Argument for God's Existence from Goodness

[Afterthought]

In more general terms: everything seeks its own perfection; perfection presupposes a good to be perfected; ergo...

What if it is objected: Why can't something amoral seek perfection? The agent (the person) is moral, but the moral agent seeks perfection for its amoral being? And the perfection itself is amoral qualities, e.g., healthiness, wealth, quality of life?

What if it is objected: That not everything seeks its own perfection? That some things seek defects or that being doesn't seek anything: it just is? If someone says beings seek defects, I suppose one could point out that the being only does so on the belief that the defects are good; but how does one demonstrate that, not merely assert it as common sense, to a stubborn objector?

 

[MW]

What if it is objected: Why can't something amoral seek perfection? The agent (the person) is moral, but the moral agent seeks perfection for its amoral being?

Seeks perfection of WHAT? The WHAT must be considered good in order for it to be capable of perfection.

What if it is objected: That not everything seeks its own perfection?

This is the irony of nihilism. Not seeking its own perfection would then be considered a "good," and this "good" would be pursued unto perfection.

As for seeking defection, it does so under the notion that it is seeking its perfection. Otherwise it could not be called a defection.

 

[Afterthought]

Seeks perfection of WHAT? The WHAT must be considered good in order for it to be capable of perfection.

Could the WHAT be evil and be capable of perfection? Or maybe the WHAT is amoral, and it is not perfection of being that is desired, but perfection of the person? Perhaps it would be helpful to explain what is meant by "perfection."

This is the irony of nihilism. Not seeking its own perfection would then be considered a "good," and this "good" would be pursued unto perfection.

As for seeking defection, it does so under the notion that it is seeking its perfection. Otherwise it could not be called a defection.

I'm not following you on how it could not be called a defection. It would seem a defection would be an adding of defects, so I do not see how it is done under the notion of seeking perfection.

How is it shown that not seeking perfection, i.e., one's being is amoral and remains amoral with nothing good or evil in it, would be considered "good"? In the case of noting that nihilism is pursued to "perfection," does one observe what people do, and make a general conclusion, or does one only observe what oneself does?

 

[MW]

If something is "evil" it is "not good," and by definition assumes goodness of being because of its privative nature, which we established previously from Augustine.

The same applies to a "defect." A defect is a defect of something held to be ideally good.

There cannot be amorality where the will is involved. The will is an inclination to good. The exercise of the will is the self-determination of the person; and personhood itself is regarded as a good, otherwise we would not have all this clamour over individual's rights.

 

[Afterthought]

Ah, I think I see now. I was even wondering whether it might be proper to argue that "death" and "ill-being" cannot be viewed as evil if being just "is" and is an amoral entity? Perhaps given the aversion to murder, it might be argued that the wrongness of murder in part presupposes the goodness of being (strictly speaking, the goodness of a particular kind of being; so perhaps not good for showing the matter in general); I suppose it might be countered that it merely presupposes the wrong of doing something against someone's will, which would be tricky to argue as being a part of a person's being.

There cannot be amorality where the will is involved. The will is an inclination to good. The exercise of the will is the self-determination of the person; and personhood itself is regarded as a good, otherwise we would not have all this clamour over individual's rights.

And if someone argues that personhood is not "being," strictly speaking, but is grounded upon being, which being is an amoral entity?

If something is "evil" it is "not good," and by definition assumes goodness of being because of its privative nature, which we established previously from Augustine.

I was hoping to establish Augustine's view on the basis of being being good, especially since that's partly how Augustine arrived at his view. I suppose Augustine's view will have to be established on other grounds in order to argue the goodness of being with someone who stubbornly objects to its having a moral condition or to its being good.

 

[MW]

I was hoping to establish Augustine's view on the basis of being being good, especially since that's partly how Augustine arrived at his view. I suppose Augustine's view will have to be established on other grounds in order to argue the goodness of being with someone who stubbornly objects to its having a moral condition or to its being good.

I am content to move in a circle at that point, since we are circumscribed by the fact of created existence, and created existence owes its being to the goodness of the Creator's will. If anyone desires to move outside of the circle, they will have to explain how it is possible that something comes out of nothing. Only when they can explain that impossibility can they stand as an authority to explain how being is not in itself good. But even then, why explain anything if being is not good. Explanation itself is proof of the fact since being is considered worthy of explanation. And what purpose is explanation serving if it is not part of the movement of being seeking its own perfection? Which brings us back to the irony of nihilism.

 

[Afterthought]

I am content to move in a circle at that point, since we are circumscribed by the fact of created existence, and created existence owes its being to the goodness of the Creator's will. If anyone desires to move outside of the circle, they will have to explain how it is possible that something comes out of nothing. Only when they can explain that impossibility can they stand as an authority to explain how being is not in itself good. But even then, why explain anything if being is not good. Explanation itself is proof of the fact since being is considered worthy of explanation. And what purpose is explanation serving if it is not part of the movement of being seeking its own perfection? Which brings us back to the irony of nihilism.

Good points. We do tend to explain everything though, which supposes the inherent worth of everything; indeed, I wonder whether saying something "just is" is itself an explanation. I suppose a problem could arise if the objector doubts the Creator's goodness or doubts that a good Creator necessarily implies that all aspects of the creation is good--rather than some things, like being--that which is required for existence but neither good nor evil in itself--being amoral.

Incidentally, I thought creation was a matter of special revelation? It would seem we could reason back to the fact of creation by noting that nothing comes from nothing, and that our world is not eternal (since it is subject to the condition of time).

 

[MW]

Incidentally, I thought creation was a matter of special revelation? It would seem we could reason back to the fact of creation by noting that nothing comes from nothing, and that our world is not eternal (since it is subject to the condition of time).

That sounds right. Certain facts about creation can be shown to be reasonable because reason itself depends upon them (e.g., cosmological, teleological, moral arguments, etc.). But the constitutive acts of creation (the fiats) would require special revelation, Heb. 11:3.

 

[Afterthought]

That sounds right. Certain facts about creation can be shown to be reasonable because reason itself depends upon them (e.g., cosmological, teleological, moral arguments, etc.). But the constitutive acts of creation (the fiats) would require special revelation, Heb. 11:3.

Well, thanks for the good discussion and for the time you have put into it (a one month long thread!)! (And thanks, Earl, for popping in!) I have found this thread very helpful. I think I am satisfied for now. If I think of further questions, I may ask them here, but I will likely reserve them for a future thread.

Unfortunately, a situation I know of is one in which the goodness of the Creator is doubted; if I appeal to the goodness of and preservation of being as evidence of the goodness of the Creator, the goodness of being is doubted (being is affirmed as amoral)! Hopefully, some of the thoughts in this thread will prove useful in the matter, especially as I continue to reflect on them and try to make them sharper in my mind. I find it interesting that all these matters (dualism, privative nature of evil, goodness of Creator, goodness of being, foundationalism and the OA) are tied together in such a way. They seem to be fundamental presuppositions--a web of fundamental beliefs--that come together as a package. I probably would not have noticed that beforehand.

 

[MW]

Thankyou for the discussion, Raymond. I hadn't realised it had been a month. It is good to go over and refresh some of these things, especially the points made by Augustine and Boethius. Blessings!