what is required for moral responsibility? - Galen Strawson's Basic Argument

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:) Fine by me. (You conveniently skip over my bit about God making revelation unclear and the moral law nebulous... :detective::D)
 
I won't bother to address the arguments on this thread but I will not let this quote pass. It's too common to the Christian church and we all need to rid ourselves of such deception.

Fine by me. If I can be understood as being disrespectful, I apologize--that is definitely not what I wanted to get across, and I wasn't aware that that is how I sound. I also apologize if I come across as thinking highly of myself, though this charge is more mysterious to me than the other. I only wanted to discuss the issue and I think...

Concerning apologies that include "if", I've blogged:Reformed Apologist: Apologies With No Content

I won't paste the comments from that Blog post but some I recall are useful; they can be found through the link I provided. I will provide the thrust of the post though...

How many times have we heard “If I did x-and-so, I am truly sorry and ask your forgiveness”? Maybe we have said it ourselves. But what does it even mean after all? The “apology” is predicated upon an “if”, which suggests that the one extending the apology is not sorry for some actual offence but rather for an offence that is not believed was committed; and worse, as demonstrated by modus tollens, an offence that is believed was not committed! Given the “if”, the apology is disingenuous because the sorrow is as non-existent as the transgression is hypothetical.

Maybe look at it this way:

P1. If I sinned against you, then I’m sorry for sinning against you
P2. I sinned against you
Conlcusion: I’m sorry for sinning against you

The one offering the conditional apology says that premise 1 is true. Premise 2 is not deemed true by the one offering the alleged apology. Consequently, the truth of the conclusion is not established. Therefore, it does not follow that the person is sorry for having sinned against the other person.

Applying modus tollens, things become a bit more glaring:

p1. If I sinned against you, then I’m sorry for sinning against you
p2. I’m not sorry for (actually) sinning against you
Conclusion: It is false that I sinned against you

In the second way at looking at this, both premise 1 and 2 are deemed true by the one offering the alleged apology. Accordingly, not only is the person not sorry (premise 2), he must also believe it is false that he sinned against the other person because the negation of the consequent of P1, which is P2, necessitates the negation of the antecedent of P1, which is the conclusion of no sin against the other person. In other words, the one offering such a contingent apology implies that sorrow is a necessary condition for having sinned against the other person. Accordingly, if there is no sorrow, then the person is actually communicating that he did not sin against the person who believes he has been offended! By saying without having sorrow for actual sin: "If I sinned against you, then I'm sorry" does not imply that the person thinks he might have sinned. Rather, the statement actually underscores that the apology is being rendered by one who thinks he is innocent!

The moral of the story is, don't extend contingent apologies and don't receive them for what they truly communicate. It does nobody any real good. At best, one might mean by such an apology that he would not want to hurt someone else unnecessarily and that had he believed he was wrong, then he would be sorry and apologize. But even that communicates that there is disagreement over the question of whether an offence was actually given or just received (without warrant)....

Ron
 
Steven,

I'm still trying to figure out what your argument is. While outside influences can affect you, you are still morally responsible.

You are falling into the (all-too-common) trap of reformed idealism. That is, you find a select group of axioms in Calvinism and you deduce all kinds of weird and wonderful things from them and you step back and say "It's beautiful and elegant therefore it must be true." Then, you reinterpret reality to fit your beautiful system. This is the mistake of Leibniz--it's a huge temptation to be so intent on constructing a beautiful system that you lose touch with the reality that this is supposed to be explaining. Instead of letting reality shape your philosophy, you force reality to fit your philosophy.

I'm not saying I don't do this, but any time a Calvinist comes close to saying that we're sock puppets in the hand of God, red flags go up.
 
I think the Reformed/autonomous dichotomy you are putting up not only is false but plainly absurd.

Actually a youth who hold himself in high esteem correcting a lawfully elected elder in a Prebyterian Church is absurd.

Who can correct a lawfully elected elder in a Presbyterian Church? Someone of a certain age? A person who is also an elder in a Presbyterian Church? Is there a written test that one must take first?

CT
 
I think the Reformed/autonomous dichotomy you are putting up not only is false but plainly absurd.

Actually a youth who hold himself in high esteem correcting a lawfully elected elder in a Prebyterian Church is absurd.

Who can correct a lawfully elected elder in a Presbyterian Church? Someone of a certain age? A person who is also an elder in a Presbyterian Church? Is there a written test that one must take first?

CT

Why do you ask? Do you hold yourself in high esteem?
 
Actually a youth who hold himself in high esteem correcting a lawfully elected elder in a Prebyterian Church is absurd.

Who can correct a lawfully elected elder in a Presbyterian Church? Someone of a certain age? A person who is also an elder in a Presbyterian Church? Is there a written test that one must take first?

CT

Why do you ask? Do you hold yourself in high esteem?

Job 32-33
 
Actually a youth who hold himself in high esteem correcting a lawfully elected elder in a Prebyterian Church is absurd.

Who can correct a lawfully elected elder in a Presbyterian Church? Someone of a certain age? A person who is also an elder in a Presbyterian Church? Is there a written test that one must take first?

