Classical vs Presuppositional Apologetics

[RamistThomist]

But the unbeliever will always disagree with the believer on the significance of anything in the realm of common grace and common revelation.

They don't disagree, other things being equal, on the law of noncontradiction. That's one thing that is common to both. They might disagree on how it is "grounded" or something, but not on the fact that it works for both and both use it.

Regardless, I did not find your previous description of Van Tillianism to be accurate. ...That is far more characteristic of Van Tillians than your description is.

You are welcome to think that. I believe my characterization was accurate (of Bahnsen at least). Bahnsen accepts Mill's critique of the cosmological argument.

 

[Ploutos]

But the unbeliever will always disagree with the believer on the significance of anything in the realm of common grace and common revelation.

That's different from saying there is no common ground, which incidentally is a better term than neutral ground. One doesn't need to argue - and shouldn't - that there is a such thing as neutral ground. But to argue that there is no common ground at all seems to deny common grace.

 

[RamistThomist]

In his review of Sproul and Gerstner, Bahnsen clearly rejects the cosmological argument.

And from some of his lectures

Arguments for the Existence of God (Part 2/2) – Greg Bahnsen

Notes from Greg L. Bahnsen’s two-part lecture series, Arguments for the Existence of God. I was asked a question about the difference between natural revelation and natural theology. Natural theolo…

defenseofaith.wordpress.com

***I’d like to look at the fallacious character of the theistic proofs offered in natural theology. None of the arguments ever offered in the light of natural theology has ever been good. I’m going to look at the Cosmological Argument, the Ontological Argument and the Teleological Argument.****

I have my copy of the Van Til reader floating around somewhere. It has more of Bahnsen's criticisms.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

From my perspective, the issue has less to do with being all in with respect to a school of apologetics.

It has more to do with recognizing that the creature is never in a position to treat God as an object of his knowing and deciding for himself whether he can know Him.

There are also some peripheral issues around generic classical apologetics because some theologians who engage in it approach the issue from a semi-Pelagian (or even bordering on Pelagian) conception of man and grace.

I spend a good deal of time listening to the "current apologetic conversations" where the Christian Apologists seek as their primary goal of trying to convince the unbelieving mind that God is something worth believing in. He's not as bad as you think. He's not a moral monster. It's respectable to be a Christian.

William Lane Craig, for instance, uses the Cosmological Argument but he's perfectly content to reduce the "target" for what he's arguing for a generic Theism. He, like many, is more concerned with reducing the target of criticism against belief in Christianity and is willing to compromise many aspects of Biblical theology as debatable.

When the classical arguments were formed, it is undeniable that those who crafted them did so with a belief framework. They didn't form the arguments in order to believe that God existed and then decide which God existed and which parts of Revelation would be acceptable to their culture.

 

[RamistThomist]

There is a simple way to do apologetics:

1) Give reasons for what you believe.
2) Offer defeaters of the other positions

Practically speaking, this means:

3) No one argument is going to be a silver bullet. What works against strict empiricism will be largely useless against Roman Catholicism or New Age mysticism.

And even though I am a staunch critic of presuppositionalism, I've been just as harsh against Thomism. From 2017-2020 I was a big critic of Reformed Thomism, even getting kicked off the Reformed Thomist Facebook group (I've since rejoined).

I side with most Thomists on their reading of the historical sources. I think the biblicists have utterly failed on this point. With that said, I am starting to feel the criticism analytic theologians make of the stronger divine simplicity claims, although in terms of arguments for God's existence I don't think Alvin Plantinga's properly basic beliefs are sufficient.

 

[jwright82]

That's different from saying there is no common ground, which incidentally is a better term than neutral ground. One doesn't need to argue - and shouldn't - that there is a such thing as neutral ground. But to argue that there is no common ground at all seems to deny common grace.

I don't think that he was. If I may, I think he's referring to Epistemological common ground. Not psychological or creational common ground. One deals with the how/why we know (which is only possible in a reality in which Christianity is true). The other two are what we know.

 

[MW]

What that means is God is first in the order of being, but, as Sproul pointed out, in the order of knowing I begin with self-consciousness, not God-consciousness.

This means all your thinking about God and the world is a projection of self. There is no way to get to the self-revelation of God in Scripture.

