McCormack lectures

[Ploutos]

I have been listening to the first of the McCormack lectures linked by @RamistThomist in another thread.

Two questions so far:

1) He links the Reformed "underdevelopment" of the doctrine of God, in part, to Calvin's anti-speculative tendencies and also his doctrine of double predestination. Is this accurate? I have thought that as the Reformed did not diverge from the Catholic tradition on the doctrine of God, they didn't see much need to restate the points of agreement.

2) He speaks of God as one person in three modes of being, and of a humility and obedience constituative to the second mode of being. This language is not familiar to me. Is this an orthodox way to describe God? And regarding the latter part, along with his remarks that it's not possible to eliminate every last trace of eternal subordination from the Scripture, is he not in effect advocating a moderated form of ontological subordinationism while saying he's not subordinationist?

 

[RamistThomist]

He links the Reformed "underdevelopment" of the doctrine of God, in part, to Calvin's anti-speculative tendencies and also his doctrine of double predestination. Is this accurate? I have thought that as the Reformed did not diverge from the Catholic tradition on the doctrine of God, they didn't see much need to restate the points of agreement.

You're both correct. Calvin did not add much because he didn't need to add much. That said, Turretin is more useful than Calvin on the doctrine of God.

2) He speaks of God as one person in three modes of being, and of a humility and obedience constituative to the second mode of being. This language is not familiar to me. Is this an orthodox way to describe God?

The Cappadocian fathers spoke that way, particularly Basil. Advantage: it precludes any reading of modern "personality" into the Trinitarian persons, so that's good. It has the downside of...well...making the Trinity seem impersonal.

And regarding the latter part, along with his remarks that it's not possible to eliminate every last trace of eternal subordination from the Scripture, is he not in effect advocating a moderated form of ontological subordinationism while saying he's not subordinationist?

There is a subordination tendency in Barth and among Barthians. He isn't saying the same thing Evangelicals were. Some Evangelicals changed the Trinity to keep women from getting too uppity. Barth and McCormack have a different goal: kenosis.

 

[faithandfreedom]

2) He speaks of God as one person in three modes of being, and of a humility and obedience constituative to the second mode of being. This language is not familiar to me. Is this an orthodox way to describe God?

I recently came across this idea for the first time when reading Dr Thomas Brand’s PhD thesis on the forsakenness of Christ during the atonement. Initially it raised alarm bells. I thought “this sounds like modalism”.
Quotes from said PhD thesis:

Muller outlines the five distinctions between person and nature in Scholastic Trinitarian thought. The three main distinctions are formal, modal, and real. Put simply, a formal distinction is a distinction perceived by reason that does not rest in the thing itself, but only in the mind of the perceiver. A modal distinction is a distinction between the thing and the way in which the thing exists. A real distinction is a distinction between one thing and another thing. A formal distinction, without qualification, would therefore collapse the distinctions between the persons, because each person would also be only formally distinct from the other persons. A real distinction between person and nature in the Trinity would deny divine simplicity and block the vital orthodox assertion that each person is fully God. Therefore, the modal distinction, which states that the distinction between person and nature is the distinction between a thing (the divine nature) and the modes of existence of the thing (the subsistences or persons), is the best fit with the claims of orthodox Trinitarian theology.

Turretin’s respect for the mystery of Trinitarian theology fuels the profundity of his theology as he continues to argue that the species of distinction between the divine nature and the divine persons that appears to be the most precise is the modal distinction. In this distinction the mode is distinguished from some thing

Quote from Turretin:

“The personal properties by which the persons are distinguished from the essence are certain modes by which it may be characterised; not indeed formally and properly but eminently and analogically, all imperfection being removed. Thus the person may be said to differ from the essence not really (realiter), i.e., essentially (essentialiter) as a thing and thing, but modally (modaliter) – as a mode from the thing (modus a re). “

Turretin argues that the modal understanding of the distinction between person and nature avoids contravening the doctrine of divine simplicity because the modal distinction does not consider the persons to be distinct from the essence as a thing from a thing, as with the essential distinction understanding. Instead, Turretin argues that the distinction is between the divine essence as the thing, and the divine persons as the modes of the thing, ‘by which it is not compounded but distinguished.’

