Classical vs Presuppositional Apologetics

[Bryanlbaez]

What is y’all’s take on when either of these methods of apologetics (Classical and Presuppositional)are to be employed? Would you say one is more effective than the other ? If so, why?



Thank you to all you big brain folk here helping me think through big questions with my small brain haha!

 

[Polanus1561]

Don’t forget Augustinian City of God like apologetics.

 

[RamistThomist]

Classical. As to which one is more "effective," that just depends on who is reporting. I've been told that the cosmological argument has never worked, although I have used it with profit in highly volatile situations. Likewise, I've said that the average man on the street would have no clue what the transcendental argument means, but I have been told that people use it all the time.

 

[retroGRAD3]

Both can be used effectively I think. They can also be mixed. Use the best tool for the job when the situation presents itself.

 

[Redeemed Ronin]

I lean more presuppositional as a default, but I think they differ in a matter of emphasis rather than the content of the arguments. I'm often around uncritical but amiable people, so it seems more prudent to simply "shake the tree" by addressing presuppositions with scriptural backing than to delve into more robust argumentation. The classical method seems more appropriate for some of my more thoughtful friends that think through arguments and evidence more closely. Regardless, I still have their presuppositions in mind, and am trying to get to that root, but the classical arguments would serve as a shovel to dig through that "intellectual dirt".

 

[RamistThomist]

Both sides use presuppositions. CS Lewis, a classical apologist, wrote a whole book on why naturalism couldn't account for reality. It comes down to the following:

1) Are the classical arguments ever valid or do they simply capitulate to sinful man's autonomous reason?
2) Is the Transcendental Argument valid?
3) Why is sinful man unable to trust his reason about the traditional arguments but able to trust his reason when he explores TAG?

 

[RamistThomist]

Part of the problem for both schools is that epistmology and metaphysics have moved on. The current arguments about metaphysics, both secular and theist, are far more complex than street-level kalaam arguments suggest. And anyone in the field of epistemology will eat the lunch of those who simply parrot, "oh yeah, by what standard? oh yeah, by what standard? oh yeah, by what standard?" (ad nightmare, ad infinitum).

Classical Reformed Apologetics

That’s fine, if we don’t want to give an inch, but give me an example in this day and age when such an approach worked off the bat with a nonbeliever. Heck, we can’t even get Reformed brethren from buying into cultural Marxism... we give more leeway to our own reformed brethren, maybe we need to...

puritanboard.com

 

[Jerusalem Blade]

The only reason I know anything at all about God is because He has spoken and revealed Himself and His decrees in His word. Also, I know who and what I am because He has told me in His word.

 

[Cornelius Van Halen]

Part of the problem for both schools is that epistmology and metaphysics have moved on. The current arguments about metaphysics, both secular and theist, are far more complex than street-level kalaam arguments suggest. And anyone in the field of epistemology will eat the lunch of those who simply parrot, "oh yeah, by what standard? oh yeah, by what standard? oh yeah, by what standard?" (ad nightmare, ad infinitum).

Classical Reformed Apologetics

That’s fine, if we don’t want to give an inch, but give me an example in this day and age when such an approach worked off the bat with a nonbeliever. Heck, we can’t even get Reformed brethren from buying into cultural Marxism... we give more leeway to our own reformed brethren, maybe we need to...

puritanboard.com

To be fair, "Oh yeah, by what standard?" has never been a sterling example of presuppositional apologetics.

EDIT - I want to clarify that I am completely in agreement with your point!

 

[jwright82]

What is y’all’s take on when either of these methods of apologetics (Classical and Presuppositional)are to be employed? Would you say one is more effective than the other ? If so, why?



Thank you to all you big brain folk here helping me think through big questions with my small brain haha!

The inner debates between believers aside, it just depends on the person. If an unbeliever says they believe in a God because you can't get something from nothing, why on earth would you argue with that?
If they try to reject Christianity because of a faulty philosophy of facts (like I won't believe unless God appears to me now, that's the only fact I'll believe), what good is the classical arguments going to do?
Those are extreme examples to be sure but they're meant to illustrate the nitty gritty on the street type of apologetics. So it really does depend on the person's involved.
As far as the transcendental argument goes, I think a better way to look at is the way Van Til did as more of a method of argument rather than just a single argument. This is the way the best Vantillian's have looked at it.
Also there's a lot of good Classical people out there as well. I personally choose presuppositionslism because it seems more fluid and adaptable as a method.
As far as those idiots online that just scream "by what standard, by what standard" they're just that idiots. As was already pointed out that's not affective just annoying.
I've also had luck using Plantinga's method as well.

