Gettysburg/Gods and Generals
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AlexanderHenderson1647
Puritan Board Freshman
Agree here. You'll get some fine details on battles and the figures who fought in and generally surround the conflict. Ideologically though, keep an eye out for advocacy and unashamed partisanship and several tasteless misdirections by way of revisionism. Think critically and be prepared to study your facts.
LawrenceU
Puritan Board Doctor
If you really want to learn about The War and get a good central view of it, you will not get that by watching movies. Movies, even documentaries are made to make money - not teach history. They will condense and simplify, necessarily for time and often by viewpoint, and in so doing lose the ability to display the complexities that drive history. To really learn you must read. There are some good works out there. Foote's is a classic. It is often accused of being 'pro-South', but it is not. It is just not PC. (Anything that is a bit off the PC line in the study of this war is immediately branded as either a Southern apology, racist, or both.)
Lawrence,
Just to be clear, I am not interested in the movies as a basis for historical research. In my original post I mentioned that I was taking time out from my studies, in order to watch the films.
I do think also that your concerns about movies/documentaries equally apply to books. So I personally do not look at documentaries so cynically, at least not those of the caliber of Mr Burns.
Also one could just as easily assert that anything a bit off of the pro-South line is immediately branded as politically correct. I think an assertion either way is unhelpful and only serves to discount the other viewpoint before it can be investigated by the inquirer.
I have no horse in this race, and am only interested in approximating the facts that are available to us. Both "sides" have some simplistic explanations for their view. I think truth is found somewhere in the middle, and I am not seeking those facts in order to arrive on either side. My motivation is strictly to catch up on an important subject I was deprived of learning as a child.
Regarding Foote, he is interviewed in the Ken Burns series, and he speaks freely about where he finds bias in the films. So I am not one who would be quick to assume or be easily persuaded that the documentaries have an outright bias, when dissenting viewpoints are available.
Otherwise, thank you for the general reminder.
PreservedKillick
Puritan Board Freshman
I think Foote actually did go on the record that he leaned more pro-South, but didn't think much of either cause. I'll look for the reference when I have more time this coming week. The thing to remember with Foote was that he wasn't a trained historian, so there are problems with his narrative, but it is still, as Pastor Underwood said, a classic. For books, I'd start with James M. McPherson's masterful Battle Cry of Freedom. It's one of the best one volume general histories of the Civil War out there and McPherson is one of the top Civil War historians around.
So I watched the two films this weekend. Some of my thoughts:
1. I think I enjoyed G&G slightly better than Gburg.
2. I do not know which portrayal of General Lee was more accurate, but I preferred Duval's version over Sheen. In secular public school, I was taught that General Lee was the hero of the South and the best General on either side of the war. Based strictly on these films, I would have to disagree. The beginning of the war it seemed that Lee was handed his war tactics/stategy by Union incompetency. Later, as portrayed at Gettysburg, Lee seems to have gone off the rail once the Union had learned from its mistakes. The two Lees as portrayed in the films were so opposite one another it is hard to believe they were the same person.
3. I thought the battle scenes were pretty hammy at many points. Understandable for Gburg, but not understandable for G&G considering this film was made years after the realism of battle scenes portrayed in films like Braveheart and Saving Private Ryan. There were several scenes during battles that were just repeated over and over, and several scenes where the actors could be see just lying or standing around casually talking.
4. I think both movies suffer from miscasting. Stephen Lang stood out as the best actor in both films, both as Jackson and Pickett. An especially inspiring performance as Jackson.
5. I thought G&G dropped the ball on the slavery issue. Everytime a slave was shown, they were shown to be happy or as part of a benevolent family. Reminds me of Gone With the Wind and Lost Cause mythology. The films did make the point several times that the North's cause was not about slavery, at least not at first (or at least not explicitly for political reasons at the time). And they also showed how some southerners were for abolition. But, overall the films do show the contradiction's of the South's viewpoint regarding freedom, rights, invasion, etc. without at the same time giving blessing to everyting the North had to say on the matter.
6. The persons I found myself most drawn to were Jackson, Chamberlain, Longstreet, and Buford. Buford seems to be an unsung hero, that should receive more recognition. Chamberlain was the man I most identified with. Jackson was a paradox and an enigma of sorts. Outstanding example of warm yet restrained piety, yet so explosive in temper. He seemed to be a reluctant yet dutiful soldier in the beginning, but by the end became militaristic. I do not kow the truth about his views politically, but that aside I can see why so many are drawn to him. As for Longstreet, I could not help but think that if Longstreet were in charge rather than Lee, the results of the war may have been different.
7. The war seemed to be a prophecy of WWI. The ineptitude and naivete (or was it stubborness) of those in command on both sides is remarkable. Longstreet seems to be one of the few who actually knew it was time to change ideas on warfare. Why the charge up Marye's Hill at Fredricksburg, or Pickett's charge at Gettysburg, are seen as heroic is terribly sad. Great courage by those who were sent in, for sure, but the orders to do so must be seen as heartless and stubborn at worst, and naive at best.
8. My favorite scenes were:
a) the Irish brigade at Fredricksburg
b) Chamberlain's defense of Little Round Top
c) all of Jackson's moments with his wife
9. I wish that there were more on the western front (in both the films, and the documentary). One should be forgiven for thinking that the Civil War was just the North vs. Virginia. Thankfully the history books fill in the gaps.
Overall, I really enjoyed the films and look forward to the third part of the trilogy.
1. I think I enjoyed G&G slightly better than Gburg.
2. I do not know which portrayal of General Lee was more accurate, but I preferred Duval's version over Sheen. In secular public school, I was taught that General Lee was the hero of the South and the best General on either side of the war. Based strictly on these films, I would have to disagree. The beginning of the war it seemed that Lee was handed his war tactics/stategy by Union incompetency. Later, as portrayed at Gettysburg, Lee seems to have gone off the rail once the Union had learned from its mistakes. The two Lees as portrayed in the films were so opposite one another it is hard to believe they were the same person.
