Clark: Scientific Reasoning is fallacious

[JohnV]

Hermonta:

You said above,

It is not a formal fallacy to act as if induction is induction? What is it then?
It has to be a fallacy of some sort.

I get the idea that you don't trust induction as valid. Now I know that you must not mean this above statement in the same way as to say, "It is a formal fallacy to call a horse a horse, and then to expect to be able to ride it." So can you explain your view of induction for me? Is induction part of reason, but also of a bigger mental capacity, or is it only of reason? Or is it that it is no part of reason? Why does induction have to be a fallacy of some sort?

I think we are all agreed that, if you applied the rules of inference to induction, the rules would fail to account for what is supposedly inducted. Some of us say that these rules don't apply to induction, but rather they apply to induction when what has been inducted is tested in a syllogism. It is the syllogism that falls under the rules of inference, and hence also the deduction which results. But every syllogism must have at least two premises, even if the one is only assumed instead of asserted. These premises are propositions in themselves, and hence are deducted from elsewhere. These elsewhere premises are again from other deductions, etc., etc. Is it an infinite regress? Or is there some solid foundation to this somewhere? Is certainty a possibility in knowledge, whether induced or deduced?

As I said, it seems to me that you mistrust induction.

 

[ChristianTrader]

Originally posted by JohnV
Hermonta:

You said above,

It is not a formal fallacy to act as if induction is induction? What is it then?
It has to be a fallacy of some sort.

I get the idea that you don't trust induction as valid. Now I know that you must not mean this above statement in the same way as to say, "It is a formal fallacy to call a horse a horse, and then to expect to be able to ride it." So can you explain your view of induction for me? Is induction part of reason, but also of a bigger mental capacity, or is it only of reason? Or is it that it is no part of reason? Why does induction have to be a fallacy of some sort?

I mistyped. I meant act as if induction is deduction. I was not trying to be deep

I think we are all agreed that, if you applied the rules of inference to induction, the rules would fail to account for what is supposedly inducted. Some of us say that these rules don't apply to induction, but rather they apply to induction when what has been inducted is tested in a syllogism. It is the syllogism that falls under the rules of inference, and hence also the deduction which results. But every syllogism must have at least two premises, even if the one is only assumed instead of asserted. These premises are propositions in themselves, and hence are deducted from elsewhere. These elsewhere premises are again from other deductions, etc., etc. Is it an infinite regress? Or is there some solid foundation to this somewhere? Is certainty a possibility in knowledge, whether induced or deduced?

As I said, it seems to me that you mistrust induction.

I do to a certain extent. But I do not mistrust that we must use induction in order to live day to day. The issue is how much do we trust it? Are we open to various things being shown to be wrong after we have accepted them to be true for many years. That happens in science all the time.

CT

[Edited on 8-2-2005 by ChristianTrader]

 

[JohnV]

Here we are all in agreement: induction is not deduction. So then to call induction a formal fallacy is not actually the objection you're looking for.

So far we are in agreement. I think the question is more than on how we verify it; or perhaps better, when do we trust it? I agree that not all inductions are valid. Some are just stupid, but that doesn't keep people from believing it. I have no idea what kind of induction would justify a belief, for example, that man descended from apes. That really blows the mind. I think we will find that it is not really an induction but a blind leap of faith; or, if you will, and anti-induction.

So in those cases in which induction is to be trusted, and those cases in which it is not, how do you tell the difference?

[Edited on 8-2-2005 by JohnV]

 

[RickyReformed]

Gerry,

Let me address your post first. You said:

Actually there is no paradox as far as to which one will age. If there were a set of twins living in Chicago and one of them moved to Dallas then only one of them moved relative to the earth. Even watching from Dallas only one of them moved. Relativistic effects are dependent on the speed of the object referenced to the speed of light, so twin B that leaves earth for another star is the only one traveling at near light speed. Someone living on a planet circling another star would ‘see’ twin B approaching at near light speed but twin A would still be stationary, since earth’s motion relative to light speed is so little. Thus only twin B would experience the relativistic effect (i.e. slowing down of the aging process.)

Perhaps Microsoft Bookshelf 98 isn't the best interpreter of Einstein, but it reads:

In 1905 Einstein published a paper in which he proposed that absolute motion does not exist- no object in the universe is suitable as an absolute frame of reference. Thus, it is equally correct to say that a train moves past a station, or that a station moves past a train.

From which I inferred that (twin A) the twin is space in my example can be considered stationary while (twin B) the twin on earth and the earth, etc. can be considered as traveling away from the other twin at the speed of light. Since the twin A can be considered stationary, and twin B - and the earth, etc. - is moving away at the speed of light, why doesn't twin B, etc. age slower than the twin in space?

Interestingly enough, relativity was needed to account for the location of the planet Mercury. Mercury actually moves fast enough to create its own relativistic effect and using standard Newtonian mechanics was not enough to predict exactly where is should have been.

Gerry, the Ptolemaic model worked for for over 1,000 years in explaining the movement of the heavenly bodies. It was later overthrown by Copernican model. Just because a theory can make predictions does not mean that the theory is true. I can hypothesize that a rooster causes the sun to rise and test this prediction every day!

I enjoy reading about science and I am amazed at the precision and order of creation. Those who see only random chance are truly living the lie. God has granted us the gift of science to use and I am glad He did, else I would probably not be alive today.

I'm not denying that science can be very useful; I have previously posted in another thread an example of an antibiotic curing cows from milk fever by injecting the antibiotic into the udders. Did that mean that milk fever is caused by bacteria? That hypothesis seemed plausible until it was determined that injecting boiled water did the same. Later it was found out that even injecting air worked. Were the cows cured of milk fever by the antibiotic? Yes. Was the original theory correct? No.