 

[MW]

They are doing two different things. One is trying to prove that God exists; the other is showing that without the existence of God and the knowledge of Him by the Scriptures we cannot prove anything.

The "proofs" are useful for conversation and may be helpful for someone who professes openness to religion, especially if they have not had much experience with arguments for God's existence. These arguments are simply appealing to the attributes of God. Power is cosmological, wisdom and goodness is teleological, righteousness is moral, etc. Learning the arguments is helpful to oneself in giving a better appreciation for God through His creation, and this is beneficial in talking to others about Him.

But for those who are more rationally coherent and think about their worldview the proper approach is presuppositional in nature. One must show that God is the light by which we see all things.

There are various presuppositional approaches. In reformed circles you have probably only heard of one -- Van Tillian -- and it is presented as if you are for or against him. But there are other ways. A priori foundationalism has a long pedigree in the Christian tradition and in Reformed apologetics. There are numerous foundational approaches. Basic beliefs, axiomatic, intuition, etc. They all show that "first principles" are presupposed and cannot be proven.

My suggestion is not to treat it as an either/or, but as an opportunity to build one's own knowledge so as to be better equipped to help others. Experience will be important here. Trial and error will be part of the process. But ultimately, as a Reformed Christian, the Scriptures are the only infallible rule to teach and guide you.

 

[RamistThomist]

Here is one very important tip, regardless of which side: avoid cliches. Do some very hard reading in metaphysics and epistemology. Here's what that looks like.

Even though I am a harsh critic of presuppositionalism and in the past have generally sided with the Great Tradition Thomists (GTT) because they have generally not made the same howlers on the doctrine of God, I've come to realize that they have limitations, too. With the exception of Feser, GTT have generally ignored or misunderstood the reality of analytic philosophy. Speaking as one who generally likes Thomism, I admit the "Modal Collapse" problem is a real problem and I don't have a good answer to it. I've read some Thomist responses to it, and I have even understood one or two, but I couldn't explain it to the man on the street.

For presups: if the classical arguments capitulate to fallen man's autonomy, allowing him to "stand in judgment upon the word of God," then basically ALL of Reformed orthodoxy up to Kuyper is guilty of that sin. On the other hand, if presups would understand the difference between the order of being and the order of knowing, many of these misunderstandings would go away.

Even worse, if fallen man can't interpret the natural world rightly, then it is not clear why we should think he should use a tool from the natural world, i.e., basic logical categories, to interpret Scripture rightly when we present it to him. The same problem applies to our ten page long expositions of the Transcendental Argument.

 

[ZackF]

An example of an apologist who got it from both sides was Francis Schaeffer. He fits in where I find myself. His popular reputation has him as an Aquinas trasher. Many don't like him for that. Fair enough. I consider Schaeffer, I think he would agree, a moderate and modified presuppositionalist. His methodology was also critiqued by more pure presuppositionalists.

 

[RamistThomist]

An example of an apologist who got it from both sides was Francis Schaeffer. He fits in where I find myself. His popular reputation has him as an Aquinas trasher. Many don't like him for that. Fair enough. I consider Schaeffer, I think he would agree, a moderate and modified presuppositionalist. His methodology was also critiqued by more pure presuppositionalists.

I do commend Schaeffer for avoiding any cultlike mentalities on "you're either fir our method or you're agin it." That said, Schaeffer could have spent a lot more time understanding the history of philosophy before he wrote.

 

[MW]

For presups: if the classical arguments capitulate to fallen man's autonomy, allowing him to "stand in judgment upon the word of God," then basically ALL of Reformed orthodoxy up to Kuyper is guilty of that sin.

Turretin is a good example of a type of presuppositionalism which has always been a part of reformed orthodoxy.

