Ultimate Epistemology

[Philip]

Ron,

Given those presuppositions, I agree. I will defend to the death the fact that I know that the Bible is God's Word. What I will not agree to is that the Bible is epistemologically axiomatic because its authority rests on other truths.

 

[JTB]

Why is it unacceptable to argue, a priori, that "The Bible is the Word of God"?

Because the Bible is known a posteriori.

No it isn't. What the Bible is truly, is only known when one knows it as the Word of God. That conclusion comes only from the Holy Spirit, and then becomes the axiom by which Christians organize their knowledge of God, man, and the world.

Also, would you please provide me a succinct statement distinguishing metaphysical and epistemological justification?

Metaphysical justification of knowledge entails an accounting for why we can have knowledge (eg: God imposes knowledge).

Epistemological justification entails an accounting of how that happens a priori. You cannot have a metaphysical justification unless you first have an epistemological one.

I don't recognize that distinction as valid. Why we have knowledge (God imposes it upon the mind) is the same as how we have it (God imposes it upon the mind).

Define "intermediate state."

The soul that is present with Christ and absent from the body.

That's a theological axiom, not an epistemological one. Why I say this is that the axiom presupposes the existence of God and of the Christian God. One has to have knowledge of this prior to the axiom.

I don't understand how the axiom is presupposing something other than what it says. Obviously the axiom contains the definition of its terms within itself, otherwise every term is itself presupposed prior to the proposition, which would be the case with every axiom.

In addition, I think I've already made it clear that human deduction is fallible and therefore anything that you deduce from Scripture is fallible.

Yes, the noetic effects of sin lead to faulty deductions. But that individuals fail does not make deduction faulty. If the premises are true, then the conclusions that necessarily follow are true.

Circular--we have maximal warrant for God's word because God has testified to us in His word?

Self-justifying. God's word is the axiom, so it has maximal warrant by definition. You cannot get out more than is put in. We know because God revealed it to us. There is no other conclusion, and the search for something more is, I think, a form of autonomy.

The regenerative work of the Holy Spirit is demonstrative of the truth of God's word. It constitutes proof in the same way that God sending fire from heaven constituted proof of God's word on Mount Carmel.

But that goes back to my earlier point that we don't "know" what the word of God is until the Spirit confirms it to us. The pagan understands what the Bible claims to be, but he doesn't believe it is true, so he doesn't know it is God's Word.

Nonetheless, of necessity we are forced to trust them and therefore are unreasonable to doubt them unless given good reason. The burden of proof is on the skeptic to prove that, in a given instance, doubt is reasonable.

I agree that the skeptic bears the burden of proof, but that doesn't mean you escape the requirement to justify why the senses are reliable.

So you can know theology by the axiom of the Bible, but you cannot know knowledge by the axiom of the Bible. Such a conclusion seems like alternative theories of epistemology to me. How can you retain both and not lead to incoherence? Is knowledge a divided subject matter?

The Bible is indeed a source of knowledge about God, provided that we are presupposing the same things that it does.

What I mean to say is that while we can, I think, take the Bible to be a source of knowledge, we are not justified in taking it to be the only source of knowledge.

The Bible is the only justification for knowledge. Recall that this is the key issue in our discussion. I agree that the senses are reliable, but not that they can justify the truth of what we experience by them.

As for your second assertion, I'd like to hear you support just how it is that the axiom requires a further presupposition.

In order to assume your axiom, one would have to know enough about the Scriptures to understand that such is the case. Further, as I stated, in order to assume this, one has to already have a knowledge of God. There can be no word of God without God.

Of course, but by containing the term in the axiom, how does it not also contain the definition? We are back to the problem I mentioned above, namely, that if an axiom does not include the definitions of each of its terms, then any axiom must presuppose those definitions and cannot truly be an axiom at all!

 

[steven-nemes]

I think you are all misunderstanding my point in my posts. My point is that JTB's restrictions on knowledge are absurdly high, so high that even he does not have knowledge by his own standards.

