordering of reason to the common good. The genus is ordering and the species is reason. From this definition he divides law into eternal and natural. One is tempted to create a Ramist chart of his definitions, and that works to an extent. But there are difficulties. Natural law is separate from eternal law, yet it also participates in eternal law. The Mosaic law on one hand is an application of natural law, yet since it comes from God it seems to be divine. I think the solution is to ignore the problems that arise in the particulars. Junius is strong enough on the big picture and that is what we should focus on.
Since the Mosaic law is from God, it is perfect in origin but imperfect in mode. It has mutable and immutable parts. It is immutable concerning common notions and eternal reason. It is mutable regarding ceremonies, circumstances, and particular determinations. What parts then remain? If one can find, for example, an analogy of right between the Mosaic code and today’s laws, then that remains.
Natural law, on the other hand, advenes to nature and exists in time, though participating in God. The natural law, as it pertains to society, can be subdivided into common notions and particular determinations. The common notions, known to our Puritan forebears as “koinia ennoia,” are what they sound like. They remain constant throughout the ages. The particular determinations are the applications unique to this or that society.
Evaluation
Junius perhaps raises more questions than he answers. Structuring his argument around various theses was wise, but even then he sometimes made his task more difficult than was necessary. A good thesis is short, having a proposition and making a claim. Some of Junius’s theses ran to near-paragraph length. Even more, some of his theses seemed to summarize earlier points. Again, the best way to deal with such communicative difficulties is to ignore them and focus on the big picture. He succeeds in answering what law is. And even if he is not always clear where the Mosaic ends and the natural begins, he is clear in his use of natural law terminology, and that can prove most instructive to the reader.
