Logical Certainty and Probability

[Cheshire Cat]

Okay, so in the objective certainty thread it ended off with some like, me: We can't be 100% epistemologically certain of anything because we are finite human beings, and as such there is always the possibility that we will make an error. When there is the possibility of an error occuring, one cannot be 100% epistemologically certain. Blah blah etc.

Okay, well one argument against induction is that it only yields to probability. People speak of deduction being logically certain (if the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises). The problem as I see it is, Can we be epistemologically certain (100%) of our logical certainty? I don't think we can. Does this pose any sort of problems in any other areas? Does this lead to epistemological probability over and above our logical certainty and thus put us back in the probability realm in a sense? Thoughts? Naysayers ?

 

[Arch2k]

If our first principle is the Scriptures we can be 100% sure.

 

[Cheshire Cat]

Are you the pope? J/k, but my point is humans are fallable creatures and there is always the possibility that one will make an error. Thus, if there is a possibility than we cannot be 100% epistemologically certain of anything. e.g. Because you are a human being, it is possible (I'm not saying you are) that you could misinterpret the scripture. See this thread also: http://www.puritanboard.com/showthread.php?t=17450

So my question still stands:

Okay, well one argument against induction is that it only yields to probability. People speak of deduction being logically certain (if the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises). The problem as I see it is, Can we be epistemologically certain (100%) of our logical certainty? I don't think we can. Does this pose any sort of problems in any other areas? Does this lead to epistemological probability over and above our logical certainty and thus put us back in the probability realm in a sense? Thoughts? Naysayers ?

Edit: On second thought, I don't think it matters. The point isn't over whether we can only have probable epistemological knowledge, but that we have a basis for believing that this knowledge is true, wherease materialist do not (with respect to epistemology).