Ultimate Epistemology

[amishrockstar]

Does a single epistemological view have to be ultimate in a person's life? I mean, we can know some things rationally, some things empirically, and some things "revelationally," right?
When you're asked, "how do you know what you know?" what do you say?

Thanks

 

[Zenas]

Surely there are multiple ways to come to the same conclusion is many areas. For instance, we know from Scripture, i.e. revelation, that Jesus was a real man. We also know from empirical evidence that Jesus was a real man.

 

[ChristianTrader]

Does a single epistemological view have to be ultimate in a person's life? I mean, we can know some things rationally, some things empirically, and some things "revelationally," right?
When you're asked, "how do you know what you know?" what do you say?

Thanks

I would say, yes to the question, because at some level you have to determine how you are going to answer the question. You have to know when to pull the empirical lever and when to pull the rational lever etc.

CT

 

[JTB]

Surely there are multiple ways to come to the same conclusion is many areas. For instance, we know from Scripture, i.e. revelation, that Jesus was a real man. We also know from empirical evidence that Jesus was a real man.

While there are multiple arguments to arrive at the same conclusion, not all of them are valid, nor do all rely upon a valid epistemological foundation.

Empiricism is not a sound empistemological foundation because it cannot establish a universal basis for truth. All conclusions would therefore be contingent, and "knowledge" would be identical to "belief." A poor lot that would be.

For example, you cannot establish Christ's humanity empirically, because you cannot establish a definition of humanity by empirical methods. What observation can dictate to you the definition of man? Only Revelation can establish such definitions, from which empirical conclusions may proceed with sufficient warrants. For example, I cannot establish the existence of tomorrow based upon empirical data, for no empirical data warrants causal relationships. Only an a priori acceptance of a causally structured reality justifies such conclusions. Who can supply such a priori principles but the only absolute and eternal God?

-----Added 10/5/2009 at 01:00:46 EST-----

Does a single epistemological view have to be ultimate in a person's life? I mean, we can know some things rationally, some things empirically, and some things "revelationally," right?
When you're asked, "how do you know what you know?" what do you say?

Thanks

Epistemology is different from simple argumentation. There are plenty of empirical evidences that support the truth of Christianity, but empirical evidence is not sufficient to establish the truth of Christianity. Epistemology is not simply about how we can know, but also how we justify what we know. Only Revelation provides a sufficient warrant for establishing the truth.

 

[Philip]

Empiricism is not a sound empistemological foundation because it cannot establish a universal basis for truth.

Why must an epistemology establish a universal basis for truth? Is it possible that certain truths can be known empirically while others can be known by other means? Why must we only have one epistemological source?

Only Revelation can establish such definitions, from which empirical conclusions may proceed with sufficient warrants.

This, of course, assumes that you as the interpreter are correct in your interpretation. How do you know, revelationally, that you can even understand revelation?

Epistemology is different from simple argumentation. There are plenty of empirical evidences that support the truth of Christianity, but empirical evidence is not sufficient to establish the truth of Christianity. Epistemology is not simply about how we can know, but also how we justify what we know. Only Revelation provides a sufficient warrant for establishing the truth.

What do you mean by "establish"? I would say I can establish that it is raining outside from the fact that when I look out the window, I see water coming from the clouds. Can I doubt my senses? Yes, but I don't see indubitability as a criterion for knowledge.

 

[Julio Martinez Jr]

Does a single epistemological view have to be ultimate in a person's life? I mean, we can know some things rationally, some things empirically, and some things "revelationally," right?
When you're asked, "how do you know what you know?" what do you say?

Thanks

Wow. Great question. This has been an unending struggle for me personally. Ever since this question has plagued me in my philosophy class, I have dug my nails in Van Til and some of Sproul. I'm currently reading Plantinga--when I have time, of course--and he has a lot of insights that I think clarifies a lot. I think that there is an ultimate starting point in epistemology, but it is an interplay of revelational and an incipient epistemology. For Van Til, all knowledge must and has to begin with God, but more specifically with the Trinity. His justification for that is that if we have just a general idea of God, much like the debate that took place between Bertrand Russell and the Jesuit priest, Frederick C. Copleston, there will be plenary problems with other formulations or causal problems in theology; and for Van Til, theology is very important before the apologist's task. Van Til called this the problem of the One and the Many. Since this problem is placated by the doctrine of the Trinity, then other causal problems will not ensue. However, the doctrine of the Trinity or a Transcendental proof cannot solve for me the doctrine of innerency. This is why I take an interplay view of epistemology. I don't think that I am violating anything Van Til said, but I definitely think that the ultimate starting point should be transcendental.