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Around the 1hour 9 min mark of the first lecture McCormack talks about the will of God in creation being tied to God knowing that he was going to create. I think he says “knowing and willing are equally original for God”. I wonder if this has implications for the “Counsel of Redemption”?

 

[Ploutos]

You're both correct. Calvin did not add much because he didn't need to add much. That said, Turretin is more useful than Calvin on the doctrine of God.

The Cappadocian fathers spoke that way, particularly Basil. Advantage: it precludes any reading of modern "personality" into the Trinitarian persons, so that's good. It has the downside of...well...making the Trinity seem impersonal.

There is a subordination tendency in Barth and among Barthians. He isn't saying the same thing Evangelicals were. Some Evangelicals changed the Trinity to keep women from getting too uppity. Barth and McCormack have a different goal: kenosis.

So, despite McCormack's insistence that he is not advocating subordinationism, and his stringent request not to accuse him of such... he is, in fact, advocating a form of subordinationism?

Is his position within the bounds of orthodoxy? It seems that we can't eliminate all subordinationist language completely, since we still speak of a logical order of being (Father 1st, Son 2nd, Spirit 3rd)... but does he go farther than is necessary? Is it appropriate to speak of a humility ontologically innate to the Son, as if he possesses this in a way unique to his person and not to that of the Father and Son?

 

[Corey Powell]

He speaks of God as one person in three modes of being, and of a humility and obedience constituative to the second mode of being.

 

[faithandfreedom]

Youtube transcript:

 

[Ploutos]

Thank you. It appears I didn't quote him accurately. So he said a single divine subject in three modes of being. Is that sufficiently orthodox?

 

[faithandfreedom]

Thank you. It appears I didn't quote him accurately. So he said a single divine subject in three modes of being. Is that sufficiently orthodox?

I’m not sure the youtube transcript is completely reliable. It spells Barth wrong for instance.

 

[RamistThomist]

So, despite McCormack's insistence that he is not advocating subordinationism, and his stringent request not to accuse him of such... he is, in fact, advocating a form of subordinationism?

In a sense, but in a very different sense than we are used to. There is no subordination of function, for example. Mind you, I disagree with him on this but he isn't saying the same thing Ware is.

 

[faithandfreedom]

When he speaks of subordinationist language is he getting at the Taxis? “From the Father, through the Son, by the Holy Spirit?” The Father begets the Son and the Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son.

In this sense the Father is first, Son is second and Spirit is third, but this does not mean that the Son or Spirit are lower than the Father, nor is the Father a higher authority.

 

[RamistThomist]

When he speaks of subordinationist language is he getting at the Taxis? “From the Father, through the Son, by the Holy Spirit?” The Father begets the Son and the Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son.

In this sense the Father is first, Son is second and Spirit is third, but this does not mean that the Son or Spirit are lower than the Father, nor is the Father a higher authority.

He is going a bit further than that. His construal of eternal humiliation is rooted in a desire to protect the Logos from any abstract identity besides that of Jesus of Nazareth.

 

[faithandfreedom]

Thank you. It appears I didn't quote him accurately. So he said a single divine subject in three modes of being. Is that sufficiently orthodox?

In my estimation it is an unsatisfactory formulation.

It doesn’t appear to do justice to the three persons and seems to take away from the relationship of mutual indwelling.

 

[RamistThomist]

In my estimation it is an unsatisfactory formulation.

It doesn’t appear to do justice to the three persons and seems to take away from the relationship of mutual indwelling.

It's not perfect, but it does have a patristic pedigree. We'll parse it:

Single Subject

I would have said single nature because this phrase risks Nestorianism when we apply Cyril's formula of One Subject (person) of the Logos.

Three Modes

You will find this explicitly in Basil (tropos huparxeos). It is fine.

Eternal Simultenaity

This safeguards against historic modalism.

 

[Ploutos]

In a sense, but in a very different sense than we are used to. There is no subordination of function, for example. Mind you, I disagree with him on this but he isn't saying the same thing Ware is.

