It contradicts the formula in the creeds precisely because person does not mean absolute personality, it means a subsistence within the Godhead.
Which he affirmed. But if he meant it in two different senses than no contradiction, you just seem to not like his way of saying it. Again back to my point, you seem to be operating on the assumption that he meant it in the same sense and therefore it's a contradiction.
That seems to be the only way to make sense out of what you're saying, one sense and one sense only.
I am not saying that the framers thought that the biblical language, when referring to God in the singular, justified the thought of God as one person. I am saying that the framers interpreted the language of scripture to mean that God is one essence.
An impersonal essence? So God is one part three persons and one part impersonal essence? I don't think that's what you mean but that's where Van Til was concerned. So building off of other thinkers he developed on absolute personality to avoid that line of thought.
In terms of why he was not brought up on charges, Rev Winzer's comment sheds some light on this. I also suspect he was given more leeway due to being a prominent member of the OPC and a close friend of Machen, although this is speculation on my part. As I have previously mentioned, I believe there are men in Reformed circles who church members and ministers are reluctant to criticise, due to their prominence.
Well this is speculation on both of our parts but the fact remains he was never brought up on charges.
No the framers had not said everything regarding the Trinity. However, they took extreme care to set out a formula "one essence, three persons" which sets the boundaries for any future theological speculation.
How does that do service to the biblical language? Also going back again to what I think is the underlying issue, how does one person (in one biblical sense) and three persons ( in a different biblical sense) contradict the creeds? If only if person is used in the same sense.
If it's used in different senses than all there's to debate is whether or not his development is orthodox or not, or even helpful.
Your apparent insistence that we must only speak about God's oneness in relation to his essence because that's all the creeds allow. I grant that creeds only speak about oneness that way but you also admit that the framers were well aware of the biblical language as well.
So then the case I'm making is how likely is it that the framers (reacting to one problem) ruled development to react to different problems? Bavink, Vos, and Van Til did exactly that. I also agree with your sentiment that the only way to ensure orthodoxy is by staying within the bounds of the creeds but history happens as you well know and expansions of dogma become necessary.
This may be an explanation for the source of the problem; Van Til and others sought to modify language used to describe the Trinity in order to engage with philosophical schools of the day. These philosophical ideas could have been refuted using the language and formulations that were already set out by the Church.
How? If it were that simple they wouldn't have needed to do what they did, either rightly or wrongly.
There is no biblical language that I am aware of the warrants the use of the term "one person", one essence yes, one person no.
I am aware that he did affirm this, but he then went on to claim that God is one person and three persons, which is problematic.
I think this gets to the heart of your problem person means the same thing in both uses of the term. Cut and dry, and that is a contradiction. But you haven't mentioned the two different senses ever that I'm aware. You seem to just appear to treat it one way and one way only.
Perhaps if you grant the two different senses and then show that that's still the same problem than you'd have something but you seem to be guilty of reductionist thinking about a complex problem.
History is reduced to a nice simple story. Sure the bible does speak about oneness in relation to God's activities but after the creeds it can only ever mean essence. But activities are done by person's so guys tried to incorporate this fact into our doctrine so as not to make any impersonal essence in God.
You seem to reduce Van Til's formulation to simply meaning the term in the same sense, which leads to a contradiction.
I would argue that the institutions involved mishandling the developments by these men is probably overly simplistic, but it's a lot of institutions involved. Taken in isolation each thing can be explained in a different way but taken together at least is evidence not proof that these men were not off the reservation as is being promoted.
I am not against Bavinck's use of the term "absolute personality", clearly that term is not in the creed, but that presents no problem. A term does not need to be in the creed to be Orthodox, however, any term used to describe God must not contradict the doctrine, as set forth in the creeds.
In terms of Bavinck, I did a little research and it seems that he sought to formulate a modified explanation of the Trinity in order to combat issues that were raised by certain philosophers.
The following quotes summarise this:
As you rightly say it seems that Bavinck may be partly responsible for laying the groundwork upon which VT built his novel statement of the Trinity.
I also ran into the following quote that is attributed to Vos, although I am unable to confirm if it is definitely from him, since I don't have a copy of his Reformed Dogmatics:
Geerhardus Vos, Theology Proper, vol. 1 of Reformed Dogmatics, ed. Richard B. Gaffin, trans. Annemie Godbehere (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2013), 17, 43.
Fair enough but you really seem to want, if I'm wrong here please correct me (I don't want to accuse you of saying stuff you're not saying, you're my brother in Christ) person to be used in the same sense in both uses. But you have yet, that I've seen, to show that Van Til's different senses contradict the creeds like person in the same sense. And your argument really hinges on that being true.
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I have several suspicions on that point, and it is much deeper than Van til.
Well I'd be pretty interested in that story. Maybe you could PM it to me, thanks.
That's true, but it boils down like this: Because Van til shifted the meaning of person, he committed the fallacy of equivocation. That fallacy saved his orthodoxy.
Agreed. I've yet to read Tipton's book, as you have, so I'll wait till I do. But I have listened to his lectures and it seemed to make sense what he's saying.
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I am saying that these "dynamics" are reasons why he would not necessarily have been called to account for an error. You are right that Van Til was never formally disciplined, but I do not think that serves as a simple stamp of approval on the specific, controversial way he framed the Trinity. The reality is more complex.
Large denominations don't discipline every controversial idea. The machinery is slow and is often reserved for clear, practical denials of the faith. Van Til was a powerful ally against liberalism and neo-orthodoxy so his philosophical debates were often given a wide berth. Moreover, seminary professors like Van Til are given significant academic liberty to engage with philosophy on a speculative level. His project was seen as happening in the laboratory of the academy, where complex ideas are tested. The church often tolerates this as long as the theologian's overall goal is to defend orthodoxy, which Van Til's certainly was. And then you have the fact that many would have seen this as a philosopher's quarrel. The debate over "person" and "consciousness" within the rise of modern psychology was viewed as a technical discussion. The church has a long history of allowing such debates to play out among scholars without immediate disciplinary action.
In brief, the lack of discipline tells us more about the dynamics of the OPC and the role of academic theology than it does about the orthodoxy of Van Til's formulation.
Again nicely put. I don't consider that proof but evidence. Whether or not that's how it played out is a fact we'll probably never know. And you're right, it doesn't mean he was orthodox but it also doesn't mean he was unorthodox either.