This, of course, is a hypothesis that I'm working with. Reading Plantinga could raise significant issues that I might have, like the problem of existence having properties, but I will see. Does existence have properties? If so, how does Plantinga solve this problem? These are just questions that I am concerned with. I don't want to stray from the general question of this thread.

 

[JTB]

Why must an epistemology establish a universal basis for truth? Is it possible that certain truths can be known empirically while others can be known by other means? Why must we only have one epistemological source?

Truths are not contingent. Even historical truths, such as George Washington crossed the Delaware are universally true, or not true at all. Finite men cannot establish such truths, because we lack the foundation in and of our own thinking. You cannot justify the validity of your senses simply by using them. David Hume proved as much.

This, of course, assumes that you as the interpreter are correct in your interpretation. How do you know, revelationally, that you can even understand revelation?

The Bible supplies the propositions. When the Bible says 1) God does not lie, and 2) The Bible is God's Word, then I have a sound argument that revelation is true. It is self-attesting and does not depend upon my interpretation. Not only is it self-attesting, but is established by the impossibility of the contrary--we cannot know anything without God revealing it, for He is the possessor of truth.

What do you mean by "establish"? I would say I can establish that it is raining outside from the fact that when I look out the window, I see water coming from the clouds. Can I doubt my senses? Yes, but I don't see indubitability as a criterion for knowledge.

I'm talking about logically valid conclusions that have maximal warrant. What is your criterion for knowledge? That something smells as it smells to you?

 

[Philip]

The Bible supplies the propositions. When the Bible says 1) God does not lie, and 2) The Bible is God's Word, then I have a sound argument that revelation is true. It is self-attesting and does not depend upon my interpretation. Not only is it self-attesting, but is established by the impossibility of the contrary--we cannot know anything without God revealing it, for He is the possessor of truth.

How do you know what the proposition "God does not lie" actually means? How do we define the terms in which the Scriptures speak?

My point here is that at some point, you are making an interpretation. Unless you are content to say that we can know the propositions without understanding their content (at which point I would contend that the "knowledge" is of no value), then you have to admit that you are getting your definitions from outside the Scriptures.

Truths are not contingent. Even historical truths, such as George Washington crossed the Delaware are universally true, or not true at all. Finite men cannot establish such truths, because we lack the foundation in and of our own thinking. You cannot justify the validity of your senses simply by using them. David Hume proved as much.

David Hume rejected inductive logic: I don't. I maintain that knowledge is justified true belief. That is a) you have a good reason for it b) it's actually true (though you obviously don't have 100% certainty) c) you actually believe it. This is the classic pre-Cartesian definition.

I'm talking about logically valid conclusions that have maximal warrant.

Then you can establish nothing except your own existence. After all, your faculties of reasoning could be wrong (eg: you could commit a fallacy and not know it). Maximal warrant on any other issue is impossible for anyone except God.

 

[steven-nemes]

I don't get what is being said here, JTB--all truths are not contingent? What about the truth that Barack Obama is the current president? That's contingent, isn't it? Perhaps you are using contingent in a different-than-normal sense...

Also, surely empiricism can give us knowledge even if we cannot get knowledge of universal truths like "All dogs are of a certain DNA structure" or "Every instance of X is Y." We can still have knowledge of things that are (frankly) more down-to-earth and useful, like knowledge of what the world around me looks like, or things like that.

 

[JTB]

How do you know what the proposition "God does not lie" actually means? How do we define the terms in which the Scriptures speak?

Either you weren't paying attention, or you are being intentionally misdirecting. I stated that the Scripture's are self-affirming and do not depend upon my interpretation for their validity. By your argument, knowledge would be impossible because everything depends upon the idiosyncrasies of an individual's interpretation.

My point here is that at some point, you are making an interpretation. Unless you are content to say that we can know the propositions without understanding their content (at which point I would contend that the "knowledge" is of no value), then you have to admit that you are getting your definitions from outside the Scriptures.

Truth is not a matter of interpretation, but of imposition. God, the source of Truth, uses whatever occasions He sees fit to impose knowledge upon the mind of any given individual. But knowledge isn't created from my interpretation. At best, my interpretation grasps what is already true. Your argument sounds like the common postmodern argument that all things are subject to some limited point of view. But that assumption denies the Revealer of Truth.