CT

Why do you ask? Do you hold yourself in high esteem?

I ask because I would like to know the answer. Are you dodging the question?

CT
 
I'm still trying to figure out what your argument is. While outside influences can affect you, you are still morally responsible.

Philip,

You might have missed something that this young man is trying to flesh out. At best, he would like to draw category distinctions for being enticed. One category has included hamburgers and scantily dressed woman as it were. Another category included fumes from the neighbor’s fire that affect the faculty of choice and chips that are implanted in the brain aimed to manipulate the strongest inclination at the moment of choice. He has even developed a third category of influence, positing that God could have “made us such that we do not clearly know what is right and what is wrong in such a way that we'd be blameworthy for doing what is wrong.” (In passing we might note that such a premise denies the basic Reformed doctrine that God can only do what is good and holy.)

God’s revealed civil and ecclesiastical sanctions do not take into account environment, natural tendencies and demonic influences (let alone chips, fumes and an alleged deviant god). In Ephesians 2 where God addresses the world, the flesh and the devil, he states that by Grace we are no longer enslaved to such influences. That we were once enslaved but have been released through conversion is a common Pauline theme, which he also employs in 1 Corinthians 6. James (chapter 3) speaks of earthly, unspiritual and demonic – same thing. Accordingly, practicing homosexuals are to be turned over to Satan and murderers are to be put to death, without regard to the influences! End of discussion. God holds men responsible in a very objective sense and he requires that his ordained servants, whether ecclesiastical or civil, carry out his prescribed sanctions according to the known transgression without consideration for hypothetical or unknown circumstantial influences. Pleading insanity, or “the devil made me do it!” is simply foreign to biblical justice. Reformed Apologist: More Muddled Musings & Flip Wilson's Geraldine How much more the case with fumes, chips and a deceiving god? Moreover, when God says that he will send a lying spirit, are we to suppose that those who are taken captive by such a spirit are somehow not culpable for what they might do under its influence?

As I said before, at the judgment God will take into account all influences (both external and internal; artificial and natural), but to think that we will not be held responsible and found guilty to one degree or another for all willful transgressions is simply to sit in judgment of God’s word...

Ron
 
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:) Fine by me. (You conveniently skip over my bit about God making revelation unclear and the moral law nebulous... :detective::D)

Wait, what? I'm lost.

EDIT - I'm sorry; I really did just skip over that. That was foolish of me. I'll formulate a response now.
EDIT2 - Looking back on the email which I got on my phone when you initially responded, I see that the paragraph I skipped wasn't even there (likely a technical malfunction). So that would explain why I missed it. :think: In any case, here it is:

But it seems that if we hold to that, then God could literally do anything with humans and still hold them responsible. God could've made the created order such that it was not clear that he exists, and he could've made us such that we do not clearly know what is right and what is wrong in such a way that we'd be blameworthy for doing what is wrong. Imagine he did do that. Are we still responsible for sinning and not believing in him?

How do you move from the premise that God has a more authoritative grasp over the human heart (such that He can manipulate as He pleases while retaining the responsibility of the second cause), to the premise that anything can be deemed as responsibility? My appeal to the Creator-creature distinction is not, "Yeah, it's the same category but I don't care; it's God"; it really is a qualitatively different relation.

-----Added 11/16/2009 at 08:15:34 EST-----

I think the Reformed/autonomous dichotomy you are putting up not only is false but plainly absurd.

Actually a youth who hold himself in high esteem correcting a lawfully elected elder in a Prebyterian Church is absurd.

Who can correct a lawfully elected elder in a Presbyterian Church? Someone of a certain age? A person who is also an elder in a Presbyterian Church? Is there a written test that one must take first?

CT

I may be wrong, but I am pretty sure Adam was aiming to correct not the content of Steven's statements, but the manner in which they were presented.
 
I'm not saying I don't do this, but any time a Calvinist comes close to saying that we're sock puppets in the hand of God, red flags go up.

Sorry to say but this seems to plainly follow. Ask Ron, who argues that no one has free will, not even God, and everything which happens happens necessarily. That is an apparent consequence of Calvinism. Perhaps you ought to argue how it is that the thesis that God is the cause of our desires and actions doesn't follow?

To Ben: I am saying that it seems a slippery slope, applying the Creator-creature distinction as justification. It seems that if God can cause me to sin and hold me responsible for it, all the rest about me knowing what is wrong and so on doesn't even matter. Why bother adding that? I wasn't "able" in a very real sense to take all that into consideration anyway, so it seems superfluous. But surely those things are not superfluous...

And regarding the "manner in which" my response to Ron was presented, I didn't intend for it to come across the wrong way. I don't agree that an apology of the sort I made is meaningless or empty but I am not going to argue that.
 
I'm not saying I don't do this, but any time a Calvinist comes close to saying that we're sock puppets in the hand of God, red flags go up.

Sorry to say but this seems to plainly follow. Ask Ron, who argues that no one has free will, not even God, and everything which happens happens necessarily. That is an apparent consequence of Calvinism. Perhaps you ought to argue how it is that the thesis that God is the cause of our desires and actions doesn't follow?

