Barth and Van Til: a comparison-contrast

[jwright82]

Depending upon how one defines "philsophy". I think it is first a theological concern. Epistemology is not a subject that stands as a set of facts for men to organize using the function of their minds to make sense of but knowledge is God's self-revelation.

Philosophy is defined as the logical analysis of reality. Epistomology has a history to it, one that Van Til clearly understood. Theology provides us christians with the presupossitions that we frame a worldview around and withen that worldview are answers to questions of epistomology. A practical warning, never underestemate philosophical concerns, Van Til didn't, becauase you are doomed to never see certian logical objections against your argument that you would have seen had you taken philosophy serious.

I think the reason people see Van Til as primarily being concerned with epistemology as a proper philsophical science is that he had such pointed critiques about how philsophy operating according to the kingdom of this world can never provide the answers it seeks to discover because it begins and ends with man.

Your mistaken about Van Til here. No commentator of him would ever suggest that he was not entering into philosophical analysis (see Frame, Bahnsen and Van Til's book Christian Apologetics). If you are suggesting that he was not intemently involved in philosophical concerns is simply, if that is what you mean, to be very naive about Van Til or his successors. He did philosophy, his most gifted successors did philosophy too.

This is the kind of knowledge that I believe Van Til was concerned with.

Rich, these scriptures do not invalidate a philosophical dimension to Van Til's thought. In fact if you do not admit such a dimension, which I am not saying you do, than you do not understand Van Til. Again it took me 12 years to understand the philosophy behind Bahnsen and Van Til.

 

[Philip]

I don't know, provide the quote in context so it can be discussed. What's he driving at where he mentions Anselm in passing?

The context of the quote is his analysis of the history of epistemology. Unfortunately I don't have the book here---if I have time, I'll go and find it.

How do you know he wasn't aware of Common-sense realism?

He's not unaware of common-sense realism, he's unaware of Reid---Reid wasn't well-known in the academic world in the early 20th century and was only rediscovered (by analytic philosophers) in the later 20th century (Plantinga, for example, is heavily influenced by Reid). I'm guessing that Warfield, Hodge, and Old Princeton didn't lay out a systematic epistemology in their work: they left that to Reid and the philosophers.

Again, I'll have to go back and look at what I read up on---I actually worked more with Bahnsen's critique of Schaeffer than I did with the critiques of Old Princeton.

 

[Philip]

Ok, so I took a study break to check up on the relevant passges:

The quote on Anselm is a passing reference in Survey of Christian Epistemology where Van Til puts him as the Augustinian opponent of Abelard. Also, he clearly has Proslogion in mind (it's referenced as a source).

I also have Defense of the Faith in hand, where Van Til critiques "less consistent Calvinists" (ie: Warfield and Hodge) as not taking the fall and our suppression of truth in unrighteousness seriously enough. If this were all he were saying, I'd admit it, and move on.

However, Van Til ends up arguing (V, III) that any sort of "common sense" notions reached outside a Christian framework must be categorically rejected as autonomous and opposed to God, being products of a depraved mind. Instead he offers a story in which we suppress the truth in unrighteousness and any facts that the unbeliever knows are just proof that he has done so.

Here's the trouble: first, I don't think that Van Til takes the doctrine of common grace seriously enough here. Second, I don't think his phenomenology of how we come to our beliefs reflects reality. How did I come to believe that there is a desk in front of me? I saw it: I did not go through any sort of chain of reasoning to get there---I just looked and found myself believing that there was a desk. Now, a believer and an unbeliever are going to have radically different stories about why they trust the senses (sometimes the unbeliever will have no story at all), but they can agree on some basic reliability of the senses. The phenomenon is a given: the question is how you ground it.

 

[MW]

However, Van Til ends up arguing (V, III) that any sort of "common sense" notions reached outside a Christian framework must be categorically rejected as autonomous and opposed to God, being products of a depraved mind. Instead he offers a story in which we suppress the truth in unrighteousness and any facts that the unbeliever knows are just proof that he has done so.

We must remember a basic point for Van Til: "we may observe that all the various methods of investigation that have been advanced may be used theistically or they may be used antitheistically, according as God is taken into or is left out of consideration at the outset" (SCE, 202). What is claimed for common sense realism would apply to any theory of knowledge which did not begin with the self-attesting God of Scripture.

Here's the trouble: first, I don't think that Van Til takes the doctrine of common grace seriously enough here.

He devoted a complete work to the subject.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Rich, these scriptures do not invalidate a philosophical dimension to Van Til's thought. In fact if you do not admit such a dimension, which I am not saying you do, than you do not understand Van Til. Again it took me 12 years to understand the philosophy behind Bahnsen and Van Til.

James,

Your responses to my post indicate you complete missed my point.

I didn't say that Van Til was unconcerned with philosophy and I wasn't asking for a definition to philosophy in my response. The scriptures I posted were apropos because there is a knowledge of God that cannot simply be arrived at no matter how hard a man tries to arrive at it. Of course, Van Til understood and cared about philosophy. I care too but it, as it operates according to the "wisdom of this age" it does not arrive at true knowledge.

It's not that I haven't read Bahnsen, Frame, and many others but I'm also somewhat studied on Calvin and some of the early Reformers. More fundamentally, I study the Scriptures and God has condescended to make me alive and reveal things to this babe.

Ponder on the Scriptures I quoted and consider this question: if there is knowledge that God has not revealed to the wisdom of this age then how is that knowledge to be articulated according to the "philosophical organization" of the wisdom of this age? Is it merely a re-shuffling or re-prioritization of the standard concepts of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics or is there something outside of the approach to knowledge that Biblical wisdom seeks? (Incidentally, these are rhetorical questions that I do not want you to answer. I want you to ponder things like the fact that the Lord learned obedience through His suffering.)

If the only grid by which one can primarily see the issue of knowledge is a philosophical category of epistemology and how such things are organized then one is only going to see Van Til's concern along those lines. They're going to miss the primary theological concern about knowledge being about Revelation rather than simply trying to counter-propose a new epistemological paradigm around which to form a new "wisdom of this age".

That is to say, Van Til is saying in effect: "Yes, I know how philosophy has sought to understand life, knowledge, and being but here is the primary pursuit of the Christian...." If one truly grasps what Van Til is speaking about then there is a knowledge that Van Til is concerned with that is beyond the grasp of any man as he seeks, by his power, to take it. That knowledge has to be granted him by God and it only comes to babes and not those who would seek to be wise according to the wisdom of this age.

