Presuppositionalism Q&A

[chbrooking]

Uh . . .

So Ben simply denies the obligatory powers and demands of natural law?

He could have said so, but perhaps he thinks if too simply put, it appears weird?

Rather, he denies the ability of sinful man to interpret natural revelation aright. And he makes that denial with biblical warrant.

Really?

If this were true, how could reprobates possess the necessary knowledge to willingly and actively suppress Godly truth?

Well, for starters, you missed the word "aright"
But consider that Romans 1 indicates that God "makes known to him" his eternal power and divine nature. It is in them and God has made it plain to them. He does not have to reason to God. He knows God. But he suppresses that truth. So he's living a lie. We are merely showing him that he cannot live consistently with his lie, since the lie is not consistent with the world he lives in or the God he knows but suppresses.

 

[MW]

No EPISTEMOLOGICAL common ground. We do not have an archimidean point of agreement on the basis of which to argue. But we do live in the same world, and bear the same God's image. That's why the unbeliever is living in contradiction.

First, I'm speaking to Ben, who only made a distinction between principle and practice, and has made an absolute denial which does not recognise your distinction. Secondly, I've already responded to your distinction by noting that the presuppositional view of epistemology is dependent on the ontological reality presupposed; therefore your distinction is artificial and has no practical relevance.

 

[Confessor]

Uh . . .

So Ben simply denies the obligatory powers and demands of natural law?

He could have said so, but perhaps he thinks if too simply put, it appears weird?

Rather, he denies the ability of sinful man to interpret natural revelation aright. And he makes that denial with biblical warrant.

Really?

If this were true, how could reprobates possess the necessary knowledge to willingly and actively suppress Godly truth?

The distinction between natural revelation and natural theology is crucial here. Everyone has a non-inferential knowledge of Jehovah as Creator and Judge, but they always suppress it (Romans 1:18 ff.) (natural revelation). It does not follow from this, however, that humans are capable of inferentially deducing from nature things about God on an autonomous basis (natural theology).

 

[MW]

The unbeliever believes he is not made in the image of God and therefore the worldviews do not have common ground (epistemological) at that point.

This response requires you to assume of all unbelievers what might only be true of some of them. And already you are modifying your absolute statement to be applicable only at certain points.

 

[chbrooking]

I apologize for horning in. I'll desist. But I would suggest that it does have practical relevance. We do not share the same view of the world. We see the same world, but we see it very differently. We cannot don God-denying glasses with the unbeliever and then try to point God out using them.

No EPISTEMOLOGICAL common ground. We do not have an archimidean point of agreement on the basis of which to argue. But we do live in the same world, and bear the same God's image. That's why the unbeliever is living in contradiction.

First, I'm speaking to Ben, who only made a distinction between principle and practice, and has made an absolute denial which does not recognise your distinction. Secondly, I've already responded to your distinction by noting that the presuppositional view of epistemology is dependent on the ontological reality presupposed; therefore your distinction is artificial and has no practical relevance.

 

[Turtle]

The second sentence denies what the third sentence affirms. Either the unbeliever believes in universal laws of logic or he does not. One cannot have it both ways. Certainly the unbeliever cannot account for his belief on the basis of his worldview, but the fact remains that he still holds the belief, which means that his worldview is not 100% different.

If he were consistent in his unbelieving principles, he would not believe in the laws of logic. But they are retained in him because the imago Dei cannot be eradicated.

Also, keep in mind Rev. Winzer that we can speak of different ontologies. Although it is an ontological fact that the unbeliever bears the image of God, this is only the case on a Biblical presupposition.

It is the case because of Creation. Creation is Revelation. It is clear in this context and rationally defensible in this context. This is why an unbeliever is held accountable in the context of a clear general revelation. The Bible need not be presupposed for this to be reality.

Yes... creation is revelation. But we presuppose that to be the case.

Just kidding. I agree creation is revelation. One can deny revelation ad infinitum and claim it merely presupposition but actually that is just choosing to be irrational. Unless of course we presuppose that all belief is on equal footing which leaves us only with dialectic truth, which denies truth and revelation. That brings us back to one can choose to be irrational and deny revelation. Which of course is suppressing the truth in unrighteousness.

 

[Confessor]

The unbeliever believes he is not made in the image of God and therefore the worldviews do not have common ground (epistemological) at that point.

This response requires you to assume of all unbelievers what might only be true of some of them. And already you are modifying your absolute statement to be applicable only at certain points.