Just as with most other Biblical doctrines, we should expect this to be showing man as dust and God as glorious. There's a reason that Biblical doctrines (esp. predestination/divine sovereignty, justification by faith alone, complementarianism, Total Depravity) are hated by the world today. The world likes to think of man as genuinely free from any restraints ("You can do it if you put your mind to it!") and as possessing miniature creator-powers when it comes to determining the future, rather than saying that God has first decreed the future, and unveils it to us, who are ignorant of it. According to John Owen in his The Mortification of Sin, "Mortification from a self-strength, carried on by ways of self-invention, unto the end of a self-righteousness, is the soul and substance of all false religion in the world." To tell the world that the problem with us is in the very roots of our natures, and that we act only in accord with our natures (and therefore that any hope of assistance must come externally), is offensive. It casts man down to the dust.

What we need to do is follow what the Creator has Himself told us, to follow it faithfully, and then to modify our affections accordingly. Our philosophy must be delimited by Scripture. If Scripture tells us, if God Himself tells us, that we are entirely bound by His sovereignty and cannot act but how He decrees, and yet we are genuinely responsible for it -- then that is the case, period.

By sticking with this simple formula, grand results follow. A philosophy under the authority of Scripture, not catering to libertarianism, is a juggernaut. Philosophies stilted on libertarianism come crashing down to the ground. They are dreadfully inconsistent -- and rightfully so, for they attempt to posit man as a mini-creator and determiner of his own future, wishing to be as God (Gen. 3:5).

I am saying that it seems a slippery slope, applying the Creator-creature distinction as justification.

Again, you have to recognize that I'm not just throwing out the distinction as some arbitrary excuse. I am not saying that there is no distinction, but "I don't care; he's God." Rather, there is a genuine difference between God's dealing with the souls of men, and men's dealing with the souls of men. And this genuine difference comes from being the Creator. I may not be able to describe how it works, but nonetheless I know from the Bible that God is capable of altering men's hearts while fully retaining their responsibility. I use the distinction as justification only because Scripture advises me to do so. Scripture teaches that men imposing restraints on other men is destructive of freedom, whereas God can do so without destroying freedom at all. Scripture prevents such a justification from falling down a slippery slope, cf. Deut. 29:29.

It seems that if God can cause me to sin and hold me responsible for it, all the rest about me knowing what is wrong and so on doesn't even matter. Why bother adding that? I wasn't "able" in a very real sense to take all that into consideration anyway, so it seems superfluous. But surely those things are not superfluous...

I'm not sure what point you're making. Are you arguing that if God can ultimately cause others to sin and impute sin entirely to them, supposedly contrary to (libertarian) moral intuitions, then why doesn't He just impute people with sin right away and skip all the means?
 
I'm not saying I don't do this, but any time a Calvinist comes close to saying that we're sock puppets in the hand of God, red flags go up.

Sorry to say but this seems to plainly follow. Ask Ron, who argues that no one has free will, not even God, and everything which happens happens necessarily. That is an apparent consequence of Calvinism. Perhaps you ought to argue how it is that the thesis that God is the cause of our desires and actions doesn't follow?

Steve,

That you don't draw a distinction between the non-willful actions of puppets and the willful actions of men tells me that you have not reflected on these matters adequately - not even in the least. (That is not so bad in and of itself but that you correct so many people along your journey from Arminian leanings is a bit puzzling to me. I hope you can receive that.)

That morally relevant choices are not purely contingent and, therefore, are necessary is not to equate them with the actions of puppets; for puppets don't act according to an inclination, yet men do. Men choose what they want; puppets don't choose at all. Added to this, men make choices for which they are accountable. The only question is whether man has LFW or not. You might wish to look at it this way. Since LFW is a philosophical surd which actually would destroy moral accountability, the only thing left is necessity. Now prove that the necessity of willful choices contradicts moral accountability! Frankly, the Arminian sounds just like the one from Romans nine who questions God. "How can God find fault, for who can resisit his will?" One point of Romans nine is that God does find fault with those who act according to what he determines. There we have it - God's determination of man's morally releveant choices for which they will give an account. But keep in mind, man is responsible for the actions he desires to make! Now if you have a problem with that, then you will certainly have a problem with God imputing Adam's sin to us and our being guilty of our sin nature, also called concupiscence. No personal choice of ours was even involved in those sins God credits to us.

There are many ways to refute LFW. First off, God's omniscience necessarly implies that LFW is false simply because God cannot know a future contingency, for the outcome of a future contingency defies a truth value until it occurs. There would be nothing true for God to know in his prescience if our choices are purely contingent. That is why a consistent Arminian view of the will works its way out in Open Theism.