To quote another author:
Science is successful when one understands its purpose, and when one understands that false theories sometimes work. Newtonian science, for example, worked for years. It has been replaced by Einstein’s theory. But even though he believed his theory to be a better approximation of the truth than Newton’s, Einstein declared that his own theory was false.

By the way, I agree that those who see only chance are living a lie.

To God alone be praises and honor and glory!

Yes indeed, brother!

 

[RickyReformed]

Originally posted by JohnV

Or put another way: in this case, does logic trump science or does science trump logic?

The problem with this concept, Rick, is that you're using logic to try to trump logic. The science really doesn't have anything to do with it. That's why I said that science consists of two parts necessary to each other. We have to be careful here to keep them distinct, though they are both integral parts of doing science as a whole.

John, I missed your point here. What are the two distinct parts that are necessary to each other and integral to doing science?

Here is another scenario. It goes back to point one in your post, namely that God cannot lie.

Person X knows of person Z, but person Y knows person Z. Which is better, to know of or to know? I mean, Mr. X has heard of Mr. Z, but Mr. Y goes to bowling with him every Thursday, and hangs out with him afterward, and on weekends they go boating and fishing together. They have lots of time to talk. Mr. X has only heard of him because he needs to beat his bowling average to become he new champ. Which knowing is to be preferred?

Well there are those who know of God, but it is much better for those who know God. But how did these latter get to know God? Was it not primarily because they were known by God first?...

John, I would really like to ask more questions concerning what you said here, but I'm afraid we'll open up another:

Questions like: what does it mean to know one personally? (Didn't Judas know Christ personally? Yet he was not one of the elect.) Also, does knowing someone personally not also involve verbal communication (as in words, ideas, propositions, truths; not necessarily spoken words) also? (After all, if I sit in the presence of someone and we just stare at each other, is that getting to know someone personally?) Doesn't knowing God also mean that we communicate with him (like when we offer our prayers - even though he knows what we're going to say before we say it) and he with us (via his revelation)?

You think we can save this one for another day?

Person X may be able to prove God exists, but person Y knows him personally, even though he never was one to think through a problem philosophically. And it is quite likely that, were he asked to provide a proof that God exists, that his so-called proof would be deemed fallacious. Yet there is no one more certain that God does indeed exist than he.

Does his failure to avoid fallacious argumentation mean that God does not exist? Certainly not; it means he can't argue his points adequately, that's all. Does he make a leap of faith in his belief in God? Certainly not, because otherwise he is mistaken that he really knows God; he has been fooling himself. Does his belief in God change the nature by which men know, some things as if immediate and some things as if mediate? Of course not. He uses more than syllogism in order to know, or it may be that he uses syllogism so automatically that he does not even discern it. (Think of the sound of a car going by, and contemplate which came first, the sound or the syllogism? Or were they simultaneous? Or does he know before he reasons?

I think I get the gist of this. As I told Paul, I presently hold that knowledge is true belief. Therefore, if a person believes that Word of God is true, and that God is, but cannot account for those beliefs; he still knows God. In fact, God caused him to believe that his Word is true, because God loves him in that special way that God loves his elect. The person who purports to prove that Triune God exists, but is not one of his elect, believes that God is also (Rom 1:19*) but does not believe what God says is true, neither does he believe what he says he believes. (He is in fact a liar, and the truth of God is not in him. see 1 John 2:4**)

Now Mr. X and Mr. Y are both working at Johns Hopkins Research laboratory. One comes up with a study that shows that remedy a alleviates symptom s, while the other comes up with a study that shows remedy b alleviates symptom t. Is one study better than the other because one knows God and the other does not? No; it depends more on God's blessing the work than the person doing the study. And God is more likely to bless a believer than a non-believer, according to His Word. But that is not proof that the study was done well.

I don't necessarily disagree with you here, but as I told Gerry, just because science is useful does not mean that the theory used to derive the desired result is true. If I propose that "remedy A alleviates symptom S", what happens to my proposal when we have an instance of remedy A not alleviating sympton S? Even supposing that in that study, remedy A alleviated symptom S in all 100 patients which participated in that study, how can I be certain that remedy A will alleviate *every* instance of sympton S when administered?



*Rom 1:19 For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them.

**1Jo 2:4 Whoever says "I know him" but does not keep his commandments is a liar, and the truth is not in him,



[Edited on 9-2-2005 by RickyReformed]

 

[gwine]

From which I inferred that (twin A) the twin is space in my example can be considered stationary while (twin B) the twin on earth and the earth, etc. can be considered as traveling away from the other twin at the speed of light. Since the twin A can be considered stationary, and twin B - and the earth, etc. - is moving away at the speed of light, why doesn't twin B, etc. age slower than the twin in space?

Because there is a frame of reference - the speed of light. The clock experiment showed that. I have some links I will track down and send you if you would like.

Gerry, the Ptolemaic model worked for for over 1,000 years in explaining the movement of the heavenly bodies. It was later overthrown by Copernican model. Just because a theory can make predictions does not mean that the theory is true. I can hypothesize that a rooster causes the sun to rise and test this prediction every day!

And Einstein's theory may someday be proved false. That's ok with me. All I was trying to point out is that it works better than the previous theories. Definitely there are theories that make predictions that are based on faulty reasoning. Look at the sunspot "correlations" that people see in <name your theory>.

I am not saying that science is always right or that it has a correct world view because I know it doesn't. But many things work well enough that people get healed and space craft get to Saturn and a myrid of other events happen as predicted, within the limits of necessity. And sometimes they don't.

I don't know which theory the quote was about but I do know Einstein's attempt to create a Grand Unified Theory was not sucessful because he stubbornly refused to let go of his biases. But, he was operating outside the Christian world view.