Unbelievers believe they are not made in the image of God (as the Bible teaches it) by definition. I guess there could be someone who acknowledges the truth of the Bible and hates it, but for all intents and purposes that person is a "believer," intellectually speaking.

How am I modifying my statement to be applicable only at certain points? I said there was no common ground at all; you replied that the imago Dei counted as common ground; and I replied that it was not. I was simply attempting to rebut a defeater to my claim, not limiting its scope.

 

[MW]

We cannot don God-denying glasses with the unbeliever and then try to point God out using them.

Hence the antithetical approach with which we speak to the unbeliever on the common ground which the image of God provides.

 

[Reformed Rush]

Rather, he denies the ability of sinful man to interpret natural revelation aright. And he makes that denial with biblical warrant.

Really?

If this were true, how could reprobates possess the necessary knowledge to willingly and actively suppress Godly truth?

Well, for starters, you missed the word "aright"
But consider that Romans 1 indicates that God "makes known to him" his eternal power and divine nature. It is in them and God has made it plain to them. He does not have to reason to God. He knows God. But he suppresses that truth. So he's living a lie. We are merely showing him that he cannot live consistently with his lie, since the lie is not consistent with the world he lives in or the God he knows but suppresses.

Well, we guess we are extremely unsophisticated and thus too theologically radical, for we believe that reprobates who suppress God's truth are sovereignly left to do so, without moral excuse.


And all the apologetics in the world cannot reverse God's decrees to leave some souls in such a state of denial and hatred of His truth.

The only thing that can reverse sinners' natural enmity to the truths of God, is divine mercy and grace.

And that mercy and grace comes only by the preaching of the gospel of Jesus Christ, which should be our primary emphasis and interest in this life.

J&R
(Simple believers)

 

[Confessor]

J&R,

We are not trying to classify you as simpletons or anything of the sort. Nor do we do believe that apologetics can in itself resurrect the hearts of unregenerates.

However, what apologetics can do is show more vividly just how wrong the unbeliever is. He can acknowledge this fact intellectually without having his heart turned morally. The Spirit provides the moral change. (And of course God in His providence provides the intellectual ammunition anyway; it's not wholly "of ourselves.")

Ben

 

[chbrooking]

We cannot don God-denying glasses with the unbeliever and then try to point God out using them.

Hence the antithetical approach with which we speak to the unbeliever on the common ground which the image of God provides.

Indeed. But we do not adopt his set of presuppositions and then reason from them with him. His presuppositions are such, because of the fall, that they will never allow him to get to the Biblical conception of God. But you are right that we speak to him from the antithesis. And we know that, in one sense, he understands it, because he is created in God's image. In another sense, he will not understand it, because spiritual truths are spiritually discerned. But on that point, I'm sure we are in agreement -- that effectual calling is required for him to respond favorably.

 

[Confessor]

Alright, I'm going to bed. I shall return to this surprisingly lively thread in the morning. I hope it's less than 5 pages long.

 

[ChristianTrader]

We cannot don God-denying glasses with the unbeliever and then try to point God out using them.

Hence the antithetical approach with which we speak to the unbeliever on the common ground which the image of God provides.

Indeed. But we do not adopt his set of presuppositions and then reason from them with him. His presuppositions are such, because of the fall, that they will never allow him to get to the Biblical conception of God. But you are right that we speak to him from the antithesis. And we know that, in one sense, he understands it, because he is created in God's image. In another sense, he will not understand it, because spiritual truths are spiritually discerned. But on that point, I'm sure we are in agreement -- that effectual calling is required for him to respond favorably.

Needing the spirit in order to response favorably does not imply that there are no proper "neutral" presuppositions that you can share with the unbeliever. It just implies that they will refuse to go from point A to point B.

CT

 

[Beth Ellen Nagle]

Alright, I'm going to bed. I shall return to this surprisingly lively thread in the morning. I hope it's less than 5 pages long.

Rest well. God bless you. I wish I had more time to engage the Natural Theology aspect and clarity of General Revelation.

 

[Confessor]

Alright, I'm going to bed. I shall return to this surprisingly lively thread in the morning. I hope it's less than 5 pages long.

Rest well. God bless you. I wish I had more time to engage the Natural Theology aspect and clarity of General Revelation.

You can make a new thread and link it here so that I see it tomorrow morning if you want.

But anyway, good night (seriously).