Here is another refution:

Establish the necessity of God’s belief about Tom’s choice:

1. 100 years ago God believed that Tom will do x tomorrow
2. If x is believed in the past, it is now necessary that x was believed then
3. It is now necessary that 100 years ago God believed that Tom will do x tomorrow

Establish the necessity of Tom’s choice, given the necessity of God’s belief:

4. Necessarily, if 100 years ago God believed Tom will do x tomorrow, then Tom will do x tomorrow
5. If p {i.e. God's historical belief about Tom's choice} is now necessary (3), and necessarily if p, then q; then q {i.e. Tom's choice of x tomorrow: (consequent from 4)} is now necessary [transfer of necessity principle]
6. Therefore, it is now necessary that Tom will do x tomorrow [3, 4 and 5]

Establish that Tom does not act freely, given the necessity of Tom’s choice:

7. If it is now necessary that Tom will do x tomorrow, then Tom cannot do otherwise
8. Therefore, Tom cannot do otherwise than x tomorrow
9. If one cannot do otherwise, then one does not act freely
10. Therefore, when Tom does x tomorrow, he will not do it freely

Ron
 
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There are three possible definitions of free will that have been used:

1. (Pre-1700) Free will is the moral ability to do what is right in the sight of God. The whole debate between Agustinianism/Thomism and Molinism is over whether man in his natural state has this ability.

2. (Edwards/Compatibilism) Morally significant free will is the ability to do what one wants. That is, the ability to have chosen differently, given a different set of circumstances/desires.

3. (Incompatibilism) Morally significant free will is the unconditioned ability to choose. That is, the ability to have chosen differently regardless of all factors.

Obviously, we agree that 3. has no connection to reality, in addition to making moral significance a meaningless term. Since Dordt, definition 1. has largely been superseded by the term "total depravity" in our theology and thus its primary usefulness is for understanding what the reformers meant.

Definition 2. is, I think, the proper definition of free will and certainly allows for human responsibility. In fact, it enhances our awareness of responsibility.

If a man holds a gun to my head and says, "your money or your life", the libertarian says, "Your will is constrained, therefore anything you do is not a free choice and therefore not responsible." The compatibilist says, "You still have the option to refuse or kick the man in the gut, therefore you are morally responsible."

Steven, consider this: if we are sock puppets in the hand of God, then we can say that He is the author of our sin. Again, you are failing a) to take the whole counsel of Scripture into account b) to let reality shape your system. Yes, it's nice and tight, compact, elegant, and beautiful. I can admire it for its pleasing aesthetic qualities. Unfortunately it has little connection to reality (I'll just call this "Leibniz' disease"). As I said, I am prone to do this as well.
 
If a man holds a gun to my head and says, "your money or your life", the libertarian says, "Your will is constrained, therefore anything you do is not a free choice and therefore not responsible." The compatibilist says, "You still have the option to refuse or kick the man in the gut, therefore you are morally responsible."

Philip,

I'm not sure I follow the point of the anecdote. If a libertarian were to say in such a case that the "will is constrained, therefore anything you do is not a free choice", then of course he would not be using the term "free choice" in a libertarian sense. If he is true to his philosophy, then all the libertarian could say is that the purely contingent, libertarian free will choice was being exercised under duress, but that would not make the choice in his estimation "not a free choice" as you suggest. So for example, let's assume the man gave up his wallet to the gunman. The libertarian would say that the man's choice to save his life would not have been necessitated by the circumstances God provided (and also pre-interpreted) but rather it would have been a purely contingent choice that could have just as easily been otherwise. What is bedrock for the libertarian is that circumstances can never make a choice not free - even if those circumstances are life threatening. Accordingly, the libertarian is bound to agree that the man had an option to "refuse or kick the man in the gut" as it were. Though such circumstances would be dire indeed, it would be maintained by the libertarian that a libertarian free choice would have been made nonetheless.

Cheers,

Ron
 
I will respond to you, Ron, and you, Philip, tomorrow. I only got home around 11 tonight and don't think I'm in the perfect mental condition to offer a reply.

-----Added 11/18/2009 at 12:51:06 EST-----

Very briefly, however, Ron, your argument is about the same as Nelson Pike's argument for the incompatibility of omniscience (or more specifically, foreknowledge) and free will. This is also the argument that is dealt with in the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on theological fatalism here.

I remember reading in Plantinga that (following Ockham) some propositions about the past are such that they are not necessary, and are actually contingent upon the choices of libertarian creatures, so that we some kind of power over what exactly it is that God believes. I would not be able to defend this view in detail because I'd have to reread the article but this is one of the proposed solutions on the SEP entry.

I am also thinking that there is some word play going on in the argument. What matters for freedom on a libertarian scheme is that I alone am the cause of my behavior. God's knowing that I will do X is not causing me to do X, so it seems to me that even if it is a matter of the necessity of the consequence that I do X, that's hardly enough to prove that I am not free.

I think it shows that it is late at night and I'm tired, but perhaps I can expand/explain that in the morning.
 
I remember reading in Plantinga that (following Ockham) some propositions about the past are such that they are not necessary, and are actually contingent upon the choices of libertarian creatures, so that we some kind of power over what exactly it is that God believes.

The problem with this is that it would disallow propositions regarding our choices from being either true or false before we actually make the choices. They would need to be some third category, which is floating around until the agent comes around and makes the choice. E.g. if it were true five minutes ago that I would be typing this presently, then I could not have done but this; it came about necessarily. (A distinction between absolutely necessary and decretally necessary would be helpful here, as it would better account for what you are trying to cover with "necessary" and "contingent.")