 

[jwright82]

I didn't say that Van Til was unconcerned with philosophy and I wasn't asking for a definition to philosophy in my response. The scriptures I posted were apropos because there is a knowledge of God that cannot simply be arrived at no matter how hard a man tries to arrive at it. Of course, Van Til understood and cared about philosophy. I care too but it, as it operates according to the "wisdom of this age" it does not arrive at true knowledge.

Well it seems that we are both missing eachother's points. I am sorry that I missed your point, I will be more dillegent to understand your points in the future. But you have missed my points too. Ever since I joined this site I have defended a pretty strong view of Van Tillian Apologetics. I have never to my mind made a statment that suggested that man could through his own auotonomous reason arive at knowledge about God. God must reveal Himself to us for us to have any knowledge of Him, albeit analogical knowledge. It appears to me that you think that was my point. If you did think that than you will be happy to know that that is not what I think.

As far as your view of philosophy goes and Van Til I think we are also in agreement there, If I understand you. I would like to point a distinction about philosophy that Van Til made at least implicitly. Philosophy, like science, has two distinct ways in which it can be talked about.
1. As a historical attempt by people to interpret reality from their own autonomous perspective. In this sense we can call these philosophies in the plural sense. This is the sense in which you seem to be talking about philosophy exclusivly.
2. As a normative creational aspect of the logical nature or element of things, it is an awkward metaphysical situation to describe. In this sense of term, which I primaraly meant, philosophers (christian or otherwise) deal with and study the same criteria you could say. We use our own pressupositions to interpret them, our's come from God's revealed word. In the sense there is a commonality between the beleiver and the unbeleiver.

So in the first sense, which Van Til always meant when criticizing an unbeleiving philosopy, there is in principle no commonality between the beleiver and unbeleiver. The second sense would include logical principles and the questions of philosophy. We as beleivers take our general views about reality from scripture and work out our own biblical answers to these questions utilizing the normative logical principles that God created us with. The indescernability of indenticals was a logical principle before the fall and it will be to the end of time, and probably beyond. That is that if two things are exactly the same or indentical than there can be no difference between them in regards to predication, or to assighn an attribute to something.

I like to point these distinctions out to people who may not understand (I don't mean you but other people who might be reading this discussion in curiousity) Van Til can better understand him, even if they disagree. When I was not a Van Tillian it used to drive me crazy when Van Tillians would just sort of seemingly parrot Van Til's phrases and not explain to me the apparant contradictions in what he said. So I as a strong supporter of Van Til now have vowed never to do that. I always try to explain what he was saying rather than just quote him. I try to explain, probably not that well, these apparrant contradictions away. In fact it is a passion of mine to Van Tillianize the church as much as possible, that is to say to get people thinking about these things and apply him in their own lives.

As far as my defense of Phillip's OP question or argument is that he and I are both well versed in philosophy and what he said was what philosophers do. We as Van Tillians should always be checking ourselves and others for our philosophical pressupositions, are we operating with biblical presupossitions or apostate ones? To make the argument he made is not forieghn to my ears because although I think he is somewhat mistaken he is doing what philosophers do. That is how we talk when we get together. So that is why I took no offense to it but treated it as a legitmate argument worthy of discussion.

 

[jwright82]

Here's the trouble: first, I don't think that Van Til takes the doctrine of common grace seriously enough here. Second, I don't think his phenomenology of how we come to our beliefs reflects reality. How did I come to believe that there is a desk in front of me? I saw it: I did not go through any sort of chain of reasoning to get there---I just looked and found myself believing that there was a desk. Now, a believer and an unbeliever are going to have radically different stories about why they trust the senses (sometimes the unbeliever will have no story at all), but they can agree on some basic reliability of the senses. The phenomenon is a given: the question is how you ground it.

This is one area of Van Til's thought that is in my opinion underdeveloped, how we come to aquire beleifs. He was open to many different methods without a clear worked out theory. He was mainly concerned with sets of beleifs or worldviews. The point he is making about unbeleivers is not unlike the distinction I made between different sense of the word philosophy. The unbeleiver is an "awkward mixture" to use Banhsen's discription. In principle the unbeleiver cannot know anything at all, that is in principle not in actuality. The difference is that they will always be collecting info about creation and be interpreting that based on their faulty autonomous principles which guarantees a certian very fundemental level of untruth in their worldviews, they will always have skewed vision you could say. On the pschological level we all share many of the same beleifs because we inhabit the same world. Epistomologically, or how Van Til used the phrase theory of knowledge, we have different ultimate authorities. The issue of authority in epistomology was essential to Van Til's thought.

To the unbeleiver their ultimate authority is themselves. The problem from evil is on the one hand essentially as misguided view that God must have a good reason, one that they agree with of course, for allowing evil. But who decides what a good reason is? The unbeleiver who is at emnity to God in their thinking, they will have a fairer perception of what constitutes a good reason? I don't think so. For us we demend no such good reason from God because we know from the bible that He owes us no explinaition for what He does.

So the unbeleiver will spout about rationality being the ultimate authority for them. But what they mean is a philosophy or system of what they think constitues rationality rather than just the creational normative aspect of logical laws. Think John Rawls, he doesn't argue that the principle of logic should decide what reasons can be given in the public square but some view of a privileged unbiased (especially nonreligous) reasons, whatever those are, that one must submit their argument to for it to be allowed in the public square. Wolterstorf does a nice job of showing the internal contradictions or unreasonableness of this view.

So what Van Til was against was putting some set of reasons or basic beleifs up that everyone could agree on as the ultimate authority in epistomological matters and now the beleif in God must pass this test as well as the bible. To different people who disagree at the most basic religous will have trouble with compliling such a list. Don't confuse his distinction between philosophy and philosophies, when making those extreme statments of principles he was refering to phlosophies of various unbeleivers, not the normative excersize of philosophical or logical thought.

 

[Philip]

What is claimed for common sense realism would apply to any theory of knowledge which did not begin with the self-attesting God of Scripture.

It's at precisely this point that I take issue with Van Til. He takes it as a given that "starting point" and "standard" are necessarily the same. This is not the case. One does not simply start with God in a vacuum, one starts with what one has where one is. Again, I would point to Augustine: did his journey to faith begin with God? No! What he found, though, was that when pursued to its conclusion with Truth as its object, reason leads one to God. This is why he could say, "all Truth is God's Truth."