 

[chbrooking]

That wasn't my claim.
My claim is that we don't both stand on A.
The unbeliever begins his thinking where I cannot go -- autonomously. It is the autonomy in all of his presuppositions which a) distinguishes them from ours and b) which prohibits him from arriving at the Christian God.

Feel free to respond. I will pick up the thread in the morning. But it's late for me, too.

Hence the antithetical approach with which we speak to the unbeliever on the common ground which the image of God provides.

Indeed. But we do not adopt his set of presuppositions and then reason from them with him. His presuppositions are such, because of the fall, that they will never allow him to get to the Biblical conception of God. But you are right that we speak to him from the antithesis. And we know that, in one sense, he understands it, because he is created in God's image. In another sense, he will not understand it, because spiritual truths are spiritually discerned. But on that point, I'm sure we are in agreement -- that effectual calling is required for him to respond favorably.

Needing the spirit in order to response favorably does not imply that there are no proper "neutral" presuppositions that you can share with the unbeliever. It just implies that they will refuse to go from point A to point B.

CT

 

[MW]

Unbelievers believe they are not made in the image of God (as the Bible teaches it) by definition. I guess there could be someone who acknowledges the truth of the Bible and hates it, but for all intents and purposes that person is a "believer," intellectually speaking.

Deists and Pantheists are not Atheists and Agnostics.

How am I modifying my statement to be applicable only at certain points? I said there was no common ground at all; you replied that the imago Dei counted as common ground; and I replied that it was not. I was simply attempting to rebut a defeater to my claim, not limiting its scope.

First, Your defeater is only applicable if it defeats the true concept that the unbeliever is made in the irrepressible image of God. What the unbeliever believes about the image of God is irrelevant. Secondly, your defeater spoke to the point of one who does not believe in the image of God in man, but there are numerous unbelieving theologies which do believe in it. Remember, reformed presuppositionalism does not simply start with God, but with the God of holy Scripture.

 

[MW]

Indeed. But we do not adopt his set of presuppositions and then reason from them with him. His presuppositions are such, because of the fall, that they will never allow him to get to the Biblical conception of God. But you are right that we speak to him from the antithesis. And we know that, in one sense, he understands it, because he is created in God's image. In another sense, he will not understand it, because spiritual truths are spiritually discerned. But on that point, I'm sure we are in agreement -- that effectual calling is required for him to respond favorably.

Very true. If he understands then he is epistemically equipped to know what is presented to him; it is just that his rebellious worldview will not allow him to submit to what he understands. His problem is therefore moral, not necessarily intellectual.

 

[Philip]

By reasonable certainty do you mean probable-ness?

No. When we talk in ordinary parlance about someone being "reasonable", we simply mean that he is not being overly skeptical or discounting possibilities unnecessarily. For example, I am reasonably certain that I am having a debate right now (though if I was Gordon Clark, I would be calling that into question). Reasonable certainty is skeptical of skepticism and asks for a good reason to believe other things.

The thing is, Kant and classical apologetics are arguing in the same arena, with the same autonomous footing beneath them, so it is quite fair to use Kant to critique classical apologetics.

No, because they do not share the same presuppositions. Their epistemology is quite different (and there are gaping holes in Kant). Also, assuming autonomous reasoning, even for the sake of a reductio ad absurdum should be rejected, if you are going to be a really consistent Christian presuppositionalist.

Here I am distinguishing between presupp as a Christian epistemology and presupp as a method of critiquing. I maintain that the two are anathema to one another, because, on the one hand, you maintain that all autonomous reasoning is sinful, yet on the other, you reason autonomously (or force your opponent to do so) in order to disprove his presuppositions. It's inconsistent to say that all autonomous reasoning is sinful, and then, even only for the sake of a reductio, reason autonomously. The only way that a consistent Christian presuppositionalist can critique is for him to do so using only his own presuppositions.

On the other hand, you also have implicitly given yourself an out into the realm of classical apologetics by assuming general revelation. General revelation (common sense) may therefore be used to prove the truth of Christianity. All revelation implicitly assumes the truth of Christianity, according to presuppositionalism, and may therefore be used in its defense.

Assuming your view is "common sense" begs the question. I would say that accepting the Bible on its own authority is common sense.

No, the Bible is, as Chesterton put it, "Uncommon sense for the world's common nonsense."

That is not an epistemology. It is a small subset of epistemology which has no bearing on presuppositions. It's like asking, "Did you and that unbeliever agree that you had eggs for breakfast this morning?"

