what is required for moral responsibility? - Galen Strawson's Basic Argument

[steven-nemes]

Lately I have been thinking over the issue of what exactly is required for moral responsibility.

It is said, I think by Jonathan Edwards, that was is required is being at liberty to what you please, and being able to do the thing you ought to do if you so desired. So, we cannot hold a paralyzed man responsible for running a race, because even if he is at liberty to do what he wants (no one is chaining him down, or whatever), he still is not able to do the thing, even if he wanted to (say he has no legs).

But these conditions don't seem enough to me. Imagine an evil neuroscientist who puts a chip in my brain such that he controls my desires and what I do. Suppose he makes me want to kill my worst enemy. Suppose then, after wanting to do so sufficiently strongly, that I do it. Now, I was at liberty to do what I wanted to do--no one chained me down, nor did anyone take me by the hand--and had I wanted to not kill the man, I wouldn't have--after all, the neuroscientist could have made me to not want to kill him. Yet I am hardly responsible for doing the thing.

But then what are the conditions?

I have also read an article by philosopher Galen Strawson who argues that we cannot be ultimately, heaven-and-hell morally responsible for what we do. His argument is this:


1. Interested in free action, we are particularly interested in actions that are performed for a reason (as opposed to “reflex” actions or mindlessly habitual actions).
2. When one acts for a reason, what one does is a function of how one is, mentally speaking. (It is also a function of one's height, one's strength, one's place and time, and so on. But the mental factors are crucial when moral responsibility is in question.)
3. So if one is to be truly responsible for how one acts, one must be truly responsible for how is, mentally speaking—at least in certain respects.
4. But to be truly responsible for how one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, one must have brought it about that one is the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects. And it is not merely that one must have caused onself to be the way one is, mentally speaking. One must have consciously and explicitly chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, and one must have succeeded in bring it about that one is that way.
5. But one cannot really be said to choose, in a conscious, reasoned, fashion, to be the way one is mentally speaking, in any respect at all, unless one already exists, mentally speaking, already equipped with some principles of choice, “P1”—preferences, values, pro-attitudes, ideals—the light of which one chooses how to be.
6. But then to be truly responsible, on account of having chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, one must be truly responsible for one's having the principles of choice P1 in the light of which one chose how to be.
7. But for this to be so one must have chosen P1, in a reasoned, conscious, intentional fashion.
8. But for this, i.e. 7, to be so one must already have had some principles of choice P2, in the light of which one chose P1.
9. And so on. Here we are setting out on a regress that we cannot stop. True self-determination is impossible because it requires the actual completion of an infinite series of choices of principles of choice.
10. So true moral responsibility is impossible, because it requries true self-determination, as noted in 3.

The problem with the argument is that it seems plausible and intuitive, but the conclusion is so obviously false, and dismal and depressing, that it cannot be true.

But then we have to offer some sort of conditions of responsibility, which would survive under attack! What exactly might these conditions look like?

 

[Peairtach]

The fact that man's inability to all true good is in his will rather than in his e.g. limbs, makes him morally responsible for e.g. his unbelief.

When he says that he can't believe, this is true because he won't believe.

When he says that he won't believe, this is true because he can't believe.

Nothing is preventing him from believing but his morally depraved will. If if was something else like his body or a chip in his brain he couldn't and shouldn't be held responsible by God or Man.

The chill is in the will.

Without the knowledge of God, Man couldn't be held morally responsible. Since all men have some knowledge of God and therefore of true moral norms, they are responsible for rebellion against them.

Those who have not had any intimation of the Gospel are not morally responsible for rejecting it, but are responsible for how they behave with the light they have.

 

[au5t1n]

But these conditions don't seem enough to me. Imagine an evil neuroscientist who puts a chip in my brain such that he controls my desires and what I do. Suppose he makes me want to kill my worst enemy. Suppose then, after wanting to do so sufficiently strongly, that I do it. Now, I was at liberty to do what I wanted to do--no one chained me down, nor did anyone take me by the hand--and had I wanted to not kill the man, I wouldn't have--after all, the neuroscientist could have made me to not want to kill him. Yet I am hardly responsible for doing the thing.