BTW, I wasn't really trying to get into the discussion you were having with Paul. All I wanted to do was correct a misconception you had about the twin paradox. You two can carry on.

 

[RickyReformed]

Originally posted by gwine

From which I inferred that (twin A) the twin is space in my example can be considered stationary while (twin B) the twin on earth and the earth, etc. can be considered as traveling away from the other twin at the speed of light. Since the twin A can be considered stationary, and twin B - and the earth, etc. - is moving away at the speed of light, why doesn't twin B, etc. age slower than the twin in space?

Because there is a frame of reference - the speed of light. The clock experiment showed that. I have some links I will track down and send you if you would like.

Sure! You can u2u me the links or my email is in my profile too.

Gerry, the Ptolemaic model worked for for over 1,000 years in explaining the movement of the heavenly bodies. It was later overthrown by Copernican model. Just because a theory can make predictions does not mean that the theory is true. I can hypothesize that a rooster causes the sun to rise and test this prediction every day!

And Einstein's theory may someday be proved false. That's ok with me. All I was trying to point out is that it works better than the previous theories. Definitely there are theories that make predictions that are based on faulty reasoning. Look at the sunspot "correlations" that people see in <name your theory>.

I am not saying that science is always right or that it has a correct world view because I know it doesn't. But many things work well enough that people get healed and space craft get to Saturn and a myrid of other events happen as predicted, within the limits of necessity. And sometimes they don't.

Oh, okay. I think we're in basic agreement here. Because something is useful does not necessarily make it true.

BTW, I wasn't really trying to get into the discussion you were having with Paul. All I wanted to do was correct a misconception you had about the twin paradox. You two can carry on.

 

[JohnV]

Originally posted by RickyReformed

Originally posted by JohnV
The problem with this concept, Rick, is that you're using logic to try to trump logic. The science really doesn't have anything to do with it. That's why I said that science consists of two parts necessary to each other. We have to be careful here to keep them distinct, though they are both integral parts of doing science as a whole.

John, I missed your point here. What are the two distinct parts that are necessary to each other and integral to doing science?

In order to do science one must do the actual observation of particulars, and one must theorize concerning these observations, from which further experiments can be made to test those theories. Observation and theorizing are two fundamental parts of doing science.

John, I would really like to ask more questions concerning what you said here, but I'm afraid we'll open up another:

Questions like: what does it mean to know one personally? (Didn't Judas know Christ personally? Yet he was not one of the elect.) Also, does knowing someone personally not also involve verbal communication (as in words, ideas, propositions, truths; not necessarily spoken words) also? (After all, if I sit in the presence of someone and we just stare at each other, is that getting to know someone personally?) Doesn't knowing God also mean that we communicate with him (like when we offer our prayers - even though he knows what we're going to say before we say it) and he with us (via his revelation)?

You think we can save this one for another day?

This is very a important aspect to induction and knowledge, but we can discuss it later. By then we will have moved along to quite an extent into an ontological necessity, as opposed to proposing theories.

I think I get the gist of this. As I told Paul, I presently hold that knowledge is true belief. Therefore, if a person believes that Word of God is true, and that God is, but cannot account for those beliefs; he still knows God. In fact, God caused him to believe that his Word is true, because God loves him in that special way that God loves his elect. The person who purports to prove that Triune God exists, but is not one of his elect, believes that God is also (Rom 1:19*) but does not believe what God says is true, neither does he believe what he says he believes. (He is in fact a liar, and the truth of God is not in him. see 1 John 2:4**)

The question about this latter person is how is he able to prove God's existence if the truth of God is not in him? We have two basic choices: first that things can be proved without precise fidelity to truth; or two, that even if the truth is not in him, yet he is unable to escape the necessities of truth which are indeed in him. In other words, 1. he does not need total truth to find truth, or 2. necessity is laid upon him in such a way that he cannot escape that necessity, even though he may not have the truth.

I don't necessarily disagree with you here, but as I told Gerry, just because science is useful does not mean that the theory used to derive the desired result is true. If I propose that "remedy A alleviates symptom S", what happens to my proposal when we have an instance of remedy A not alleviating sympton S? Even supposing that in that study, remedy A alleviated symptom S in all 100 patients which participated in that study, how can I be certain that remedy A will alleviate *every* instance of sympton S when administered?

By "useful" do we mean that it is a working model that helps for a time? How do we know it stops being useful? I suppose when it no longer works. So it is science, in the end, which defeats it as a theory. That's all I really wanted to show, but there is so much more now that the can has been opened. But I don't want to go that way. I want to keep on the topic of induction.

But my main concern with your latest post is this: is certainty possible?

 

[JohnV]

from Christian Trader
I do to a certain extent. But I do not mistrust that we must use induction in order to live day to day. The issue is how much do we trust it? Are we open to various things being shown to be wrong after we have accepted them to be true for many years. That happens in science all the time.

CT

I share this same trepidation, Hermonta. But I also have a certainty. Some things I am quite fearless about. There is no way, for example, that Islam or Budhism can overthrow Christianity on a mere intellectual level, never mind spiritual, authoritative, or any other sphere. It's just not an intellectual possibility. These can be reduced, eventually, to the same dictum equal to, "It is absolutely true that there is no such thing as absolute truth." Christianity is the only belief that does not have that failing.

That much I know. My own intellect may come up short a lot, but that does nothing to the truth itself.

But back to your point. Do we, then, suppose the Christian basis for faith to be finally a theory, a presupposition, or an inducted 'ism'? One would hope that it is more than these. It is inducted, and it is a presupposition, and it is a theory, to be sure, but that is not all it is. It is also a revelation; this cannot be discounted. It stands far above those meagre inductions or presuppositions or theories that unbelievers have or hold to. And we find, I would suggest, at least two significant things about this: first, that it is impossible for anyone to integrate truth on any other basis, so that we can see that everyone must assume God's revelation of truth whether they will or not; and second, that integrity to truth is closely related to integrity of character, or, in other words, to a humble and submissive spirit.