David Hume rejected inductive logic: I don't. I maintain that knowledge is justified true belief. That is a) you have a good reason for it b) it's actually true (though you obviously don't have 100% certainty) c) you actually believe it. This is the classic pre-Cartesian definition.

Hume not only rejected inductive logic, he refuted it. You haven't shown a valid refutation of Hume. Truth does not depend upon psychological certainty, as you would have it. What is your standard of justification? So far all you have is "not 100% certain." In that case, I'm 99% certain you're wrong on the good reason that you haven't refuted Hume.

Then you can establish nothing except your own existence. After all, your faculties of reasoning could be wrong (eg: you could commit a fallacy and not know it). Maximal warrant on any other issue is impossible for anyone except God.

Maximal warrant can only be given by God. The Word of God is given to us so that we may know with maximal warrant. I couldn't even establish my own existence without the justification provided from scriptural propositions.

Also, you still haven't explained how senses can be ground for arriving at knowledge.

If I look at a clock on the wall, and that clock stopped at 12 o'clock three days ago without my knowledge, but it happens to be 12 o'clock when I look at the clock, then I meet all of your criteria: 1) I have good reason to believe that a clock will reflect the time, 2) it is true that it is 12 o'clock, and 3) I believe it. But the clock isn't working, so obviously my assumption about the clock working is false--but according to your definition, I have knowledge!

-----Added 10/5/2009 at 09:03:26 EST-----

I don't get what is being said here, JTB--all truths are not contingent? What about the truth that Barack Obama is the current president? That's contingent, isn't it? Perhaps you are using contingent in a different-than-normal sense...

Also, surely empiricism can give us knowledge even if we cannot get knowledge of universal truths like "All dogs are of a certain DNA structure" or "Every instance of X is Y." We can still have knowledge of things that are (frankly) more down-to-earth and useful, like knowledge of what the world around me looks like, or things like that.

Contingent was the wrong choice of words.

However, empiricism does not provide sufficient warrant for knowledge, unless you significantly lower the bar for what constitutes knowledge. I reserve the term for something with maximal warrant. Obviously all sorts of empirical conclusions are worthy of my assent, but I do not know them in any strict sense.

Every time I walk into a room to turn on a light, I believe that flipping the switch will result in the light coming on. I cannot know this to be true, however, for it is possible that the circuit fails or that the light bulb is blown. Such beliefs are not unwarranted, but they do not contain sufficient warrant to be considered knowledge. To do so is to make the knowledge of assurance or justification by faith on par with my belief that a light will come on when I flip a switch in the room.

 

[Philip]

Either you weren't paying attention, or you are being intentionally misdirecting. I stated that the Scripture's are self-affirming and do not depend upon my interpretation for their validity. By your argument, knowledge would be impossible because everything depends upon the idiosyncrasies of an individual's interpretation.

Assuming your definition of knowledge, yes knowledge is impossible for anyone but God. In order for me to truly "know" (by this definition) one must not only be 100% certain but one must have at least some degree of understanding of the meaning of the proposition.

For example, take the sentence "God exists." Now, we have two terms that need definition: "God" and "existence." If our epistemological foundation is Scripture alone, then we don't have these definitions because Scripture itself assumes the definitions.

As another example, take the story of Balaam's ass. In order for the propositions to be understood, one must understand the nature of things like roads, angels, asses, speech, animals, etc.

Suppose I say "All slithey toves are capable of gyreing." This is a meaningless proposition to you because the terms are meaningless. For them to mean anything, you must interpret or have the definitions provided propositionally. Let's assume that I have provided a definition. Even then, unless you understand the terms I use to define it, the proposition is meaningless. At some point, the definitions are assumed.

My point is that Scripture cannot exist in an epistemological vacuum. A newborn cannot know the Scriptures because the Scriptures are written in a language, and the infant does not know language and can therefore have no knowledge of propositions. Is the capacity there? Yes, but he or she must learn things like language before he or she can know/understand the Scriptures.

No, the Scriptures do not depend on you for their validity, but neither can you really know them unless you interpret. Otherwise you are left with propositions that you cannot, in any meaningful sense, be said to know. Knowledge without understanding is meaningless.

