Compatibilism

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sotzo

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What would be a good, but brief, explanation of compatibilism and what is a way in which we can illustrate it?

For example, I am typing this post right now. How would a compatibilist view explain how much of my decision to type certain words is actually my own decision versus God ordaining me to write them?

I realize there is no way to exhaustively explain this...just looking for something that removes the immediate, prima facie contradictions that some folks struggle with in reconcilling free will with God's sovereignty.
 
Def: "Combatibilism" a. the ability to be punched in the face, and keep on trucking like the Juggernaut, b. possible misspelling of 'compatibilism'.
 
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You're using 2 different words. Twice in the post heading you say Combatibilism (with a 'b') and then twice in the post you say compatibilism (with a 'p').
 
I tried to read Freedom of the Will :judge: but i was over my head.

but in the case of sinners they sin and it is ordained that they sin... but they WANT to sin as well.

just as God is not the cosmic rapist because he regenerates us to be able to repent and trust in Jesus Christ and we then WANT to.

:2cents:
 
What would be a good, but brief, explanation of compatibilism and what is a way in which we can illustrate it?

For example, I am typing this post right now. How would a compatibilist view explain how much of my decision to type certain words is actually my own decision versus God ordaining me to write them?

I realize there is no way to exhaustively explain this...just looking for something that removes the immediate, prima facie contradictions that some folks struggle with in reconcilling free will with God's sovereignty.

John Gerstner's A Primer on Free Will is very short (28 pages) and might be a good starting point.
 
What would be a good, but brief, explanation of compatibilism and what is a way in which we can illustrate it?

For example, I am typing this post right now. How would a compatibilist view explain how much of my decision to type certain words is actually my own decision versus God ordaining me to write them?

I realize there is no way to exhaustively explain this...just looking for something that removes the immediate, prima facie contradictions that some folks struggle with in reconcilling free will with God's sovereignty.

Compatibilism is the teaching that the following are compatible with each other:

free will and determinism

or

The moral responsibility of one's actions and the fact that God has ordained whatever comes to pass

Those who say that free will is compatible with determinism use the word, "free will", to mean, "to act according to one's desires". Determinism can be described as the idea that everything that happens is caused by a something or someone that guarantees that it would happen.

God made a plan that you would have the desire to type certain words and you act according to your desire. You are not forced to type certain words. Your will was involved in your action. It was God's plan that your will would choose to type those words. It is true that is it your decision to type certain words and it is also true that God ordained that you would type certain words.
 
You're using 2 different words. Twice in the post heading you say Combatibilism (with a 'b') and then twice in the post you say compatibilism (with a 'p').

I did??

Yes. But I see it's changed now. Archlute noticed it too. I was just confused as to the question.

Def: "Combatibilism" a. the ability to be punched in the face, and keep on trucking like the Juggernaut, b. possible misspelling of 'compatibilism'.
 
The idea that all that is required for moral responsibility is the physical capability of the person to keep the commandment (meaning, if he is being required to fly or run a mile, he is not in a wheel chair) and not coerced one way or the other, and able to act according to his strongest desire. The ability to otherwise, all things as they are, is not necessary and impossible even.
 
Feinberg, in No One Like Him, offers the argument along the following lines.

An illustration might help to explain the compatibilist view. Suppose I decide I want a given student in my class to leave the room. There are three ways I could accomplish this. I could literally grab the student and carry him out of the room. In this scenario, the constraint in operation on the student involves a force (me) exerted on the student that involves bodily movement, but not bodily movement that the student’s will in any sense made happen. Clearly he did not leave the room freely.

Or, I could threaten the student with a failing grade unless he left the room immediately. In this case, while the student does not really want to leave, yet on the other hand the student does not want a failing grade, so he decides to reluctantly leave the classroom. The constraint operating here is a force (me) that does not entirely remove willing by the student so constrained, although what is “chosen” by the student is contrary to what the student wished to choose. Again, the student did not leave the room freely.

Finally, I could perhaps point out the various factors that make it advantageous for the student to leave the room, though nothing I say threatens the student in any way. The student may not initially want to leave, for after all, I am a fantastic lecturer. Eventually though, I convince the student by reason and argument (without threats or warnings of danger if he refuses to go) to leave the classroom. In this situation, while the student did not initially want to leave, after considering all the pros and cons of staying or leaving, his desire to stay changed to a desire to leave, and the student acted on that new desire. In this scenario, a compatibilist will say that while the act (leaving the classroom) was causally determined, the student was not constrained to leave but did so voluntarily, in accord with his own nature, according to his own wishes.

To summarize, compatibilists hold that for every decision a person makes there are causal conditions playing upon that individual’s will so as to incline it decisively and sufficiently in one direction rather than another such that the agent could not have done otherwise, given the prevailing causal influences.
 
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