3. I thought the battle scenes were pretty hammy at many points. Understandable for Gburg, but not understandable for G&G considering this film was made years after the realism of battle scenes portrayed in films like Braveheart and Saving Private Ryan. There were several scenes during battles that were just repeated over and over, and several scenes where the actors could be see just lying or standing around casually talking.
4. I think both movies suffer from miscasting. Stephen Lang stood out as the best actor in both films, both as Jackson and Pickett. An especially inspiring performance as Jackson.
5. I thought G&G dropped the ball on the slavery issue. Everytime a slave was shown, they were shown to be happy or as part of a benevolent family. Reminds me of Gone With the Wind and Lost Cause mythology. The films did make the point several times that the North's cause was not about slavery, at least not at first (or at least not explicitly for political reasons at the time). And they also showed how some southerners were for abolition. But, overall the films do show the contradiction's of the South's viewpoint regarding freedom, rights, invasion, etc. without at the same time giving blessing to everyting the North had to say on the matter.
6. The persons I found myself most drawn to were Jackson, Chamberlain, Longstreet, and Buford. Buford seems to be an unsung hero, that should receive more recognition. Chamberlain was the man I most identified with. Jackson was a paradox and an enigma of sorts. Outstanding example of warm yet restrained piety, yet so explosive in temper. He seemed to be a reluctant yet dutiful soldier in the beginning, but by the end became militaristic. I do not kow the truth about his views politically, but that aside I can see why so many are drawn to him. As for Longstreet, I could not help but think that if Longstreet were in charge rather than Lee, the results of the war may have been different.
7. The war seemed to be a prophecy of WWI. The ineptitude and naivete (or was it stubborness) of those in command on both sides is remarkable. Longstreet seems to be one of the few who actually knew it was time to change ideas on warfare. Why the charge up Marye's Hill at Fredricksburg, or Pickett's charge at Gettysburg, are seen as heroic is terribly sad. Great courage by those who were sent in, for sure, but the orders to do so must be seen as heartless and stubborn at worst, and naive at best.
8. My favorite scenes were:
a) the Irish brigade at Fredricksburg
b) Chamberlain's defense of Little Round Top
c) all of Jackson's moments with his wife
9. I wish that there were more on the western front (in both the films, and the documentary). One should be forgiven for thinking that the Civil War was just the North vs. Virginia. Thankfully the history books fill in the gaps.
Overall, I really enjoyed the films and look forward to the third part of the trilogy.
PreservedKillick
Puritan Board Freshman
On point nine, I agree with you--my own opinion is that the war was decided in the western theatre. Not as dramatic for filming, though...I don't see movie audiences getting into scene after scene of Union soldiers entrenching around Vicksburg. The city where you reside was quite important in supporting the Union war effort in that theatre of operations.
People forget how violent Jackson's approach to war was--one good thing about Gods and Generals is that it does refer correctly to the fact that he wanted to raise "the black flag," take no prisoners, and destroy the cities of the north. I think he and Sherman had the most realistic view of the destructiveness of war and what would be required to end it decisively. I think those two were the most farsighted generals the war produced.
I agree about Lee, but we're both probably about to hear about it from our Southern brothers on the PB! Just think of Little Round Top...
People forget how violent Jackson's approach to war was--one good thing about Gods and Generals is that it does refer correctly to the fact that he wanted to raise "the black flag," take no prisoners, and destroy the cities of the north. I think he and Sherman had the most realistic view of the destructiveness of war and what would be required to end it decisively. I think those two were the most farsighted generals the war produced.
I agree about Lee, but we're both probably about to hear about it from our Southern brothers on the PB! Just think of Little Round Top...
That does seem to be the case doesn't it. Once the North had the waterways, suppply lines, and victories well within the borders of the CSA, if not practically defeating it must have been psychologically defeating.
I did not know that about St. Louis. Here is the extent of what I was taught in public school growing up:
1. Lincoln freed the slaves
2. the South was for states rights
3. Mark Twain has a strong literary role in the conflict
4. the Dred Scot decision
5. MO was part of the Mason-Dixon line
I only recently learned that the Jesse James gang here in MO had connections to the war. I was always taught strictly about their bank robbing outlaw ways.
The dominant perspective I have experienced here has been pro-Confederate. I am just now learning about the Union's place in MO. It is interesting to me that MO's connections to the Union were never brought up in any class that I remember.
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This is one of many places where the film just doesn't match up with the novel it was based on. What Lee did well was to manage campaigns and to manage subordinates. He was an expert at logistics, strategic positioning, and at choosing competent subordinates who he could trust and who worked well together. This combination won him numerous battles: the seven days' campaign, Second Manassass, it saved him at Antietam, when McLellan had everything in his favor, it also won him Chancellorsville, when Jackson's brilliant night attack (inspired by Scripture, no less) caught Hooker's army off-guard.
So what happened between Chancellorsville and Gettysburg? Simply put, it was lack of communication and a breakdown of the chain of command. When Jackson was killed, his corps was split in two, and his former subordinates were promoted to take command. Unfortunately, they couldn't read Lee's mind the way that Jackson could. Lee was used to giving Jackson a lot of autonomy on the battlefield, and Jackson had an ability to see the end result that Lee wanted and to command accordingly. However, the commanders who replaced Jackson were not so adept and so Lee's chain of command was crippled.
In addition, Lee was unsure of himself because of Stuart's absence, making him much more cautious than usual. Plus, Lee did not like fighting an offensive war, as he thought it gave the enemy the high ground morally, as well as tactically. In short, pretty much everything went against Lee at Gettysburg, and he is really only to blame for Pickett's charge (which nearly succeeded anyway). He made the critical mistake of forgetting that Napoleonic tactics wouldn't work for him any more than they had worked for Burnside at Fredericksburg.
The other thing to say about Lee was that he was an inspiring figure in a way that no one else in the war ever was. He was one of those leaders who men would follow to the end. And Lee knew it, which was one reason why he was such a major figure in healing the rift between north and south after the war.