So what would you say then, in contrast with McCormack?

 

[RamistThomist]

So what would you say then, in contrast with McCormack?

I would stick with classic orthodoxy. I don't think it needs to be tweaked.

 

[MW]

To attempt to parse what is happening here -- the classical doctrine operates with a metaphysic of being-as-substance. This is the one divine ousia or WHAT God is. The three hypostases are distinct, relational subsistences of that one being. They are WHO God is. Their personal properties are constitutive of their very identity, not just roles they play.

Barth's "actualism" replaces this with a metaphysic of being-as-act. In this model, God's being is not a prior substance that then acts; His being is in His act. The "modes of subsistence" are pushed from an ontological meaning to a functional one. God's being is constituted by His acts in revelation, and the "modes" are simply "ways of being God." This raises the question, Why is God three? The classical answer is ontological: God's being is eternally and necessarily tripersonal. The actualist answer can only be because God has chosen to reveal Himself in this threefold way. This moves the Trinity from a necessary truth about God's inner being to a contingent truth about His self-revelation. Barth would deny this is modalism proper, but his metaphysic is exerting pressure in that direction and it is real.

So what are we dealing with? Basically, there is no substance. The actualist deliberately rejects a "being behind the act." To speak of God's "being in Himself" is meaningless abstraction; we only know and can speak of God "as He is for us" in His acts of revelation and grace. The "substance" is nothing other than the event of the relationship.

This brings us to subordination. It can be nothing else in the absence of an ontological "Person." In the classical model the Son is eternally the Person of the Son, the hypostasis of the Logos. In the Incarnation, this divine Person voluntarily assumes a human nature and, within that nature, lives a life of humility and obedience. The actor is a divine Person, the acting is done in a human nature. The obedience is a human act, willed by a human will (the will of the Son's human nature), which is perfectly aligned with the divine will. The ontological Person, the divine Son, is the ground and subject of the functional act, the human obedience.

In McCormack's actualist model there is no prior, ontological "Person of the Son" who chooses to obey. The "Person" of the Son just is the event of His obedience. God can only be what He actualises. The Son actualises obedience. Therefore the Son must be subordinate. Without the conceptual holder of a divine hypostasis that freely and temporally takes on the function of a servant, the function of obedience becomes constitutive of the identity itself. The command-obedience structure is not something the Son does; it is, in a significant sense, who He is in His eternal self-distinction from the Father.

There is no way of saving the actualist system. It has no way of grounding the economic works of the Trinity in an eternal order that is ontologically prior to its ad extra works. You cannot introduce any concept to soften the conclusion of an ontological hierarchy. If the Son's very identity is defined by His obedience to the Father's command, then the relation is not one of free, co-equal persons in a communion of love, but of a necessary and eternal order of command and obedience.

The actualist model fails on every level.

 

[RamistThomist]

Jay W. Richards (The Untamed God) offers a good critique of Barth's actualism.

On this reading God, in a primal decision, chooses to be who and what he is--to be God. Barth uses “freedom” in five senses (133ff):

(1) freedom as gratuity (CD 4/1, 39)
(2) freedom as a choice between alternatives (CD 2/2, 28-32).
(3) freedom as self-determination (CD 2/1, 301; CD 1/1, 323)
(4) Freedom as initiative (2/2, 168)
(5) freedom as energy

Richards defines Strong Actualism as: “For any essential property P, God has P iff God has chosen P from a set of alternatives” (Richards 134).

But this raises a dilemma: if God chose P, could God have willed otherwise? If so, then there is a possible world where God doesn’t have P, which means it isn’t an essential property. If God couldn’t have willed otherwise, then in what sense did God actually choose P?

There are other similar problems. Saying God can choose among alternatives presupposes he is a being that can choose. So he has to have the property of “being able to choose.” Did he choose to have that property? Well, then he has another property, the property of ‘having the property of being able to choose,’ and so on.

But maybe Barth doesn’t mean that. He doesn’t say God “chooses to be God,” but he does say God wills to be God.