The analogy doesn't work because the bolded part is impossible, even with technology that could control absolutely every physical part of your body down to the nano scale. The desires of your heart are immune to brain chips, and it is from the heart that evil springs.

 

[Skyler]

I would question 1. if it is possible for a scientist to actually control your will with a chip like that; and 2. if it would be different from a psychologist convincing you that you really do want to kill that person.

 

[steven-nemes]

If you have troubles with the brain chip analogy, though I think whether or not it is possible is besides the point, and I do think it is possible--despite all that, imagine a case like this.

My neighbor has been burning his garbage in his backyard for years, not knowing that most of the hazardous fumes find their way into my A/C and are pumped into my house, and me and my whole family breath them in. Now those fumes have a particularly strange psychological effect, namely, making a person who consumes them regularly and at great length to desire to kill their wife. So, I over time form the desire to kill my wife and eventually do so.

In that case I was at liberty to do what I wanted, and had I wanted to not kill my wife, surely I would have, but I am still hardly free or morally responsible.

 

[au5t1n]

If you have troubles with the brain chip analogy, though I think whether or not it is possible is besides the point, and I do think it is possible--despite all that, imagine a case like this.

My neighbor has been burning his garbage in his backyard for years, not knowing that most of the hazardous fumes find their way into my A/C and are pumped into my house, and me and my whole family breath them in. Now those fumes have a particularly strange psychological effect, namely, making a person who consumes them regularly and at great length to desire to kill their wife. So, I over time form the desire to kill my wife and eventually do so.

In that case I was at liberty to do what I wanted, and had I wanted to not kill my wife, surely I would have, but I am still hardly free or morally responsible.

This is the same problem. How can your spirit, heart, or will be controlled by hazardous fumes? It is not what goes into the man that makes him unclean. Ultimately, your heart has to allow external things like this to stir you up in anger against your wife.

 

[steven-nemes]

I think it is plainly obvious that things external to me, in my environment, even chemicals, can cause me to desire things, especially bad things.

A woman with very little to wear can cause me to want to have sex with her. A particularly juicy-looking hamburger can cause me to want to eat it. Repeated time spent with friends speaking of spiritual things and matters can cause me to want to read my Bible more.

So also perhaps there could be some strange chemical which makes me want to kill my wife. It is a counterexample--it need not be true to life or realistic given the present laws of nature; it just has to be logically possible.

 

[au5t1n]

I think it is plainly obvious that things external to me, in my environment, even chemicals, can cause me to desire things, especially bad things.

A woman with very little to wear can cause me to want to have sex with her. A particularly juicy-looking hamburger can cause me to want to eat it. Repeated time spent with friends speaking of spiritual things and matters can cause me to want to read my Bible more.

So also perhaps there could be some strange chemical which makes me want to kill my wife. It is a counterexample--it need not be true to life or realistic given the present laws of nature; it just has to be logically possible.

It appears to us that external things affect our desires, and certainly the connection between body and spirit can at times be hard to distinguish. We are not gnostic - We know that a human is more than just a spirit: His mind makes use of his brain; and when he trembles in spirit, often he trembles in the flesh too! But nevertheless, Jesus tells us in [KJV]Mark 7:18-19[/KJV] that man's heart is not changed by external things. We have to be willing (read:"desiring") to accept any outside influence for it to become a snare to us.

I think Edwards has it right.

 

[gene_mingo]

I think it is plainly obvious that things external to me, in my environment, even chemicals, can cause me to desire things, especially bad things.

A woman with very little to wear can cause me to want to have sex with her. A particularly juicy-looking hamburger can cause me to want to eat it. Repeated time spent with friends speaking of spiritual things and matters can cause me to want to read my Bible more.

So also perhaps there could be some strange chemical which makes me want to kill my wife. It is a counterexample--it need not be true to life or realistic given the present laws of nature; it just has to be logically possible.

The chemicals only enhance a desire already within yourself. The same with lust and gluttony.

 

[Peairtach]

At the end of the day we are free and responsible creatures.

Your illustration of the fumes shows that a sinful person when acted on by these fumes would want to kill someone.

On the other hand when someone without sin is acted on by the fumes what would He do?

We see this to an extent with mental illness.

Although I agree that this area is poorly understood and shouldn't be used as a whipping boy against any poor people that suffer from mental troubles?