III. Although that there is a God is an indubitable first principle of religion (rather to be taken for granted than proved, so that they who doubt it are to be punished and not disputed with, as Aristotle says), yet the execrable madness of modern atheists (of whom this most corrupt age is far too fruitful, who do not blush impiously to deny this clearest truth) renders this question necessary.

IV. The question is not whether the true and saving knowledge of God obtains everywhere among men. For no one can deny that the true God was
and is even now unknown by many nations, who are therefore called atheists (atheoi) by the apostle (Eph. 2:12). Rather the question is whether such a knowledge of the deity is implanted in men by nature, that no one can be wholly ignorant of him; or whether the existence of God can be demonstrated by unanswerable arguments, not only from the Scriptures, but also from nature herself. Profane men and atheists unscrupulously deny this; we assert it.

 

[Alexander Suarez]

Turretin is a good example of a type of presuppositionalism which has always been a part of reformed orthodoxy.

III. Although that there is a God is an indubitable first principle of religion (rather to be taken for granted than proved, so that they who doubt it are to be punished and not disputed with, as Aristotle says), yet the execrable madness of modern atheists (of whom this most corrupt age is far too fruitful, who do not blush impiously to deny this clearest truth) renders this question necessary.

IV. The question is not whether the true and saving knowledge of God obtains everywhere among men. For no one can deny that the true God was
and is even now unknown by many nations, who are therefore called atheists (atheoi) by the apostle (Eph. 2:12). Rather the question is whether such a knowledge of the deity is implanted in men by nature, that no one can be wholly ignorant of him; or whether the existence of God can be demonstrated by unanswerable arguments, not only from the Scriptures, but also from nature herself. Profane men and atheists unscrupulously deny this; we assert it.

Good day Rev. Winzer,

We cross paths virtually again. I hope all is well.

Concerning your quotation of Turretin, if I recall correctly, you are against what he has stated at the end of that quotation, correct? That "the existence of God can be demonstrated by unanswerable arguments . . . from nature herself"?

 

[MW]

Concerning your quotation of Turretin, if I recall correctly, you are against what he has stated at the end of that quotation, correct? That "the existence of God can be demonstrated by unanswerable arguments . . . from nature herself"?

Hello Alex,

We have been over this in a previous thread.

Can God be Proven to Exist?

Hebrews 1:3 says God is “upholding all things by the word of his power.” If this is true then it should be for all created things that their existence and continuance has no sufficient explanation in their own created natures, but is due only to God willing them to exist. Thus if one...

www.puritanboard.com

Again I refer you to the first statement I made in that thread: "I accept there is a 'rational level' where you can prove God exists." I do not know how I could make it any clearer. The reasonableness of belief in God is beyond doubt. But the limitations of reason must be accounted for, as explained in that thread.

 

[VictorBravo]

The methods may have use in various circumstances, but I reflect on how the spirit works through light of Christian living. As in Eph 5:11.

I recall as a pagan reveling in acts of darkness being convicted by a rock guitarist saying, “the good Lord has protected you from your foolishness.”

 

[RamistThomist]

Turretin is a good example of a type of presuppositionalism which has always been a part of reformed orthodoxy.

III. Although that there is a God is an indubitable first principle of religion (rather to be taken for granted than proved, so that they who doubt it are to be punished and not disputed with, as Aristotle says), yet the execrable madness of modern atheists (of whom this most corrupt age is far too fruitful, who do not blush impiously to deny this clearest truth) renders this question necessary.

IV. The question is not whether the true and saving knowledge of God obtains everywhere among men. For no one can deny that the true God was
and is even now unknown by many nations, who are therefore called atheists (atheoi) by the apostle (Eph. 2:12). Rather the question is whether such a knowledge of the deity is implanted in men by nature, that no one can be wholly ignorant of him; or whether the existence of God can be demonstrated by unanswerable arguments, not only from the Scriptures, but also from nature herself. Profane men and atheists unscrupulously deny this; we assert it.

I don't see that as unique to presuppositionalism. I think the defining point for Van Tillian presuppositionalism is whether we must presuppose the self-contained concrete universal in order to account for all of reality, along with the claim that the traditional arguments (and method) are false.

 

[MW]

I don't see that as unique to presuppositionalism. I think the defining point for Van Tillian presuppositionalism is whether we must presuppose the self-contained concrete universal in order to account for all of reality, along with the claim that the traditional arguments (and method) are false.