Actually, I would argue that the question of whether or not we agree that I had eggs for breakfast this morning is relevant (in fact, I had a bagel). If we both agree that there is an external reality and are reasonably certain of our facts, we can reason from there. There is no possible way to reason, unless some presuppositions are held in common by all involved (eventually, I need to outline my theory of the hierarchy of presuppositions).

I would also say that we need to take Biblical precedent into consideration. Was Elijah a presuppositionalist? No. He didn't try to logically disprove arguments for pagan worldviews, instead he said "Back it up. If Baal is so powerful, have him call fire from heaven. Can't do it? Here, let Jahveh show you how it's done." He didn't give a negative proof for the existence of Baal, but a positive one for the existence of Jahveh.

In principle, the unbeliever has an entirely different worldview from the believer (no epistemological common ground).

I would argue that we do have epistemological common ground here. We both have physical senses and powers of reasoning. These are God-given (ie: God-presupposing) methods of knowledge.

What do you mean they "used" Kant? Employed transcendentalism? It's not wrong to use some concepts made throughout the history of philosophy

Those concepts carry presuppositions with them. In Kant's case, his transcendentalism is a reaction to "enlightenment" (ie: endarkenment) thinking, which presupposes a deistic theology. Kant is presupposing autonomy and therefore, according to consistent Christian presuppositionalism, should be rejected.

 

[Confessor]

Deists and Pantheists are not Atheists and Agnostics.

They don't believe they are made in the image of God with the full Biblical ramifications of it -- most notably, they believe that autonomous philosophy is the correct approach to understanding the world.

In other words, deists talk about being made in the image of God in the context of a natural religion. This is completely different from the Christian perspective, especially enough to change one's view when interpreting evidence and attempting to reason to God's existence.

First, Your defeater is only applicable if it defeats the true concept that the unbeliever is made in the irrepressible image of God. What the unbeliever believes about the image of God is irrelevant. Secondly, your defeater spoke to the point of one who does not believe in the image of God in man, but there are numerous unbelieving theologies which do believe in it. Remember, reformed presuppositionalism does not simply start with God, but with the God of holy Scripture.

1. I was responding to your defeater, not making one of my own. (You were saying that Christians have common ground in principle with others who believe they were made in the image of God.)

What the unbeliever believes is absolutely relevant. The "principles" that I refer to when I say that believers and unbelievers disagree on everything in principle is that according to their espoused worldviews they have nothing in common. The presuppositional apologist would never deny that the unbeliever is not actually made in the image of God.

2. As I said above, believing that man is made in the image of God in the context of another worldview does not equate to having common ground in principle. When a Muslim or deist or pantheist says he is made in the image of God, he means something with totally different ramifications than when a Reformed Christian says it.

-----Added 6/15/2009 at 10:28:28 EST-----

Here I am distinguishing between presupp as a Christian epistemology and presupp as a method of critiquing. I maintain that the two are anathema to one another, because, on the one hand, you maintain that all autonomous reasoning is sinful, yet on the other, you reason autonomously (or force your opponent to do so) in order to disprove his presuppositions. It's inconsistent to say that all autonomous reasoning is sinful, and then, even only for the sake of a reductio, reason autonomously. The only way that a consistent Christian presuppositionalist can critique is for him to do so using only his own presuppositions.

If you talk to your kids about the consequences of premarital sex, would you be sinning? No. Likewise, it is perfectly fine to discuss what happens when autonomous reasoning is presupposed, or what would happen if autonomy rather than theonomy were correct. When the presuppositionalist steps in the shoes of the unbeliever to show him where his reasoning leads, he is not actually committing himself to rebellion against the Bible. He is merely telling the unbeliever how bad of an idea that is.

On the other hand, you also have implicitly given yourself an out into the realm of classical apologetics by assuming general revelation. General revelation (common sense) may therefore be used to prove the truth of Christianity. All revelation implicitly assumes the truth of Christianity, according to presuppositionalism, and may therefore be used in its defense.

The non-inferential knowledge given by natural revelation (Romans 1:18 ff.) does not give way to natural theology, the discursive method of interpreting reality in an attempt to reason to God's existence. General revelation is not "common sense." All revelation does implicitly assume the truth of Christianity -- but only when viewed in the right light! To revert to an analogy Van Til enjoyed employing: although everything illumined by a light "proves" that light indirectly (everything illumined "implicitly assumes" a light source), you cannot somehow "prove" the light by assuming it's dark! Likewise, you cannot show how everything implicitly assumes Christianity by assuming that God is not sovereign over human reasoning; you cannot show how everything implicitly assumes Christianity by assuming that Christianity is false.