If I look at a clock on the wall, and that clock stopped at 12 o'clock three days ago without my knowledge, but it happens to be 12 o'clock when I look at the clock, then I meet all of your criteria: 1) I have good reason to believe that a clock will reflect the time, 2) it is true that it is 12 o'clock, and 3) I believe it. But the clock isn't working, so obviously my assumption about the clock working is false--but according to your definition, I have knowledge!

No, you don't have knowledge here. What you just gave me is an utter non sequitor. The actual time has nothing to do with whether the clock is working. All that you have good reason to believe is that it is 12:00. Then, a couple minutes later, you look at the clock and say "My goodness! It stopped!" and you go fix it or throw it out.

I would also say that one can arrive at true belief by faulty means. At the point at which you discover that the justification for that belief is faulty, you have to find a new reason or else be stuck in fideism.

Maximal warrant can only be given by God. The Word of God is given to us so that we may know with maximal warrant. I couldn't even establish my own existence without the justification provided from scriptural propositions.

I'd like to see that. Afterwards, I'll just ask "Define 'I' from Scripture." Proving one's own existence assumes a reasoner just as knowing assumes a knower. One's own existence is an axiom.

 

[D. Paul]

I see Clark in an Avatar but no one has ID'd his argument even though it sure sounds like a Clark argument to me e.g. "One's own existence is an axiom." and Axioms can't be proven.

 

[amishrockstar]

Thanks for all the posts.

So, as Christians, can we say that we can understand things empirically, rationally, and even inductively because we first believe that God exists and is actively involved in this world?

In other words, A Christian scientist can say that the sun will rise and set tomorrow based on empirical methods and the fact that God has spoken that he will cause our planet to keep spinning (until He returns). But a non-Christian scientist cannot make the same claim because empiricism alone cannot prove that the sun will rise?

Is it a matter of coupling induction, empirical evidence, etc. with a belief in God? Is it an either/or situation or a both/and situation?

Thanks again,
Matthew

P.S.
If it's either/or, then how can we prove "revelationally" things that are typically proved empirically? In other words, how can I prove that I'm sitting in my room if "revelation" doesn't directly tell me that I'm sitting in my room?

If it's both/and, then can we even speak about an ultimate foundation --as Christians-- in epistemology?

 

[Philip]

Metaphysically, yes we might be able to say that as Christians. Not only that, but philosophically, we can reason backwards from what we know to say that the is a God and that Jesus Christ is His Son.

There are two kinds of epistemology: there are those that start with a narrow definition of knowledge and try to figure out what we can know. Then there are epistemologies that begin with what we know and reason backwards to figure out how we know it.

 

[JTB]

No, the Scriptures do not depend on you for their validity, but neither can you really know them unless you interpret. Otherwise you are left with propositions that you cannot, in any meaningful sense, be said to know. Knowledge without understanding is meaningless.

You have ignored for the third time my basic premise. God imposes knowledge upon the mind. It does no depend upon my interpretation or senses, although God may use such occasions to impose upon my mind what He will. If you won't form a response to that view in particular, I'm just going to let it stand and bow out of the conversation.

No, you don't have knowledge here. What you just gave me is an utter non sequitor. The actual time has nothing to do with whether the clock is working. All that you have good reason to believe is that it is 12:00. Then, a couple minutes later, you look at the clock and say "My goodness! It stopped!" and you go fix it or throw it out.

I would also say that one can arrive at true belief by faulty means. At the point at which you discover that the justification for that belief is faulty, you have to find a new reason or else be stuck in fideism.

I know I don't have knowledge there, but by your definition you have to accept it as knowledge, in the moment in which the judgment was made. Looking at a faulty clock at the moment it happens to be correct meets all of your criteria for knowledge and is based upon a false assumption; therefore your basis for knowledge is undermined. A couple of minutes later is irrelevant to the time in which you made the initial judgment. You may have corrected yourself, but at the initial moment you had "knowledge" according to your definition.

True belief is not the same as knowledge, even by your own definition. If you have to find new justification, then obviously you don't have knowledge. This is why I want you to provide me with what you consider to be sufficient warrant (justification) for knowledge. Induction will always have a margin of error, which means your justification will always be subject to change. How can knowledge be changing? To imply such is to imply that we can never know what God knows, for our knowledge is always changing while His is ever the same.

-----Added 10/6/2009 at 08:44:29 EST-----

I see Clark in an Avatar but no one has ID'd his argument even though it sure sounds like a Clark argument to me e.g. "One's own existence is an axiom." and Axioms can't be proven.