Longstreet was an excellent battlefield commander, but was much more useful as Lee's subordinate, where he was often the anvil to Jackson's hammer. As I said before, the book does a better job of developing the way in which the dynamics of Lee's rise and his management style worked. If Jackson had been at Gettysburg, the battle would never have happened and the actual battle would have gone much differently.
PreservedKillick
Puritan Board Freshman
Would you say this was true of the Confederacy as a whole? I always felt that their major weakness was failure to develop an effective, centralized system of command and control that the North had by at least the middle of the war, and definitely by 1864. Of course, it's hard to centralize when you've been preaching states' rights...
LawrenceU
Puritan Board Doctor
Very true. Jackson as an uncanny general when it came to knowing Lee's mind. Eerily uncanny.
In reality Lee was fighting blindfolded. Stuart's intel would have proven valuable; not only intel, but geographical information. We tend to forget that maps were very inaccurate at the time. He Lee known what lay between Gettysburg and Washington he may very well have flanked the Federals and pulled of an amazing victory by reversing the tables.
Another major factor in the failure of Pickett's charge was the soft ground. The incredible artillery assault that preceded the charge was largely ineffective after the third rounds were fired because the softness of the ground caused the tails of the pieces to drop beyond the ability of the muzzles to be depressed. Many of the gunners surmised this and tried to adjust accordingly, but it was pretty much futile. The smoke prevented the commanders from realising how ineffective the barrage actually was. Most of the rounds fell into Meade's reserves. My GGGrandfather was a gunner that day. He writes about this in his journal.
Actually, it was the north that had problems with the chain of command, particularly in the east. What won the war for the north was greater manpower and greater industrial resources. Grant realized this and turned it into an effective strategy: it doesn't matter how many men you lose when you outnumber the enemy 5-1.
Now certainly the western theatre had greater turnover for the Confederacy, but that was mainly because Albert Sydney Johnston was killed early on in 1862. Loss of your commander is an obvious disruption in the chain of command, and one that is hard to work around.
PreservedKillick
Puritan Board Freshman
Problems, yes, but at least they had a chain of command, and I would argue it was working quite well by '64, once Halleck wasn't running things. You had an overall strategic vision with coordinated offenses on all fronts with a high degree of cooperation between army and navy. Lincoln had been trying to set this up since the beginning of the war, and succeeded once he identified Grant as the man to coordinate Union strategy.
While the North did have overwhelming demographic and industrial superiority, it's always been my understanding that the full weight of this didn't come to bear until 1863, so citing these as the main reason the north won overlooks some clear blunders on the part of Davis and the Confederacy, both strategically and in foreign policy.
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I'll hunt around my library this afternoon after I've done the assignments for the online class I'm taking.
Since this is a Reformed discussion board, my first recommendation is Mark Noll's The Civil War as a Theological Crisis. He blames the way the Reformed (and other) churches became divided over slavery, with the issue having to be decided by civil war instead, for the church's later weakness in answering Darwin and the dramatic move in American Christianity away from Reformed theology.
Off the top of my head, the most respected living Civil War historian today is James M. McPherson. No academic historian is going to claim allegiance to either side, although I would think McPherson would lean toward the Union. I also enjoy reading Steven E. Woodworth, who writes on varied topics and who I think is a believer. He is especially good for the Western theatre, and I'm going to browse his book on the Army of the Tennessee for info on the forlorn at Vicksburg. There are many good writers on the Civil War--it depends on what aspect you're interested in reading about. For causes of the Civil War, I highly recommend Chandra Miller Manning's new book (I think it was her dissertation) What This Cruel War Was Over (a play on words with the wartime song, When This Cruel War is Over.
For a more Southern focus, you might read something by Grady McWhiney. He and Perry Jamieson collaborated on Attack and Die, arguing that the South's unique Celtic background informed the Confederacy's battlefield tactics. (I disagree with the thesis, but its an interesting one.)
If you're interested in the common soldier, the classic books are Bell Wiley's Life of Johnny Reb and Life of Billy Yank. Finally, if you're interested in what was going on in your neck of the woods, there's Louis Gerteis' Civil War St. Louis.
I'm interested in seeing other member's suggestions--I'm always looking to expand my reading list.
Ok, time for my study break to be over. Happy reading.
While the North did have overwhelming demographic and industrial superiority, it's always been my understanding that the full weight of this didn't come to bear until 1863, so citing these as the main reason the north won overlooks some clear blunders on the part of Davis and the Confederacy, both strategically and in foreign policy.
---------- Post added at 09:28 AM ---------- Previous post was at 09:04 AM ----------
I'll hunt around my library this afternoon after I've done the assignments for the online class I'm taking.
Since this is a Reformed discussion board, my first recommendation is Mark Noll's The Civil War as a Theological Crisis. He blames the way the Reformed (and other) churches became divided over slavery, with the issue having to be decided by civil war instead, for the church's later weakness in answering Darwin and the dramatic move in American Christianity away from Reformed theology.
Off the top of my head, the most respected living Civil War historian today is James M. McPherson. No academic historian is going to claim allegiance to either side, although I would think McPherson would lean toward the Union. I also enjoy reading Steven E. Woodworth, who writes on varied topics and who I think is a believer. He is especially good for the Western theatre, and I'm going to browse his book on the Army of the Tennessee for info on the forlorn at Vicksburg. There are many good writers on the Civil War--it depends on what aspect you're interested in reading about. For causes of the Civil War, I highly recommend Chandra Miller Manning's new book (I think it was her dissertation) What This Cruel War Was Over (a play on words with the wartime song, When This Cruel War is Over.
For a more Southern focus, you might read something by Grady McWhiney. He and Perry Jamieson collaborated on Attack and Die, arguing that the South's unique Celtic background informed the Confederacy's battlefield tactics. (I disagree with the thesis, but its an interesting one.)
If you're interested in the common soldier, the classic books are Bell Wiley's Life of Johnny Reb and Life of Billy Yank. Finally, if you're interested in what was going on in your neck of the woods, there's Louis Gerteis' Civil War St. Louis.