I think it's helpful at this point to show the distinction between the two attitudes through a contrast: between Thomas Reid and G.E. Moore.

Thomas Reid, the father of Common Sense Realism (which was really just a throwback to pre-Cartesian assumptions) embraced the fact that our beliefs must be grounded in God. He takes it as a given (contra Hume) that God exists and is the ground for our basic beliefs. His argument is, "Our senses are God-given, therefore we can trust them."

G.E. Moore, the 20th century logician and father of analytic philosophy, wrote an essay defending common sense thinking. However, in the middle of it, he abruptly dismisses belief in God as groundless. This section is so jarring and abrupt as to make me think that he really did see clearly that if pursued, his line of thinking would lead one to God. He didn't want to accept this conclusion, so he denied it from the outset.

That's the difference between autonomy and faithful dependence.

So what Van Til was against was putting some set of reasons or basic beleifs up that everyone could agree on as the ultimate authority in epistomological matters and now the beleif in God must pass this test as well as the bible.

Putting basic beliefs as the ultimate authority is shortsighted. My basic belief set includes such beliefs as "there is a desk in front of me", "the world is more than five minutes old", and "there are other minds." These beliefs are basic because I trust (credulity) certain authorities: namely, my senses, my memories, and my reason.

This is why I do not agree that putting my belief in God through the same sort of tests that I put my belief in this desk through is not justified. Of course it's justified! It's a basic belief! I don't believe in God because of some argument or even because He's a nice second-order belief for me to ground my trust in the senses with: I believe in God in a basic way because I have the Sensus Divinitatus which has been regenerated by the Holy Spirit.

In principle the unbeleiver cannot know anything at all, that is in principle not in actuality.

Principles should reflect actuality. Our epistemology needs to be at least partially descriptive.

 

[MW]

It's at precisely this point that I take issue with Van Til. He takes it as a given that "starting point" and "standard" are necessarily the same. This is not the case. One does not simply start with God in a vacuum, one starts with what one has where one is. Again, I would point to Augustine: did his journey to faith begin with God? No! What he found, though, was that when pursued to its conclusion with Truth as its object, reason leads one to God. This is why he could say, "all Truth is God's Truth."

I believe the usual presuppositional response to the idea of beginning with a search for truth is to simply point out the idolatry of exalting impersonal truth to the status of something which one should spend one's life in search of obtaining.

 

[Philip]

I believe the usual presuppositional response to the idea of beginning with a search for truth is to simply point out the idolatry of exalting impersonal truth to the status of something which one should spend one's life in search of obtaining.

Can one begin where one is not? Is all Truth God's Truth or is it not?

 

[MW]

Can one begin where one is not? Is all Truth God's Truth or is it not?

See WCF 7.1. Seeking for truth as blessedness is idolatry. Knowing truth as God's covenantal condescension will set you free.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

It's at precisely this point that I take issue with Van Til. He takes it as a given that "starting point" and "standard" are necessarily the same. This is not the case. One does not simply start with God in a vacuum, one starts with what one has where one is. Again, I would point to Augustine: did his journey to faith begin with God? No! What he found, though, was that when pursued to its conclusion with Truth as its object, reason leads one to God. This is why he could say, "all Truth is God's Truth."

I believe the usual presuppositional response to the idea of beginning with a search for truth is to simply point out the idolatry of exalting impersonal truth to the status of something which one should spend one's life in search of obtaining.

Indeed. "All Truth is God's Truth" not because there are impersonal "truths" that stand apart from God's revelation but because God is a revealer. One only has to read Augustine's Confessions to see him constantly praising God for every aspect of his knowledge. It wasn't a matter of what *Augustine* thought he was pursuing when he began his philosophical inquiries but what the Creator was molding and unfolding. Augustine would certainly be shocked to have his words twisted that "All Truth is God's Truth" meant that there was a moment in his life where his reason led him to understand impersonal truths that stood apart from but built up to a personal God.

 

[Afterthought]

Excuse me for budging in, but if this is all so, how can one seek truth without being idolatrous (is that even possible?)?

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Augustine:

CHAPTER VIII

13. Did I not, then, as I grew out of infancy, come next to boyhood, or rather did it not come to me and succeed my infancy? My infancy did not go away (for where would it go?). It was simply no longer present; and I was no longer an infant who could not speak, but now a chattering boy. I remember this, and I have since observed how I learned to speak. My elders did not teach me words by rote, as they taught me my letters afterward. But I myself, when I was unable to communicate all I wished to say to whomever I wished by means of whimperings and grunts and various gestures of my limbs (which I used to reinforce my demands), I myself repeated the sounds already stored in my memory by the mind which thou, O my God, hadst given me. When they called some thing by name and pointed it out while they spoke, I saw it and realized that the thing they wished to indicate was called by the name they then uttered. And what they meant was made plain by the gestures of their bodies, by a kind of natural language, common to all nations, which expresses itself through changes of countenance, glances of the eye, gestures and intonations which indicate a disposition and attitude--either to seek or to possess, to reject or to avoid. So it was that by frequently hearing words, in different phrases, I gradually identified the objects which the words stood for and, having formed my mouth to repeat these signs, I was thereby able to express my will. Thus I exchanged with those about me the verbal signs by which we express our wishes and advanced deeper into the stormy fellowship of human life, depending all the while upon the authority of my parents and the behest of my elders.

CHAPTER XII

19. But in this time of childhood--which was far less dreaded for me than my adolescence--I had no love of learning, and hated to be driven to it. Yet I was driven to it just the same, and good was done for me, even though I did not do it well, for I would not have learned if I had not been forced to it. For no man does well against his will, even if what he does is a good thing. Neither did they who forced me do well, but the good that was done me came from thee, my God. For they did not care about the way in which I would use what they forced me to learn, and took it for granted that it was to satisfy the inordinate desires of a rich beggary and a shameful glory. But thou, Lord, by whom the hairs of our head are numbered, didst use for my good the error of all who pushed me on to study: but my error in not being willing to learn thou didst use for my punishment. And I--though so small a boy yet so great a sinner--was not punished without warrant. Thus by the instrumentality of those who did not do well, thou didst well for me; and by my own sin thou didst justly punish me. For it is even as thou hast ordained: that every inordinate affection brings on its own punishment.