One's own existence is not Clark's axiom. The Bible is God's Word is Clark's axiom.

If anything other than God's Revelation is one's axiom, then one has no justification for the laws of logic or any universal abstract entities, as Greg Bahnsen so marvelously demonstrated against Gordon Stein.

-----Added 10/6/2009 at 08:51:55 EST-----

Thanks for all the posts.

So, as Christians, can we say that we can understand things empirically, rationally, and even inductively because we first believe that God exists and is actively involved in this world?

In other words, A Christian scientist can say that the sun will rise and set tomorrow based on empirical methods and the fact that God has spoken that he will cause our planet to keep spinning (until He returns). But a non-Christian scientist cannot make the same claim because empiricism alone cannot prove that the sun will rise?

Is it a matter of coupling induction, empirical evidence, etc. with a belief in God? Is it an either/or situation or a both/and situation?

Thanks again,
Matthew

P.S.
If it's either/or, then how can we prove "revelationally" things that are typically proved empirically? In other words, how can I prove that I'm sitting in my room if "revelation" doesn't directly tell me that I'm sitting in my room?

If it's both/and, then can we even speak about an ultimate foundation --as Christians-- in epistemology?

Every subsequent form of proof depends upon its foundation. Induction always asserts the consequent, and is therefore fallacious--that is to say, although it may sometimes arrive at a true conclusion, it can never do so validly, as a matter of logical implication.

We need God's Revelation as the foundation for assumptions like causality, the laws of logic, and all other abstract, universal laws. Without a transcendental starting point, a finite mind cannot justify any universal conclusions whatsoever.

Empirical arguments and induction are only plausible because we have universal abstract laws based in the very nature of God. But unless God reveals Himself in some way, we cannot know anything, because there is no adequate justification for our conclusions apart from God's Revelation.

 

[jwithnell]

So, as Christians, can we say that we can understand things empirically, rationally, and even inductively because we first believe that God exists and is actively involved in this world

I hope I'm not quibbling here, but we can know because God chose to revealed it to us either through his word or through his works (natural revelation) and gave us the ability to receive that knowledge (either through the teaching of the Holy Spirit through his word or through our senses in discerning natural revelation).

The latter, I'm convinced, is different from empiricism for two reasons. First, it recognizes that God is the source of all knowledge and secondly because empiricism does not account for the fact that man interprets the natural world through fallen senses.

 

[Philip]

You have ignored for the third time my basic premise. God imposes knowledge upon the mind. It does no depend upon my interpretation or senses, although God may use such occasions to impose upon my mind what He will. If you won't form a response to that view in particular, I'm just going to let it stand and bow out of the conversation.

Ok, I see what you're saying.

Really, though, this constitutes a couple problems:

1) If God can impose knowledge via the written word, why can He not do so via general revelation?

2) If God is imposing knowledge of His word, then can a Christian be wrong about what that word says?

3) How do you know that you are a Christian? You argue that in order to know anything, God must impose that knowledge on your mind, so how do you know that He has done so?

I argue that any attempt to explain or understand the Scriptures constitutes an interpretation. Even to bring in other Scriptures constitutes interpretation because someone is deciding which Scriptures are relevant.

I know I don't have knowledge there, but by your definition you have to accept it as knowledge, in the moment in which the judgment was made.

All you knew is that is was twelve o'clock. Knowledge by faulty justification is still knowledge. All that a critique of the justification does is to cause one to re-examine the belief, which is a healthy thing. Doubt can be constructive as well as destructive.

Would the people of Israel have been right to question their senses at Mount Carmel?

Induction will always have a margin of error, which means your justification will always be subject to change. How can knowledge be changing? To imply such is to imply that we can never know what God knows, for our knowledge is always changing while His is ever the same.

And I would argue that only God can have unchanging knowledge. We are changeable, God is not. The truth does not change, but our knowledge of it does. I am perfectly willing to say that I am fallible, even with the help of the Holy Spirit. I am still a finite sinner who has been saved by Grace Alone.

If anything other than God's Revelation is one's axiom, then one has no justification for the laws of logic or any universal abstract entities, as Greg Bahnsen so marvelously demonstrated against Gordon Stein.

I read the text of the debate and Bahnsen did nothing of the kind. He simply asserted things and gave no coherent argument as to why atheism does not account for logic/etc. Granted, Stein was just as sloppy (and didn't understand what Bahnsen was saying--probably because he wasn't familiar enough with philosophy), but I can't say that Bahnsen won: his case for Christian Theism was not prima facie. He failed to establish that God should be assumed because he failed to establish any necessary connections. Neither side fulfilled their burden of proof.

