One of Bahnsen's primary points in his lecture is that Clark denies axioms can be proved whereas Van Til says we can prove ultimate presuppositions by the impossibility to the contrary. I've linked to the transcendental argument at the bottom of
this post before, but I still know of no better presentation of the argument itself or response to an anticipated objection.
This, by the way, is another response Clark could have provided as to why one should choose the Bible over the Koran without compromising his view of axioms as unproveable. If Clark had no issue with defending the Bible by appealing to its internal consistency, he should have had no issue with defending the Bible using transcendental argumentation. Each of these defenses exhibits self-referential coherence.
In fact, Clark has used transcendental argumentation in his apologetic. Take his following argument from
The Wheaton Lectures: "
It is incorrect, therefore, to complain that the axiom of revelation deprives us of knowledge otherwise obtainable. There is no knowledge otherwise obtainable." This is excellent. It excludes the epistemic viability all non-Christian axioms and theorems.
Now, I take the transcendental argument to be apologetic, not epistemic. That is, the language of "proof" sounds as though the transcendental argument is that which epistemically justifies my belief in the Bible. I deny this - and so does Bahnsen, if we take him at his word that the Bible bears the "highest epistemic certainty." I prefer the language that this is a "transcendental
argument," for arguments are related to apologetics, defenses of that faith which we already know.
Clark, therefore, is right insofar as any "dogmatic answer must be found in the Bible itself." Apologetics is dependent on epistemology, after all. And as Ron Digiacomo says, the premises in the argument in turn are defended by "appealing to the absolute authority of Scripture," the extant extent of God's self-authenticating word. God's word is epistemically basic, foundational, or axiomatic. It stands in no need of prior, epistemic proof.
I've likely written more than is helpful, but one more statement by Bahnsen made at mark 1:07:00 is connected to the foregoing: "
If knowledge is justified true belief, reasons pertain to the truth. Causes pertain to the believing." Bahnsen says this in the context of taking Clark to task for failing to give a proper answer (and even a proper formulation of the question) regarding choosing between Christian and Islamic first principles. Again, no one much wants to compare these to know that which each first principle (or its theorems) attribute to be
causes of beliefs in them. Rather, people want to know why one should be chosen over another.
I've already provided my answer to this. I don't quite understand Bahnsen's own answer. That which is true is true regardless of one's reasons for his belief... if he even has any. One can have a true belief without reasons, after all. Perhaps Bahnsen meant to say that reasons pertain to
justification?
If I am interpreting Bahnsen correctly, then I have two questions. The first is: in order to have
justified true belief (knowledge), does Bahnsen think one
always need reasons? If so, I disagree. Knowledge of or justification for belief in God's word does not require reasons. Reasons cannot make me to know or become justified in my belief that God's word is true if God's word
already bears the "highest epistemic certainty," for if the "reasons" did do so, they would themselves then have the "highest epistemic certainty." God's word is justified non-inferentially.
The second question is whether Bahnsen considers the transcendental argument to be epistemic, apologetic, or both. I've stated why I think the transcendental argument is apologetic: the argument is itself grounded in one's knowledge of the Christian first principle. But right after his definition of knowledge, at minute mark 1:08:00, Bahnsen says, "Van Til says
there's a reason for believing our ultimate presupposition: the impossibility of the contrary. If you don't follow this presupposition, you can't make sense out of any other method."
It appears that one of two things has happened. Bahnsen may be subordinating his "ultimate presupposition" to his "reason" for it; that is, Bahnsen may be suggesting his "ultimate presupposition" is derived from some logically prior "reason." Is it realistic that Bahnsen thought his transcendental argument (his "reason") was more fundamental than that which has been divinely revealed ("ultimate presupposition")?
The other option is that the "reason" Bahnsen mentions is derived from his ultimate presupposition. After all, the concept of "the impossibility of the contrary" came from somewhere - and I don't mean in a causal sense. The concept must be related to Bahnsen's ultimate presupposition. But what
is the relation? If one's knowledge of "the impossibility of the contrary" is derived from God's word, then isn't the argument's construction circular? If so, a tangential question I'll skip but write for my own reflection is whether Bahnsen's correspondence of reasons to justification and causes to beliefs in the "justified true belief" definition of knowledge means that circular reasoning would entail circular causation.