Augustine, everywhere, thanks God for the most mundane of Providences.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Excuse me for budging in, but if this is all so, how can one seek truth without being idolatrous (is that even possible?)?

What Matthew has in view is the seeking of knowledge as blessedness apart from God. That is to say, when Paul says that Greeks pursue wisdom, he's referring to an idolatrous pursuit of the wisdom of this age with no reference to the Creator.

I believe the Book of Ecclesiastes is a prime example of Scripture warning about this kind of pursuit of wisdom and knowledge "under the Sun" in contradistinction from the Book of Proverbs that sees Lady Wisdom as standing at the top of the street calling out to all men to heed her.

 

[Philip]

Indeed. "All Truth is God's Truth" not because there are impersonal "truths" that stand apart from God's revelation but because God is a revealer.

And if one seeks this truth truly, then one is not reasoning in autonomy. General revelation can lead one to God just as surely as special revelation can. It is the spirit in which one reasons, not the starting point from which one starts.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Indeed. "All Truth is God's Truth" not because there are impersonal "truths" that stand apart from God's revelation but because God is a revealer.

And if one seeks this truth truly, then one is not reasoning in autonomy. General revelation can lead one to God just as surely as special revelation can. It is the spirit in which one reasons, not the starting point from which one starts.

Philip,

It may be that we're agreeing violently.

I don't believe one has to be cognizant of how God's revelation is acting upon him. That revelation is acting upon a man is axiomatic. How a man understands he comes to understand things is another. I don't believe the issue is really haggling over whether or not some men think they came to understand certain things but that, ultimately, we are to understand God is the revealer of all truth and no fact stands apart from Him. I believe this is Van Til's main point - knowledge is bound up in Revelation. Read what I quoted Van Til states about natural revelation above again and you'll see that. This is the essence of the theology of the ectype.

 

[MW]

Excuse me for budging in, but if this is all so, how can one seek truth without being idolatrous (is that even possible?)?

In context, one cannot seek "truth" apart from God without being idolatrous. Why seek it? Why rest upon it when it is found? It could only be because some absolute value is given to the truth which belongs to God alone. It is one thing to believe truth because God is truth itself and all truth is of God; it is altogether different to seek for truth in the place of God and ascribe God's attributes to the truth. The first acknowledges the rightful Owner of truth while the latter violently dispossess the Owner of what is rightfully His.

 

[Philip]

Rich,

I think maybe we are just agreeing violently. I tend to look at epistemology from a phenomenological standpoint: that is, I'm more interested in the internal story of how one comes to true faith. When I look at someone like Augustine, I see a man who looked everywhere but God for Truth and finally realized that if he was to really be a lover of Truth, he had to be a lover of God first.

It probably doesn't help our communication that when I see the term "revelation" used, I usually interpret it as "special revelation."

I don't believe one has to be cognizant of how God's revelation is acting upon him.

Let's be honest, is any of us really cognizant until after the fact?

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Rich,

I think maybe we are just agreeing violently. I tend to look at epistemology from a phenomenological standpoint: that is, I'm more interested in the internal story of how one comes to true faith. When I look at someone like Augustine, I see a man who looked everywhere but God for Truth and finally realized that if he was to really be a lover of Truth, he had to be a lover of God first.

It probably doesn't help our communication that when I see the term "revelation" used, I usually interpret it as "special revelation."

I don't believe one has to be cognizant of how God's revelation is acting upon him.

Let's be honest, is any of us really cognizant until after the fact?

I don't think we're very cognizant of a lot of things. One of the profound things about Augustine's Confessions is the manner in which he praises God for all of the Providences that led him. A pastor friend of mine noted that one of the things he's noticed in people that begin to deny the faith is that they don't have a sense of God's Providence over all things. If we see our lives (including our knowledge) being in His Sovereign Hands then we may retrospectively look at moments in our lives and marvel how He revealed things to us. This was not immediate revelation but mediate. He formed our minds and, not only so, used a host of instructors to impart knowledge unto us.

It is interesting if you step back for a moment and think how like our conversation might be to a Calvinist arguing with an Arminian. The Arminian keeps objecting because, phenomenologically, he states that he believed and he remembers the details how he first understood spiritual things. He sees the Calvinist as stating that God had to make him alive as amounting to "God forcing him to believe" or "God believing for him". We understand the principle but it's hard for some to get behind what is being stated. Furthermore, we don't preach to anyone to wait to believe until God has regenerated them. Nevertheless, we understand that God is the author of salvation and we, who have eyes to see, retrospectively give glory to God for all the good He has done for us.

I believe Van Til's concern is primarily apologetic. He speaks imprecisely at times but I see his concern as limited to the issue of how the Christian is to understand these things. If the Christian understands that knowledge is the fruit of God's constant revelation after he becomes aware of this fact, does he abandon that understanding and adopt philosophical ideas that deny what he now understands? In other words, I believe Van Til brings up Anselm because Anselm is criticizing Abelard for reasoning as if he's an unbeliever and has no light. Abelard's objections, Anselm noted, were as a scoffer would reason and not one who believes.

Thus, I think it's important to recognize that Van Til nowhere denies mediate knowledge nor that men gain knowledge through natural revelation and common grace. He even states repeatedly that men borrow from the Christian religion in order to reason. He never denies their gifts nor some of the light that's manifest in them. His concern is that he can see underneath and behind all the methods and see them as media for the God Who is the revealer. He reminds us not to give this up in our dialog. He reminds us that in our conversations with an unbeliever that we are never to gain "common ground" by agreeing with the unbeliever that God is nowhere in the room when we're reasoning together and destroying objections. It doesn't mean that we have to tell the unbeliever to follow a certain discursive method to reason to God but it is an awareness that every moment is lived Coram Deo and that we can never abandon this and assume knowledge or any fact stands outside of Him.

 

[jwright82]

Putting basic beliefs as the ultimate authority is shortsighted. My basic belief set includes such beliefs as "there is a desk in front of me", "the world is more than five minutes old", and "there are other minds." These beliefs are basic because I trust (credulity) certain authorities: namely, my senses, my memories, and my reason.

This is why I do not agree that putting my belief in God through the same sort of tests that I put my belief in this desk through is not justified. Of course it's justified! It's a basic belief! I don't believe in God because of some argument or even because He's a nice second-order belief for me to ground my trust in the senses with: I believe in God in a basic way because I have the Sensus Divinitatus which has been regenerated by the Holy Spirit.