I am also thinking that there is some word play going on in the argument. What matters for freedom on a libertarian scheme is that I alone am the cause of my behavior. God's knowing that I will do X is not causing me to do X, so it seems to me that even if it is a matter of the necessity of the consequence that I do X, that's hardly enough to prove that I am not free.

That God's knowing our future actions is not identical to God's causing our actions is granted, but the former nonetheless implies the latter. For God to know we will do something in the future, the propositions He knows must already be true. And if it is true that we will do something before we do it, then clearly the ground of that proposition's truthfulness is entirely outside us (we're not creating truth when we make the choice), in which case at the point at which we make the choice we are not acting as genuinely new causes, but carrying out the effects of some external cause -- and therefore the causal chains of events in a world "pass through" us; we are not the genuine beginning of new causal chains, as in the libertarian sense. In other words,, that our actions are "set in stone" before we do them implies an exhaustively external locus of causation.

As implied in your sentence, "What matters for freedom on a libertarian scheme is that I alone am the cause of my behavior," libertarians make the mistake, perhaps in trying to utilize some rhetoric, of claiming a monopoly for agent-causation. The way they do this is by divorcing every morally relevant entity (e.g. desires, inclinations) from an agent, and then claiming that compatibilists aren't concerned with true agent-causation. No, on the contrary, I believe in agent-causation; I just don't deny that agents possess unchosen factors which necessarily bring about choices. For libertarians, agent-causation consists of some empty causal factor, because they falsely view things necessary for morality (desires etc.) as destructive of morality.

Seriously buddy, this is dangerous ground. Libertarianism implies open theism.
 
Very briefly, however, Ron, your argument is about the same as Nelson Pike's argument for the incompatibility of omniscience (or more specifically, foreknowledge) and free will. This is also the argument that is dealt with in the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on theological fatalism here.

Such utterances are of very little use when wanting to deal with what you think.

I remember reading in Plantinga that (following Ockham) some propositions about the past are such that they are not necessary, and are actually contingent upon the choices of libertarian creatures, so that we some kind of power over what exactly it is that God believes.

Well, even if Plantinga suggested that we can can have (in any sense) power over what God thinks, shouldn't such a philosophy give you reason to pause and think a bit more? Steve, it is clear that you do not embrace a Reformed view of God's determination of the choices of men. The way you have dealt with moral responsibility is to question whether God determines all that comes to pass. Such questions have a place, but not on a board that requires members to be Reformed. That is not as bad as what I've seen you do in other places, like posit that God could be a deceiver of men and that maybe we know nothing at all. Such thinking is not even Arminian. It is pagan.

I would not be able to defend this view in detail because I'd have to reread the article but this is one of the proposed solutions on the SEP entry.

Steve, nobody wants you to try to defend a view that is not your own and if one is your own then you should not have to Google your thoughts to such an extent.

I am also thinking that there is some word play going on in the argument. What matters for freedom on a libertarian scheme is that I alone am the cause of my behavior. God's knowing that I will do X is not causing me to do X,

I trust nobody would suggest that God's foreknowledge causes actions. Rather, God's foreknowledge presupposes that he has ensured the cause of actions.

so it seems to me that even if it is a matter of the necessity of the consequence that I do X, that's hardly enough to prove that I am not free.

That's an unintelligible remark. Nonetheless, if you are not convinced that LFW is false, then how can you call yourself Reformed?

I think it shows that it is late at night and I'm tired, but perhaps I can expand/explain that in the morning.

Nope, your post does not indicate that it is late at night. Your post is very representative of what you have said all along.

Please address all inquiries to Confessor. He is more than capable on these matters
.

Ron

-----Added 11/18/2009 at 08:45:11 EST-----

Seriously buddy, this is dangerous ground. Libertarianism implies open theism.

Yes brother, Steven is on very dangerous ground.

If I wanted to deal with Arminians, I'd go to the Rapture Ready message board. I am not inclined to do that - nor am I inclined to deal with Arminians on Reformed boards.

Best of providence with Steven. My work is done.

Ron
 
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So for example, let's assume the man gave up his wallet to the gunman. The libertarian would say that the man's choice to save his life would not have been necessitated by the circumstances God provided (and also pre-interpreted) but rather it would have been a purely contingent choice that could have just as easily been otherwise.

I'm still trying to understand what the libertarian means by contingent--in metaphysics, contingency is a state of dependency or non-necessity. That is, a contingent being is a being that could have not existed without incurring a logical contradiction--all events and beings apart from God are contingent. To say that our choices are logically contingent is to state the obvious.

I can actually agree with the libertarian in all but one point: the man could have done otherwise had he wanted to. The trouble with the libertarian view of the will is that by taking away all factors, there is no motivation for action. Thus, when the choice is made, it is made on no basis whatsoever, being completely arbitrary. Thus, we might say that the choice is random and therefore a person cannot be held responsible for it.