If we both agree that there is an external reality and are reasonably certain of our facts, we can reason from there. There is no possible way to reason, unless some presuppositions are held in common by all involved (eventually, I need to outline my theory of the hierarchy of presuppositions).

When you say that you had a bagel for breakfast, you are implying that you had a bagel created and sustained by the God of the Bible. When the unbeliever says that he had a bagel, he is implying something completely different. This is not common ground in principle.

However, seeing as this actually is God's world, and the unbeliever actually would have been eating a bagel created by God, it follows that there is metaphysical common ground.

I would also say that we need to take Biblical precedent into consideration. Was Elijah a presuppositionalist? No. He didn't try to logically disprove arguments for pagan worldviews, instead he said "Back it up. If Baal is so powerful, have him call fire from heaven. Can't do it? Here, let Jahveh show you how it's done." He didn't give a negative proof for the existence of Baal, but a positive one for the existence of Jahveh.

Would his evidence have made sense at all in the context of a non-Christian worldview, in which knowledge is impossible? Furthermore, I am not directly opposed to evidence as long as they are used presuppositionally, essentially "backwards" to how evidentialists use them. Elijah did not imply, "Look at this fire neutrally and autonomously reason to what you think is a reasonable conclusion," but rather, "This fire makes sense if we presuppose the living God rather than Baal."

Honestly, this is no problem, but it could take me a long time to explain, as I would have to explain "immutable facts" from before. Maybe a separate thread?

I would argue that we do have epistemological common ground here. We both have physical senses and powers of reasoning. These are God-given (ie: God-presupposing) methods of knowledge.

Since they are God-given, this is actual common ground, but since the unbeliever does not believe they are God-given, it is not common ground in principle. (I think the "metaphysical" and "epistemological" descriptors are only confusing the issue.)

Those concepts carry presuppositions with them. In Kant's case, his transcendentalism is a reaction to "enlightenment" (ie: endarkenment) thinking, which presupposes a deistic theology. Kant is presupposing autonomy and therefore, according to consistent Christian presuppositionalism, should be rejected.

If a presuppositionalist were to use Kantian concepts autonomously, then they should be rejected. Using transcendental argumentation while recognizing God's prerogative to interpret the world (theonomy) is not contrary to presup in the least.

If an unbeliever says, "I can use my senses!" does that mean the presuppositionalist must abandon speaking of sensory experience in his worldview?

 

[chbrooking]

No. When we talk in ordinary parlance about someone being "reasonable", we simply mean that he is not being overly skeptical or discounting possibilities unnecessarily. For example, I am reasonably certain that I am having a debate right now (though if I was Gordon Clark, I would be calling that into question). Reasonable certainty is skeptical of skepticism and asks for a good reason to believe other things.

And my point was that the non-believer cannot ground his request (for a good REASON).

The thing is, Kant and classical apologetics are arguing in the same arena, with the same autonomous footing beneath them, so it is quite fair to use Kant to critique classical apologetics.

No, because they do not share the same presuppositions. Their epistemology is quite different (and there are gaping holes in Kant). Also, assuming autonomous reasoning, even for the sake of a reductio ad absurdum should be rejected, if you are going to be a really consistent Christian presuppositionalist.

Here I am distinguishing between presupp as a Christian epistemology and presupp as a method of critiquing. I maintain that the two are anathema to one another, because, on the one hand, you maintain that all autonomous reasoning is sinful, yet on the other, you reason autonomously (or force your opponent to do so) in order to disprove his presuppositions. It's inconsistent to say that all autonomous reasoning is sinful, and then, even only for the sake of a reductio, reason autonomously. The only way that a consistent Christian presuppositionalist can critique is for him to do so using only his own presuppositions.

Well, CA and the unbeliever certainly pretend to share the same presuppositions. Both start with man's reasoning as ultimate. And you should recognize that we do not assume autonomous reasoning. We merely observe and point out where such reasoning would lead. We never actually adopt it. By saying we reason his way "for the sake of argument" MEANS that we are recognizing its futility and demonstrating that to him.

On the other hand, you also have implicitly given yourself an out into the realm of classical apologetics by assuming general revelation. General revelation (common sense) may therefore be used to prove the truth of Christianity. All revelation implicitly assumes the truth of Christianity, according to presuppositionalism, and may therefore be used in its defense.