I'm interested in seeing other member's suggestions--I'm always looking to expand my reading list.
Ok, time for my study break to be over. Happy reading.
So did the Confederates---by '62, Lee ran the show. He had Jeff Davis's complete trust. One battle where this worked incredibly well was Chickamauga, where a division of the Army of Northern Virginia under Longstreet reached the battlefield in time to defeat the Yanks.
As for the co-ordination of army and navy, remember that the Confederate Navy was mostly limited to coastal defence.
Actually, there was one blunder---and know one knows who was responsible. During the Antietam campaign, several Union soldiers were camping on the site of a Confederate camp and discovered three cigars wrapped in a copy of Lee's marching orders. The information gave McLellan all that he needed (he blew the chance, as usual, and Antietam was a draw rather than a Union victory). If not for this incident, Lee would have most likely won the campaign and taken Washington, which would have given England and France enough encouragement to enter the war.
PreservedKillick
Puritan Board Freshman
You're right about Chickamauga, and the Perryville campaign was paired with the invasion of Maryland, but I can't think of any other examples of a coordinated, multifront strategy. I'm happy to be corrected.
As far as blunders go, I wasn't thinking so much on the tactical level, although I was happy to be reminded of the Lost Order. When I was in grad school, on the anniversary of the Lost Order, we gave our major professor a copy of the orders wrapped around three cigars. He told us he hoped we weren't comparing him to McClellan.
I was thinking more strategic--such as (debatable, I know) firing on Fort Sumter, violating Kentucky's neutrality, A.S. Johnston's half-hearted attempt to defend everything in the run-up to Fort Donelson, inept generalship at Donelson, and keeping Braxton Bragg in command too long. Actually, because of Bragg, sending Longstreet out to the Western theatre didn't end up working out so well after all; he had to be sent away to Knoxville when he was needed to help face Grant, because he and Bragg got along so badly. Not that anyone got along with Bragg, not even his biographers. The biggest blunder of all in my mind has to do with foreign policy--the cotton embargo. Davis should have gotten as much cotton overseas as possible before the blockade became effective so he could buy munitions and war materiel, instead of trying to hold the British economy hostage to get an alliance (which I don't think was coming, anyway.)
Enjoying the discussion, by the way. This is making me go back to my old notes and books.
As far as blunders go, I wasn't thinking so much on the tactical level, although I was happy to be reminded of the Lost Order. When I was in grad school, on the anniversary of the Lost Order, we gave our major professor a copy of the orders wrapped around three cigars. He told us he hoped we weren't comparing him to McClellan.
I was thinking more strategic--such as (debatable, I know) firing on Fort Sumter, violating Kentucky's neutrality, A.S. Johnston's half-hearted attempt to defend everything in the run-up to Fort Donelson, inept generalship at Donelson, and keeping Braxton Bragg in command too long. Actually, because of Bragg, sending Longstreet out to the Western theatre didn't end up working out so well after all; he had to be sent away to Knoxville when he was needed to help face Grant, because he and Bragg got along so badly. Not that anyone got along with Bragg, not even his biographers. The biggest blunder of all in my mind has to do with foreign policy--the cotton embargo. Davis should have gotten as much cotton overseas as possible before the blockade became effective so he could buy munitions and war materiel, instead of trying to hold the British economy hostage to get an alliance (which I don't think was coming, anyway.)
Enjoying the discussion, by the way. This is making me go back to my old notes and books.
Well, part of it was just that the Confederacy was on the defensive and, in the west at least, was slowly being beaten back. The Confederates felt that defending gave them the moral high ground, for one thing.
The other reason why co-ordination didn't work as well for the Confederacy was that, particularly in the west, their infrastructure was poorer than the north's (a lesson, by the way, which Prussian observers of the war took home with them---and used to devastating effect during the Austro and Franco-Prussian Wars).
As for cotton, it was a gamble either way. And frankly, you can't buy much when you're blockaded, no matter how much cotton you can sell. Sumter was a case of choosing the lesser of two evils (strategic victory=moral loss: moral victory=the north has control of one of your best harbors).
The overall strategy for the Confederacy was simply hard to pull off: you had unfriendly geography, a lack of necessary infrastructure, an enemy with naval superiority, and very little industrial strength. It's a tribute to good generalship that the South lasted four years!
PreservedKillick
Puritan Board Freshman
Short answer to # 1: 150 Union volunteers whose job during the May 22 attempt by Union forces to take Vicksburg by storm was to charge ahead of the Union army with ladders and fascines, and bridge the ditches in front of the Confederate defenses and spearhead the attack. They were promised 60 days' furlough if successful, and there were a high number of Medal of Honor winners among them that day. Incidentally, that attack was one of the first (the first?) times in military history the officers were ordered to synchronize watches, as all Union forces involved in the attack were to begin the assault at the same time.
"Forlorn hope" was a general term for the volunteers directed to go into a breach or otherwise lead an attack.
Vicksburg is worth a visit, by the way. You can still see the trench lines.
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Right on about Fort Sumter, which speaks to Lincoln's skill and canniness early on in his presidency. He had pledged to avoid a policy of coercion, simply aggressively marching troops into the seceded states to bring them back into the Union, but had also pledged to protect federal property. The northern public wanted to avoid being the aggressor while seeing the secession crisis resolved. The way Lincoln handled Sumter, if a war started, it would be the Confederacy firing the first shot and the north would be absolved of the role of the aggressor and take the moral high ground. Then there's the whole debate, was Lincoln deliberately provoking South Carolina to shoot first? (Not being in Lincoln's head, I have no answer). Either way, Davis had a tough decision, and took the bait. What he got was only four rather than eight of the slave states that hadn't seceded yet. Lincoln, in turn, lost four slave states but managed to keep three strategically vital ones, while getting tens of thousands of willing volunteers incensed by Fort Sumter.