It appeared to me that what JTB said was this: if your belief is possibly false (whether he meant logical possibility or epistemic possibility I don't know--either one isn't any good for him), then you do not know it. That is an absurd restriction on knowledge. Almost all of my beliefs are possibly false, both epistemically and logically, and the same would hold true with JTB. His belief that the Bible is the word of God is possibly false; his belief that the Bible states that God cannot lie is possibly false; it could be that he is being deceived all the time by a malevolent Cartesian demon to believe those things.

So the purpose of my posting is not that the Bible ought not be taken as axiomatic (though I don't think this), but rather that JTB's restrictions on knowledge are unreasonable.

 

[Philip]

No it isn't. What the Bible is truly, is only known when one knows it as the Word of God. That conclusion comes only from the Holy Spirit, and then becomes the axiom by which Christians organize their knowledge of God, man, and the world.

Nonetheless, it is a posteriori. One cannot know that the Bible is the word of God unless one has had contact with the Bible or has heard of the Bible. The Bible cannot be known to be true in an epistemological vacuum.

I don't recognize that distinction as valid. Why we have knowledge (God imposes it upon the mind) is the same as how we have it (God imposes it upon the mind).

How do you know that God imposes it upon the mind? Is that a theory or do you have maximal warrant?

Epistemology cannot presuppose a metaphysic--God would be a metaphysical justification for why knowledge is possible because we cannot know that until we have established how we actually come to have knowledge, which is a matter of how we learn things and come to have warrant for beliefs.

But that goes back to my earlier point that we don't "know" what the word of God is until the Spirit confirms it to us.

And how does He do this? By means of a miracle--by demonstration, not proposition.

I agree that the skeptic bears the burden of proof, but that doesn't mean you escape the requirement to justify why the senses are reliable.

I think I've established this: because we have to rely on them.

The Bible is the only justification for knowledge.

Why think this? Again, why this "maximal warrant" definition of knowledge?

Of course, but by containing the term in the axiom, how does it not also contain the definition?

It assumes a definition. Depending on that definition, the proposition may be true or false. All axioms presuppose the definitions of their terms--unless those terms are commonly understood, there is no content.

As I said, the truth of the proposition "The Bible is the Word of God" rests on two presuppositions: that God is there and that He has spoken. If this were not so, we could say, in good Barthian fashion, "There is no God and the Bible is His word" (incoherent) or "God is silent and the Bible is His word" (also incoherent). The "axiom" can be broken down into further presuppositions and is therefore not axiomatic.

 

[christianyouth]

I've enjoyed this thread so far.

Steven,

If it's true, that some demon may be deceiving us, then we certainly can't make positive statements of knowledge about the existence of God or the resurrection of Christ, since the events that lead us to those two beliefs could have just been engineered by a demon, or our perception of those beliefs could be faulty.

So how can I act with certainty, even to the point of risking my life because of certain beliefs, if what I perceive and call 'reality' is justan illusion created by Descartes' demon?

btw, I'm not saying that your argumentation(and Descartes) is wrong simply because your conclusions(and Descartes) seem counter-intuitive and dangerous. I'm just honestly wondering about this.

Thanks

 

[JTB]

Nonetheless, it is a posteriori. One cannot know that the Bible is the word of God unless one has had contact with the Bible or has heard of the Bible. The Bible cannot be known to be true in an epistemological vacuum.

The definition is contained within the axiom, as I've said. An elect infant that dies in infancy goes to be with the Lord without ever having heard of or touched a Bible will know that the Bible is God's Word in the intermediate state. Knowledge does not require sensation in order be possessed. God can, and does, deliver knowledge directly to our minds apart from any intermediary sensations. That He desires to use our sensations as occasions for that imposition does not make them necessary for knowledge to be had.

How do you know that God imposes it upon the mind? Is that a theory or do you have maximal warrant?

How do you know that God brings about knowledge through the senses and not simply in coincidence with them?

Epistemology cannot presuppose a metaphysic--God would be a metaphysical justification for why knowledge is possible because we cannot know that until we have established how we actually come to have knowledge, which is a matter of how we learn things and come to have warrant for beliefs.

How can epistemology NOT presuppose a metaphysic? Something must exist to be known, therefore some metaphysic is presupposed. The issue is one of logical priority. We need to know how we know what is, before what is can be known truly.