So it would be my suggestion that induction itself is related to a submission to truth both in mind and in practice. So there is more to it than a mere inducted syllogism. Induction is not a superimposing of invented theories, but rather a recognition of truth that exists in relationships and characteristics of things, whether seen or unseen. It is wider than the premises because we presume wider premises than we are willing to admit of. This makes induction itself wholly trustworthy; but it also recognizes how untrustworthy we as knowers can be to the truth. We live by truth to the degree we must, but where we feel we have the freedom to wander into our own myths and lies we infallibly take the liberty to do so. So I trust induction; I just don't trust myself. I trust truth; but I also know that I am a long way from apprehending it rightly in respect to the things in which my mind is still fumbling.

I would insist that objectivity must not only be possible, but that it is fundamental. (To say that there is absolutely no objectivity is to make an objective statement. ) And for that we need an impeachable authority. And the Bible is the only one that has stood up to impeachment trials in every sort of sphere of discipline and integrity, without relying on a leap of faith in the process. That is to say, all the charges against have come to nothing in the end, and it has not stood upon the unfailing faith of its believers, but upon its own integrity and nobility.

 

[Arch2k]

You're judging induction by the rules of deduction. Like calling someone out in baseball for face-masking! So, when you do this you comit the fallacy of bifurcation.

I am not sure how to show that inductive reasoning is fallacious if we aren't to compare it to the rules of deduction. We surely can't compare it to the rules of induction for reason of defeating our own argument by circular reasoning. If there are some "other" standards to compare this type of reasoning to, I would like to know what they are.

An inductive argument is "not valid even though their premises provide some support for their conclusions" (David A. Conway/Ronald Munson, The Elements of Reasoning). An argument that isn't valid means that the conclusion doesn't NECESSARILY follow from the premises. This is why all inductive arguments are fallacious. By definition, they commit the fallacy. One need not prove that they are fallacious, for that is embedded in the definition.

As for science, it operates under the fallacy of induction, and therefore cannot lead to truth (truth being defined as absolute, 100% true). Not only are we mutible, but nature is mutable as well. Only the Word of God and what is logically deduced from it can lead to truth.

"I call that knowledge, not what is innate in man, or what is by diligence acquired, but that which is delivered to us by the Law and the Prophets" John Calvin on Jer 44:1

I would like to add that I am brand new to these message boards, and would like to say hi to everyone.

Thanks for the discussions!

 

[Scott Bushey]

Jeff,
Feel free to post in the welcome area.........

 

[JohnV]

Welcome Jeff.

Maybe we're going about this all wrong. You know, I could admit that induction is always fallacious and achieve the very same thing that I said above. That's because to say that induction is fallacious is really not saying anything about induction. It might be better to say that induction is always saying more than it has a right to, and that might serve the point better. Induction assumes more in its conclusion than are found grounds for in the premises. Like assuming that both sides of the sheep are white when all you can see is the one side.

But are we just saying that inducted syllogisms are not solid proof? Or are we saying that all inductions are invalid? I would agree with the former, but not the latter. Paul and I have been saying that it is valid to make inductions, but that they can't be counted the same as deductions. There are no rules for induction like there are for deduction. At least none that I know of. We apply the rules of deduction as a guide, but induction by definition trangresses the bounds of deduction. But we are also saying that an inducted conclusion can be tested by the rules of deduction. We can do that by observing the conclusions, to see if they are true. We can apply inducted conclusions as premises with a deducted conclusion as the other premise and see if the conclusion turns out as true. That's how science does its thing.

So as has been pointed out, some theories have been adopted as true, though it is still well known that they may yet test as unfaithful theories sooner or later. But science needs a working model from which to work outward. And these are inducted.

This is altogether different than 'inducting' a religious tenet. For that we have Revelation. We aren't theorizing there. And we aren't theorizing about God's existence either. To discount a proof of God's existence on the basis of syllogistic incompletion is a fallacy. It does not take into account that there are more ways of knowing than by syllogism. It must be so, for otherwise we could not begin to syllogize, could we?

Again, welcome a-Board, Jeff.

 

[JohnV]

I was thinking through this last night, and pondering the concept of 'necessary inference', and I just about changed my mind. I got the idea that induction is invalid for unbelievers, but valid for believers; but that then it no longer is mere induction anymore. So I think I need to ask more questions than try to give answers.

Why do you who believe induction to be fallacious think so? And what do you mean by 'fallacious'? Do you mean that it is not proof? Or do you mean it is wrong? Or do you mean that it isn't valid? And what do you say about deduction then?

I had two thoughts running through my mind, and the first is, that if truth, goodness, and love are self-evident, and these are attributes of God's character, then why isn't God self-evident even more so? And the second is that we have revelation, so we have the premises upon which to make deductions, which unbelievers would call inductions because they think that our belief came before the declaration of revelation. We say we believe in God, and they say that is an induction from creation. Without the Word it would be; but we have revelation, so proof from creation is not inducted, and is not invalid but is rather necessary inference.

I couldn't get past that. It was tough stuff to think through.

What do you think?

 

[Arch2k]

But are we just saying that inducted syllogisms are not solid proof? Or are we saying that all inductions are invalid? I would agree with the former, but not the latter.

It seems to me that definitions at this point are in order.

Validity: An argument is valid if the conclusion necessarily follows from the conclusion. It does not deal with the truths of the premises, but merely that the conclusion is logically deduced from them.