I'm a little less (ok, a lot less) gentle on Davis with King Cotton Diplomacy. The whole point was to get the British to either join or somehow recognize the South and act to end the blockade. The only really feasible way to do that was to demonstrate that it was not effective, a "paper blockade," and therefore illegal. The question the British had was, if it was merely a paper blockade, why wasn't any cotton getting through. Davis couldn't very well answer, "Because I put an embargo on it to cause massive unemployment in your country to get you into the war." He was stuck, if no cotton got through, the British had to assume it was because of the blockade, and therefore the blockade was legitimate. Meanwhile, the Confederacy couldn't put up cotton as collaterol for loans and do anything fiscally, since they lost most of their banking facilities when New Orleans fell. And then the British discovered the wonders of Egyptian and Indian cotton.
The points in your last paragraph speak to my own frustrations looking back on all of this--none of this was unknown to anyone then, and it is tragic that the only attempts at compromise before the war started were half-hearted at best, dishonest at worst.
"Forlorn hope" was a general term for the volunteers directed to go into a breach or otherwise lead an attack.
Vicksburg is worth a visit, by the way. You can still see the trench lines.
---------- Post added at 09:22 PM ---------- Previous post was at 08:53 PM ----------
Right on about Fort Sumter, which speaks to Lincoln's skill and canniness early on in his presidency. He had pledged to avoid a policy of coercion, simply aggressively marching troops into the seceded states to bring them back into the Union, but had also pledged to protect federal property. The northern public wanted to avoid being the aggressor while seeing the secession crisis resolved. The way Lincoln handled Sumter, if a war started, it would be the Confederacy firing the first shot and the north would be absolved of the role of the aggressor and take the moral high ground. Then there's the whole debate, was Lincoln deliberately provoking South Carolina to shoot first? (Not being in Lincoln's head, I have no answer). Either way, Davis had a tough decision, and took the bait. What he got was only four rather than eight of the slave states that hadn't seceded yet. Lincoln, in turn, lost four slave states but managed to keep three strategically vital ones, while getting tens of thousands of willing volunteers incensed by Fort Sumter.
I'm a little less (ok, a lot less) gentle on Davis with King Cotton Diplomacy. The whole point was to get the British to either join or somehow recognize the South and act to end the blockade. The only really feasible way to do that was to demonstrate that it was not effective, a "paper blockade," and therefore illegal. The question the British had was, if it was merely a paper blockade, why wasn't any cotton getting through. Davis couldn't very well answer, "Because I put an embargo on it to cause massive unemployment in your country to get you into the war." He was stuck, if no cotton got through, the British had to assume it was because of the blockade, and therefore the blockade was legitimate. Meanwhile, the Confederacy couldn't put up cotton as collaterol for loans and do anything fiscally, since they lost most of their banking facilities when New Orleans fell. And then the British discovered the wonders of Egyptian and Indian cotton.
The points in your last paragraph speak to my own frustrations looking back on all of this--none of this was unknown to anyone then, and it is tragic that the only attempts at compromise before the war started were half-hearted at best, dishonest at worst.
SwordoftheLord
Puritan Board Freshman
While I love both movies
I think Gods and Generals is the better of the two myself Although I agree that it doesnt follow the novel that greatThanks. I have the book Deeds of Valor which has a good section on the "forlorn hope", though it didn't mention the 60 days furlough or the watch synchronization. Interesting.
(Please remember, I am nowhere near as studied on this stuff as you guys are. So take my comments from that perspective.)
As I go through the Ken Burns documentary, I am more and more under the impression (as opposed to the view asserted in the films) that Lee is overrated. McClellan was so inept (or was he passively trying to help the South as some suggested?) that he did not make it difficult for Lee. It seems, on the surface, that Lee was the product of Longstreet, Jackson, and Stuart. It seems that the North's success was partly due to its better generals rising to the top, whereas the South's structure remained more stagnant. Of course, Stuart's mistake before Gettysburg and Jackson's death did not help either.
Back to a comment I made earlier, which Lee was more accurate? Duvall's calm, humble, wise sage, or Sheen's angry, impatient, reactionary? Or was he both?
And I am to the point in the films where the debate is now "which battle was more significant: Gettysburg or Vicksburg?" That's a tough one. Shelby Foote made the point that though the answer may be Gettysburg, those who think it could not possibly be Vicksburg are much further from the truth. Point being, it was probably Gettysburg, but not by much.
Thanks guys for keeping this discussion going and doing so in such a mature manner.
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You see, Sheen's portrayal struck me as being humble, cautious, and deeply burdened, wondering if he is on God's side. Duvall, on the other hand, seems less tortured---which Lee was, in real life. He struggled a lot with the decision of whether to resign from the US Army or to accept the offer to command it. And afterward he struggled with doubt about whether he had done the right thing. The book makes this very clear (it opens when Lee was a Colonel for the US Army serving in Texas---and disgusted with the attitude of his superiors in turning over forts to the Confederacy so eagerly). The other character-shaping thing that the film glosses over is Lee's rise in the Confederate Army. It shows the scene where he takes command of Virginia's armed forces at the Virginia General Assembly. What it doesn't show is the fact that in doing so he was, in effect, taking a dead-end job, because he knew that within months his command would be turned over to the main Confederate Army.
Once in the Confederate Army, he was near the bottom of the totem pole in terms of seniority, which was compounded by the fact that he was such an upright individual that he almost never took up for himself, and thus was given the worst commands in the army throughout 1861. However, eventually he got onto Jeff Davis's staff and so when Joe Johnston was incapacitated, Lee was given the job of commanding the Army of Northern Virginia as the peninsula campaign was already in progress. And even then it wasn't until Second Manassas that Lee really got his army and general staff together.