First, general revelation is not the same as common sense, as your parentheses would have it. Secondly, revelation cannot assume anything. But if you mean that Christianity presupposes both natural and special revelation, you are correct. But because it embraces special revelation, it cannot consistently believe that men are permitted to reason autonomously. I simply cannot begin with the unbelieving frame of reference -- one in which the human mind reigns supreme -- and think that I will arrive at a point of submission to God. The former and the latter are antithetical.

No, the Bible is, as Chesterton put it, "Uncommon sense for the world's common nonsense."

Think about your Chesterton quote and you will see that it supports our side of this discussion rather than yours.

... There is no possible way to reason, unless some presuppositions are held in common by all involved (eventually, I need to outline my theory of the hierarchy of presuppositions).

Philip, I’m still not convinced that you understand what we mean by presuppositions. We are not referring to the world the unbeliever lives in. And we would maintain that man (even fallen man) cannot BUT reason, made as he is in the image of God. What we are claiming is that he makes CLAIMS that do not comport with his use of reason. He claims the world is one way. But we point out that, if it were in fact as he says it is, then he couldn’t even make those claims, since predication itself depends on the truth of the Bible. Further, I don’t understand what you mean by a hierarchy of presuppositions. Presuppositions are like axioms. They are pre-logical, pre-scientific. They are assumptions on the basis of which logic and science are done. If there is a hierarchy, are you saying that lower level presuppositions can be proved by higher level ones? If so, the former are not presuppositions at all. But perhaps you are saying that some presuppositions are held more tenaciously than others -- I’d have to think about that, but I don’t think I’d have a problem with it. Nevertheless, I don’t see how that would help your case.

I would also say that we need to take Biblical precedent into consideration. Was Elijah a presuppositionalist? No. He didn't try to logically disprove arguments for pagan worldviews, instead he said "Back it up. If Baal is so powerful, have him call fire from heaven. Can't do it? Here, let Jahveh show you how it's done." He didn't give a negative proof for the existence of Baal, but a positive one for the existence of Jahveh.

Okay, but since neither of us can call down fire from heaven, we might have a better model for our approach in Acts 17, where Paul’s approach is presuppositional.

In principle, the unbeliever has an entirely different worldview from the believer (no epistemological common ground).

I would argue that we do have epistemological common ground here. We both have physical senses and powers of reasoning. These are God-given (ie: God-presupposing) methods of knowledge.

Here you show your misunderstanding of presupposition. You are equating God-given with God-presupposing. Are you saying that the unbeliever presupposes the biblical God? Undoubtedly the Christian God gave him being and the ability to speak and reason, etc. But the unbeliever sinfully uses these tools, given as a gift, to hurl insults at God. They do not presuppose the Christian God. But, since these things are God-given and constitutive for them, they cannot help but live in contradiction with their presuppositions.

What do you mean they "used" Kant? Employed transcendentalism? It's not wrong to use some concepts made throughout the history of philosophy

Those concepts carry presuppositions with them. In Kant's case, his transcendentalism is a reaction to "enlightenment" (ie: endarkenment) thinking, which presupposes a deistic theology. Kant is presupposing autonomy and therefore, according to consistent Christian presuppositionalism, should be rejected.

Once again, I’m afraid you are misunderstanding what a presupposition is. A concept does not carry a presupposition with it. A presupposition is a frame of reference. Presuppositions are determinative of concepts that flow from them. Hence, no frame of reference that begins with the human mind as ultimate arbiter will later submit to God as ultimate arbiter.

-----Added 6/15/2009 at 11:14:58 EST-----

Once again, Ben, you're too quick on the draw. As a "tag-team partner", I'm always just a few seconds too slow

 

[Confessor]

Haha, don't worry about. I enjoyed your commentary on Chesterton's quote.

Regarding what you told Philip about hierarchical presuppositions, there is a sense of hierarchy with the term "presupposition," but that is of course different from the denotation that presuppositionalists are using. For instance, I may say that on the PB, I presuppose that everyone else is adhering either to the WCF, TFU, or LBC. But this is using a different denotation of "presupposition" than when we talk about the difference between autonomy and theonomy.

 

[Confessor]

Rev. Winzer,

I think I can clear up the problem you brought up in your first post of the thread:

Tell me if anything in this thread is not clear.