My point is only to show there are elements in the reformed tradition that support a presuppositional approach. Van Til never claimed that the traditional arguments were false. He likened them to the furniture in a room, which is supported by a floor. The self-revelation of God in Scripture provided that floor. However, he did criticise the "method." I think it can be shown that the "method" was theologically eclectic, and not distinctively Reformed.

 

[Ploutos]

I think it can be shown that the "method" was theologically eclectic, and not distinctively Reformed.

Can you elaborate on this? The Reformed would have probably viewed "theologically eclectic" as a compliment, since they set out to show that they were in line with the traditions of church history, not doing something "distinctively Reformed".

 

[Blood-Bought Pilgrim]

I think from a philosophical standpoint one must presuppose God's word as the normative standard. From that point there is room I think for a variety of arguments, including many of the classical ones, though I might take issue with the way some representatives of classical apologetics approach the issues. I would lump myself in with Frame's leaky presuppositionalism.

 

[MW]

Can you elaborate on this? The Reformed would have probably viewed "theologically eclectic" as a compliment, since they set out to show that they were in line with the traditions of church history, not doing something "distinctively Reformed".

They were philosophically, not theologically, eclectic. They were distinctively and self-consciously Reformed as opposed to Romanist, Socinian, Arminian,, etc.

I don't have time to pull out Muller right now. In vol. 3 of PRRD there is a full discussion of the theistic proofs, where he shows the presuppositional methodology in both reformed and reformed orthodox, and notes a few rationalistic developments in later orthodoxy. Here is one quotation I have on hand without being able to give a full reference:

Given that the primary testimony to the existence of God is God himself speaking in Scripture, there is a relative priority of the proofs from “testimony,” including the rhetorical proofs, over the rational demonstrations in Reformed orthodox thought. This priority coincides, moreover, with the frequent denial of the existence of a genuine speculative atheism and the focus of the discussion on “practical atheism.” The true “speculative atheists” will deny the proof from testimony: “For as they deny that there is a God, so they deny likewise that the Scripture is his word.” The primary testimony, as already noted, is the divine revelation.

 

[jwright82]

I don't see that as unique to presuppositionalism. I think the defining point for Van Tillian presuppositionalism is whether we must presuppose the self-contained concrete universal in order to account for all of reality, along with the claim that the traditional arguments (and method) are false.

I think those are not as connected as you think. The first point is basically the way I've layed it out before. If Christianity isn't true what (besides non-existentience) would be different in our experience of reality? This is a paradigm case argument, it fleshes out what "account for" means.
If there is a difference than what is it and we can compare reality to the difference to see if it's that way. But that's a transcendental argument and that contradicts the critique of TA'S in general as a method of argumentation. You can't critique the method only to turn around and use it.
If there would be no difference than that is autonomy in being, knowledge, and ethics. It makes Christianity superfluous to reality, ultimately. Either way Van Til wins, that's the dirty little secret of criticisms from other Reformed Christians that they'll fall in one of those boats.
Now the second point can be summed up like this. If the apologist falls into the second option, either knowingly or unknowingly, and then they try to build their arguments (assuming that) than what they are arguing for is not Christianity but something else.
Now is it possible for a Classical apologist to admit option one and still insist on using and developing classical arguments with that in mind? Sure, Van Til said that the classical arguments could be reformulated along these lines, whether or not his formulations are acceptable to the classical apologist (or are sound) is beyond my interest so I never thought about it.
But if we take his general criticisms and pull them back a bit to show that it's possible to avoid the problem I (working from his thoughts) developed, than fine. Then it's more of a warning of what not to do, instead of an inherent problem in CA.
Now I know some may not know what a paradigm case argument is so I'll explain. A paradigm case argument (PCA) is a type of argument used against extreme skeptical claims. The Matrix argument is kinda the classic example, the claim has been made long before the movie (or movies in general) existed but for contemporary people they can use it to latch on what's going on. How do we know the world around us isn't just an illusion or matrix type reality?
Various answers have been given, common sense realism is the best but it's a positive argument never the less. A better question is "is there really a problem I have to solve there?"
Taking this angle one could argue that the skeptic has the burden of proof here. They need to demonstrate how reality would be different if it's all a Matrix type illusion or not? They generally say that there would be no difference. Well if there's no difference than I have no reason to abandon my belief in reality being not an illusion and have no worries about being stuck in the Matrix as the result of machines. Great movies though.