Well you still involve yourself in a circuler argument in that you think your Sensuses are operating fine but you do not know because there is no outside them. So round and round you go with the question of faith in your Sensuses. But did my explination of what Van Til meant make more sense?

Principles should reflect actuality. Our epistemology needs to be at least partially descriptive.

Depending upon what you mean by descriptive please elaborate. What it sayd here is a hypothetical situation since the unbeleiver is seeking to supress the truth of God in unritoussness if they could consistantly work this worldview out it would because of its starting principles be completly false, if they could than they would deny everytruth they could. But they do not live in this hypothetical world in fact metaphysically speaking they are made in the image of God so every time they use this image to deny God they are in fact contradicting themselves, this a point of contact between the two sides. Also they live in God's creation so no worldview or theory who starts without that assumption can yeild truth. But unbeleivers do make truthful statements and do make cultural advancements. Is it because God's creation hides the fact that it is creation from the scientist or they are psychologically betraying their most fundemental presupossition, that they are god and God is not. That is why we can point out the inconsistencies in their worldview. They cannot in practice work out their worldview.
Your view works well in deciding trivial common everyday beleifs. The same issues of justification and authority are there but on a much less important level. So I would adopt your scheme to decide if I should listen to my brother's advice on which is the best route to a particuler destination without looking at his ultimate presupossitions in life. So I would say that your scheme works well at a particuler everyday level and not at a broad entire worldview level. Just Van Til works well at the broad worldview level but not so much at the particuler everyday level.

---------- Post added at 12:11 PM ---------- Previous post was at 12:03 PM ----------

Excuse me for budging in, but if this is all so, how can one seek truth without being idolatrous (is that even possible?)?

It depends on how you define truth and what truth you are seeking. The unbeleiver does not want to seek God's truth so they try not to, which is impossible to do in practice. Also there are many different theories of what truth is, each one has its own pros and cons. I follow Bahnsen who pointed out that the beleiver out to accept all the theories in their pros and not limit ourselves to a particuler theory of truth. Truth corresponds to its object, it coheres to other truths, it is pragamtic in that a true theory should work, but most importantly things are true if the line up with God's revealation about things.

 

[Philip]

Well you still involve yourself in a circuler argument in that you think your Sensuses are operating fine but you do not know because there is no outside them.

What exactly are you getting at? I'm not sure what was circular there. A sense is simply a cognitive faculty, so of course there's no getting outside them: why would I want to?

Now, in philosophy I can provide a nice theory of how they work and why, but the beliefs remain regardless of the theory.

if they could than they would deny every truth they could.

Why think this? Again, I would point you to G.E. Moore, who is interested in knowing stuff about the world: he's just not interested in knowing God.

if they could consistantly work this worldview out it would because of its starting principles be completly false

Again, what do you mean by "starting principles." This presupposes that all people have an internalist coherentist epistemology. It only applies if we all work deductively outward from a few starting principles to formulate a theory of knowledge. The trouble is that no one actually does it. I did not reason from God's existence to the fact that I have hands---both are basic beliefs. I know of non-theistic systems that believe that we have hands. I know of non-theistic systems that doubt that we have hands (Gordon Clark comes to mind). The two beliefs may be independent of each other, depending on the type of system.

I happen to have an externalist and foundationalist view of epistemology because, frankly, it reflects the way in which our beliefs are actually formed.

They cannot in practice work out their worldview.

Neither can we (Romans 7).

Depending upon what you mean by descriptive please elaborate.

I mean this: our epistemology needs to be able to not only provide not only explanations for why unbelievers deny God, but also for how they know a lot of the same stuff we do. One transcendental argument does not demand another (I've checked with a couple logicians).

Is it because God's creation hides the fact that it is creation from the scientist or they are psychologically betraying their most fundemental presupossition, that they are god and God is not

Yes.

The trouble with Van Til is that he wants everything to be nice and smooth and logical. He wants to give us a method for worldview analysis that works on everything: apologetic versions of duct tape and WD40 (the only things you really need for home improvement, so it's claimed). The trouble is that it ain't so: worldviews are messy animals that defy simple categories. I don't think there is one method that works on every worldview or even on every variation within a worldview. We in our fallenness are the kind of people who, to quote Lewis Carroll, "believe six impossible things before breakfast every morning."

Epistemology should reflect how people actually think. Once we disconnect epistemic theory from the way in which we actually form beliefs, we are disconnecting it from the way that God actually made us.

 

[Afterthought]

It depends on how you define truth and what truth you are seeking.

Well, I wouldn't be able to define truth in any way right now given my current knowledge. I was mainly talking about seeking truth that is true in order to know what is true. I guess that would be called seeking truth for truth's sake? Though that still doesn't define things well. Thanks all for the answers (**stops diverting conversation**)!

 

[jwright82]

And if one seeks this truth truly, then one is not reasoning in autonomy. General revelation can lead one to God just as surely as special revelation can. It is the spirit in which one reasons, not the starting point from which one starts.

I think you have a different view in mind than Van Til did. For you there is a linear line of reasoning much like a syllogism in that there is a starting point and an end point, this is Sproul's criticism of Van Til. What Van Til meant was itstead of starting point substitute foundaional beleifs about reality. My most fudemental beleifs or presupossitions are for me the most authoritative beleifs I have. They determine in a way what shape my worldview will take from the most basic level to the most mundane everyday experience. So in a sense that is the starting point for analysisng someones argument and what they will take as reasonable or not. If someone doesn't believe that the ressurection took place I would ask why? They ussually give a few answers that clue me into their hidden assumptions.

1. Things like that don't normaly happen so it is fantastical and unreasonable to believe in it.
2. There is not enough evidence to support the claim.

I will lay out a hypothetical discussion on this matter between me and an unbeleiver and how I would handle it from a presupossitional perspective. This will be based on my own experience debating and reading ubeleivers so it cannot be perfect but hopefully helpful in laying out Van Till's thought.