Some who suffer from e.g. depression, just go into themselves and don't get out of bed. On the other hand, others who suffer from depression harm themselves and others.

A similar scenario happens when people take drink. There is always a degree of responsibility whatever happens, and a distinction between the good and the bad.

The man in the dock who is guilty of murder could turn to the judge and say, I couldn't help it because I've been a dirty, rotten, scoundrel all my life! Please let me go free!, but no-one would take his plea seriously.

Even unbelievers have access to the common grace of the Holy Spirit, by which they can and often do, develop characters that are, as far as they go, admirable. The WCF indicates they have a responsibility to do so. Such are less likely to react badly to the fumes or to temptation.

 

[steven-nemes]

This is the problem, Richard:

in what way can our behavior sensibly be called free? I am inclined to think that, if Calvinism is true, then our behavior is not free, at least not in any meaningful sense of the term.

But of course we are morally responsible. But how is it that we are morally responsible? Being at liberty and doing what you want is not enough, (and this is my point!!!) because the person in the cases I outlined are at liberty and they do what they want, but they are hardly responsible for what they did.

 

[au5t1n]

This is the problem, Richard:

in what way can our behavior sensibly be called free? I am inclined to think that, if Calvinism is true, then our behavior is not free, at least not in any meaningful sense of the term.

But of course we are morally responsible. But how is it that we are morally responsible? Being at liberty and doing what you want is not enough, (and this is my point!!!) because the person in the cases I outlined are at liberty and they do what they want, but they are hardly responsible for what they did.

The Calvinist position is that we are free to do anything we desire. If we do not desire something, we do not do it, hence the bondage of the will to sin prior to conversion. External factors cannot create a desire in a person's heart (per Mark. 7:18-19), but we who already have these desires in some measure may allow external influence to exacerbate the heart condition from which we suffer.

 

[steven-nemes]

Yes, by "free to do anything we desire," I understand you mean something like liberty, like Jonathan Edwards uses the phrase (if I am not mistaken).

But I am speaking of free, in terms of our will--and I think the only meaningful way to speak of having free will is being causa sui, yourself being the only cause of your actions, freedom to otherwise all things being the same, free will in the libertarian sense.

If Calvinism is true, then we don't have free will (as I defined above). The trouble now is finding some way to define how it is we are morally responsible for our actions even if we are not causa sui.

 

[gene_mingo]

This is the problem, Richard:

in what way can our behavior sensibly be called free? I am inclined to think that, if Calvinism is true, then our behavior is not free, at least not in any meaningful sense of the term.

But of course we are morally responsible. But how is it that we are morally responsible? Being at liberty and doing what you want is not enough, (and this is my point!!!) because the person in the cases I outlined are at liberty and they do what they want, but they are hardly responsible for what they did.

What is freedom in regards to behavior? I would say that is is the ability to act on ones desires.
I fail to see in the cases you made that the people involved didn't act in accordance to their desires.

-----Added 11/15/2009 at 06:16:42 EST-----

Yes, by "free to do anything we desire," I understand you mean something like liberty, like Jonathan Edwards uses the phrase (if I am not mistaken).

But I am speaking of free, in terms of our will--and I think the only meaningful way to speak of having free will is being causa sui, yourself being the only cause of your actions, freedom to otherwise all things being the same, free will in the libertarian sense.

If Calvinism is true, then we don't have free will (as I defined above). The trouble now is finding some way to define how it is we are morally responsible for our actions even if we are not causa sui.

Your definition above fails with external causes against ones will. Like floods or earthquakes. It is an unrealistic idea of freedom.

 

[MW]

I prefer the exaplanation provided in the Westminster Confession, 4.2. Man is created with moral quality (reasonable and immortal souls), moral ability (having the law of God written in their hearts), and moral liberty (being left to the liberty of their own will). This is what makes man a capable moral agent, and as such is morally culpable for his actions.

 

[ChristianTrader]

Yes, by "free to do anything we desire," I understand you mean something like liberty, like Jonathan Edwards uses the phrase (if I am not mistaken).

But I am speaking of free, in terms of our will--and I think the only meaningful way to speak of having free will is being causa sui, yourself being the only cause of your actions, freedom to otherwise all things being the same, free will in the libertarian sense.