If the following statement were true there could be no such field as Christian apologetics:

Presuppositionalists believe that, because of contrary presuppositions that permeate to affect one’s entire belief-structure, believers and unbelievers have absolutely no common ground in principle.

What has happened to the imago Dei as providing common ground?

The distinctions between metaphysical and epistemological common ground are essentially actual and espoused common ground. But as they stand, "metaphysical" and "epistemological" are misnomers. Metaphysical common ground would seem to imply that both believer and unbeliever agree on a specific metaphysic, but that is denied by presuppositionalists. Epistemological common ground would seem to imply that both believer and unbeliever agree on a specific epistemology, but that is obviously denied as well.

In other words, the terms "metaphysical common ground" and "epistemological common ground," as their names imply, appear to both be distinctions of espoused common ground -- i.e. "Your espoused metaphysic is equivalent to my espoused metaphysic." This is a problem with using the terms "metaphysical common ground" and "epistemological common ground." Therefore I will only employ the terms actual and espoused common ground (and I will ask Clark to do the same (please)).

Seeing then, as unbelievers' espoused worldviews would not agree on anything when properly understood, we can say there is a full antithesis in principle. For instance, both believers and unbelievers may believe in the laws of logic, but believers see these as reflections of the Creator's mind, whereas unbeliever see these as self-existing, necessary principles "inherent to matter" (for instance).

The objection that the imago Dei is still common ground between believer and unbeliever is therefore not harmful to the fact that believer and unbeliever have no espoused common ground. Neither atheists nor deists espouse belief in the imago Dei as understood in Christian doctrine; therefore neither of them have any espoused common ground with the Christian. However, since it is still true that they are made in the image of God, it follows that the imago Dei is actual common ground.

Please tell me if that was unclear. I hope that resolves any perceived inconsistencies regarding common ground and the imago Dei.

 

[cih1355]

What would you say if an unbeliver were to ask you, "How do you know that the Bible is inspired by God?"

 

[Confessor]

What would you say if an unbeliver were to ask you, "How do you know that the Bible is inspired by God?"

Excellent question. I would say it's self-evident. I find it overwhelmingly obvious that I should accept the Bible on its authority immediately.

Generally, this will get two responses: (1) that it is unfair, or (2) that it would open the floodgates to other ridiculous propositions (e.g. affirming Santa Clause as self-evident).

(1) If he thinks it is unfair, I would respond that he is in fact presupposing that Christianity can never be true. For if the questioner assumes that the Bible cannot be self-evidently accepted on its own authority, then he is presupposing that the Bible can never be accepted on its own authority, which would make his choice just as "unfair" as mine. In other words,, I would reply that there is no neutrality; autonomy is not the "fair" position.

(2) It would only open the floodgates if people were allowed to blatantly lie about whatever presupposition they want to hold as self-evident. But in such a case, it would not actually be self-evident, and therefore no flood gates would be opened in the first place.

Tell me if I left anything uncovered.

 

[cih1355]

What would you say if an unbeliver were to ask you, "How do you know that the Bible is inspired by God?"

Excellent question. I would say it's self-evident. I find it overwhelmingly obvious that I should accept the Bible on its authority immediately.

Generally, this will get two responses: (1) that it is unfair, or (2) that it would open the floodgates to other ridiculous propositions (e.g. affirming Santa Clause as self-evident).

(1) If he thinks it is unfair, I would respond that he is in fact presupposing that Christianity can never be true. For if the questioner assumes that the Bible cannot be self-evidently accepted on its own authority, then he is presupposing that the Bible can never be accepted on its own authority, which would make his choice just as "unfair" as mine. In other words,, I would reply that there is no neutrality; autonomy is not the "fair" position.

(2) It would only open the floodgates if people were allowed to blatantly lie about whatever presupposition they want to hold as self-evident. But in such a case, it would not actually be self-evident, and therefore no flood gates would be opened in the first place.

Tell me if I left anything uncovered.

If the unbeliever were to ask, "How do you know that the Koran or some other book other than the Bible is not inspired by God?", how would you answer?

 

[Confessor]

If the unbeliever were to ask, "How do you know that the Koran or some other book other than the Bible is not inspired by God?", how would you answer?

In the very first place, it lacks all the indicia divinitatis (marks of divinity) that the Bible has. But seeing as this is a type of knowledge that cannot be shown discursively, since it is necessarily non-inferential, the presuppositionalist would show inconsistencies within the Islamic worldview, or whatever worldview results from the book they ask about.

 

[chbrooking]

Which is why the method is sometimes described as indirect.