 

[JTB]

1) If God can impose knowledge via the written word, why can He not do so via general revelation?

He can, and He does. But the premise that God imposes knowledge upon the mind is not provided by induction, or empiricism. Therefore induction and empiricism cannot account for the foundation of their validity.

2) If God is imposing knowledge of His word, then can a Christian be wrong about what that word says?

Of course. God is not bound to impose upon the mind all truth, and the reality of sin's effects upon the mind means that Christians (still under the corruption of sin) do not reason from the Scriptures infallibly. But that fault does not in any way impinge upon the premise that God is still the one who imposes knowledge upon the mind, when the mind in fact knows.

3) How do you know that you are a Christian? You argue that in order to know anything, God must impose that knowledge on your mind, so how do you know that He has done so?

My axiom is the same as Clark's: The Bible is God's Word. When the Bible says that the Holy Spirit testifies with the individual spirit that the individual is saved, and when combined with the various propositions indicating what must be believed in order to be saved, I can, with maximal warrant, discern my own salvation. If I believe and have the testimony of the Spirit, then I am saved. I believe and have the testimony of the Spirit, therefore I am saved.

I argue that any attempt to explain or understand the Scriptures constitutes an interpretation. Even to bring in other Scriptures constitutes interpretation because someone is deciding which Scriptures are relevant.

I have never denied that explanation of the Scriptures is an interpretation. I have simply said that interpretation is not the basis of knowledge. The very fact that symbols on the page are intelligible to the mind depends upon the truth of propositions set forth in Scripture. Those proposition do not depend upon the marks on the page, nor my interpretation of those marks, but rather upon their nature as God's Revelation.

-----Added 10/6/2009 at 12:11:34 EST-----

All you knew is that is was twelve o'clock. Knowledge by faulty justification is still knowledge. All that a critique of the justification does is to cause one to re-examine the belief, which is a healthy thing. Doubt can be constructive as well as destructive.

You are contradicting your own definition. You defined knowledge as "justified true belief," and now you are arguing that one does not need justification to have knowledge! Either justification is adequate, or it is not. Until you provide what you think is adequate justification, you haven't articulated your theory of knowledge. I actually agree with your stated definition of justified true belief, but I have a very different notion of justification (maximal warrant, which is defined by the axiom of God's Revelation).

Are you prepared to explain what you consider to be the justification necessary for knowledge?

-----Added 10/6/2009 at 12:19:27 EST-----

And I would argue that only God can have unchanging knowledge. We are changeable, God is not. The truth does not change, but our knowledge of it does. I am perfectly willing to say that I am fallible, even with the help of the Holy Spirit. I am still a finite sinner who has been saved by Grace Alone.

You reduce knowledge to human belief. But belief, in order to be sound, requires an unchanging foundation. Yes, our beliefs may change, but that is why our beliefs are not knowledge. If so, then our assurance of salvation, our understanding of God, and every other indispensable truth of Christianity is reduced to human opinion.

I read the text of the debate and Bahnsen did nothing of the kind. He simply asserted things and gave no coherent argument as to why atheism does not account for logic/etc. Granted, Stein was just as sloppy (and didn't understand what Bahnsen was saying--probably because he wasn't familiar enough with philosophy), but I can't say that Bahnsen won: his case for Christian Theism was not prima facie. He failed to establish that God should be assumed because he failed to establish any necessary connections. Neither side fulfilled their burden of proof.

I think you need to read the transcript again, perhaps several times.

 

[steven-nemes]

Alright JTB, if you want, you can place the restrictions on knowledge so high that you do not have knowledge if there is the possibility of your belief being wrong. But I will go so far as to say that you don't have any knowledge at all, if that is the case. Furthermore, no one is inclined to agree that that is a reasonable restriction to put on knowledge.

 

[JTB]

Alright JTB, if you want, you can place the restrictions on knowledge so high that you do not have knowledge if there is the possibility of your belief being wrong. But I will go so far as to say that you don't have any knowledge at all, if that is the case. Furthermore, no one is inclined to agree that that is a reasonable restriction to put on knowledge.

First, you are wrong that one cannot have knowledge. I'll even give you proof based upon my axiom.