If Calvinism is true, then we don't have free will (as I defined above). The trouble now is finding some way to define how it is we are morally responsible for our actions even if we are not causa sui.

I think the free will of which you speak is meaningless or self contradictory

"Free Will and Responsibility" by John Byl

CT

-----Added 11/15/2009 at 07:23:48 EST-----

If you have troubles with the brain chip analogy, though I think whether or not it is possible is besides the point, and I do think it is possible--despite all that, imagine a case like this.

My neighbor has been burning his garbage in his backyard for years, not knowing that most of the hazardous fumes find their way into my A/C and are pumped into my house, and me and my whole family breath them in. Now those fumes have a particularly strange psychological effect, namely, making a person who consumes them regularly and at great length to desire to kill their wife. So, I over time form the desire to kill my wife and eventually do so.

In that case I was at liberty to do what I wanted, and had I wanted to not kill my wife, surely I would have, but I am still hardly free or morally responsible.

Are you imply that the man was "fatalistically forced" to kill his wife here?

CT

 

[steven-nemes]

Doing what you want to do is not enough for being free. I can do what I want to after being hypnotized and caused to want some thing, but that's not free behavior.

I will get back to you on that article, Hermonta. But I'm not implying the man was "fatalistically forced," whatever that means. I mean to say that man fulfilled the suggested conditions and was not responsible for his action.

 

[cih1355]

Doing what you want to do is not enough for being free. I can do what I want to after being hypnotized and caused to want some thing, but that's not free behavior.

I will get back to you on that article, Hermonta. But I'm not implying the man was "fatalistically forced," whatever that means. I mean to say that man fulfilled the suggested conditions and was not responsible for his action.

If I were to act according to my desires and my desires originated in the appropriate way, would I be free?

 

[ChristianTrader]

Doing what you want to do is not enough for being free. I can do what I want to after being hypnotized and caused to want some thing, but that's not free behavior.

I will get back to you on that article, Hermonta. But I'm not implying the man was "fatalistically forced," whatever that means. I mean to say that man fulfilled the suggested conditions and was not responsible for his action.

I'll put it this way, can God's law that is written in your heart be erased by hypnosis etc.?

When I say fatalistically forced, I mean, can a person evaluate a scenario, see that a certain position is evil, and be unable to stop themselves from doing it?

CT

 

[Tim]

We always do what we want to do.

 

[Ron]

God holds us accountable for all our thoughts, words and deeds. That settles the matter for those who are Reformed, whose authority is God’s word and not autonomous reason.

The hypothetical absurdities that have been mentioned (like chips and fumes affecting the faculty of choice) really speaks to the degree of guilt God will find with men as opposed to whether they are going to be held responsible. God will take all influences into account.

Of course liberty is a sufficient condition for responsibility, which is not to say it is a necessary condition for responsibility. With respect to the former, if one has liberty to choose what he wants, he is responsible before God. If one due to his own sinful choices loses liberty, then of course he can still be held responsible for what he no longer has liberty to do. For instance, if one's sinful choice(s) prevents him from providing for his family, his lack of liberty to work due to having to serve prison time does not negate his responsibility to provide for his family. Accordingly, liberty is not always a necessary condition for moral responsibility but it is always a sufficient condition.

Since it is my understanding that only Reformed folk are permitted to post on this site, I will not entertain musings dealing with chips, fumes or any other silly notion that is distinctly humanistic and not Reformed in any sense of the word.

For a fuller treatment of the matter: Reformed Apologist: Liberty, the Seat of Moral Accountability

Ron

 

[Skyler]

I think it is plainly obvious that things external to me, in my environment, even chemicals, can cause me to desire things, especially bad things.

A woman with very little to wear can cause me to want to have sex with her. A particularly juicy-looking hamburger can cause me to want to eat it. Repeated time spent with friends speaking of spiritual things and matters can cause me to want to read my Bible more.

So also perhaps there could be some strange chemical which makes me want to kill my wife. It is a counterexample--it need not be true to life or realistic given the present laws of nature; it just has to be logically possible.

All of the above examples you just presented allow for moral responsibility. Why not the fumes/chip example?

edit: On a related and possibly helpful note, are we responsible for sin if we don't realize that it's sin when we do it?