Using this definition, it renders all induction invalid.

Sound: An argument is considered "sound" when not only is the argument VALID (see above), but the premises are also true.

Using this definition, it renders all induction unsound, because they are invalid.

I belive that the dichotomy you have suggested (between solid proof and invalidity) is a false one (granting that the premises are true). If the arguement is valid (and the premises are true), it will be solid proof. The conclusion of an induction do NOT necessarily follow from the premises.

The formal name for this fallacy is called "Asserting the consequent" and it's form is
1: If A, then B.
2: B.
Conclusion:Therefore A.

The standard example is:
1: When it rains, the streets get wet.
2: The streets are wet.
Conclusion: It must have rained.

Using this example, there are many other reasons the streets are wet aside from it raining. The conclusion doesn't necessarily follow from the premises and renders the form invalid (using the above definition).

Thanks for the warm invite, and nice to meet you!

 

[Arch2k]

It also seems to me that there is insuffiecient evidence (biblically) to suggest that Adam "reasoned" inductively before the fall. There is a large difference between using the senses, and reasoning from them.

The way I look at the subject of pre-fall sense use is similar to how the law is used biblically. If used correctly, the Christian man is obedient to God, and therfore loves him. If used incorrectly, man seeks justification before God by means of the law. Similarly, I suggest that Adam used correctly used the senses for the purposes of naming the animals and subduing the earth. However, he did not use them to gain knowledge, for this is fallacious not only after the fall, but before it as well.

In fact, John Robbins would argue that the first time Adam used his senses to gain knowledge was at the fall. The syllogism would go something like this (Adam speaking):
1: I see that Eve has eating the forbidden fruit.
2: I see that she did not die as God said she would.
Conclusion: I will not die either.

This argument is in the same form as all science, and cannot lead to truth because of it's invalidity. By relying on his senses, over and above God's Word, Adam fell.

Any thoughts?

 

[JohnV]

Jeff:

I won't answer your second post just yet; lets concentrate on the first. Besides, I guess you never heard how the hoe got its name Eve left it laying in the grass in the Garden, beside the beans; and when Adam stepped on it he said, "HO!!!!!!" Its been called that ever since.

But that's a supra-apocryphal account, I think.

The juxtaposition of solid proof and validity was intentional, and not so as to present a dichotomy. I see your point, I think.

from your post above
Validity: An argument is valid if the conclusion necessarily follows from the conclusion. It does not deal with the truths of the premises, but merely that the conclusion is logically deduced from them.

Using this definition, it renders all induction invalid.

Sound: An argument is considered "sound" when not only is the argument VALID (see above), but the premises are also true.

Using this definition, it renders all induction unsound, because they are invalid.

OK, I won't restate what I said before about the difference between induction and deduction, and confusing the two. I'm think we agree here. I just want to ask which of these two you are advocating:

1. that induction is not valid or sound because it is not deduction; or
2. that the Christian's knowledge of God and His Word makes what is normally called 'induction' (by unbelievers and by some who make a leap of faith before they believe) is in reality deduction from revealed premises, revealed from eternity.

Number Two would mean that induction while disclaiming God's existence is unsound and invalid; while believing on His Word because He has revealed Himself to you is valid and sound. Number One denies induction eventually, and would have to assume that we get at Revelation through our own reasoning deductive abilities. Or, to say it entirely differently, the Presuppositionalist would say we presuppose Revelation, while the Classicalist would say that we could not presuppose it if it weren't there prior to the presupposing of it.

An example:
The teacher tries to convince the students that he has blue socks. One student just will not believe him. So the teacher jumps up on his dests and pulls up his trouser legs. But the student refuses to look; as he does not trust his senses. Everyone else now knows that the teacher is wearing blue socks.

If Revelation is there, whether admitted of or not, then it is there equally for the believer as for the unbeliever. And it is firm on its own, not relying on belief. It is a matter of either accepting it or not accepting it. By disbelieving one cannot merely discount it. That would be an invalid induction.

In form now, another example:
Revelation is a given, and is a valid premise; and,
We have discovered a Piltdown man again;
conclusion:
There must have been a different man or race of men living in this area, one that was not normal to the created original man. Or, another hoax.

Some would say that the first premise is inducted, and therefore invalid. I say that I know God, and that His Word is trustworthy, and is more than sufficient as a firm premise, even for the person who thinks it is an induced premise. Knowing God in not inducted, because He revealed Himself to me, it is not that I discovered Him; He came to me, I did not go to Him, so to speak.


I'm just trying to think through this thing a bit more. It may yet be that the idea of induction is a mere invention by man, a sanitized version of a leap of faith in the negative sense. If Revelation is truly seen as Revelation, then it may well be that what some call induction is really mothing more than the inescapability of Revelation in nature and Scripture upon all men in their reasoning. So the question that gets to me is not whether induction is valid, but whether it really exists at all?

This, however, does not account for theorizing, extrapolating from a peceived pattern. Yet behind such extrapolation is the innate (it seems) knowledge that there is a unified field of knowledge that allows for extrapolation without exceeding the bounds of reason altogether. In other words, there are unspoken premises in everyone's knowledge underlying even such extrapolations and theorizings.

If we see a tree with branches, it may be deemed as induction from that narrowed point to conclude that all trees have branches. But it does not exceed the bounds of reason to think that all trees may indeed have branches; so it is a theory to work with in order to study trees. This, then, bespeaks of an unuttered premise that justifies theorizing about trees. It is created in man, or it is revealed to him, but he did not get it out of his own reasoning.

So, in short, there is a witness of God's existence in every man that reasons. That's why induction is invalid for disbelievers, but valid for believers. Or, that is why induction does not really exist after all, but is just an excuse for unbelievers to jump to invalid conclusions. I'm not sure which it is.