 

[jwright82]

They don't disagree, other things being equal, on the law of noncontradiction. That's one thing that is common to both. They might disagree on how it is "grounded" or something, but not on the fact that it works for both and both use it.

Yes but would the "law of non-contradiction" even exist if Christianity weren't true. If it would than that's autonomy, for it gives creation (as we experience it) an almost self-existence in nature and everything contained within it.
The whole point of my previous reply was to move from "reality would be different and here's how" to "ok, that's a transcendental argument so it's clearly not that bad (your using it)." To "now that you've admitted it, let's come together and help each other refine our arguments".
Or admit there would be no difference and that's autonomy and Van Til's criticisms are basically right.
If it's the second option then you would have to admit that upfront and then try to prove that despite that we can still prove a God exists and maybe something else. But it wouldn't be Christianity.

You are welcome to think that. I believe my characterization was accurate (of Bahnsen at least). Bahnsen accepts Mill's critique of the cosmological argument.

But your characterzation of his arguments and the transcendental argument are wrong. I've shown that.

 

[jwright82]

There is a simple way to do apologetics:

1) Give reasons for what you believe.
2) Offer defeaters of the other positions

Practically speaking, this means:

3) No one argument is going to be a silver bullet. What works against strict empiricism will be largely useless against Roman Catholicism or New Age mysticism.

And even though I am a staunch critic of presuppositionalism, I've been just as harsh against Thomism. From 2017-2020 I was a big critic of Reformed Thomism, even getting kicked off the Reformed Thomist Facebook group (I've since rejoined).

I side with most Thomists on their reading of the historical sources. I think the biblicists have utterly failed on this point. With that said, I am starting to feel the criticism analytic theologians make of the stronger divine simplicity claims, although in terms of arguments for God's existence I don't think Alvin Plantinga's properly basic beliefs are sufficient.

Friend to friend, I think (if I may) that you're well deserved animosity towards certain Vantillian's who incorrectly wavered into heresy on the doctrine of God might be skewing your view of all Vantillian's. It makes it a lot easier to respond if that's what you're inadvertently doing with "no we don't". Why make it that easy?

 

[Ploutos]

This means all your thinking about God and the world is a projection of self. There is no way to get to the self-revelation of God in Scripture.

I don't agree with that. We can never truly be outside of ourselves. All knowledge passes through the filter of human finitude to get to us. That by no means makes all our thinking a projection of self, though to pretend there is a way to think without any involvement of self is to imagine a sort of objectivity and detachment not possible for finite minds.

 

[RamistThomist]

Yes but would the "law of non-contradiction" even exist if Christianity weren't true

Ultimately, no. That's why I said God is prior in the order of being.

This means all your thinking about God and the world is a projection of self. There is no way to get to the self-revelation of God in Scripture.

I didn't say it in a clear way, but I was summarizing Sproul.

But your characterzation of his arguments and the transcendental argument are wrong. I've shown that.

I just quoted Bahnsen. I didn't get into the TAG in this thread, aside from mentioning it. He rejects the cosmological argument. He said it is fallacious. I think he is wrong, but I didn't go into it. My point was to show a prominent presuppositionalist who did believe we could use the traditional argument. (He did allow for something along Plantinga's ontological argument in his course on The Philosophy of Christianity).

It makes it a lot easier to respond if that's what you're inadvertently doing with "no we don't". Why make it that easy?

Fair enough, but I quoted Bahnsen (and I'll quote more when I find my copy).

 

[MW]

I don't agree with that. We can never truly be outside of ourselves. All knowledge passes through the filter of human finitude to get to us. That by no means makes all our thinking a projection of self, though to pretend there is a way to think without any involvement of self is to imagine a sort of objectivity and detachment not possible for finite minds.

I am sorry to say you have missed the point. Please go and read the original comment to which I replied. It refers to the order of knowing. It had nothing to do with denying the fact of self.

 

[jwright82]

Ultimately, no. That's why I said God is prior in the order of being.

Well why not first in the order of everything? Knowledge, ethics, and being? It would seem that if Christianity is true than that would be the case.

I didn't say it in a clear way, but I was summarizing Sproul.


I just quoted Bahnsen. I didn't get into the TAG in this thread, aside from mentioning it. He rejects the cosmological argument. He said it is fallacious. I think he is wrong, but I didn't go into it. My point was to show a prominent presuppositionalist who did believe we could use the traditional argument. (He did allow for something along Plantinga's ontological argument in his course on The Philosophy of Christianity).