The other problem is that, in reality, no one makes choices like this. We all have reasons (logical, emotional, physical, etc.) for what we do. I've never done anything I didn't want to do--naturally, there are things that, all things being equal, I would rather not have done, but all things aren't equal. The libertarian view not only destroys responsibility, but it contradicts the way we actually do make choices--we weigh pros and cons (sometimes rather hastily) and then we choose.
 
I'm still trying to understand what the libertarian means by contingent--in metaphysics, contingency is a state of dependency or non-necessity.

First off, good post! It's easy to understand.

Also, I think we agree on all the majors.

Apart from necessity we’re left with chaos – mice coming from rags.

That is, a contingent being is a being that could have not existed without incurring a logical contradiction--all events and beings apart from God are contingent. To say that our choices are logically contingent is to state the obvious.

When you say “logically contingent” I’m not sure what you mean. In common parlance we say things like “I’ll come over to your house contingent upon my getting off work at a reasonable hour.” Contingency used in that sense simply means predicated upon. It is not a statement of metaphysical considerations. I would never say, let alone say it is “obvious”, that our choices are logically contingent. I know they can’t be metaphysically contingent.

I can actually agree with the libertarian in all but one point: the man could have done otherwise had he wanted to.

I find no place for “had he wanted to” in their philosophy. But even so, why would you take issue with that? That is very Edwardsian, is it not? Not only could one have acted differently had he wanted (i.e. had he been so inclined) – one indeed would have necessarily acted differently had he been so inclined. He could have done no other.

The libertarian position is that given the identical state of affairs at the moment of choice, the choice can be other than what it ends up being. Accordingly, since the state of affairs that precedes the choice includes the strongest inclination that triggers the choice in reality, then for the choice to be other than what it ends up being would require that it be possible for a morally relevant choice to be contrary to what is intended! (You clearly affirm this below, which is very good). This is why I often say that libertarian free will does not save moral responsibility, it actually would destroy it, which again you affirm below. We’d have people intending to do x (i.e. their strongest inclination at the moment of choice would be to act x) and they’d end up doing ~ x instead. Again, mice coming from rags.

The trouble with the libertarian view of the will is that by taking away all factors, there is no motivation for action. Thus, when the choice is made, it is made on no basis whatsoever, being completely arbitrary. Thus, we might say that the choice is random and therefore a person cannot be held responsible for it.

Precisely! I prefer “chaotic” to “random” because what we call random are really things that are caused; we just can’t capture and analyze the causes. But yes, your point is I believe very well taken.

The other problem is that, in reality, no one makes choices like this. We all have reasons (logical, emotional, physical, etc.) for what we do. I've never done anything I didn't want to do--naturally, there are things that, all things being equal, I would rather not have done, but all things aren't equal.

Yes, and so many people try to use Romans 7 to defend LFW! Obviously the apostle is not given a discourse on the metaphysics of choosing.

The libertarian view not only destroys responsibility, but it contradicts the way we actually do make choices--we weigh pros and cons (sometimes rather hastily) and then we choose.

I agree. Also, I don't think the problem people have with the necessity of the will is an intellectual one. The problem is I believe a moral one.

Ron
 
Steven, do you advocate a libertarian free choice? If so, this is incompatible with God's sovereignty, and is contrary to our standards. God is not limited in ANY way by the creature.

As to helpful ways of getting at the issues, I think that Frame has a great analogy here: Shakespeare and one of the characters of his play. Shakespeare and Iago, for instance, operate on different levels entirely. Can Iago actually do anything other than what Shakespeare wrote for him to do and say? Well, no. But when one enters the level of the play, everything is different and feels different. If you are Othello in the play, for instance, Iago's actions do not seem forced at all by Shakespeare. Now, of course, all analogies will break down somewhere, for Othello does not know about Shakespeare, whereas we know at least some things about God, and hopefully we know God Himself. However, the analogy of the different levels on which causality happens is, I think, a helpful way of thinking about this. But libertarian freedom (the ability to do A and the opposite of A in any and all circumstances) is contrary to the sovereignty of God and is Pelagian. Calvinists have always held to free will in the sense that any being can do whatever it is in his nature to do. God cannot sin, and sinful man cannot please God. But God wrote the script, even if the characters are not forced. The reason they are not forced is that God's causality and our free will operate on different levels.
 
I only now came across this thread, and I think this portion pretty much sums up the issue:

But it seems that if we hold to that, then God could literally do anything with humans and still hold them responsible. God could've made the created order such that it was not clear that he exists, and he could've made us such that we do not clearly know what is right and what is wrong in such a way that we'd be blameworthy for doing what is wrong. Imagine he did do that. Are we still responsible for sinning and not believing in him?

To put it bluntly: what does it matter to created Man what God could hypothetically do? It is an impossibility to consider.

We do know what God has done. He has made us to be moral beings and he holds us to the moral law as he has revealed it. Judging God's motives by speculating on alternative universes that God could have created assumes a definition of moral responsibility that is higher than God.

Shall we judge our Creator? We know the answer plainly: NO. And it is precisely because God has told us this is how it is to be.