Anyways, Jeff, what do you think? Can you follow my jumbled reasoning here? If not, give me a few days or weeks and I'll have it a bit more refined. I don't know if this is clear, as I'm still working through this and trying to put my thoughts together on this. Or, as some are wont to say, to wrap my brain around this.

 

[Arch2k]

Originally posted by JohnV
I just want to ask which of these two you are advocating:

1. that induction is not valid or sound because it is not deduction; or
2. that the Christian's knowledge of God and His Word makes what is normally called 'induction' (by unbelievers and by some who make a leap of faith before they believe) is in reality deduction from revealed premises, revealed from eternity.

Number Two would mean that induction while disclaiming God's existence is unsound and invalid; while believing on His Word because He has revealed Himself to you is valid and sound. Number One denies induction eventually, and would have to assume that we get at Revelation through our own reasoning deductive abilities. Or, to say it entirely differently, the Presuppositionalist would say we presuppose Revelation, while the Classicalist would say that we could not presuppose it if it weren't there prior to the presupposing of it.

I would have to say that I am definately advocating #1. I do hold to the presuppositionalist doctrine of apologetics. That stated, I believe that inductive arguments are invalid because they by definition are invalid. If you were to take a course in logic, they would talk of the deductive and inductive arguments, and the validity or invalidity of each.

So the question that gets to me is not whether induction is valid, but whether it really exists at all?

I would like to discuss your syllogism, but I simply don't have time at this point. I like the thought that you are putting into it though.

I'll simply try to address the above statement that you made from a presuppositionalist standpoint. One idea that Clark argues is that existence is a meaningless term. If a word can be applied to everything, then it means nothing. He argues that everythings exists. The question is not whether something exists or not, but what is it? Unicorns for example...do they exist? They are an imaginary horse with a horn on its head. They exist as that. Inductive arguments, do they exist? Certainly they do...whether as a conceived hypothesis, or an invalid syllogism, either way they exist.

The same is for God. Of course God exists. The Westminster Shorter Catechism doesn't answer if God exists, but pressuposes in asking:
Q. 4. What is God?
A. God is a Spirit,infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.

I know this doesn't answer all of your questions, but I will try to answer them at some point. I am heading off to a conference on "Reformed Worship."

Thanks for your thoughts!

 

[JohnV]

Jeff:

You said,

I would have to say that I am definately advocating #1. I do hold to the presuppositionalist doctrine of apologetics. That stated, I believe that inductive arguments are invalid because they by definition are invalid. If you were to take a course in logic, they would talk of the deductive and inductive arguments, and the validity or invalidity of each.

OK, #1 was induction is not deduction. So why would the laws of deduction apply to induction? Therefore, to say that induction is invalid is merely to say that induction is not deduction, and does not really make a judgment on induction's own form validity.

I think we need to separate whether doing induction is a valid practice from whether the results from inducted conclusions are always reliable. We have to be careful that we leave validity and soundness out of induction, because otherwise it would be judged as a deduction.

But, you see, that's the problem, isn't it? Are we really making an induction when we assume that all trees have branches when we base it on one tree? We do know something more, and to take one tree as the only experience is far too abstract for us to really contemplate. We're not only assuming uniformity and sense, but we're assuming that there are other trees as well. So we really didn't have just that one tree experience no matter how hard we try to define it into our syllogisms.

It is the same with God's existence. It is impossible to contemplate just a physical world, because the contemplation itself bespeaks of a wider world of thought, reason, and spirit, as well as extending that uniformity of thought into those areas. In fact, all men reason as if these are prior. In short, man cannot reason without assuming God's existence. (That is the Presuppositionalist view as well. ) But further, to deny God's existence cannot be done without overtly assuming His existence. (That's the Ontological Necessity. In other words, to deny His existence is really an admission of not desiring His existence, but an undeniable admission that He does indeed exist. ) Thus, some things normally thought to be the result of induction are really a result of deduction, but are classed as inductions because of man's stubbornness rather than because of reason.

Just thinking out loud.

I'll simply try to address the above statement that you made from a presuppositionalist standpoint. One idea that Clark argues is that existence is a meaningless term. If a word can be applied to everything, then it means nothing. He argues that everythings exists. The question is not whether something exists or not, but what is it? Unicorns for example...do they exist? They are an imaginary horse with a horn on its head. They exist as that. Inductive arguments, do they exist? Certainly they do...whether as a conceived hypothesis, or an invalid syllogism, either way they exist.

The same is for God. Of course God exists. The Westminster Shorter Catechism doesn't answer if God exists, but pressuposes in asking:
Q. 4. What is God?
A. God is a Spirit,infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth.

I'll leave the "Clark who?" thing to someone else; I think that pretty well takes care of his equivocating observation. I want to pursue something else. Existence is indubitably more than idea, when we speak of God. He does not exist in the same respect as a unicorn exists. And it is not a meaningless distinction. The question is, does the WSC presuppose, assume, assert, or confess God's existence? There is a mighty difference between presuppose and confess, strictly speaking. If it is not confessed prior to presupposing, then it is nothing more than an assertion of a possibility, or a suggested paradigm. Anselm says (and I agree) that this is a contradiction: it is impossible for God to be merely an idea.

This is the Ontological Necessity, and it appears to be simply indisputable. Critiques that I have read seem to reduce finally to an inapplicable critique because they don't really address the argument. They assume that the rules of deduction apply without an admission of all that is involved in the deduction. In other words, the Ontological syllogism is ruled as an invalid argument by virtue of the fact that God's existence is assumed in the premise. But that reduces God to an idea, which is impossible to do without making a greater error. We confess God's existence whether we ilke it or not, we can't merely assume it without confessing it in some sort of form.