AlexanderHenderson1647
Puritan Board Freshman
No, he certainly was not overrated. If anything, the average person would reactionarily say, "The South lost, the North won, therefore Lee was a poor general." Lee has insurmountable odds to overcome and he could never be called the "product" of any of his subordinates. He overcame 3 years worth of political squabbles/ineptitude that harmed him in the battlefield, infighting among his men, a very calm, warm, trusting attitude towards most his Lieutenants and the devastation of protecting the citizenry of the Southern states while balancing those political pressures and the court of public opinion. Note how many Major General changes the North had verses how many the south had for a commentary on his value. I think this is a fair characterization of perhaps Lee in many respects (for other readers, this is a lengthy quote- I apologize, but I think it illustrates my points):
"Deeper still had been the defect of Lee's excessive amiability. When every hour of an uneven struggle had called for stern decision, he had kept all his contention for the field of battle. The action opened, he was calm but terse and pugnacious; the fighting ended, he conceded too much in kind words or kinder silence to the excuses of commanders and to the arguments of politicians. Humble in spirit, he had sometimes submitted to mental bullying. Capable always of devising the best plan, he had, on occasion, been compelled by the blundering of others to accept the second best. He had not always been able to control men of contrary mind. His consideration for others, the virtue of the gentleman, had been his vice as a soldier...
When Lee's inordinate consideration for his subordinates is given its gloomiest appraisal, when his theory of command is disputed, when his mistakes are written red, when the remorseless audit of history discounts the odds he faced in men and resources, and when the court of time writes up the advantage he enjoyed in fighting on inner lines in his own country, the balance to the credit of his generalship is clear and absolute.
In three fast-moving months he mobilized Virginia and so secured her defense that the war had been in progress a year before the Unionists were within fifty miles of Richmond. Finding the Federals, when he took command of the Army of Northern Virginia on June 1, 1862, almost under the shadow of the city's steeples, he saved the capital from almost certain capture and the Confederate cause from probable collapse. He repulsed four major offensives against Richmond and by his invasion of Pennsylvania he delayed the fifth for ten months. Ere the Federals were back on the Richmond line again — two years to the day from the time he had succeeded Johnston — Lee had fought ten major battles: Gaines's Mill, Frayser's Farm, Malvern Hill, Second Manassas, Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the Wilderness, and Spotsylvania. Six of these he had indisputably won. At Frayser's Farm he had gained the field but had not enveloped the enemy as he had planned. Success had not been his at Malvern Hill and at Sharpsburg, but only at Gettysburg had he met with definite defeat, and even there he clouded the title of his adversary to a clear-cut victory.1 During the twenty-four months when he had been free to employ open manoeuvre, a period that had ended with Cold Harbor, he had sustained approximately 103,000 casualties and had inflicted 145,000. Holding, as he usually had, to the offensive, his combat losses had been greater in proportion to his numbers than those of the Federals, but he had demonstrated how strategy may increase an opponent's casualties, for his losses included only 16,000 prisoners, whereas he had taken 38,000.2 Chained at length to the Richmond defenses, he had saved the capital from capture for ten months. All this he had done in the face of repeated defeats for the Southern troops in nearly every other part of the Confederacy. In explanation of the inability of the South to capitalize its successes, one British visitor quoted Lee as saying: "The more [the Confederates] followed up the victory against one portion of the enemy's line the more did they lay themselves open to be surrounded by the remainder of the enemy." Lee "likened the operation to a man breasting a wave of sea, who, as rapidly as he clears a way before him, is enveloped by the very water he has displaced." These difficulties of the South would have been even worse had not the Army of Northern Virginia occupied so much of the thought and armed strength of the North. Lee is to be judged, in fact, not merely by what he accomplished with his own troops but by what he prevented the hosts of the Union from doing sooner elsewhere...
In assembling this information he was not more adept than many another capable general, and in studying it he was not more diligent, but in interpreting it he excelled. Always critical of the news that came from spies, few of whom he trusted, he was cautious in accepting newspaper reports until he learned which correspondents were close-mouthed or ill-informed and which were reckless or well-furnished with fact. ...Stuart's "sixth sense" Lee soon learned to appreciate, and when the tireless officer affirmed that the enemy was marching toward an objective he named, Lee rarely questioned it. The infantry were apt to move quickly in the hoof-prints made by Stuart's returning courier. If Lee's strategy was built, in large part, on his interpretation of his intelligence reports, that interpretation was facilitated more by Stuart and Stuart's scouts than by anything else...
If Lee on occasion seemed "slow" to his restless and nervous subordinates, it was because some unvoiced doubt as to the enemy's plan or his own best position still vexed his mind. For when his military judgment was convinced, he begrudged every lost hour. Herein was displayed the fourth quality that distinguished his strategy, namely, the precision of his troop movements, the precision, let it be emphasized, and not the speed nor always the promptness of the march. The army as a whole, under Lee's direction, could never cover as much ground in a given time as the Second Corps under Jackson or under Ewell. It was very rarely that the whole force completed, under pressure, what "Old Jack" would have regarded as an average day's march. Usually Lee had to ride with Longstreet to accomplish even as much as was credited to the slow-moving commander of the First Corps. Lee, however, could calculate with surprising accuracy the hours that would be required to bring his troops to a given position. This was true, also, of the various units in a converging movement unless the units were Longstreet's and were not operating under Lee's own eye. After the Seven Days' campaign had acquainted him with his men and their leaders, Lee made only three serious mistakes in logistics. One of these was in the time required to occupy Harpers Ferry and to reconcentrate the army at Sharpsburg. The next was in calculating when the First Corps would arrive at Gettysburg, and the third was in estimating the hour at which that same corps would overtake A. P. Hill in the Wilderness. In two of these three instances, Lee based his advance on Longstreet's assurances, which were not fulfilled. Against these three cases of the failure of Lee's logistics are to be set his transfer of the Army of Northern Virginia to meet Pope; the movement down the Rappahannock to confront Burnside at Fredericksburg; the quick and sure detachment of Anderson and then of Jackson at Chancellorsville; the convergence of Hill's and of Ewell's corps at Gettysburg; the march from the Wilderness to Spotsylvania; the shift to the North Anna, and thence to the Totopotomoy and to Cold Harbor, and the careful balancing of force north and south of the James during the operations against Petersburg — the list is almost that of his battles. Had his mastery of this difficult branch of the art of war been his only claim to distinction as a soldier, it would of itself justify the closest scrutiny of his campaigns by those who would excel in strategy.