Unbeleiver (UB): I don't believe in the ressurection because of (points 1 and 2 that I mentioned above)
Beleiver (B): Really so what you are saying is that it is unreasonable to assume that God could raise someone from the dead?
UB: Well of course, but I don't believe in God either, first prove that he exists to me than I will believe it.
B: Well hold now lets deal with one issue at a time, so you admit that your assumption 1 is incorrect?
UB: Well no it is not incorrect I mean this is the 21rst centurey who beleives in that sort of thing anyway. I believe that that is impossible like I believe it is impossible that fairies or santa clause exist.
B: Ah but you said it was perfectly reasonable to believe that God could raise someone from the dead.
UB: Ok yes I guess it could be but I still don't see enough evidence to puersuade me to believe it.
B: Well do you admit that there is a lot of history that could never meet your extreme burden of proof?
UB: Yes but we are not talking about those, we are talking about Jesus, what evidence is there that he rose from the dead?
B: So you admit that it could have happened regardless of whether or not there was enough evidence per se?
UB: Well yes but come on something that fantastical would be well documented.
B: Like the new testament?
UB: Yeah but they were just a bunch of guys who were trying to control others so they took advantage of the people's ignorance.
B: What evidence do you have to suggest that this beleif is true?
UB: Well come on that is all religion is any way.
B: No what I want to know is what evidences historically you have to back up your claim about the new testament which allows you to rationally rule out what ever it says on principle?
UB: Well none but there are many experts out there who would agree with me.
B: What reasons do they give?
UB: Well none.
B: Than you hold a beleif about history that you use to rule out legitmate evidences on grounds to which you have no evidence whatsoever to believe in. That is your beleif about the new testament doesn't even pass your own standered of truth.

The ending there I will admit is a little literary creativity on my part as I have never had anyone admit that they had no reason to believe something so important as to rule out the whole legitemacy of the new testament itself, which I introduced as evidence of the ressurection but always in a presupossitional perspective. I kid you not it is like taking a pig out of the mud of their invalid pressupositions and cleaning them off with the tool of reason but they always want to go back to that same mud. Like wise our hypothetical UB if you look kept going back to his original assumptions implicitly. He would talk about how unreasonable the idea of the ressurection was just in different forms( its like beleiving in fairies, who could believe in that in this day and age, etc.).
I have dealt with this over and over again they will always want to go back to their original assumptions which I showed were not as rational as they thought. But they go back there anyway. So the idea that they are just these neutral rational people looking for enough evidence is absurd. They hold basic beleifs about reality and what counts as reasonable or not and that determines if they will in principle except something like the new testament. They have no actual evidences to not believe it only their own biased presuppositions.

Also I have noticed how quikly the skeptic wants the discussion to go to a classical apologetical basis. They love to go there for probably the same reasons Van Til disliked it. They can just stand there and act fair by saying you don't have enough evidence to convince me. No I layed out my reason for beleiving in the ressurection, it is perfectly reasonable to believe in on christian presuppositions.

So my starting point was God as a presupposition when asking myself whether or not the resurection was reasonable which it is. Not as a starting point of a premise to an argument like "God exists" yada yada the ressurection happened. That is classical apologetics and to convince the UB of the syllogism you would have to keep revising it to meet his or her standered of proof which they never consistantly apply in there own lives and is a standered devised as fair by someone who hates God and wishes to suppress any of God's truth in unritoughsness. That hopefully illustrates how to apply Van Til to everyday discussion and answers the question of starting point.

---------- Post added at 01:41 PM ---------- Previous post was at 01:23 PM ----------

What exactly are you getting at? I'm not sure what was circular there. A sense is simply a cognitive faculty, so of course there's no getting outside them: why would I want to?

That statment is a transcendental one. You are describing the cognitive faculties in way that cannot be proven by any fauculty or module. My own module may think it is functioning right but how does it know?

Now, in philosophy I can provide a nice theory of how they work and why, but the beliefs remain regardless of the theory.

True and Van Til admitted that many people don't have nicely worked out philosophies but if you have a baleif that you hold for no rational reason than you hve no reason to hold that beleif. That act of holding a beleif does not justify the beleif itself. Even logical tautologies can be invalidated on the grounds of someones other more presupossitional beleifs. If there beleifs about reality do not allow for logic to exist as it does than no logical tautologies can be introduced as free standing neutral basic beleifs that we can build a nice neutral and fair basis to judge everything else. Because your individual beleifs are affected by your most presupossitional ones.

Why think this? Again, I would point you to G.E. Moore, who is interested in knowing stuff about the world: he's just not interested in knowing God.

To take an actual historical example who is subject to the rest of what I said doesn't say anything about what the bible says about unbeleivers most basic motives or presupossitions. Moore lived in God's creation so his worldview is subject to the qualifiers that I mentioned about working a worldview out in practice.

Again, what do you mean by "starting principles." This presupposes that all people have an internalist coherentist epistemology. It only applies if we all work deductively outward from a few starting principles to formulate a theory of knowledge. The trouble is that no one actually does it. I did not reason from God's existence to the fact that I have hands---both are basic beliefs. I know of non-theistic systems that believe that we have hands. I know of non-theistic systems that doubt that we have hands (Gordon Clark comes to mind). The two beliefs may be independent of each other, depending on the type of system.

What I presented was a hierarchy of beliefs. Not a string of beleifs.

I happen to have an externalist and foundationalist view of epistemology because, frankly, it reflects the way in which our beliefs are actually formed.

Which cannot deal with the big picture of worldviews which is why you seem reluctant to admit in the worldview as a concept because once you apply your scheme to the big picture it breaks down. For your scheme basic beleifs are immediate beleifs for me basic beleifs are foundational presupossitional ones that is the difference.

I mean this: our epistemology needs to be able to not only provide not only explanations for why unbelievers deny God, but also for how they know a lot of the same stuff we do. One transcendental argument does not demand another (I've checked with a couple logicians).

And I haven't on a Van Tillian basis provided an explination as to why your scheme works on a lower level and mine on a higher one? I have shown that the unbeleiver can know many things to be true on a surface level of beleifs not on the presupossitional level, they are at odds with the very creation they are seeking to form beleifs about.

---------- Post added at 01:44 PM ---------- Previous post was at 01:41 PM ----------

Yes.

The trouble with Van Til is that he wants everything to be nice and smooth and logical. He wants to give us a method for worldview analysis that works on everything: apologetic versions of duct tape and WD40 (the only things you really need for home improvement, so it's claimed). The trouble is that it ain't so: worldviews are messy animals that defy simple categories. I don't think there is one method that works on every worldview or even on every variation within a worldview. We in our fallenness are the kind of people who, to quote Lewis Carroll, "believe six impossible things before breakfast every morning."