 

[Confessor]

But these conditions don't seem enough to me. Imagine an evil neuroscientist who puts a chip in my brain such that he controls my desires and what I do. Suppose he makes me want to kill my worst enemy. Suppose then, after wanting to do so sufficiently strongly, that I do it. Now, I was at liberty to do what I wanted to do--no one chained me down, nor did anyone take me by the hand--and had I wanted to not kill the man, I wouldn't have--after all, the neuroscientist could have made me to not want to kill him. Yet I am hardly responsible for doing the thing.

Assuming the brain chip example is legitimate, here is a relevant quote from Craig's and Moreland's Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, p. 274:

Advocates of the causal theory of action [i.e., compatibilism - BM] have responded to cases of causal deviance [e.g. the brain chip example - BM] by patching up the theory to include the idea that the act must be caused by the right mental states in the appropriate way. [...] The problem with this response is that advocates of the causal theory of action have had a hard time defining "in the appropriate way."

The gist of the matter is that it's sometimes difficult to classify when a cause of our actions is from within (conducive to moral responsibility) or from without (destructive of moral responsibility), because genetics affect our immaterial aspects, and body and soul can interact in other ways we do not understand. Therefore, we can usually acknowledge when certain acts are caused appropriately or inappropriately, but it's difficult to get "back of" that and see why the causality is appropriate or not.

But this doesn't mean that the two categories aren't distinct -- as you can clearly place different examples in different categories without having the categories well-defined -- and thus Craig and Moreland are wrong if they imply that difficulty in assessing which causes are from within and which are from without is evidence for compatibilism's falsity.

As Ron said above, God recognizes which influences are conducive to moral responsibility and which are destructive. We don't need to be able to do that perfectly to have a Biblical philosophy of the will.

-----

As for Strawson's argument, he basically says that we cannot be responsible for our choices if our choices are efficiently caused by ultimately unchosen desires. But his argument begs the question in favor of libertarianism, and therefore carries no weight.

 

[steven-nemes]

To Ron:

God holds us accountable for all our thoughts, words and deeds. That settles the matter for those who are Reformed, whose authority is God’s word and not autonomous reason.

I think the Reformed/autonomous dichotomy you are putting up not only is false but plainly absurd. I think it is good and proper to ask what it is that are the necessary and sufficient conditions of our being held morally responsible, given the truth of determinism. If you don't think so, then you don't have to answer (even though I dealt with your suggestions above with counterexamples), but it's hardly conducive to discussion to use presuppositionalist buzz words and poison the well.

The hypothetical absurdities that have been mentioned (like chips and fumes affecting the faculty of choice) really speaks to the degree of guilt God will find with men as opposed to whether they are going to be held responsible. God will take all influences into account.

So you are saying people in those scenarios are morally responsible for what they did, it is just a matter of degree. Fine. I am thinking you would agree that the people in those circumstances have minimal responsibility for their actions, even if they have some.

Here's the clincher: something very much like those is the case, given the truth of Calvinism. God is the cause of our beliefs, desires, etc., if determinism is true--and it seems that if we have minimal moral responsibility in those cases (given the conditions you suggested), then we ought to have minimal moral responsibility in real life also. But that can't be the case. So those conditions are no good.

But I think the intuitive view is that those people are not responsible for what they did at all.

Of course liberty is a sufficient condition for responsibility, which is not to say it is a necessary condition for responsibility. With respect to the former, if one has liberty to choose what he wants, he is responsible before God. If one due to his own sinful choices loses liberty, then of course he can still be held responsible for what he no longer has liberty to do. For instance, if one's sinful choice(s) prevents him from providing for his family, his lack of liberty to work due to having to serve prison time does not negate his responsibility to provide for his family. Accordingly, liberty is not always a necessary condition for moral responsibility but it is always a sufficient condition.

Liberty is not sufficient because I could be under hypnosis and at liberty to do what I want and be forced to commit all kinds of atrocities. That hardly seems to be responsible behavior.

Since it is my understanding that only Reformed folk are permitted to post on this site, I will not entertain musings dealing with chips, fumes or any other silly notion that is distinctly humanistic and not Reformed in any sense of the word.