The initial post was asking for how to deal with a long-winded argument that, in essence, denies sin. Nothing new or profound about the argument--Luther dealt with it long ago. Men are responsible because God made them that way. Men are dead, helpless, unable to run the race or meet their responsibility, because of sin. They need God not only to show what is right, but to redeem them from being unable to be and do what is right.

I doubt very much that one can come up with a philosophical argument to convince a person dead in sin that he is wrong because he is dead.
 
VictorBravo said:
To put it bluntly: what does it matter to created Man what God could hypothetically do? It is an impossibility to consider.

There is some merit for possible worlds theory when considering "Why did God make things the way He did?" Impossibilities are just things that are logically self-contradictory. Anything that is logically consistent is possible.

I don't think I'm questioning God here: I'm merely trying to understand Him as He has presented Himself.

I doubt very much that one can come up with a philosophical argument to convince a person dead in sin that he is wrong because he is dead.

The purpose of the argument is to confirm that he is dead.
 
Calvinists have always held to free will in the sense that any being can do whatever it is in his nature to do.

This is more food for thought for Confessor and Philip, though I'm addressing this to Lane since it has to do with something he and I discussed a while back, which his most recent post reminds me of for various reasons. I could imagine that Confessor and Philip might find this matter somewhat interesting. It has to do with the often claimed premise that Adam, prior to the fall, could have chosen contrary to how he chose.

Lane,

The nature of man, whether pre-fall, post-fall and unconverted, post fall and converted, or glorified, does not affect this discussion in the least. LFW is simply the power of contrary choice and liberty is the ability to choose as we want. The nature, which you seem to like to bring up, does not determine the actual choice; it only determines the kinds (or category) of choices that will be made. This common mistake, which a quote from John Frame I employ below demonstrates, can lead to more serious mistakes.

Your remarks remind me of an exchange we had quite some time ago.

You and I have discussed this matter of LFW on GB. The gist of that discussion was put on my site: Reformed Apologist: Reformed Folk & The Power of Contrary Choice

You and I had an enormous disagreement on this subject of LFW. You even went so far to assert that I as"outright denying that Adam was created righteous and innocent, contrary to all the Reformed confessions." The stakes were high we might say, for I was thought to have denied the Confession! :eek:

I think it is worth rehearsing this discussion because discussions over LFW will eventually get back to the garden and even to God’s often time supposed freedom to choose contrary to how he has. If LFW was ever possible for any moral creature, then why not for all moral creatures, so the argument goes. Yet, if LFW is a philosophical surd, then neither God nor Adam has / had it, which gives heartburn to many.

Libertarian free will (LFW) can simply be defined as the ability to choose something different than what will be chosen. My position on the matter is straightforward. LFW is a philosophical surd. If it is true that one can choose something different than he will, then the future God believes will come to pass might not come to pass; and even if the future does come to pass as God believes, he will not have been thoroughly justified in his belief. He would have just been lucky, or at best very insightful.

John Frame once noted: “I don't know how many times I have asked candidates for licensure and ordination whether we are free from God's decree, and they have replied ‘No, because we are fallen.’ That is to confuse libertarianism (freedom from God's decree, ability to act without cause) with freedom from sin. In the former case, the fall is entirely irrelevant. Neither before nor after the fall did Adam have freedom in the libertarian sense. But freedom from sin is something different. Adam had that before the fall, but lost it as a result of the fall.”

I resonated with John’s observation the very first time I read his lament. This is a very serious matter. These men to whom John refers may have very well been ordained and licensed in Reformed denominations (or have gone on to teach other men at seminary; or even have their own Blog!) - yet without any appreciation for the implications of their religious philosophy as it pertains to free will.

In our discussion, Lane, you asserted that Adam could have chosen contrary to how he did, which of course I denied (and in that instance challenged the notion). You went on to say to me that “The pre-Fall and post-Fall distinction is what is completely escaping you.” On this matter I agree with John Frame... "the fall is entirely irrelevant. Neither before nor after the fall did Adam have freedom in the libertarian sense."

I asked you: “Did the metaphysics surrounding LFW change with the fall?”

You responded with: "The mechanics of how man chooses something are the same before and after: he can always choose what his nature determines that he can choose.”

Your response made me somewhat suspicious of a couple of things and I believe those suspicions were confirmed in what followed. As I pointed out to you then, the nature does not determine the choice; it only determines the kinds of choices that will be made. I said: “The nature determines no action of choice. The nature simply determines the moral quality of the particular choice that will necessarily occur according to the inclination at the moment of choice. So then, an unregenerate man will sin; his nature determines that he must. His nature, however, does not determine what sin he will choose.” Consequently, LFW is not concerned with the general category of choice (whether it is sinful or not), which is dictated by one’s nature, but rather, it is concerned with what the specific action will be.

You ended up skipping over that part and went on to affirm what I believe to be a very common, philosophical contradiction.

You stated: “Let me state that again: Adam could NOT have thwarted God’s will in the garden.” Plus you stated: “What I am saying is that Adam could have willed to do the right thing.” “Are you denying that Adam could have chosen to obey?”