And how does He do this? By means of a miracle--by demonstration, not proposition.

Sure. The proposition doesn't contain persuasion. But persuasion doesn't occur apart from a proposition. Otherwise, what are you persuaded to accept as true?

I think I've established this: because we have to rely on them.

You haven't demonstrated it at all. I asked about souls in the intermediate state--souls that have no bodies with which to have sensations. Do those souls lose all the ability to know because they can no longer use their bodies' senses? Knowledge cannot be tied to sensation if disembodied souls are to possess it.

Why think this? Again, why this "maximal warrant" definition of knowledge?

Because if you cannot know with maximal warrant that God is not a liar, then you could possibly be wrong that God is not a liar, which, presumably, you would not accept. If you accpt that it is possible that God is a liar, you deny the truth that Scripture affirms.

It assumes a definition. Depending on that definition, the proposition may be true or false. All axioms presuppose the definitions of their terms--unless those terms are commonly understood, there is no content.

As I said, the truth of the proposition "The Bible is the Word of God" rests on two presuppositions: that God is there and that He has spoken. If this were not so, we could say, in good Barthian fashion, "There is no God and the Bible is His word" (incoherent) or "God is silent and the Bible is His word" (also incoherent). The "axiom" can be broken down into further presuppositions and is therefore not axiomatic.

It doesn't "assume" a definition, it contains the definition within itself. What axiom can you provide that does not require you to define its terms so as to make the full meaning of the axiom known? By asserting "The Bible is the Word of God" you automatically assume the existence of all the terms as they are defined within the axiom. They aren't presupposed, but asserted as true in the axiom.

 

[Philip]

The definition is contained within the axiom, as I've said. An elect infant that dies in infancy goes to be with the Lord without ever having heard of or touched a Bible will know that the Bible is God's Word in the intermediate state. Knowledge does not require sensation in order be possessed. God can, and does, deliver knowledge directly to our minds apart from any intermediary sensations. That He desires to use our sensations as occasions for that imposition does not make them necessary for knowledge to be had.

Example please: sensations include all emotional and rational capacity for understanding, not just physical sensations.

Also, how do you know that physical sensation depends on the physical body? After all, spiritual realities can become visible to physical beings, I see no reason why physical realities would not be visible to incorporeal beings.

How do you know that God brings about knowledge through the senses and not simply in coincidence with them?

Can you provide an example of anything that God has revealed to you without the use of any other means?

How can epistemology NOT presuppose a metaphysic? Something must exist to be known, therefore some metaphysic is presupposed. The issue is one of logical priority. We need to know how we know what is, before what is can be known truly.

But even here you state that epistemology must have priority because we must understand what it is to know before we can know what there is to be known.

Because if you cannot know with maximal warrant that God is not a liar, then you could possibly be wrong that God is not a liar, which, presumably, you would not accept. If you accpt that it is possible that God is a liar, you deny the truth that Scripture affirms.

Just because I accept that I could possibly be wrong in my persuasion that God cannot lie does not mean that I do not affirm most emphatically that God cannot lie. This is no more logical than that my acceptance of the possibility that you don't exist means that I would not affirm that you actually do exist. It's a non sequitor.

It doesn't "assume" a definition, it contains the definition within itself.

What I'm perceiving here is circularity. If an axiom contains the definitions upon which it depends within itself, then it is circular and therefore fallacious.

 

[steven-nemes]

If it's true, that some demon may be deceiving us, then we certainly can't make positive statements of knowledge about the existence of God or the resurrection of Christ, since the events that lead us to those two beliefs could have just been engineered by a demon, or our perception of those beliefs could be faulty.

Yes that's true.

So how can I act with certainty, even to the point of risking my life because of certain beliefs, if what I perceive and call 'reality' is justan illusion created by Descartes' demon?

Well surely it is possible that we are being deceived by demons. But it does not follow that we cannot be certain about some of our beliefs. I am certain that I am typing on a computer at the moment even though I am possibly deceived. I suppose there are two ways of construing "certainty."

There is one sense of certainty, which I would take to be knowing that your belief is true. So if you are certain in the first sense, you not only know that belief, but also you know that your belief is true. I suppose a second sense of certainty would be just holding a belief very strongly and not regarding as plausible alternative explanations.