Epistemology should reflect how people actually think. Once we disconnect epistemic theory from the way in which we actually form beliefs, we are disconnecting it from the way that God actually made us.

You are right only if you accept your scheme about worldviews in which there is no hierarchy of beleifs. If that were so than yes you would be correct. But on Van Til's scheme a worldview is like a house.

 

[Philip]

James,

I noticed a problem with your dialogue:

Your hypothetical unbeliever seems incredibly dimwitted. Assumptions 1 and 2 are much too weak, frankly. I would put the assumptions as these:

1. Miracles do not happen.
2. Miracle claims are the result of exaggeration or falsification.

My most fudemental beleifs or presupossitions are for me the most authoritative beleifs I have. They determine in a way what shape my worldview will take from the most basic level to the most mundane everyday experience.

Again, I'm not sure of this. My belief in this desk appears to me to be independent of my belief in God. Granted, the metaphysical story behind the belief in the desk would be a lot weaker without God, but it would probably still be there. Pretty much all I'm doing is putting Van Til in reverse.

Granted, Van Til does make a lot of sense of interpretation of evidence, but I think we can attribute such "hidden assumptions" to attitudes rather than propositions. That is, when we unmask these, what we are really finding are attitudes toward what the unbeliever wants to believe and what he/she does not want to believe.

 

[jwright82]

It depends on how you define truth and what truth you are seeking.

Well, I wouldn't be able to define truth in any way right now given my current knowledge. I was mainly talking about seeking truth that is true in order to know what is true. I guess that would be called seeking truth for truth's sake? Though that still doesn't define things well. Thanks all for the answers (**stops diverting conversation**)!

There is nothing wrong with your question. The answer I think is that both a beleiver and an unbeleiver can claim to seek truth for truths sake but mean two different things. The unbeleiver could seek it because for them reason is practically god and we must bow all of our ideas to it in some religous fashion. The beleiver can do this on the grounds that all truth is God's truth and that is an obediant thing to do.

 

[Philip]

if you have a baleif that you hold for no rational reason than you hve no reason to hold that beleif. That act of holding a beleif does not justify the beleif itself.

True. However, if I was not warranted for holding the belief, I would not hold it. That is, from the fact that I hold belief A, it follows that I think myself warranted in holding belief A.

Because your individual beleifs are affected by your most presupossitional ones.

Not really. It would just affect where I placed them.

Which cannot deal with the big picture of worldviews which is why you seem reluctant to admit in the worldview as a concept because once you apply your scheme to the big picture it breaks down. For your scheme basic beleifs are immediate beleifs for me basic beleifs are foundational presupossitional ones that is the difference.

I do indeed think that worldview plays a significant role in our belief system---as a filter or grid through which we categorize and arrange beliefs. You see it as a structure, where I see it as a filing system. Beliefs that don't fit into the system are discarded.

I have shown that the unbeleiver can know many things to be true on a surface level of beleifs not on the presupossitional level

Again, no one thinks this way. Presuppositions are not a basic level, or else the unbeliever would de facto know nothing.

You are right only if you accept your scheme about worldviews in which there is no hierarchy of beleifs.

I don't deny a hierarchy of beliefs, just the order in which you place them.

That statment is a transcendental one. You are describing the cognitive faculties in way that cannot be proven by any fauculty or module. My own module may think it is functioning right but how does it know?

You are assuming doubt here. Knowledge only arises through cognitive faculties (warrant). Now, if you can give me a good reason to think, in fact, that my cognitive faculties are not functioning properly, I will take that into consideration.

Example:

A man says that the leaves are grey. His companion realizes that the man is colorblind and informs him of the fact, calling in several others. The man now has good reason based on one (higher-order) cognitive faculty (credulity) to believe that another (sight) is not functioning properly.

Also, I am not attempting to prove anything except that there is a rationally (and Christianly) acceptable counter-model to Van Til's.

EDIT: Here's an example of how this model would work. A skeptic is challenging my belief that there is a tree outside:

(S)keptic: Why do you believe that there is a tree outside?
(P)hilip: I see it.
S: So you trust your senses?
P: Yes.
S: Why?
P: I'm fearfully and wonderfully made by God. I trust Him and therefore I trust the faculties He has given me.

Now, a Van Tillian will rightfully point out that I've just used a transcendental argument here, but how did I do it?

1) The belief (there is a tree)
2) Phenomenal basis (I see it)
3) Transcendental argument based on other basic beliefs (reason).

For step 3, here's how I get there:

1) I know from revelation (credulity+Sensus Divinitatus) that I am fearfully and wonderfully made.
2) I trust God (SD)
3) Therefore, I trust what God has given me: my faculties.

Notice here what I did: reason (guided rightly) has combined beliefs to form an argument. The end result is not a more basic belief, but a transcendental justification of a basic belief on the basis of other equally basic beliefs. However, I was no less warranted in my belief before I formulated the argument and I would still be warranted if I went to my grave without formulating it. What I did not do was to use a higher-order belief.

 

[jwright82]

James,

I noticed a problem with your dialogue:

Your hypothetical unbeliever seems incredibly dimwitted. Assumptions 1 and 2 are much too weak, frankly. I would put the assumptions as these:

1. Miracles do not happen.
2. Miracle claims are the result of exaggeration or falsification.

Yes my dialoge was intentionaly simple but my exact same questions would hold true to your two statements. It is perfectly rational to believe in a God who makes miracles. Again what burden of proof are they stating for point two, if they claim every so called miracle could be explained away from science but they will and never know if it was science or God so again they have no reason to believe as they do but they demand a very high level of proof for the Christian.

Again, I'm not sure of this. My belief in this desk appears to me to be independent of my belief in God. Granted, the metaphysical story behind the belief in the desk would be a lot weaker without God, but it would probably still be there. Pretty much all I'm doing is putting Van Til in reverse.

Granted, Van Til does make a lot of sense of interpretation of evidence, but I think we can attribute such "hidden assumptions" to attitudes rather than propositions. That is, when we unmask these, what we are really finding are attitudes toward what the unbeliever wants to believe and what he/she does not want to believe.

Alright state one beleif that is dependent on no outside authority but itself?

---------- Post added at 06:38 PM ---------- Previous post was at 06:24 PM ----------

True. However, if I was not warranted for holding the belief, I would not hold it. That is, from the fact that I hold belief A, it follows that I think myself warranted in holding belief A.

