Attributes in God

[Prufrock]

If God is perfectly simple, how can we speak properly of divine attributes?

(I thought some good theological discussion of non-controversial topics could be fun)

 

[TimV]

If God is perfectly simple, how can we speak properly of divine attributes?

Could we say that God is holy, and His mercy is holy, His love is holy, his wrath is holy and so on?

 

[Prufrock]

Tim, we can certainly this.

 

[Sven]

If God is perfectly simple, how can we speak properly of divine attributes?

Could we say that God is holy, and His mercy is holy, His love is holy, his wrath is holy and so on?

You are still making a distinction between attributes. The problem with our finite mind is that we can only think of things in chunks, so to speak. We cannot conceive of God in totality as He really is, so we need to compartmentalize when we think of Him. It is important to realize that the attributes of God are not accidental, that is separable from His being, but essential, that is the divine attributes are the essence of God Himself. If God ceases to be Holy or Good, He ceases to be God. When the divine attributes are distinguished from one another, it is not a real distinction, but a rational one, i.e., there is no distinction in God, since He is a simple being; rather, when we discuss the attributes of God, we distinguish them in order to comprehend them according to our finite minds. The question inevitably arises, why should we distinguish between His attributes? The simple answer is because the Bible does. The Bible accomodates to our finite capacities, so it speaks of God in ways we can understand.

The WSC tries to capture the simplicity of God while expressing His attributes by saying, that "God is a Spirit who is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in His being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." Each attribute is said to be infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, according to the nature of His being, but there is a distinction made between each attribute.

 

[a mere housewife]

Can we say that God is holiness, just as God is love -- etc. Classifying 'attributes' is a way for us to understand Him in relation to us, but His attributes are not 'divisions' in His essence or things He possesses but what He Is?

(edit: as I was typing this Steven posted his explanation which answers my questions).

 

[Prufrock]

If God is perfectly simple, how can we speak properly of divine attributes?

Could we say that God is holy, and His mercy is holy, His love is holy, his wrath is holy and so on?

You are still making a distinction between attributes. The problem with our finite mind is that we can only think of things in chunks, so to speak. We cannot conceive of God in totality as He really is, so we need to compartmentalize when we think of Him. It is important to realize that the attributes of God are not accidental, that is separable from His being, but essential, that is the divine attributes are the essence of God Himself. If God ceases to be Holy or Good, He ceases to be God. When the divine attributes are distinguished from one another, it is not a real distinction, but a rational one, i.e., there is no distinction in God, since He is a simple being; rather, when we discuss the attributes of God, we distinguish them in order to comprehend them according to our finite minds. The question inevitably arises, why should we distinguish between His attributes? The simple answer is because the Bible does. The Bible accomodates to our finite capacities, so it speaks of God in ways we can understand.

The WSC tries to capture the simplicity of God while expressing His attributes by saying, that "God is a Spirit who is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in His being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." Each attribute is said to be infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, according to the nature of His being, but there is a distinction made between each attribute.

Of all the scholastic distinctions used in attempt to accurately describe the relationship of the attributes, that which I find most accurate and useful is that they differ "eminently" and "virtually." We have to maintain balance between the absolute, essential unity of the attributes (as they are indivisible, and are nothing more than the single, undivided essence itself), and the distinct formal conceptions of the attributes.

 

[a mere housewife]

Of all the scholastic distinctions used in attempt to accurately describe the relationship of the attributes, that which I find most accurate and useful is that they differ "eminently" and "virtually."

Could you give a more expanded definition for 'eminently' and 'virtually'?

(To clarify: it sounds like what you are saying is that the attributes differ in prominence and in appearance as opposed to essentially; but when I looked up 'virtually' it gave a very confusing definition that made it seem like something else was being said.)

 

[py3ak]

It wouldn't be a PB thread about theology proper if I didn't quote Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics (p.59)

...Hottinger, p.44: "The attributes are distinguished neither from the essence nor from each other but only by our conceiving".—Hence, since every attribute is a manifestation of the same absolutely simple essentiality of God, it may justifiably be said (Braun, I, ii, 2, 19) that "God's righteousness is His goodness, is His knowledge, is His will; or His mercy is His righteousness, etc. But it would be wrong for me to say that the concept I have of the righteousness is the same concept which I have of the deity, mercy or eternity."

 

[Prufrock]

Ruben -- I'm glad you beat me to it. I was drafting a post which included that very quote, but was rather hoping you would turn up with it.

Incidentally, to save me some typing, do you have in your database the paragraph which follows the above quote in Heppe (it contains selections from Voetius, Braun and Mastricht, and discusses the ratio ratiocinans/ratio ratiocinata distinction)?

 

[py3ak]

Nope, sorry, Paul. I will add it to my collection, though, once you type it up!

 

[Southern Presbyterian]

(T)he attributes of God are essential to the nature of God. They comprise the characteristics of God which distinguish him as God. It is precisely in the sum total of his attributes that his essence as God finds expression. With them he is distinguished as God from all other entities. Without them, either collectively or singly, he would simply cease to be God.