If certainty in the first sense is a necessary condition of knowledge, then knowledge would be impossible. I suggest that when we use the term "certain," we mean something like the second sense.

 

[JTB]

Example please: sensations include all emotional and rational capacity for understanding, not just physical sensations.

Also, how do you know that physical sensation depends on the physical body? After all, spiritual realities can become visible to physical beings, I see no reason why physical realities would not be visible to incorporeal beings.

Sensation has never, to my knowledge, been defined as all emotional and rational capacity for understanding beyond what arises through physical bodies.

Physical sensation depends upon a physical body by definition. If I don't have a hand, I cannot sense anything by means of a hand. If I am incorporeal, I cannot sense the world corporeally. It doesn't mean I don't know the world, it only means I don't know it through sensation, which is my point.

I'd like a proof for how spiritual beings "see" the world, if by "visible" you mean seeing with eyes. I'd say that spiritual beings understand the world through intellection, apart from any physical stimulus.

Can you provide an example of anything that God has revealed to you without the use of any other means?

I can provide numerous examples. The problem isn't with the examples, but with how those examples are being defined. You won't accept the definition, so you won't recognize them as examples. For example, I believe God is imposing upon my mind this moment the understanding of the words I see on the screen. But I've already given you a valid example: those in the intermediate state possess knowledge that cannot come through sensation.

But even here you state that epistemology must have priority because we must understand what it is to know before we can know what there is to be known.

Presuppose was a mistaken choice on my part. I'd prefer to amend it to "entail." Epistemology entails metaphysics, because to know anything is to know something; therefore something exists.

Just because I accept that I could possibly be wrong in my persuasion that God cannot lie does not mean that I do not affirm most emphatically that God cannot lie. This is no more logical than that my acceptance of the possibility that you don't exist means that I would not affirm that you actually do exist. It's a non sequitor.

But believing that you could be wrong about God being a liar implies that you don't really know if God is a liar. Skepticism is the only conclusion for epistemology built upon psychological conviction. The point isn't that you affirm that God is a liar, but that you cannot know whether or not He is, in fact, a liar. And this despite the fact that God has revealed it to you that He is not a liar. Is God's revelation not entirely trustworthy beyond doubt?

What I'm perceiving here is circularity. If an axiom contains the definitions upon which it depends within itself, then it is circular and therefore fallacious.

You don't seem to recognize the nature of every axiom as begging the question. If it cannot be proven, and must be assumed, then the validity is accepted on the basis of the axiom's assertion (which is circular--I state that it is true, therefore it is true). Your own axiom requires the same condition, whatever that axiom may be (you've said at least two).

So let me summarize what I'm still waiting for you to give an argument for:

1. How does a soul in the intermediate state have knowledge? Or, stated differently, how can an incorporeal being have the corporeal sensations required for knowledge upon your definition? An example would be beneficial, if possible.

2. How can any axiom be stated without presupposition, and without having its terms defined within the statement itself? An example would be beneficial, if possible.

3. If you cannot be sure in your persuasion of the truth of the proposition, "God does not lie," how can you be sure that someone's persuasion of the truth of the proposition, "God does lie," is not valid?

 

[Philip]

Sensation has never, to my knowledge, been defined as all emotional and rational capacity for understanding beyond what arises through physical bodies.

Actually, that's Locke's definition.

Physical sensation depends upon a physical body by definition.

Physical sensation, as I am using it, merely means sensation of physical realities.

I'd say that spiritual beings understand the world through intellection, apart from any physical stimulus.

I'm curious as to how this works. I've never thought without using my brain before or without having emotions engaged. If we can have thought without a physical body, then why not sensation and emotion?

I'm not going to suggest an alternative, because it would be pure speculation on my part.

I believe God is imposing upon my mind this moment the understanding of the words I see on the screen.

My question is not whether you believe it--it's whether you know that this is how knowledge works? If so, then how do you know, for example, that 2+2=4 is among the pieces of knowledge that God has imposed on you? In order to have maximal warrant, you must know that you know and also you must know that you know that you know etc etc ad infinitum. At some point you have to admit either a) you don't know anything because your axiom is held non-rationally (not necessarily irrationally) b) the definition of knowledge as maximal warrant is flawed.