What is Bahnsen's position, then? I would not have thought the former was a live option, but in Bahnsen's debate with Sproul (
link), we find the following exchange:
Sproul: How do you know the Bible's the word of God? I haven't heard a single response to that question. You've quoted the Bible, but you haven't...
Bahnsen: I know it from the impossibility of the contrary.
...
Sproul: How do you know that your presupposition is true? Where does your certainty come from? That's what I keep trying to ask.
Bahnsen: From the impossibility of the contrary.
Sproul: All right, how is the contrary impossible?
Bahnsen: Well, you want me to go through a few of the schools of philosophy and show you? I mean, how is it utterly impossible and unthinkable that there be no God?
Bahnsen repeatedly says he knows that the Bible is God's word from the impossibility of the contrary. How, then, can the Bible be his "ultimate presupposition"?
If Bahnsen's knowledge of "the impossibility of the contrary" were ultimately derived from the Bible itself, then Bahnsen's stated answer to Sproul would entail that his epistemic justification for belief in the truth of the Bible is circular: he knows the Bible is true because of the impossibility of the contrary, and he knows the impossibility of the contrary because he knows the Bible is true. I deny this attempt at circular justification, and so does Bahnsen himself (in his published works; e.g. Van Til's Apologetic: Readings and Analysis, pg. 518, footnote 122). Apologetic arguments may be circular (i.e. self-referential), but as has been pointed out, that doesn't mean said arguments are also
epistemic justifications for our beliefs.
In point of fact, Bahnsen denies that epistemic justification is circular at minute mark 1:51:29 in his conversation with Sproul about Gordon Clark's views (which are misrepresented, but we can leave that aside). When asked by Sproul how he knows the contrary is impossible, Bahnsen doesn't say, "because God has revealed such in the Bible." He replies by offering to discuss
some contraries. At least this isn't an attempt to circularly justify how he knows the Bible is true.
But Bahnsen's response fails in two ways: 1) Bahnsen fails to demonstrate that
the contrary to the Bible is true, which was Sproul's question; 2) Bahnsen subordinates knowledge of the truth of the Bible to logic, as if knowledge of the truth of the Bible depends on an argument that any and all unbiblical worldviews are false.
Regarding 1), Sproul didn't ask about the impossibility of a few contrar
ies to the Bible, he asked how Bahnsen knows the impossibility of the contrar
y. That is, what is it about the Bible in particular such that a worldview which does not accept it is unworkable? It doesn't suffice for Bahnsen to refute individual worldviews which reject the Bible.
Think of it this way: if, as Bahnsen believed, we don't defend Christianity piecemeal, then Bahnsen shouldn't attack non-Christianity piecemeal either, for that won't defend his especially bold claim that he knows the Bible is true because the contrarY (i.e. non-biblical worldviews) is unworkable or impossible. Sproul put Bahnsen on the spot and showed that in the moment, Bahnsen transcendental argument reduced to a transcendental assertion. Bahnsen
might have been able to refute
some non-Christian philosophies. But actually, one can only refute other positions if one already knows truth [axiomatically] in the first place.
Even if we grant that Bahnsen could have refuted a few non-Christian worldviews, such would have constituted a case-by-case, inductive study, a methodological procedure which cannot justify Christianity. Again, the transcendental argument is supposed to be the impossibility of
the contrary, not the impossibility of
some contraries. But in his conversation with Sproul, Bahnsen's stated justification of the impossibility of the contrary is inductive. Bahnsen himself explains elsewhere why this procedure for transcendental argumentation is wrong (
link):
Presuppositionalism is not a case by case by case inductive survey. It's not like we're going out there and saying, "Okay, here's a version of the enemy. It didn't work, now let's find another one. Oh, now this second one didn't work, now let's find another one. This third one didn't work..." And then eventually we stand back, either because we've gotten tired or we think we've done enough work and we say, "Well, then all of them won't work." That is not the argument. If it were, it would be weak, because any inductive survey that's incomplete. You don't know how much more of this is out there. But that isn't the argument. We don't consider this. I believe Christianity is the only option. On a case-by-case basis, I begin by saying Christianity is the only option. Now, who wants to fight?