That is what I want to zero in on here. For if you are correct with regard to Adam in the garden, then there is no reason why we should think that today we do not have the freedom to choose contrary to how we do choose. Again, the issue is not a matter of whether we're convereted or not but whether we are able to choose something different than what we end up choosing. If Adam, as you say, truly could have chosen contrary to how he did (which would mean he could have truly thwarted God's decree), then his radical freedom would imply that he had LFW. The "pre-fall distinction" would have had no bearing on such radical freedom to choose something different than the specific x he chose. The nature, in this case mutable, only speaks to the category of choices that can come from the strongest inclination.

The contradiction I found in your statement is that if Adam truly could have acted contrary to how he did (as you said), then Adam truly could have thwarted God’s will in the garden (which you denied). No appeal to the pre-fall state can save such a logical contradiction, which was precisely John Frame’s point. Your position was indeed most clear: It was impossible for Adam to have acted contrary to God’s decree AND Adam could have chosen to obey, which would have been to act contrary to God's decree. That’s Molinism and not Calvinism, I'm afraid.

You also asserted that I “deny that Adam was created with the power to obey.”

That, of course, is also false and cannot be logically deduced from my writings. As I clearly noted: “YES Adam prior to falling had the ‘power’ to perform spiritual good. I was most clear in my affirmation that Adam had the power to obey. Nonetheless, the power to obey does not imply that Adam could have chosen contrary to how he did anymore than a car’s power to run can direct the car in a direction contrary to the way in which it ends up moving! It was clear to me that you had confused the "power" the Confession speaks of with the "power of contrary choice". You assumed that Adam had the power to choose contrary to how he did, which is LFW, and not something the Confession affirms.

Toward the end of our discussion you stated this (just prior to locking the thread): “you are using the term “molinist” as if it was all about Adam’s will before the Fall, and wasn’t about middle knowledge and man’s ability after the fall. You cannot project the one onto the other, like you are so obviously doing. I am very tired of this thread, and am therefore closing it.”

I was hesitant to even try to address this remark on my Blog because of what I believed to be the lack of clarity of the statement. It actually seemed to me (at least at the time) to be more of an emotional outburst than anything else. Let me simply say that you are in 100% agreement with Alvin Plantinga and W.L. Craig in what you affirmed back then with regard to Adam’s will and God’s decree. In other words, you affirmed the tenets of Molinism when you said that Adam could have acted differently (LFW) than he did, while also maintaining that God’s plan could not have been thwarted in the least (Exhaustive Foreknowledge). Those two tenets (LFW and EF) as an unbreakable unit are upheld by Molinists, not Calvinists.

Now you might wish to say that Adam could have chosen differently had he wanted, just like you and I can choose differently should we want. However, that would undermine your underlying defense of Adam’s radical freedom, which you narrowly indexed to the “pre-fall distinction” (that I was thought to have been missing in your estimation). In other words, you bolstered you argument for Adam’s ability to choose contrary to how he chose by attributing Adam’s alleged radical freedom to choose (contrary to how he did) to the “pre-Fall distinction”, affirming my suspicion that you fall into the category of those examined by John Frame. I find no discernable difference between your philosophy and those to whom John made reference. Both you and they say that Adam, due to his pre-fall state, could have chosen other than he did. That is to affirm LFW, at least for Adam prior to the fall. If he had it then, why can’t we have it now? Again, LFW is a metaphysical concept that is not peculiar the four states of man.

Cheers,

Ron
 
VictorBravo said:
To put it bluntly: what does it matter to created Man what God could hypothetically do? It is an impossibility to consider.

There is some merit for possible worlds theory when considering "Why did God make things the way He did?" Impossibilities are just things that are logically self-contradictory. Anything that is logically consistent is possible.

I don't think I'm questioning God here: I'm merely trying to understand Him as He has presented Himself.

I doubt very much that one can come up with a philosophical argument to convince a person dead in sin that he is wrong because he is dead.

The purpose of the argument is to confirm that he is dead.

I wasn't saying anything about you questioning God, I was commenting on the quoted portion.

But you do raise a couple of important issues:

"Why did God make things the way He did?"

As we see in Job 38-41, the question has a dangerous aspect to it. If we go too far down the road of asking the "why" of God's purpose, we necessarily place ourselves in a position of judging the propriety of what he has done.

I grant that seeking to understand the unified purpose of God is a good thing. But God has also revealed to us that the answers to some why questions are beyond our ken.

"Impossibilities are just things that are logically self-contradictory. Anything that is logically consistent is possible."

Says who? :p

Seriously, is the fact that created Man cannot comprehend the totality of God's workings logically self-contradictory? I don't see how. Yet we take it as an impossibility for us to do so because we take God at his word.
 
Seriously, is the fact that created Man cannot comprehend the totality of God's workings logically self-contradictory? I don't see how. Yet we take it as an impossibility for us to do so because we take God at his word.

I'd say it is logically self-contradictory for man to comprehend the totality of God's workings, for man is finite and God infinite.

But this is a bit besides the point, I think, as Philip was attempting to discern a specific part of God's workings, certainly not the totality of it.
 
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