1) The Bible is the Word of God.
2) The Bible states that God cannot lie.
3) The Bible states that men know God.
4) To know God is to possess knowledge.

I don't think you understand what is the restriction upon knowledge. Strictly speaking, the argument is about how knowledge is justified, and not specifically how it is granted. And I'm certainly not the only one to restrict knowledge in such a way. And even if I were, it would irrelevant whether or not anyone agreed. Consensus is not the basis of whether or not an argument is true.

 

[Philip]

He can, and He does. But the premise that God imposes knowledge upon the mind is not provided by induction, or empiricism. Therefore induction and empiricism cannot account for the foundation of their validity.

Ok, so where do you get this premise?

Of course. God is not bound to impose upon the mind all truth, and the reality of sin's effects upon the mind means that Christians (still under the corruption of sin) do not reason from the Scriptures infallibly. But that fault does not in any way impinge upon the premise that God is still the one who imposes knowledge upon the mind, when the mind in fact knows.

Given that we are still fallible, can you provide an example of a fact that you know? Again, unless there is interpretation, you cannot be said to understand even a simple sentence like "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth." You can say that this sentence is eternal truth with content behind it, but still, the question is whether you know for certain what that content is.

To do this, you need to understand several things:

1) The grammatic structure of the sentence.

2) The meanings of the words.

3) Context.

Two out of three things change with culture. All three are hermaneutical and therefore interpretive.

My point is that you cannot be sure of the meaning of anything that Scripture says and therefore cannot be sure of anything deduced from scripture.

This, in the end, leads to further skepticism. For example, since the Scriptures nowhere directly say "God exists" how can we be absolutely certain that He does? Unless you admit some measure of induction, we really do know nothing, at least nothing practical.

When the Bible says that the Holy Spirit testifies with the individual spirit that the individual is saved, and when combined with the various propositions indicating what must be believed in order to be saved, I can, with maximal warrant, discern my own salvation.

How do you know that that interpretation is correct? As soon as you start reasoning, you could be wrong.

The very fact that symbols on the page are intelligible to the mind depends upon the truth of propositions set forth in Scripture. Those proposition do not depend upon the marks on the page, nor my interpretation of those marks, but rather upon their nature as God's Revelation.

Let me put it this way: suppose I have a 100% accurate translation of the Scriptures in Old Gothic. Now, I may be able to discern the symbols and even memorize them with no comprehension of their meaning. Yes, the symbols express truth, but unless I know Old Gothic, that truth is meaningless to me. My question is one of whether you can be absolutely sure of what Scripture means. If you are not absolutely certain of what truth means, then it is of no value to you. How do you know that God's revelation is intelligible by you?

You are contradicting your own definition. You defined knowledge as "justified true belief," and now you are arguing that one does not need justification to have knowledge!

No--I would argue that a true belief reached by a faulty justification is still knowledge. If the justification is challenged, then we may say that one has mere belief that needs a justification.

Justification is just a good reason--yes, it's subjective, as all human knowledge is.

You reduce knowledge to human belief. But belief, in order to be sound, requires an unchanging foundation.

I would say it needs an unchanging object.

If so, then our assurance of salvation, our understanding of God, and every other indispensable truth of Christianity is reduced to human opinion.

If you mean that we don't ultimately know that we know, then yes: that's an unrealistic criterion.

First, you are wrong that one cannot have knowledge. I'll even give you proof based upon my axiom.

1) The Bible is the Word of God.
2) The Bible states that God cannot lie.
3) The Bible states that men know God.
4) To know God is to possess knowledge.

Define "God" and "lie" and "ability". How do you know what the Scriptures mean by "know"? How do you know that these verses have not been taken out of context?

In answer to the question that you're about to ask, Steven, yes my position has changed slightly since our discussion.

 

[JTB]

P.F. Pugh,

Your position reduces all knowledge to opinion, leading inevitably to the skepticism you accuse my position of implying.

You continue to fail to acknowledge my axiom, nor have you demonstrated how it is false.

Read Augustine's De Magistro. Symbols do not provide knowledge. They are but occasions for the Teacher, Christ, to impose knowledge upon the mind.

You asked where I get that premise, and it comes from Scripture in numerous places.

Here's a couple:
Psalms 94:10 "He who chastens the nations, will He not rebuke, Even He who teaches man knowledge?"
Proverbs 2:6 "For the LORD gives wisdom; From His mouth come knowledge and understanding"

 

[jwithnell]

axiom, nor have you demonstrated how it is false.

um, guys, an axiom is a statement that is not proven or demonstrated.