[Parenthetically, if inductive reasoning is not acceptable here, Bahnsen again implicitly concedes the importance of Clark's emphasis on infallible, internalist knowledge.]
In the above quote, the highlighted portions are correct. Internally critiquing
some non-Christian philosophies is insufficient to establish the impossibility of
the contrarY (singular) to biblical Christianity, i.e. ~biblical Christianity.
When Sproul asked why the non-biblical worldview is unworkable or impossible, Bahnsen had the following options:
1) merely claim that "Christianity is the only option." This is a transcendental assertion, not a transcendental argument.
2) argue that all non-biblical worldviews don't work or are impossible because some don't work or are impossible. This is the inductive route he takes with Sproul, but it fails for the very reasons Bahnsen states above.
3) argue that all non-biblical worldviews don't work or are impossible because God has revealed such in the Bible. This is the straightforward, correct response; however, in this case, Bahnsen should not have told Sproul that he
knows the Bible is true from the impossibility of the contrary. That inverts the truth: that Bahnsen and we know the impossibility of the contrary because he and we know the Bible
first (the Bible is self-authenticating and known noninferentially). Bahnsen might
defend the Bible from the impossibility to the contrary, but he shouldn't say he
knows the Bible from the impossibility to the contrary. This would also be problematic in that it entails circular epistemic justification.
4) argue that all non-biblical worldviews don't work or are impossible for some other reason. This would beg further questions from Sproul that would further press the issue that Bahnsen is reasoning to Christianity after all rather than taking biblical revelation as his ultimate presupposition.
I think Bahnsen's published work contradicts certain statements in his debates. The transcendental argument is supposed to be used apologetically, not epistemically. To repeat the conclusion, the transcendental argument is a
defense of the faith, not a justification by which we say we know the Bible is true. We know "the" transcendental argument is true (or, at least, some version of it such as Digiacomo provides) because we know the Bible is true, not vice versa...
Coming back to Clark's 1957 article on "Apologetics," Bahnsen argues that one other area where Clark misrepresents Van Til is with respect to the transcendental argument. Clark writes, "there is no point in talking about a perfect argument that no one has ever correctly formulated." That is, he claims Van Til has never stated the transcendental argument. Bahnsen finds the following statement Clark makes
here to be even more incredulous:
“With regard to the existence of God and the truth of Christian theism, there is absolutely certain proof. There is a cogent theistic proof.” Now, Frame’s statement there is quite true, Van Til has said this over and over again. He doesn’t accept Thomas’ proof or any other proof. But he insists that there is an absolutely certain proof. A cogent theistic proof. And he indicates he means the cosmological proof not the ontological proof. And for some forty years 3 now I’ve been bugging him to show me the proof, so I can see whether it is valid or not. He hasn’t accommodated me as yet.
Was Van Til talking about the cosmological proof? No. Clark is indeed badly mistaken. Minutes 23-26 run through some quotes that would have been available to Clark in 1957 that basically express the idea of the impossibility of the contrary.
Bahnsen again speculates that Clark's inability to correctly read Van Til implies that "there is something more to it than just an academic debate." That's possible, but an alternative explanation is unwittingly given by Bahnsen a little earlier. Elaborating on Van Til's transcendental argument, Bahnsen says:
The argument has been stated, but it's not a deductive argument. Please notice that that is what Dr Clark is looking for, and that's why he says, "tell me the premises." Because the transcendental argumentation doesn't proceed in terms of premises, it proceeds by a comparison of world views and asking after the preconditions of knowledge.
Rather than supposing that Clark was still bitter about the outcome of the 1940s debate, I think it makes more sense to consider that he was predisposed to think of arguments as syllogisms. Van Til's transcendental "argument" apparently did not meet this condition, so Clark failed to consider it to be an argument at all.
It is interesting that Bahnsen does not think transcendental argumentation proceeds in term of premises (minute 27). Digiacomo's transcendental argument proceeded in terms of premises, and I find Digiacomo's presentation more thorough persuasive. As noted earlier, Bahnsen can sometimes come off as if he is begging the question or merely making an assertion. All this is simply to say that Bahnsen's rhetoric can be improved, which shouldn't be controversial.
presupp101.wordpress.com
), but will try to give a more complete answer as I have time.