First of all warrant is subjective and second of all what counts as warrant from person to person seems affected by their presupossitions.

Again, no one thinks this way.

How do you know? You do seem to believe that this cognitive picture is accepted it is only skepticism so Van Til must pass the muster and measure up to your viewpoint or he is wrong. I have never once, though I like your scheme, any proof of its actuality. You put a lot of eggs in one basket because you seem to think that unless your right there is no hope for knowledge at all it is all skepticism.

You are assuming doubt here. Knowledge only arises through cognitive faculties (warrant). Now, if you can give me a good reason to think, in fact, that my cognitive faculties are not functioning properly, I will take that into consideration.

On your view you couldn't know that it was functioning properly or not. Because you would have to have a functioning sensus to gather my informastion to you and however it appeared is what you will think is the truth because there is no info from outside these fauculties. Therefore logically you do not know if they are functioning or not.

A man says that the leaves are grey. His companion realizes that the man is colorblind and informs him of the fact, calling in several others. The man now has good reason based on one (higher-order) cognitive faculty (credulity) to believe that another (sight) is not functioning properly.

Also, I am not attempting to prove anything except that there is a rationally (and Christianly) acceptable counter-model to Van Til's.

EDIT: Here's an example of how this model would work. A skeptic is challenging my belief that there is a tree outside:

(S)keptic: Why do you believe that there is a tree outside?
(P)hilip: I see it.
S: So you trust your senses?
P: Yes.
S: Why?
P: I'm fearfully and wonderfully made by God. I trust Him and therefore I trust the faculties He has given me.

Now, a Van Tillian will rightfully point out that I've just used a transcendental argument here, but how did I do it?

1) The belief (there is a tree)
2) Phenomenal basis (I see it)
3) Transcendental argument based on other basic beliefs (reason).

For step 3, here's how I get there:

1) I know from revelation (credulity+Sensus Divinitatus) that I am fearfully and wonderfully made.
2) I trust God (SD)
3) Therefore, I trust what God has given me: my faculties.

Notice here what I did: reason (guided rightly) has combined beliefs to form an argument. The end result is not a more basic belief, but a transcendental justification of a basic belief on the basis of other basic beliefs. However, I was no less warranted in my belief before I formulated the argument and I would still be warranted if I went to my grave without formulating it. What I did not do was to use a higher-order belief.

Like I said your model works great on common lower level beleifs you don't in presupositions because they cannot be accounted for by your model. To avoid the skepticism of previous generations you are proposing a model that relies on properly functioning sensuses. But you can never know if those sensuses are functioning properly so you just end up having faith in them that is it. But your model could never account for justifying your most general beleifs about reality because your model can't handle that level of justification. It requires you to justify a whole set of beleifs not just independent ones.

 

[Philip]

It is perfectly rational to believe in a God who makes miracles.

On your model of rationality, which is contingent on God's existence (mine is too, BTW, so that's not a criticism).

Alright state one beleif that is dependent on no outside authority but itself?

Why do I need one? Beliefs believed on authority are basic (credulity).

First of all warrant is subjective and second of all what counts as warrant from person to person seems affected by their presupossitions.

Correct, it depends on one's model of rationality.

I have never once, though I like your scheme, any proof of its actuality.

That's because it's primarily phenomenological.

On your view you couldn't know that it was functioning properly or not.

Sure I can---give me a good reason to doubt whether they are.

To avoid the skepticism of previous generations you are proposing a model that relies on properly functioning sensuses. But you can never know if those sensuses are functioning properly so you just end up having faith in them that is it.

All beliefs involve faith. I can indeed know if they aren't functioning---just give me a good reason to think so.

But your model could never account for justifying your most general beleifs about reality because your model can't handle that level of justification. It requires you to justify a whole set of beleifs not just independent ones.

Sure it can. How do I get more general than my belief in God?

 

[jwright82]

On your model of rationality, which is contingent on God's existence (mine is too, BTW, so that's not a criticism).

What do you mean by model of rationality and how does it differ from Van Til's notion of a theory of reason?

Why do I need one? Beliefs believed on authority are basic (credulity).

Yes but authority can be logicaly analysed to reveal that it was not authoritative at all. Meaning that these beleifs are not independent logically they require other beleifs to be true in order to justify their credulity.

Correct, it depends on one's model of rationality.

If you mean basically what Van Til meant than we are in complete agreement. Is there any other way to overcome this subjectivity in your view besides a strictly de facto basis? Which by BTW assumes their model of rationality which affects what is credibule evidence or not, thus it is a presupossitional antithesis.

That's because it's primarily phenomenological.

Well phenomenom can be especially problamatic philosophically.

Sure I can---give me a good reason to doubt whether they are.

Ok you tell me that you believe Bush is still president of the USA. I say no he is not but your sensus for what ever reason are malfunctioning so badly that you hear me say or cognitivly deduce I'm saying "yes your right." Since there is no way to step out of your sensus you will go on beleiving as you do and nothing I say on a de facto basis will affect that because you will always pick up that I agree with you when I don't. This is the major problem , as I see it, with your model it provides no check on the autonomous sensus you describe that are the ultimate authority on all things, man is the measure of all things here.

All beliefs involve faith. I can indeed know if they aren't functioning---just give me a good reason to think so.

I am still confused here don't they have to be functioning fine in order to aprehend that I am telling you they are malfunctioning which is a contradiction. But if they are malfunctioning than I can never tell they are because I need them to be properly functioning to communicate with you?

Sure it can. How do I get more general than my belief in God?

If knowledge of God is dependent upon creation than God is dependent on something, which denies His aseity. I can no better defend my view of immediate awarness of God but I am prepairing an argument to post on a thread to discuss with you and anyone else I think should be enlightning. What I meant by general beleif is that you seem apprehensive to metaphysical justifications of epistomology. Your model seems to demand that epistomology be autonomous in its claims and remain unaffected by a metaphysical theory. I'm not saying that matrerialists can't know things only that a materialist metaphysics worked out destroys knowledge. So that their metaphysics contradicts their epistomology leaving a huge gap in their worldview. Also by presupossition I don't mean that they are not developed or derived from immediate beleifs, what you would call basic beleifs or common sense beleifs, only that they are the most important beleifs in a persons web of beleifs and therefore the hardest to change, and our most important beleifs affect how we recieve other beleifs.