Presuppose was a mistaken choice on my part. I'd prefer to amend it to "entail." Epistemology entails metaphysics, because to know anything is to know something; therefore something exists.

But how do you know that you know anything?

But believing that you could be wrong about God being a liar implies that you don't really know if God is a liar.

That depends on the definition of knowledge, doesn't it? What reason do I have to doubt that God cannot lie?

Is God's revelation not entirely trustworthy beyond doubt?

Beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing, from our finite perspective, is trustworthy beyond skeptical doubt.

You don't seem to recognize the nature of every axiom as begging the question.

Granted. So no axiom ultimately withstands the test of skepticism which the definition of knowledge as maximal warrant naturally produces.

How does a soul in the intermediate state have knowledge? Or, stated differently, how can an incorporeal being have the corporeal sensations required for knowledge upon your definition?

That would be pure speculation, just as your idea of intellection (whatever that means) is.

How can any axiom be stated without presupposition, and without having its terms defined within the statement itself?

If the terms are assumed and the axiom is so basic as to be obvious or unreasonable to doubt. Obvious: 2+2=4. Unreasonable to doubt: my senses are generally a reliable source of information.

If you cannot be sure in your persuasion of the truth of the proposition, "God does not lie," how can you be sure that someone's persuasion of the truth of the proposition, "God does lie," is not valid?

But I am sure--reasonably sure, that is.

 

[JTB]

Actually, that's Locke's definition.

I'd like a reference to the specific passage so that I may read it for myself, if you don't mind.

Physical sensation, as I am using it, merely means sensation of physical realities.

Does the sensation of physical realities require physical sensory receptors?

I'm curious as to how this works. I've never thought without using my brain before or without having emotions engaged. If we can have thought without a physical body, then why not sensation and emotion?

I'm not going to suggest an alternative, because it would be pure speculation on my part.

Brain is not mind. Body is not soul. When your body dies, your soul goes to be with the Lord. Your brain deteriorates with the rest of your body in the ground. Emotions arise through the changes of state we experience in our physical bodies. Sensations and emotions require a physical body that experience changes of state in order to be experienced. Thoughts do not require a physical body, or else God would require a physical body, and so too would souls who have departed from the body.

My question is not whether you believe it--it's whether you know that this is how knowledge works? If so, then how do you know, for example, that 2+2=4 is among the pieces of knowledge that God has imposed on you? In order to have maximal warrant, you must know that you know and also you must know that you know that you know etc etc ad infinitum. At some point you have to admit either a) you don't know anything because your axiom is held non-rationally (not necessarily irrationally) b) the definition of knowledge as maximal warrant is flawed.

2+2=4 is formulated by mathematical theories, but basic addition is demonstrated in Scripture, which provides the necessary maximal warrant upon my axiom. It isn't an ad infinitum, because of the axiom. Again, I am not convinced that you understand what an axiom is, or how it works.

But how do you know that you know anything?

What God has revealed cannot be rationally doubted. That is one reason why the Bible calls the unbeliever a fool.

Beyond reasonable doubt. Nothing, from our finite perspective, is trustworthy beyond skeptical doubt.

But if God has given you true propositions, then those propositions aren't subject to your finitude. They come from God, and are not to be doubted--skeptically or otherwise. I maintain that you have yet to produce a sound refutation of the axiom, nor have you provided a better alternative.

Granted. So no axiom ultimately withstands the test of skepticism which the definition of knowledge as maximal warrant naturally produces.

Of course it withstands the test of skepticism, because skepticism is self-refuting. A self-refuting position cannot mount a justified counter-claim that axioms cannot be circular. The difference between the circular autonomous arguments of man and the circular argument of Scripture is that Scripture comes from a transcendent and unchanging source of truth, whereas autonomous men do not, and cannot justify the necessity of universal principles necessary for argument itself (i.e. the laws of logic) upon their autonomous presuppositions.

That would be pure speculation, just as your idea of intellection (whatever that means) is.