 

[No Other Name]

Great movies though

I was happy to be a quiet 3rd party observer, but this needs challenged! hahahahaha

Seriously, the first one set up an interesting premise with a creatively built world, but it must have taken a lot of work and was tiring, because the next one took what was interesting and mashed it all over the place like a toddler who is tired of eating and wants to see the food all mixed up and whether it retains its substance when the food hits the floor / is smeared all over the clothes / smeared all over the face and head etc.

[My apologies for the tangent. Please let this excellent thread continue as it is]

 

[ZackF]

Great movies though.

Jamey, the first one was great. The others….

 

[greenbaggins]

I don't see that as unique to presuppositionalism. I think the defining point for Van Tillian presuppositionalism is whether we must presuppose the self-contained concrete universal in order to account for all of reality, along with the claim that the traditional arguments (and method) are false.

Most Van Tillians would agree with the first part (though that is a rather impersonal way of putting things), but not the second. I have read several Van Tillians who would say that the traditional arguments are very effective for shoring up believers' faith, because they already believe it, but not so effective against unbelievers, because of the noetic effects of the Fall. The most defining element of presuppositional apologetics (in my opinion) is that the problem unbelievers have with God is not so much rational, but moral rebellion against the God they know exists. Or, to put it another way, their (ir)rational arguments stem from their moral rebellion. Added to this, all unbelievers borrow from the Christian worldview in order to try to refute it.

The typical problem that Van Til sees with classical methods is that classical methodology presupposes a neutral ground (rationality) that Christians and unbelievers share. There is no neutral ground in terms of epistemology. There is everything shared ontologically (thus disproving Jacob's untrue assertion that Van Tillians can't tell the difference between epistemology and ontology. Actually it is a rather prominent point of distinction).

 

[RamistThomist]

I have read several Van Tillians who would say that the traditional arguments are very effective for shoring up believers' faith, because they already believe it, but not so effective against unbelievers, because of the noetic effects of the Fall.

And I've listened to Bahnsen and Michael Butler mock the cosmological argument. I think it was one of the last CDs in the course on Transcendental arguments.

There is everything shared ontologically (thus disproving Jacob's untrue assertion that Van Tillians can't tell the difference between epistemology and ontology.

That is not exactly what I said. I said many do not tell the difference between the order of being and the order knowing. That's not quite the same thing. What that means is God is first in the order of being, but, as Sproul pointed out, in the order of knowing I begin with self-consciousness, not God-consciousness.

So when presups say if God didn't exist, none of this would work, I agree. That's the order of being.

 

[Ploutos]

The typical problem that Van Til sees with classical methods is that classical methodology presupposes a neutral ground (rationality) that Christians and unbelievers share. There is no neutral ground in terms of epistemology. There is everything shared ontologically (thus disproving Jacob's untrue assertion that Van Tillians can't tell the difference between epistemology and ontology. Actually it is a rather prominent point of distinction).

Neutral ground, no. Shared epistemological ground - yes: common grace and common revelation.

 

[greenbaggins]

And I've listened to Bahnsen and Michael Butler mock the cosmological argument. I think it was one of the last CDs in the course on Transcendental arguments.


That is not exactly what I said. I said many do not tell the difference between the order of being and the order knowing. That's not quite the same thing. What that means is God is first in the order of being, but, as Sproul pointed out, in the order of knowing I begin with self-consciousness, not God-consciousness.

So when presups say if God didn't exist, none of this would work, I agree. That's the order of being.

Regardless, I did not find your previous description of Van Tillianism to be accurate. There are undoubtedly some Van Tillians who might mock the the traditional arguments. Far more often, they simply disagree that such are persuasive to an unbeliever. That is far more characteristic of Van Tillians than your description is.

Neutral ground, no. Shared epistemological ground - yes: common grace and common revelation.

But the unbeliever will always disagree with the believer on the significance of anything in the realm of common grace and common revelation.