steven-nemes
Puritan Board Sophomore
Fine by me. (You conveniently skip over my bit about God making revelation unclear and the moral law nebulous... )
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Fine by me. If I can be understood as being disrespectful, I apologize--that is definitely not what I wanted to get across, and I wasn't aware that that is how I sound. I also apologize if I come across as thinking highly of myself, though this charge is more mysterious to me than the other. I only wanted to discuss the issue and I think...
I think the Reformed/autonomous dichotomy you are putting up not only is false but plainly absurd.
Actually a youth who hold himself in high esteem correcting a lawfully elected elder in a Prebyterian Church is absurd.
I think the Reformed/autonomous dichotomy you are putting up not only is false but plainly absurd.
Actually a youth who hold himself in high esteem correcting a lawfully elected elder in a Prebyterian Church is absurd.
Who can correct a lawfully elected elder in a Presbyterian Church? Someone of a certain age? A person who is also an elder in a Presbyterian Church? Is there a written test that one must take first?
CT
Actually a youth who hold himself in high esteem correcting a lawfully elected elder in a Prebyterian Church is absurd.
Who can correct a lawfully elected elder in a Presbyterian Church? Someone of a certain age? A person who is also an elder in a Presbyterian Church? Is there a written test that one must take first?
CT
Why do you ask? Do you hold yourself in high esteem?
Actually a youth who hold himself in high esteem correcting a lawfully elected elder in a Prebyterian Church is absurd.
Who can correct a lawfully elected elder in a Presbyterian Church? Someone of a certain age? A person who is also an elder in a Presbyterian Church? Is there a written test that one must take first?
CT
Why do you ask? Do you hold yourself in high esteem?
I'm still trying to figure out what your argument is. While outside influences can affect you, you are still morally responsible.
Fine by me. (You conveniently skip over my bit about God making revelation unclear and the moral law nebulous... )
But it seems that if we hold to that, then God could literally do anything with humans and still hold them responsible. God could've made the created order such that it was not clear that he exists, and he could've made us such that we do not clearly know what is right and what is wrong in such a way that we'd be blameworthy for doing what is wrong. Imagine he did do that. Are we still responsible for sinning and not believing in him?
I think the Reformed/autonomous dichotomy you are putting up not only is false but plainly absurd.
Actually a youth who hold himself in high esteem correcting a lawfully elected elder in a Prebyterian Church is absurd.
Who can correct a lawfully elected elder in a Presbyterian Church? Someone of a certain age? A person who is also an elder in a Presbyterian Church? Is there a written test that one must take first?
CT
I'm not saying I don't do this, but any time a Calvinist comes close to saying that we're sock puppets in the hand of God, red flags go up.
I'm not saying I don't do this, but any time a Calvinist comes close to saying that we're sock puppets in the hand of God, red flags go up.
Sorry to say but this seems to plainly follow. Ask Ron, who argues that no one has free will, not even God, and everything which happens happens necessarily. That is an apparent consequence of Calvinism. Perhaps you ought to argue how it is that the thesis that God is the cause of our desires and actions doesn't follow?
I am saying that it seems a slippery slope, applying the Creator-creature distinction as justification.
It seems that if God can cause me to sin and hold me responsible for it, all the rest about me knowing what is wrong and so on doesn't even matter. Why bother adding that? I wasn't "able" in a very real sense to take all that into consideration anyway, so it seems superfluous. But surely those things are not superfluous...
I'm not saying I don't do this, but any time a Calvinist comes close to saying that we're sock puppets in the hand of God, red flags go up.
Sorry to say but this seems to plainly follow. Ask Ron, who argues that no one has free will, not even God, and everything which happens happens necessarily. That is an apparent consequence of Calvinism. Perhaps you ought to argue how it is that the thesis that God is the cause of our desires and actions doesn't follow?
I may be wrong, but I am pretty sure Adam was aiming to correct not the content of Steven's statements, but the manner in which they were presented.
I may be wrong, but I am pretty sure Adam was aiming to correct not the content of Steven's statements, but the manner in which they were presented.
To use a litotes, you are not very incorrect.
If a man holds a gun to my head and says, "your money or your life", the libertarian says, "Your will is constrained, therefore anything you do is not a free choice and therefore not responsible." The compatibilist says, "You still have the option to refuse or kick the man in the gut, therefore you are morally responsible."