So what I am saying is that there is always in inevitable objectivity to induction which justifies it, even if the conclusions seem to go beyond the explicit premises. Inductions, instead of being deemed fallacious, are rather a lesser part of doing deduction, except in the area of the sciences whose goal is to go beyond the known to discover whatever it may in the observation of various phenomena, experience, or abtractions of the mind. In which case it is an invaluable tool for discovery. The validity comes from the degree to which inductions can be affirmed by deductive disciplines.

So to those who deny God's existence we can give the same reply as one would make to Clark above: God who? And then let them fumble around with their meanings to show that it is really an unwillingness to confess Him rather than an argument opposed to His existence.

(I guess I ended up with the "Clark who?" thing anyways. To understand what I said above I have to present it. So here goes:

One idea that Clark argues is that existence is a meaningless term. If a word can be applied to everything, then it means nothing. He argues that everythings exists. The question is not whether something exists or not, but what is it? Unicorns for example...do they exist? They are an imaginary horse with a horn on its head. They exist as that.

Q. Clark who?
A. The Clark whose thesis we are discussing.

Q. But does he exist?
A. Sure he does. He wrote the book we're talking about.

Q. But is his existence meaningless or meaningfull? Does he exist as a unicorn exists?
A. Its not a question of whether he exists. Of course he does. And a unicorn's existence is meaningful to the degree its existence is thought. It is meaningful in thought only, because it exists in thought only. But Clark exists, in fact.

Q. But he said that it is meaningless to speak in reference to existence, without discriminating between the two. He says that the question is not whether it exists but rather of what it is. What does he mean by, "is"?... )


Well, I could go on, but this is enough for the point I was making above when someone argues against God's existence. We just have to back him against the wall, so to speak, as gently as we may, and get him to define what he's talking about. Eventually he has to admit that, in order to deny Him he has to affirm Him; it is really a matter of choice to deny Him, not of sound argument. But the point would be that we won't convince an unwilling heart if we beat him over the head with arguments. We have to tear down his defences slowly, so as not to make him feel as if he is meaningless, but so as to improve his awareness of his meaningfulness as a creature created in God's image, and as an object of His love, if possible.

[Edited on 12-2-2005 by JohnV]

 

[RickyReformed]

Originally posted by Paul manata

Ricky, please tell me where "its own testamony and rules" call inductive reasoning unreliable? This was your comback to me admitting that inductive arguments are probablistic. So, it appears that your argument (with the hidden premises) looks like this:

a. All probablistic arguments are unreliable.

1. Inductive arguments are probablistic.
__________________________________

2. Therefore inductve arguments are unreliable.

Obviously we'd need "a" proven. Secondly, I'd like to see how you know that *all* types of inductive arguments are unreliable.

You won't like this but let me quote Cheung:

Some seek to rescue induction by saying that, although it cannot conclusively establish any proposition, at least it can establish a claim as probable. However, if probability is "the ratio of the number of outcomes in an exhaustive set of equally likely outcomes that produce a given event to the total number of possible outcomes,"28 even if we grant that empirical methods can discover the numerator of the fraction – although I deny even this to empiricism – to determine the denominator requires knowledge of a universal, and omniscience is required to establish it in many cases. Since empirical methods cannot know universals, to say that it can come to probable knowledge is nonsense.

Secondly, no one has ever said that an inductive argument cannot yield truth! It may very well be the case that some inductive arguments have true conclusions. Indeed, I'm saying that in some instances this is the method of reasoning we should use to get closer to the truth. Since we are finite we must use induction in certain instances.

Yes, some inductive arguments have true conclusions, just like some fallacious arguments have true conclusions. Should we use fallacious arguments for the Trinity simply because their conclusion is true?

Lastly, we should endorse the method because God expects us to use this method to have dominion and learn about his creation.

How do you know this, brother? Until you can prove this, it remains an assertion. Your argument that Adam, pre-fall, used induction to name the animals is an argument from silence, because scripture DOES NOT tell us that Adam used induction to name the animals. If you are going to appeal to commentators, etc., at least give their argument(s) so that we may examine them. Le me concede that SOME men and objects (in the bible) were named because of characteristics that they possessed - so does this *necessarily* imply that ALL men and objects (in the bible) were named ofter some characteristic they possessed? Even if I grant your premise that "the importance of names was supported by the entire Bible's emphasis on it (he named his son... they called the place, etc)", how do you know that the animals were named for some characteristic that *they* possessed (ex. 'rhino-ness')? Ichabod, for instance, was NOT named after some characteristic that *he* possessed (see 1Sam 4:21-22).

Tell me how you know that all unborn humans are persons, Ricky?

By definition, my friend: the Bible defines unborn humans as children; children are persons. see Exo 21: 22-23.

Your equivocating on my use of "communicated"; all I am saying is God causes everything, even your false beliefs. You use communicated as "telling". There is a world of difference between saying "God caused Bill to believe X and John to believe Non-X" and saying "God says X and non-X" Doesn't God cause Joe Christian to believe the gospel and Penny Pagan to not believe the gospel? Again, is Penny's belief that the gospel is false determined by her own free will? By spontaneous generation? By _________?

To answer the ______? It is not just that God caused it be she also chose not to believe, according to her nature. Do you deny secondary causality?

By saying "it is not just that GOD CAUSED" etc., are you not admitting that I am correct? Furthermore, what caused her to choose according to her nature? I don't deny secondary causality, but what (or more accurately, who) 'creates' and 'sustains' these secondary causes? Spontaneous generation? ___________?

I find it interesting that you said that *I* equivocated on your use of "communicate." You said you're using it as "cause." I find that cause is not in the lexical range of the word "communicate." So, I didn't equivocate but you did.