His patient synthesis of military intelligence, his understanding employment of the offensive, his sense of position and his logistics were supplemented in the making of his strategy by his audacity. Superficial critics, puzzled by his success and unwilling to examine the reasons for it, have sometimes assumed that he frequently defied the rules of war, yet rarely sustained disaster in doing so because he was confronted by mediocrity. Without raising the disputable question of the capacity of certain of his opponents, it may be said that respect for the strength of his adversaries, rather than contempt for their abilities, made him daring...Yet if "daring" is an adjective that has to be applied to him again and again, "reckless" is not. Always in his strategy, daring was measured in terms of probable success, measured coldly, measured carefully. If the reward did not seem worth the risk, nothing could move him — except the knowledge that he had no alternative...
These five qualities, then, gave eminence to his strategy — his interpretation of military intelligence, his wise devotion to the offensive, his careful choice of position, the exactness of his logistics, and his well-considered daring. Midway between strategy and tactics stood four other qualities of leadership that no student of war can disdain. The first was his sharpened sense of the power of resistance and of attack of a given body of men; the second was his ability to effect adequate concentration at the point of attack, even when his force was inferior; the third was his careful choice of commanders and of troops for specific duties; the fourth was his employment of field fortification...
As a tactician, Lee exhibited at the beginning of hostilities the weaknesses that might be expected of one who had been a staff officer for the greater part of his military career...Yet he continued to learn the military art as the war progressed, and of nothing did he learn more than of tactics. He overcame his lack of skill in the employment of his cavalry...
Predominant as was strategy in the generalship of Lee from the outset, and noteworthy as was his later tactical handling of his troops on the field of battle, it was not to these qualities alone that he owed the record he closed that day when he unbelted his sword after Appomattox. It had been as difficult to administer the army as to use it successfully in combat. Never equipped adequately, or consistently well-fed after the early autumn of 1862, the Army of Northern Virginia had few easy marches or ready victories. Lee had to demand of his inferior forces...the absolute best they could give him. The army's hard-won battles left its ranks depleted, its command shattered by death or wounds, its personnel exhausted, its horses scarcely able to walk, its transportation broken down, its ammunition and its commissary low. That was why its victories could not be pressed. Earnestly, almost stubbornly, he had to assert, "The lives of our soldiers are too precious to be sacrificed in the attainment of successes that inflict no loss upon the enemy beyond the actual loss in battle."10
On him fell the burden of an endless reorganization that is as much a part of his biography as it is of his title to fame. Out of the wreckage of battle, time after time, he contrived to build a better machine. He did not work by any set formula in administering the army, but by the most painstaking attention to the most minute details...To select men to succeed the general officers who fell in action, he would confer with those who knew the colonels of the regiments and he would examine each officer's record for diligence, for capacity, and for sobriety. ..His mobilization of Virginia, though it was among his most remarkable achievements and afforded sure evidence of his rating as an administrator, was equalled by the speed and success of his reorganization of the army after the Seven Days, after Sharpsburg, and after Gettysburg...
Next in order, among the reasons for Lee's success as a soldier, is probably to be ranked his ability to make the best of the excellencies and of the limitations of his subordinate officers. Thanks to the President's understanding of the need of professional training for command, and thanks, also, to the wisdom of his own early selections, Lee had some of the best graduates of West Point among his officers...Even when he availed himself of the well-schooled former students of the Virginia Military Institute, and of like schools in other states, he had to entrust the lives of many thousands of his men to those who had received no advanced training in arms prior to 1861. Along with the individual jealousies, ambitions, and eccentricities that had to be encountered in every army, he had to cope with political generals and with those who had a measure of class antagonism to the professional soldier. Perhaps Lee's most difficult labor was that of taking a miscellaneous group of Southern individualists, ranging in capacity from dullness to genius, and of welding them into an efficient instrument of command.
No commander ever put a higher valuation on the innate qualities of leadership. "It is," he wrote, "to men . . . of high integrity and commanding intellect that the country must look to give character to her councils."13 He was not quick to praise but he was sparing in criticism. When he offended the amour propre of any officer, he made amends. Unless a man was grossly incapable, he was slow to relieve him of command...
Lee would listen patiently to suggestions from any quarter, even when they were given by those who seemed disposed to usurp his function as commanding general; and he was always patient in dealing with personal idiosyncrasies, unless they touched his sense of honor and of fair play. Whatever the station of an officer, Lee endeavored to see that full justice was done him, though he avoided personal dealings, if he could, with those who had no merit with which to sustain their grievances.
Except perhaps in the case of Longstreet, the more a soldier was capable of doing, the more Lee demanded of him. Never brusque unless with extreme provocation, Lee was least suave and most exacting in dealing with those whose conception of duty he knew to be as high as his own. Once he got the true measure of Jackson, he would have considered it a reflection upon that officer's patriotism to bestow soft words or to make ingratiating gestures. He had a personal affection for the praise-loving Stuart, but he rarely put flattery or flourishes into his letters to that remarkable man. Yet when a dull brigadier or a stupid colonel came to his quarters, Lee did his utmost to hearten him. For young officers he always had kind words and friendly, considerate attention, except when it was manifest that they needed a rebuke. If he had nothing else to give an exhausted lieutenant who brought dispatches through the burning dust of a July day, he would proffer him a glass of water in the same tones he would have employed in addressing the President. Although he realized that a trained and disciplined officers' corps was the greatest need of the army, he was almost alone among the higher commanders of the Confederacy in realizing that the volunteer leaders of a revolutionary force could not be given the stern, impersonal treatment that can be meted out to the professional soldiers of an established government. How different might have been the fate of Bragg and perhaps of the Confederacy if that officer had learned this lesson from Lee!...