But why focus on him? I always quote others and rarely him. But you did say it would be confusing to people to use the TA. What's confusing about the argument I gave, you have two options to choose from?

Fair enough, but I quoted Bahnsen (and I'll quote more when I find my copy).

Why not quote Edgar, Oliphint, or someone else?

 

[RamistThomist]

Well why not first in the order of everything? Knowledge, ethics, and being? It would seem that if Christianity is true than that would be the case.

Because it seems my own self-knowing is prior to my theorizing about God.

But why focus on him? I always quote others and rarely him.

He is clearer than Van Til and for the longest time was considered the best exponent of Van Til. And I have listened to thousands of hours of his tapes, so that's probably the main reason.

What's confusing about the argument I gave, you have two options to choose from?

I understand the argument because I have a philosophical background. Although I could be wrong, I highly doubt the man on the street would.

Why not quote Edgar, Oliphint, or someone else?

I donated most of my library 15 years ago. And while I think Oliphint got Aquinas wrong, I do think his knowledge of Plantinga is better than most in the Reformed world.

Okay. Fine. I just bought a copy. lol

 

[MW]

Because it seems my own self-knowing is prior to my theorizing about God.

Presumably when you became aware of self you also became aware of non-self. "Something" must have touched you in order for you to become conscious that you are a feeling subject.

 

[RamistThomist]

Presumably when you became aware of self you also became aware of non-self. "Something" must have touched you in order for you to become conscious that you are a feeling subject.

True, but it doesn't follow that I was also aware of that Something.

 

[MW]

True, but it doesn't follow that I was also aware of that Something.

If that "something" did not make itself felt you would not have felt it, and if you did not feel it you could have no sense of self as a feeling subject. So it must follow, by the very fact you are aware of feeling that you were aware also of something causing that feeling that was not you.

 

[RamistThomist]

If that "something" did not make itself felt you would not have felt it, and if you did not feel it you could have no sense of self as a feeling subject. So it must follow, by the very fact you are aware of feeling that you were aware also of something causing that feeling that was not you.

Even if I grant that, how would I know it is "God"?

 

[MW]

Even if I grant that, how would I know it is "God"?

You don't have to "know" it is God. You could call it a sense or an intuition. Whatever it is called you could have no self-knowledge without it. This is all that is necessary to defeat the original claim.

 

[Knight]

Okay. Fine. I just bought a copy. lol
View attachment 11434

You'll get a kick out of pgs. 22-23

 

[ZackF]

I donated most of my library 15 years ago. And while I think Oliphint got Aquinas wrong, I do think his knowledge of Plantinga is better than most in the Reformed world.

Is there a presuppositionalist that you think gets Aquinas right?

 

[Ploutos]

You don't have to "know" it is God. You could call it a sense or an intuition. Whatever it is called you could have no self-knowledge without it.

But being incapable of self-knowledge without it is not the same as knowing one's self to be incapable of such knowledge.

 

[MW]

But being incapable of self-knowledge without it is not the same as knowing one's self to be incapable of such knowledge.

I don't see what this has to do with the point. You seem to be running your own race here.

 

[Ploutos]

I don't see what this has to do with the point. You seem to be running your own race here.

Perhaps you could try explaining it again?

 

[MW]

Perhaps you could try explaining it again?

The issue is not whether we have self-knowledge. The issue is the order of knowing -- what comes first. If a person is conscious of self, that is a differentiation which presupposes a non-self. If there is consciousness there is something that causes the person to be aware of self as a feeling subject. Quite clearly, then, we do not begin with self-consciousness.

 

[Ploutos]

The issue is not whether we have self-knowledge. The issue is the order of knowing -- what comes first. If a person is conscious of self, that is a differentiation which presupposes a non-self. If there is consciousness there is something that causes the person to be aware of self as a feeling subject. Quite clearly, then, we do not begin with self-consciousness.

Actually, I think you are missing my point. It is precisely the order of knowing that I was talking about. Also, I would appreciate if you toned down the condescension, as I'm trying to have an honest conversation with you.