 

[Philip]

Why should I be skeptical just because I might be wrong? Just because I might be wrong doesn't mean I know nothing. I'm fine with the fact that some things I claim to know may, in the end, turn out to be false.

Your axiom is not axiomatic--that's different from it being false.

Basically, if your axiom can be proven, even inductively, from other axioms, then it is not axiomatic.

As for language, the fact is that for God to communicate via language, we must first know language. Language, I would argue, is axiomatic. In addition, every word in language must have a referent, or else it is meaningless.

 

[JTB]

axiom, nor have you demonstrated how it is false.

um, guys, an axiom is a statement that is not proven or demonstrated.

Any axiom can be demonstrated to be incompatible with subsequent premises within a person's set of beliefs.

-----Added 10/7/2009 at 07:28:11 EST-----

Why should I be skeptical just because I might be wrong? Just because I might be wrong doesn't mean I know nothing. I'm fine with the fact that some things I claim to know may, in the end, turn out to be false.

Your axiom is not axiomatic--that's different from it being false.

Basically, if your axiom can be proven, even inductively, from other axioms, then it is not axiomatic.

As for language, the fact is that for God to communicate via language, we must first know language. Language, I would argue, is axiomatic. In addition, every word in language must have a referent, or else it is meaningless.

You're a skeptic because you have no viable justification for the truth. "Good reason" hasn't been defined, and when I gave what I thought was a good reason (looking at the clock on the wall) you didn't say why it was a bad reason, only that it was wrong.

I'm not asking you to prove my axiom. I'm asking you to demonstrate why it is inadequate as a foundation.

How does language function as an axiom for epistemology?

 

[Philip]

You're a skeptic because you have no viable justification for the truth.

I'm mostly skeptical about skepticism. When you talk about a justification for the truth, do mean an epistemological justification or a metaphysical one?

Your axiom alone is inadequate because it gives us knowledge of symbols without knowledge of content. According to you, I can be certain that "In the beginning God created the Heavens and the Earth" but unless I can claim to know the meanings of those words, I have no knowledge of their content.

This is why you must assume language as an axiom: because without language, the Scriptures are epistemologically meaningless. I cannot be said to "know" the story of Balaam's Ass because I don't "know" for certain that the definition of a donkey as given by God and my own definition of a donkey are the same. Unless we assume that communication via symbolic language is possible as an axiom, and that God is using words in the same sense that we are, then we can have no real knowledge of Scripture.

As for proving your axiom, I would say that your axiom is demonstrable by a means other than a reductio and is therefore not axiomatic.

As for the clock on the wall, I think it was a good reason--it just didn't turn out to be a true belief. One can reason inductively and be wrong--unlike in yours, absolute certainty isn't necessary in my epistemology because I recognize that it is, in the end, impossible.

 

[steven-nemes]

Alright JTB, if you want, you can place the restrictions on knowledge so high that you do not have knowledge if there is the possibility of your belief being wrong. But I will go so far as to say that you don't have any knowledge at all, if that is the case. Furthermore, no one is inclined to agree that that is a reasonable restriction to put on knowledge.

First, you are wrong that one cannot have knowledge. I'll even give you proof based upon my axiom.

1) The Bible is the Word of God.
2) The Bible states that God cannot lie.
3) The Bible states that men know God.
4) To know God is to possess knowledge.

I don't think you understand what is the restriction upon knowledge. Strictly speaking, the argument is about how knowledge is justified, and not specifically how it is granted. And I'm certainly not the only one to restrict knowledge in such a way. And even if I were, it would irrelevant whether or not anyone agreed. Consensus is not the basis of whether or not an argument is true.

All of those beliefs are possibly false, so you don't know them.

 

[Philip]

He is stating "The Bible is the word of God" as His axiom, so it's a given. The problem is that he cannot answer with 100% certainty to the content of those statements, as that would involve some measure of interpretation.

 

[steven-nemes]

His axiom is possibly false so by his own standards he can't know it.

 

[Philip]

He wouldn't say that it is. An axiom cannot be proved or disproved, by definition.

Part of the problem that I have with Scripture being axiomatic is that Islam claims the same for the Koran. You may attempt to show that the Koran contains inconsistencies, but even then, the Koran claims that God, and therefore the Koran, is not bound by logic.