All that can be said of Lee's dealings with his officers as one of the reasons for his success can be said in even warmer tones of his relations with the men in the ranks. They were his chief pride, his first obligation. Their distress was his deepest concern, their well-being his constant aim. His manner with them was said by his lieutenants to be perfect. Never ostentatious or consciously dramatic, his bearing, his record of victories, his manifest interest in the individual, and his conversation with the humblest private he met in the road combined to create in the minds of his troops a reverence, a confidence, and an affection that built up the morale of the army. And that morale was one of the elements that contributed most to his achievements. The men came to believe that whatever he did was right — that whatever he assigned them they could accomplish. Once that belief became fixed, the Army of Northern Virginia was well-nigh invincible. There is, perhaps, no more impressive example in modern war of the power of personality in creating morale. More than one writer has intimated that Lee's forbearance in dealing with Longstreet showed him too much of a gentleman to be a commander of the very first rank. It would be well for these critics to remember that the qualities of a gentleman, displayed to those in the ranks, contributed to far more victories than Longstreet ever cost Lee." (DS Freeman, "Lee" - I would recommend that you read Chapter XI of this book, "The Sword of Robert E. Lee" as a good summary of his life as a CSA soldier and his legacy- it can be accessed here.)
RE: Duval or Sheen?
Art has difficulty imitating life- how does anyone rightly characterize another? But as a depiction I would say that Sheen is better, though I disagree with your assessment of the portrayal. Do remember that this "Gettyburg" Lee was 1) a depiction, 2) a single battle, 3) different set of circumstances and different arrangement of subordinates. From all fair accounts, north and south, he was gracious and unpretentious, but had a certain deportment and resign that was marked. See the above quote, also note my previous quote on Lee's harsh chiding of Stuart depicted in "Gettysburg." The harshest I've read to date is, "“Well General Stuart, you are here at last.”
Don Kistler
Puritan Board Sophomore
And what do you all (y'all) speculate as to what the country would look like today had the Confederacy won the war? I remember using the term "civil war" in Virginia once only to be told sternly by an elderly gentleman, "There was nothing 'civil' about that war!"
How old was he and when? Maybe he knew somebody that did serve in the war, the last Union vet died in 1956 and the last Confederate vet is debated but would have died in the 50's. The guy could have known somebody.
PreservedKillick
Puritan Board Freshman
The Ohio state archives and National Archives would be great starting points to research that soldier--I've had the best results with pension records, since very detailed information had to be given to convince the governemtn to shell out benefits to widows. Several great questions here--a few thoughts.
1. No, I do not think Lee was overrated in the sense that, yes, he was one of the great generals of the war. However, I think we could get that impression from the Lost Cause mythology surrounding him in the late 19th century, in which he became a larger than life figure no human could live up to. On Lee, I defer to those here who are much more well read on the Eastern theatre than I am.
2. McClellan is an interesting, and frustrating fellow, if for no other reason than he had this weird internal compulsion to believe that he was always outnumbered 2 or 3-1, when the opposite was usually the case. The most interesting thing to me about McClellan was, he wasn't an idiot (although you'd think he had to be). It isn't that he was sympathetic to the South, he wasn't. He was, however, a political conservative who wanted to see the war ended with minimal animosity and no social change (read, abolition of slavery). Therefore, he wanted to win by maneuver rather than decisive action, and shrank from it even if it was offered up to him on a platter, such as with the Lost Order (S.O. 191). I think there was something psychological, too--he had been a success all his life, and we know now that fear of failure can make someone risk averse and kill their creativity. Grant, who had been selling firewood on the streets of St. Louis to make ends meet at one point, didn't have this problem and was willing to gamble, with great effect at Donelson and Vicksburg. He was the go-to guy at the beginning of the war, expert enough that the US sent him as our observer to the Crimean War.
3. Vicksburg or Gettysburg?
Gettysburg would have definitely been more significant if the Union had lost the battle, and in that regard, yes, perhaps Gettysburg. I would argue, though, that Vicksburg both did more damage to the Confederacy and represented a massive economic and psychological victory for the North. The Army of the Potomac still had brutal fighting ahead of it, and the Army of Northern Virginia remained strong, while the fall of Vicksburg signalled an achievement of a vital Union war aim and allowed Union forces to move on toward its next bifurcation of the Confederacy moving into Georgia from Tennessee.
1. No, I do not think Lee was overrated in the sense that, yes, he was one of the great generals of the war. However, I think we could get that impression from the Lost Cause mythology surrounding him in the late 19th century, in which he became a larger than life figure no human could live up to. On Lee, I defer to those here who are much more well read on the Eastern theatre than I am.
2. McClellan is an interesting, and frustrating fellow, if for no other reason than he had this weird internal compulsion to believe that he was always outnumbered 2 or 3-1, when the opposite was usually the case. The most interesting thing to me about McClellan was, he wasn't an idiot (although you'd think he had to be). It isn't that he was sympathetic to the South, he wasn't. He was, however, a political conservative who wanted to see the war ended with minimal animosity and no social change (read, abolition of slavery). Therefore, he wanted to win by maneuver rather than decisive action, and shrank from it even if it was offered up to him on a platter, such as with the Lost Order (S.O. 191). I think there was something psychological, too--he had been a success all his life, and we know now that fear of failure can make someone risk averse and kill their creativity. Grant, who had been selling firewood on the streets of St. Louis to make ends meet at one point, didn't have this problem and was willing to gamble, with great effect at Donelson and Vicksburg. He was the go-to guy at the beginning of the war, expert enough that the US sent him as our observer to the Crimean War.
3. Vicksburg or Gettysburg?
Gettysburg would have definitely been more significant if the Union had lost the battle, and in that regard, yes, perhaps Gettysburg. I would argue, though, that Vicksburg both did more damage to the Confederacy and represented a massive economic and psychological victory for the North. The Army of the Potomac still had brutal fighting ahead of it, and the Army of Northern Virginia remained strong, while the fall of Vicksburg signalled an achievement of a vital Union war aim and allowed Union forces to move on toward its next bifurcation of the Confederacy moving into Georgia from Tennessee.
PreservedKillick
Puritan Board Freshman
Yes, great comparison. Although Lee was much more successful as a battlefield general--GW's defeats far outnumber his victories. Of course, part of his brilliance was realizing that he didn't have to win battles.
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