If you mean to imply that I am not Reformed just by asking the questions, I hardly know what to say in response. My understanding was that you are a pretty smart guy and I was looking forward to dialoging with you over this issue, but you decided to take another route and simply assert the same things I already read in your blog post (which I looked over earlier in the week while I was still thinking over these issues), things which I already dealt with in the above posts. Fine by me.

To Ben: I hardly know what a proper way for desires to be brought about is. Is two billion years of blind cosmic evolution the right way? What makes that any different than me gradually gaining the desire to kill my wife by her annoying me for years and years?

If Calvinism is true, then something very much like the evil neuroscientist case is true to life, except with a few more links in the causal chain leading up to the evil act. I know that compatibilists would say that for the most part, if a person's behavior is caused by another person's intentional manipulation of his desires and beliefs, then he can't really be held responsible for it. And if a person acts such that another person will inevitably desire to do X, then the person could hardly be responsible for it. But this is the case in Calvinism.

But suppose the neuroscientist cases don't hold water. Even then, Strawson's argument does seem to go through on compatibilism. So you have to deal with that, since you are not a libertarian.

-----Added 11/16/2009 at 05:01:33 EST-----

I'll put it this way, can God's law that is written in your heart be erased by hypnosis etc.?

When I say fatalistically forced, I mean, can a person evaluate a scenario, see that a certain position is evil, and be unable to stop themselves from doing it?

CT

The person in those cases would not be reasoning freely (in a causa sui way), but then again no one does.

So he would not be able to stop and think to himself about whether or not he ought to do it; it'd seem free to him.

But then again, no one has the ability to stop and think about what they are doing, at least not in a causa sui way, which you seem to be suggesting.

 

[Christusregnat]

I think the Reformed/autonomous dichotomy you are putting up not only is false but plainly absurd.

Actually a youth who hold himself in high esteem correcting a lawfully elected elder in a Prebyterian Church is absurd.

 

[steven-nemes]

Fine by me. If I can be understood as being disrespectful, I apologize--that is definitely not what I wanted to get across, and I wasn't aware that that is how I sound. I also apologize if I come across as thinking highly of myself, though this charge is more mysterious to me than the other. I only wanted to discuss the issue and I think that Ron's response was unfair. I didn't know I'm not allowed to respond to other people when I disagree with them, if they are older than me or hold a position of authority in a denomination.

 

[Christusregnat]

Fine by me. If I can be understood as being disrespectful, I apologize--that is definitely not what I wanted to get across, and I wasn't aware that that is how I sound. I also apologize if I come across as thinking highly of myself, though this charge is more mysterious to me than the other. I only wanted to discuss the issue and I think that Ron's response was unfair. I didn't know I'm not allowed to respond to other people when I disagree with them, if they are older than me or hold a position of authority in a denomination.

It is the spirit with which one challenges, or carries oneself in discussions; I don't think that Ron would reject all challenges. But as a youth, your mind will tend to trust too much in its own wisdom, and be blinded to how you are perceived by others. This is nothing personal. I have been through this myself. If you told your father that his ideas were absurd, I hope he would give you a swift chastisement. Should this not apply with elders in Christ's church? Something to think about.

Cheers,

Adam

 

[Confessor]

To Ben: I hardly know what a proper way for desires to be brought about is. Is two billion years of blind cosmic evolution the right way? What makes that any different than me gradually gaining the desire to kill my wife by her annoying me for years and years?

I think you're going about it backwards. It's not that we conceive of the category and then determine which instances fit into the category (as Descartes and Clark do with epistemology); rather, we have clear instances of what are appropriate and what are inappropriate causal chains of action, and we can inductively proceed with those to discern a criterion.

If Calvinism is true, then something very much like the evil neuroscientist case is true to life, except with a few more links in the causal chain leading up to the evil act.

No, this is the case only if you presume that you have the correct category in the first place (backwards methodology again). As one way to describe the situations as different, consider the Creator-creature disparity. To say that a human cannot physically modify someone's desires and leave him morally responsible does not imply that God cannot.

But suppose the neuroscientist cases don't hold water. Even then, Strawson's argument does seem to go through on compatibilism. So you have to deal with that, since you are not a libertarian.

Strawson argues that if we don't exhaustively choose everything that goes into making a decision, i.e. if we don't choose what we please (rather than just choosing as we please), then we don't have moral responsibility. But this is the thesis of libertarianism. He is just asserting what he wants to prove.