A person can be conscious of self without also consciously presupposing a non-self. In fact, infants notably go through stage where they are not necessarily able to distinguish self from non-self. Now to the outsider, a person's consciousness of self is sure evidence of the differentiation between self and non-self. But from within the person's perspective, I'm not so sure that consciousness of self presupposes consciousness of non-self.

 

[RamistThomist]

Is there a presuppositionalist that you think gets Aquinas right?

Frame comes close at points. I haven't read what Welty or Anderson say, if anything, on Aquinas. Most people reduce Aquinas to the 5 Ways and basically ignore everything else he said.

 

[MW]

Actually, I think you are missing my point. It is precisely the order of knowing that I was talking about. Also, I would appreciate if you toned down the condescension, as I'm trying to have an honest conversation with you.

A person can be conscious of self without also consciously presupposing a non-self. In fact, infants notably go through stage where they are not necessarily able to distinguish self from non-self. Now to the outsider, a person's consciousness of self is sure evidence of the differentiation between self and non-self. But from within the person's perspective, I'm not so sure that consciousness of self presupposes consciousness of non-self.

There is no condescension. If you choose to read that "tone" into it that is up to you.

Infants and development are not relevant. You should be able to look at self-consciousness in any moment since it is the order of knowing and you are knowing in the present.

What is self? Is it a distinct thing? What is it distinct from?

What is consciousness? How did you become aware of yourself? Was there a cause to it? If not, how do you propose to argue from effect to cause and come up with the knowledge of God?

 

[jwright82]

Because it seems my own self-knowing is prior to my theorizing about God.

But your being is prior to knowing. I mean it's all wrapped up in the same thing. I must confess ignorance, my fault of course, at your repeated criticism of Van Til at this point. First in the order of knowing not being.
I agree with your point but I wonder what difference it makes? I think you're focusing on a methodological issue but then turning around and implying that for Van Til he collapses the two (knowing and being) into one. But Bahnsen pointed out that there is an ultimate starting point and a proximate starting point. That maintains the distinction you're interested in maintaining.
It also points to a fluidity in the method because we don't have to be worried about that distinction. We can start anywhere.
Correct me if I'm wrong but I think you're referring to Bahnsen's Epistemological emphasis in his argument. That's not all of how the method works, as I've said you can start anywhere. I will admit that many applications of the method seem to focus, so fair enough, on those types of things.
But I gave more of a metaphysical argument to consider which assumes an Epistemological structure in place. That also makes it closer to a TA by considering what must exist for things to be as they are. Which is metaphysical in nature.
But I don't see how an argument from the possibility of logic per se completely reduces to an Epistemological issue? Or morality for that matter.

He is clearer than Van Til and for the longest time was considered the best exponent of Van Til. And I have listened to thousands of hours of his tapes, so that's probably the main reason.

Fair enough.

I understand the argument because I have a philosophical background. Although I could be wrong, I highly doubt the man on the street would.

Well it was meant for a fellow believer but I wonder with a little tinkering if couldn't be adjusted. Also I've had no problems using the method for the average person.
At least then you could move to considering that things are as they are so that the story of redemption can be realized in time and space. You could say something like "look at everything that took place and must be true so that we could be having this conversation right now".
You simply start wherever they are and move out to consider how anything could be the way it is. It really is not much different in practice than using whatever method to be honest. That's why it's hard for apologists, as I know you know, to just spout out a winning argument.

I donated most of my library 15 years ago. And while I think Oliphint got Aquinas wrong, I do think his knowledge of Plantinga is better than most in the Reformed world.

Okay. Fine. I just bought a copy. lol
View attachment 11434

Fair enough, let me know how it is. Yeah I think he studied under him. I've read some stuff he's written on him. Planned on getting this book soon, so we can compare notes if you want, or you could do one of your fantastic reviews. I really think you got a gift there man. You always fairly deal with the material at hand.

 

[Ploutos]

There is no condescension. If you choose to read that "tone" into it that is up to you.

Infants and development are not relevant. You should be able to look at self-consciousness in any moment since it is the order of knowing and you are knowing in the present.

What is self? Is it a distinct thing? What is it distinct from?

What is consciousness? How did you become aware of yourself? Was there a cause to it? If not, how do you propose to argue from effect to cause and come up with the knowledge of God?

Why do you think infants and development are irrelevant? I view infants as a great illustration of the fact that order of being is different from order of knowing. Self exists as a distinct thing from other selves, long before a self is aware of that.