--Reymond, Robert L. ; A New Systematic Theology of The Christian Faith; Thomas Nelson Publishers; Nashville; 1998; p. 161.

Sorry to drop a quote on you and run, but in preparing for tomorrow's sermon I came across the quote and thought it might add to the discussion in this thread.

Blessings!

 

[dr_parsley]

I think this is a discussion about what one might mean by the word 'properly'.

I would say it's dangerous to think that one is talking 'properly' about the attributes of God; a more sensible attitude would include great humility and fear, lest one construct an idol in his mind, and an awareness of the force of via negativa.

 

[a mere housewife]

Of all the scholastic distinctions used in attempt to accurately describe the relationship of the attributes, that which I find most accurate and useful is that they differ "eminently" and "virtually." We have to maintain balance between the absolute, essential unity of the attributes (as they are indivisible, and are nothing more than the single, undivided essence itself), and the distinct formal conceptions of the attributes.

(Just in case anyone else is unfamiliar as I am with scholastic terminology--)

In scholastic terminology, an effect is contained formally in a cause, when the same nature in the effect is present in the cause: fire causes heat, and the heat is present in the fire. An effect is virtually in a cause when this is not so, as when a pot or statue is caused by an artist. An effect is eminently in a cause when the cause is more perfect than the effect: God eminently contains the perfections of his creation. The distinctions are part of the view that causation is essentially a matter of transferring something, like passing on the baton in a relay race.

-from answers.com

 

[greenbaggins]

I agree with what Steve has put up so far: The attributes are each descriptive of the entire essence of God, only each attribute is a slightly different perspective on the one and same essence. Imagine twelve people looking at a diamond in the center of all the people. Each person sees the diamond from a slightly different perspective with slightly different sparkles appearing to each one. Now, I don't mean what post-modernism would see in such an analogy: that everyone's perspective on God is right. Rather, I mean that each person's unique perspective is analogous to each one of the attributes themselves. Each attribute looks at the one and unique and simple (indivisible) essence, but from a different vantage point. Certainly, we want to avoid any idea at all of the attributes being distinct from the essence, let alone separate from the essence. They are not even distinct from the essence (as each person of the Trinity would be distinct). They ARE each the essence. Turretin has a great quotation on this in volume 1, but I don't have the volume handy.

 

[Prufrock]

Rev. Keister,

I must agree with you about Turretin -- of all my normal "go-to guys," I find his presentation on this topic the clearest and most precise though Burman, van Mastricht and Polanus certainly require reading on the topic; Voetius, also, is very clear. For those interested in a more extended discussion of the topic, Muller (PRRD3) provides a great description of the various approaches within orthodoxy to this question -- from which work, Heidi, the following summary and quotation will hopefully help to answer your earlier question.

Maccovius allows four "types" of distinctions: real, formal, modal and rational. The first (real), which indicates a distinction of "thing" or of essences cannot be allowed by any to exist within the simplicity and unity of the Godhead. The last three (formal, modal and rational) have all been used by different divines in an attempt to explain most accurately the distinction between the attributes and the essence, as well as between the attributes themselves.

Muller makes the following classes:

1. There are those types of distinctions which are in things (formal, modal, virtual and eminent). These do not indicate a real distinction, but "indicate the ways by which a thing is differentiated within itself," bringing forth the example of the formal distinction between the "woodiness" and "hardness" of a table.
2. There are rational distinctions "by reason of analysis (ratio ratiocinata) founded in the thing," which approach the virtual and eminent disctinctions.
3. Finally, there are "purely rational" distinctions (ratio ratiocinans), based purely upon external relations in the mind of the observer.

I include the following extended quotation by way of summation:

In summary, a distinction made realiter invariably indicates a distinction such as obtains between things and other things or between a thing taken as a whole and its removable parts. Its presence indicates, therefore, either two things or a composite thing. The remainder of the terms indicate carious kinds of distinctions *within* things. A distinction made formaliter belongs to the primary actuality of a substance or essence, whereas a distinction made eminenter identifies the causal foundation or ground in one thing of some other thing, effect, or attribute outside of the thing itself. Attributes that are identified per eminentian and are understood as distinct eminenter may be understood as a class or subset of those that are distinct formaliter, given that all attributes are not causal. A distinction made virtualiter identifies a quality belonging not to the primary actuality of a thing but to its potency or power -- and is, therefore, similar to a distinction made eminenter, but can be understood as an ad extra exercise of power rather than an ad intra causal foundation. A distinction made rationaliter, which assumes a foundation in the thing, is an ideational distinction (nonetheless genuine) that, unlike the formal, eminent and virtual distinctions, does not specify the nature of its foundation. (Muller, Richard Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, v.III, p.287)​

I started drafting a post yesterday more directly dealing with the question at hand, which I hope to work on again post-Sabbath. In the meantime, does that adequately answer your question, Heidi?

 

[a mere housewife]

That was very helpful; I've been thinking about it this week; thank you.