I remember reading in Plantinga that (following Ockham) some propositions about the past are such that they are not necessary, and are actually contingent upon the choices of libertarian creatures, so that we some kind of power over what exactly it is that God believes.
I am also thinking that there is some word play going on in the argument. What matters for freedom on a libertarian scheme is that I alone am the cause of my behavior. God's knowing that I will do X is not causing me to do X, so it seems to me that even if it is a matter of the necessity of the consequence that I do X, that's hardly enough to prove that I am not free.
Very briefly, however, Ron, your argument is about the same as Nelson Pike's argument for the incompatibility of omniscience (or more specifically, foreknowledge) and free will. This is also the argument that is dealt with in the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on theological fatalism here.
I remember reading in Plantinga that (following Ockham) some propositions about the past are such that they are not necessary, and are actually contingent upon the choices of libertarian creatures, so that we some kind of power over what exactly it is that God believes.
I would not be able to defend this view in detail because I'd have to reread the article but this is one of the proposed solutions on the SEP entry.
I am also thinking that there is some word play going on in the argument. What matters for freedom on a libertarian scheme is that I alone am the cause of my behavior. God's knowing that I will do X is not causing me to do X,
so it seems to me that even if it is a matter of the necessity of the consequence that I do X, that's hardly enough to prove that I am not free.
I think it shows that it is late at night and I'm tired, but perhaps I can expand/explain that in the morning.
Seriously buddy, this is dangerous ground. Libertarianism implies open theism.
So for example, let's assume the man gave up his wallet to the gunman. The libertarian would say that the man's choice to save his life would not have been necessitated by the circumstances God provided (and also pre-interpreted) but rather it would have been a purely contingent choice that could have just as easily been otherwise.
I'm still trying to understand what the libertarian means by contingent--in metaphysics, contingency is a state of dependency or non-necessity.
That is, a contingent being is a being that could have not existed without incurring a logical contradiction--all events and beings apart from God are contingent. To say that our choices are logically contingent is to state the obvious.
I can actually agree with the libertarian in all but one point: the man could have done otherwise had he wanted to.
The trouble with the libertarian view of the will is that by taking away all factors, there is no motivation for action. Thus, when the choice is made, it is made on no basis whatsoever, being completely arbitrary. Thus, we might say that the choice is random and therefore a person cannot be held responsible for it.
The other problem is that, in reality, no one makes choices like this. We all have reasons (logical, emotional, physical, etc.) for what we do. I've never done anything I didn't want to do--naturally, there are things that, all things being equal, I would rather not have done, but all things aren't equal.
The libertarian view not only destroys responsibility, but it contradicts the way we actually do make choices--we weigh pros and cons (sometimes rather hastily) and then we choose.
But it seems that if we hold to that, then God could literally do anything with humans and still hold them responsible. God could've made the created order such that it was not clear that he exists, and he could've made us such that we do not clearly know what is right and what is wrong in such a way that we'd be blameworthy for doing what is wrong. Imagine he did do that. Are we still responsible for sinning and not believing in him?
I doubt very much that one can come up with a philosophical argument to convince a person dead in sin that he is wrong because he is dead.
VictorBravo said:To put it bluntly: what does it matter to created Man what God could hypothetically do? It is an impossibility to consider.
I doubt very much that one can come up with a philosophical argument to convince a person dead in sin that he is wrong because he is dead.
Calvinists have always held to free will in the sense that any being can do whatever it is in his nature to do.
The purpose of the argument is to confirm that he is dead.
VictorBravo said:To put it bluntly: what does it matter to created Man what God could hypothetically do? It is an impossibility to consider.
There is some merit for possible worlds theory when considering "Why did God make things the way He did?" Impossibilities are just things that are logically self-contradictory. Anything that is logically consistent is possible.
I don't think I'm questioning God here: I'm merely trying to understand Him as He has presented Himself.
I doubt very much that one can come up with a philosophical argument to convince a person dead in sin that he is wrong because he is dead.
The purpose of the argument is to confirm that he is dead.
Seriously, is the fact that created Man cannot comprehend the totality of God's workings logically self-contradictory? I don't see how. Yet we take it as an impossibility for us to do so because we take God at his word.