 

[Philip]

Part of the reason that I don't like presuppositionalism as a method for proving Christianity is because, ultimately, it cannot. The transcendental argument (which is, In my humble opinion, the ontological argument used in reverse) cannot hope to prove God's existence for one reason: no human can critique every worldview under the sun. It's like trying to prove that there's no gold in China: success takes nearly forever. I would submit that only God Himself is capable of validating the TAG and when God enters the room, there is no more need of any other argument.

Classical Apologetics, on the other hand, understands that if Christianity is true, then all other religions are false. Therefore if one can demonstrate the truth of Christianity, then all else falls by default: there is no need for further argument.

It would only open the floodgates if people were allowed to blatantly lie about whatever presupposition they want to hold as self-evident. But in such a case, it would not actually be self-evident, and therefore no flood gates would be opened in the first place.

How does an unbeliever know that you're not lying. The trouble here is that what is self-evident for one person is not self-evident to another. It is self-evident to me, for example, that we are not, in fact, living in the Matrix. However, to a Cartesian, this is not self-evident as his theory of knowledge depends on undubitability. Thus, to a Cartesian (or Gordon Clark) we don't really know whether or not we are living in the Matrix.

Therefore I will only employ the terms actual and espoused common ground

These are just as confusing. Descartes espoused the laws of logic, mathematics, and the necessary existence of God, yet Descartes was not (I think) a Christian. Here's common ground aplenty, and all espoused.

Elijah did not imply, "Look at this fire neutrally and autonomously reason to what you think is a reasonable conclusion," but rather, "This fire makes sense if we presuppose the living God rather than Baal."

No, he's not:

And Elijah came near to all the people and said, "How long will you go limping between two different opinions? If the LORD is God, follow him; but if Baal, then follow him." And the people did not answer him a word.

Here Elijah is saying, "look at the evidence and see who is really God here. Choose whichever God can back it up." He's calling the prophets of Baal on their bluff, challenging them to actually back up their claims. He's proving God empirically, in a sense.

Philip, I’m still not convinced that you understand what we mean by presuppositions. We are not referring to the world the unbeliever lives in.

A presupposition is, to my mind, any sort of unprovable or tautologous preconceived notion. Materialism is a presupposition. The laws of logic are presuppositions. Every language is a whole set of presuppositions. Supernaturalism is a presupposition.

When I talk of Richard Dawkins sharing presuppositions with myself, what I mean is that both of us are speaking the same language and both of us interpret reality similarly enough to allow communication. In other words, a presupposition is any proposition that is a) assumed (or proved tautologously) rather than proved b) acted upon, either intellectually or practically. That is, to think is to presuppose. To speak is to presuppose. To act is to presuppose.

I cannot have this debate with you unless I presuppose that doing so is worth my time, that you are in fact there, and that I am not, in fact, in the Matrix.

Once again, I’m afraid you are misunderstanding what a presupposition is. A concept does not carry a presupposition with it. A presupposition is a frame of reference. Presuppositions are determinative of concepts that flow from them.

I would argue not necessarily. Arminians and Calvinists both presuppose the truth of the Bible and yet they derive quite different concepts from it. Your presuppositions do not determine the outcome any more than the battleground determines the course of the battle. There are too many other factors at play (individual temperaments and emphases, cultural background, upbringing, etc).

Okay, but since neither of us can call down fire from heaven, we might have a better model for our approach in Acts 17, where Paul’s approach is presuppositional.

Quoting pagan poets and using pagan practices to make his point? You call that presuppositional?

Recently, my reading has been Augustine's City of God, where Augustine, in the first part, compares paganism and Christianity and demonstrates, using pagan authors, how Christianity is superior. To me, this is as classical an apologetic as one gets. Granted Augustine is not Paul, yet I think that this kind of approach is what Paul is using. He's finding common ground and claiming, "This isn't yours, it's God's. You have always known what God is, now let me tell you who God is. It's what you've been waiting for, if only you knew it."

 

[MW]

They don't believe they are made in the image of God with the full Biblical ramifications of it

Here is the problem -- who does? Must one have all-knowledge in order to know anything truly? Surely not. If the unbeliever is inexcusable it is because of what he knows but suppresses; if he is credited with knowing then he obviously possesses the epistemic equipment necessary to know. It is that point of irrepressible rationality which forms the common ground on which apologetics is carried out. If one denies that common ground then there can be no apologetics -- rational defence of Christianity.