I said God "communicated" (i.e. "conveyed", which is within the lexical use according to Microsoft Bookshelf) this belief because the idea - i.e. "the Gospel is false" (which is itself false) - that Penny Pagan believed was not original to Penny Pagan. Now God did not believe this idea was true, but in his unsearchable Counsel, he purposed that Penny Pagan believe that this false idea (i.e. "the Gospel is false") is true. Or did this idea originate with Penny Pagan? Then did God not also 'cause' Penny Pagan to believe this lie?

Remember when Dr. Bahnsen said something along the lines that even if Dr. B wrote a new, original novel that the world had never seen, it would still not be a new novel because God knew every word before Dr. B wrote it? Now did God look forward in time to know what Dr. B wrote, but the book did after all originate in Dr. B's mind? Or did God orchestrate Dr. B's life around the 'raw material' but Dr. B composed the final draft? Or __________­?

Now, I'd like to know how you have a rational justification for any of your beliefs. When I ask you upon what *epistemic* basis you believe X, what can you tell me? Moreover, this is a causal approach to justification when we are asking for *epistemological* reasons for belief. I don't even remember reading this but now I'm very scared for you. So, I'm going to push on this causal account for belief. I'll start by asking the two questions I did above. Seriously, brother, I don;t think you know what you're saying or you wouldn;t have said what you did.

I don't have rational justification for *every one* of my beliefs. I had a belief that my house was mouse free - until I found a bar of soap that had bite marks on it. Perhaps everything you believe is rationally justified. What I can be certain of, though, is that whatever God reveals to me in the Bible and anything that follows by good and necessary consequence from it is true. Every other belief may or may not not be true. If I may borrow a quote from a certain hymn writer, "All other ground is sinking sand." Perhaps you can rationally justify *without appealing to Scripture* that you are not a deluded solipsist or that you are not stuck in the Matrix, but I can't. Since I can't 'rationally justify' without appealing to Scripture that I am not in the Matrix, is my belief that I am not hooked up to a machine knowledge? If Sophie the washwoman believes that God is Triune because her sunday school teacher told her so, is her belief rationally justified? If it is not, is this belief that God is Triune knowledge?

Fine by me, at least they were'nt philosophical hacks and epistemological children.

Brother, in this thread I have been called silly, dishonest, naive, and a sophist already so this does not bother me either; I hope the persons who are following along are not prejudiced by this language, but that instead, they be persuaded by the strength (or lack thereof) of the arguments. My concern is not whether I am philosophically naive vs philosophically sophisticated, but rather "What is biblical?"

Col 2:8 See to it that no one takes you captive by philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elemental spirits of the world, and not according to Christ.


Though your bias and presuppositions will not allow you to agree with me, I believe Lee Iron's makes the case that Dr. Van Til's theology was affected negatively by his dependence on idealist epistemology. (If anyone is interested, I can email the article "Van Til's Idealist Epistemology" provided you agree not to post it on the internet, per the author's wishes.)

I believe Vincent Cheung makes a good case from scripture for his biblical metaphysics and epistemology. I would be happy to repost it, if you'd like.


I remain your friend and brother in the Lord,
Ricky

 

[JohnV]

Rick:

I am not a reader of Cheung. I am not familiar with his views. I appreciate that you posted the actual argument from his work, and then applied it to your own understanding.

Also, I cannot answer for the Presuppositionalist view, since I am not officially a Presuppositionalist. I hold to some of its arguments, but do not think them to be exclusive to Presuppositionalism. I think that to be classified as a Presuppositionalist one must be convinced of exclusive Presuppositionalism. And that I adamantly disagree with. So I cannot answer for that position.

So, to turn a corner, I think we need to start over in rethinking the idea of induction. At least, that is what I have done for myself. I still believe that Adam used induction in the Garden, but my opinion of that is greatly altered from my original opinion. But I can't just lay it out before you why I changed my mind. It requires of me, at least, to explain things right from the beginning, if I am able. It still involves why I believe that Cheung is wrong on this count, if it is that he means precisely what is posted above. Please remember that we are talking about opinions here. I need to develope my understanding, so I am not afraid to expose my ignorance.

I think we should begin with deduction. What is it, and what does it entail?

I think we can simply portray it this way:

- It must consist of at least three propositions, though often one of them is an implied proposition, not specifically stated.

- two of these are called premises, and one called a conclusion.

- the premises can consist of propositions stating either particulars or generalizations, which would determine the nature of the conclusion.

- to make propositional statements of particulars, these must be the result of previous deductions.

- it is impossible to make statements regarding particulars without assuming generalizations of some sort. ("A car went by." assumes the relationship of observation with knowledge. To make a statement presupposes the viability of communication of concepts of the mind. etc. )

- it is unmistakable that axioms and maxims are revealed, and not merely of observation alone. They were first proposed by the One who is omniscient, and not by man.

- therefore induction is not the suggestion of eternal principles to our reason, but of smaller and narrower principles (or generalizations, in keeping with my first use of the term), which fall under the eternal principles of revelation.

- therefore, again, induction is not groundless, but is only not deductively validated. But that does not mean that all induction remains invalid. This would undermine many principles of the Reformed faith, which takes in trust that which has been revealed to us in God's Word as infallibly true. To say that induction is not valid or sound is merely to say that it is not deduction, nothing more. It does not infer that the practice of induction is invalid. In fact, it is unavoidable.

Here is a challenge: uphold the invalidity of induction without the use of it in your argumentation. But further, make a valid deductive statement that can be maintained without induction. Remember, I do not consider God's existence or His Word, or belief and faith in them, as inducted, but rather as revealed. They did not originate from man's thinking, and are more valid than the clearest deduction of man's reasoning powers.