I write this as someone who does have a theological problem with musical accompaniment for singing in the current dispensation of grace but I, too, am not willing to disturb the peace of the church over whether an offertory or a background communion-service instrumental is played.
I recognize your stance from your church-affiliation, and commend your patience in respect to reformation in this arena.
I'm not sure how you can posit this [
...if one did think Ps.150 makes an authorization of musical instruments for public stated worship across all eras of the church, he is bound to the exact terms of the text.]. If someone wants to argue that
Ps.150 permits the use of instruments, they
are feel free to substitute a piano for stringed instruments for the pipe because Psalm 150 is not giving an exhaustive or exclusive list of instruments used in tabernacle/temple worship. Rather the psalmist seems to be employing a synecdoche. If you think Psalm 150 allows for instruments in worship, you cannot then limit which instruments are used.
No, it doesn't follow by strict logic. Each step toward the conclusion "I can use a piano in worship" based
initially on one or more conclusions drawn from the text of Ps.150 requires a biblical, not a prudential or pragmatic, argument. The conclusions drawn from Ps.150 must be rigorously developed from the grammatico-historic rules of interpretation, not individual culturally attuned intuition. Furthermore, it is not the case one may legitimately
posit "Ps.150 obviously permits the use of instruments," and then leap from there to a further conclusion on what is essentially no basis at all, that "Thus I may substitute whatever suits my need right now for the terms of the text." That whole form of reasoning is a
conclusion in search of a justification; the person already knows what he wants (a piano, a drum set, a zither...) so he's looking for support.
Next, it does not follow that: Ps.150 either supplies an exhaustive list (for instruments in worship), or others must be permitted by substitution. Suppose (for argument's sake) there existed an exhaustive list of authorized instruments. These commands to praise the Lord on certain instruments would neither 1) authorize the substitution--though it might permit the augmentation--by another authorized instrument (you may not fail to use the commanded instrument); nor 2) would it authorize substitution or augmentation by unauthorized instruments. It simply does not follow that the person professing to fulfill the command is free to substitute at will; and all I need to do to prove the point is by reference to Lev.10, the substitution there that was so severely penalized.
If you are saying, "Well, they are doing what they want with Ps.150 anyway, so in their minds they are justified in substitution," that is most certainly true; however all along I have been at pains to subvert the typical special-pleading nature of looking to Ps.150 for support of the a priori. On display is a cascade of weak and fallacious argument, beginning with a most superficial, tenuous connection to the literal words of Holy Scripture (a violation of the 3rd Commandment).
So how do you theologically justify this [I personally think a piano typically provides about the right level of assistance to an average sized congregation singing in an average sized meeting room. I don't have a problem with a piano for accompaniment in worship song.]? How do you justify this instrument (a piano) and not that one (amplified electric ukulele)? I personally think a violin typically provides about the right level of assistance to an average sized congregation singing in an average sized meeting room but I have a problem with a violin for accompaniment in worship song.
I really do not want to divert the purpose of the thread. Briefly, since I think a piano (or a pitchpipe, or a violin) may be used circumstantially as an aid to congregational singing, while it could be dispensed with entirely and no damage done to worship, its use should make a good work more efficient and not detract. Just as the presence or absence of artificial lighting in a church, while is could be dispensed with entirely and no damage done to worship, its use should make a good work more efficient and not detract.
As for an amplified electric ukulele, first convince me that this instrument for accompaniment has the least likely potential for detracting from the good work as opposed to another available option, or that it is better for the good work to have it than to dispense with it altogether. As with any circumstantial use, this judgment requires prudence.