Do you think it pure speculation because you have no direct experience of it? Intellection is thinking, or perceiving with the mind. Unless you think that the mind is a physical body, or that an immaterial being has physical sense receptions that are themselves non-physical (how exactly would that be possible, by the way?) then you have to acknowledge that the mind does not require physical sensations in order to posses knowledge.

But I am sure--reasonably sure, that is.

You are psychologically convinced, but not epistemologically sound. If assurance boils down to nothing more than your psychological conviction of a reasonable judgment, then you can never offer anything but contingency. Thus, justifying the truth of any universal statement becomes impossible: you cannot justify that God never lies, because it is possible that he does, since you have only your own finite experience by which to judge.

I think you are allowing your autonomous judgment to be the final arbiter or authority of knowledge. If so, then I don't see what makes your view different from the unbeliever in his state of rebellion.

 

[Philip]

I'd like a reference to the specific passage so that I may read it for myself, if you don't mind.

Essay Concerning Human Understanding Book II, 4-5, Locke defines all mental thought as "internal sense" even though he refers to this later as reflection. I am not agreeing with Locke on his general epistemology, just that he has a good definition of what comprises our senses (or what Reidians call cognitive equipment).

Does the sensation of physical realities require physical sensory receptors?

Not necessarily--but I couldn't give you a definitive alternative as I have never been disembodied and the Bible is silent on the subject, so any attempt at epistemology here would be speculation.

Sensations and emotions require a physical body that experience changes of state in order to be experienced.

Why do they require a physical body? I believe that God is compassionate and has emotions--and I certainly think that He can sense things without a physical body.

2+2=4 is formulated by mathematical theories, but basic addition is demonstrated in Scripture, which provides the necessary maximal warrant upon my axiom.

Are you capable of heresy? If so, then you may not have interpreted Scripture correctly because God might not have imposed the knowledge on your mind.

What God has revealed cannot be rationally doubted. That is one reason why the Bible calls the unbeliever a fool.

So what separates you and I from the unbeliever?

But if God has given you true propositions, then those propositions aren't subject to your finitude.

It's God accommodating Himself to my language, and I am still capable of misunderstanding.

Of course it withstands the test of skepticism, because skepticism is self-refuting.

No--it just ends in "I know nothing or maybe I do and just don't know it."

A self-refuting position cannot mount a justified counter-claim that axioms cannot be circular.

The axioms of the critic have no bearing on the validity of the criticism. Regardless, skepticism is the only conclusion of the axiom that knowledge is maximal warrant.

The difference between the circular autonomous arguments of man and the circular argument of Scripture is that Scripture comes from a transcendent and unchanging source of truth, whereas autonomous men do not, and cannot justify the necessity of universal principles necessary for argument itself (i.e. the laws of logic) upon their autonomous presuppositions.

I've never seen this actually done. I argue that the Bible assumes these laws just as it assumes the existence of God and other matters of general revelation. The unbeliever cannot be without excuse if he knows nothing.

Do you think it pure speculation because you have no direct experience of it? Intellection is thinking, or perceiving with the mind.

I think it pure speculation because all that we know is thinking within a physical body.

To think, one must have terms with which to think, and therefore must have a reality backing them up. All that intellection is, then, is a machine for processing--and sometimes the machine doesn't work.

You are psychologically convinced, but not epistemologically sound. If assurance boils down to nothing more than your psychological conviction of a reasonable judgment, then you can never offer anything but contingency.

Explain to me how a contingent being can have anything but contingency. I necessarily think contingently.

Thus, justifying the truth of any universal statement becomes impossible

That depends on how high your standard of justification is. You base things on an axiom, and I base mine on a set of axioms. However, could you be mistaken in your acceptance of that particular axiom? A Muslim could make nearly an identical argument for the Koran and be consistent--in fact, he would probably be more consistent because he can at least account for errors in his system--Allah doesn't necessarily have to be logical. What separates you from the Muslim epistemologically?

I think you are allowing your autonomous judgment to be the final arbiter or authority of knowledge. If so, then I don't see what makes your view different from the unbeliever in his state of rebellion.

It's different for this reason: I have a witness on whose word I base my knowledge. The unbeliever has no witness. The only reason why I know better than the unbeliever is the Grace of God. It's not by reason alone that I know.