 

[steven-nemes]

I think you're going about it backwards. It's not that we conceive of the category and then determine which instances fit into the category (as Descartes and Clark do with epistemology); rather, we have clear instances of what are appropriate and what are inappropriate causal chains of action, and we can inductively proceed with those to discern a criterion.

Alright. You and I can think of some cases where it seems a person's desires came about the right way, and some cases where it seems a person's desires came about the wrong way, and that in the first case, they are morally responsible, and in the second case, they are not morally responsible. Now, my question is this: what do those cases where the person is morally responsible have in common with each other, and what do they commonly have distinct from those cases where the person is not morally responsible? After we come up with that, let's test those conditions and see if they are enough. That's my project.

No, this is the case only if you presume that you have the correct category in the first place (backwards methodology again). As one way to describe the situations as different, consider the Creator-creature disparity. To say that a human cannot physically modify someone's desires and leave him morally responsible does not imply that God cannot.

Is it not true that something like the neuroscientist cases is true in real life? That's all I said--I said nothing as to whether or not people in real life are morally responsible (I think they are), I simply said that something like ns cases is true to life.

Now I was also getting at this: if they aren't morally responsible in the ns cases, how are they morally responsible when God does it? You reply that there is a Creator-creature disparity and that God perhaps can justly hold us responsible whereas humans couldn't.

But it seems that if we hold to that, then God could literally do anything with humans and still hold them responsible. God could've made the created order such that it was not clear that he exists, and he could've made us such that we do not clearly know what is right and what is wrong in such a way that we'd be blameworthy for doing what is wrong. Imagine he did do that. Are we still responsible for sinning and not believing in him?

Strawson argues that if we don't exhaustively choose everything that goes into making a decision, i.e. if we don't choose what we please (rather than just choosing as we please), then we don't have moral responsibility. But this is the thesis of libertarianism. He is just asserting what he wants to prove.

Strawson doesn't try to prove libertarianism; he tries to prove moral responsibility as such is impossible.

He says that our choices are a consequence of the way we are in certain mental respects. He says that in order to be responsible for our choices, we'd have to be responsible for the way we are.

That seems plausible enough. You would deny the jump in the second sentence there, that in order to be responsible for our choices, we'd have to be responsible for the way we are. If that is not true--if it is true that we can be responsible for our choices even if we are not responsible for our mental states--then what is needed for moral responsibility? That seems to be a plausible question to ask, and probably what Strawson would push you to answer.

 

[Confessor]

Alright. You and I can think of some cases where it seems a person's desires came about the right way, and some cases where it seems a person's desires came about the wrong way, and that in the first case, they are morally responsible, and in the second case, they are not morally responsible. Now, my question is this: what do those cases where the person is morally responsible have in common with each other, and what do they commonly have distinct from those cases where the person is not morally responsible? After we come up with that, let's test those conditions and see if they are enough. That's my project.

Do I have to do it now? Really, I only entered the thread to ensure that you didn't throw out all causal determinism just because there exists such a concept as inappropriate causal chains. Presently I'm not too interested in discerning what the definitions are of appropriate and inappropriate causal chains. I find it interesting, but I just don't wish to do that now.

This stuff gets down to how body and soul interact, which might even be something that we are incapable of investigating. Deep stuff.

Now I was also getting at this: if they aren't morally responsible in the ns cases, how are they morally responsible when God does it? You reply that there is a Creator-creature disparity and that God perhaps can justly hold us responsible whereas humans couldn't.

Yup. That's it.

Strawson doesn't try to prove libertarianism; he tries to prove moral responsibility as such is impossible.

Well, yeah, but he does this on the grounds that only libertarianism could provide for moral responsibility. He takes the libertarian definition to be the right one from the outset, so you can't really expect compatibilists to have to interact with his stuff.

You would deny the jump in the second sentence there, that in order to be responsible for our choices, we'd have to be responsible for the way we are. If that is not true--if it is true that we can be responsible for our choices even if we are not responsible for our mental states--then what is needed for moral responsibility? That seems to be a plausible question to ask, and probably what Strawson would push you to answer.

I'd offer the typical compatibilsit answer: when our choices are appropriately caused by our mental states/desires.