Can you help me define some terms Scripturally?

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OPC'n

Puritan Board Doctor
Scripturally, how would you define the term "good" vs "perfect" when those words refer to God and/or to his actions?
 
Scripturally, how would you define the term "good" vs "perfect" when those words refer to God and/or to his actions?

Are you thinking in particular about the use of "good" or "perfect" to modify "will"? One of my pet peeves is the use of "God's Perfect Will for me" when people are
discussing their plans and what choices to make... it's so common, but so frightfully bad (because invariably it involves making a distinction between what God chooses for a person and what actually occurs).
 
Scripturally, how would you define the term "good" vs "perfect" when those words refer to God and/or to his actions?

Are you thinking in particular about the use of "good" or "perfect" to modify "will"? One of my pet peeves is the use of "God's Perfect Will for me" when people are
discussing their plans and what choices to make... it's so common, but so frightfully bad (because invariably it involves making a distinction between what God chooses for a person and what actually occurs).

No, has nothing to do with me or the rest of mankind.
 
The terms are somewhat related, yet distinct. In the Reformed system "Goodness" is traditionally considered as a matter of the "Quiddity" ("whatness") of God or under his actions. Though these two may seem like different topics, it is only insofar as we slip into a rationalistic understanding of God wherein we isolate some "nature" which then "performs actions" in accordance with that nature: in the traditional understanding, God is One and Simple, and the various attributes we discuss arise from the consideration of God's free and extrinsic acts. That is, we understand the "Essence" by way of the acts: an a posteriori understanding of the essence. "Perfection," on the other hand, traditionally would fall under the discussion of the "Quality" (or "howness") of God - that is, the manner in which he manifests those attributes. You will find variance in the various scholastic theologians as to how, precisely, these terms are employed, but in general this is the key to understanding the difference in their usage, which you will find below.

The Goodness of God was generally understood to be capable of bearing two different meanings: one intrinsic, the other extrinsic. The former (such as when Christ says, "There is none good, save God alone.") is intertwined with the notion of God's All-Sufficiency (El Shaddai) and his eternal blessedness. He is not only eternally blessed and all-sufficient, lacking nothing and having all to freely give, but he is so originally and as not derived from any other source. Part of this notion of goodness is the perfection of his attributes: his wisdom is perfect; that is, it lacks nothing and has no fault; his power is perfect: it lacks any hint of weakness; his righteousness is perfect: it has neither blemish nor spot. And so God is eternally blessed, all-sufficient, and good. Such is the relationship between his intrinsic goodness and the perfection of his nature or attributes.

The second way of understanding his goodness (extrinsically) is - in the order and method of theology - actually primary. His extrinsic goodness is the manifestation of his blessedness and perfection to his creatures. It is the overflow of his bounty to all his creatures - manifested by his sustaining of all his creation; and manifested even more by his love to his greatest creation: man. It is that love which he bears to all mankind, elect and reprobate, which sustains them even when cursed; and especially manifested in his love to the elect.
 
Thank you, Paul. Now I have another question. Since both are pretty much intertwined (he has perfect goodness which lacks nothing and doesn't change). When he first created all things and saw that it was good can we assume that that goodness wasn't like his goodness but a different kind of goodness?
 
Sarah, I am not by any means able to give the sort of very learned answer Paul might, but I thought of this question (which I have been thinking about, too) when I read this today, in the handbook of faith, hope, and love, by Augustine (here: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/augustine/enchiridion.pdf).

In Chapter III on the goodness of God in all creation, Augustine states: 'For the Christian, it is enough to believe that the cause of all created things, whether in heaven or on earth, whether visible or invisible, is nothing other than the goodness of the Creator, who is the one and the true God.' He goes on in Chapter IV to expand on the problem of evil:

All of nature, therefore, is good, since the Creator of all nature is supremely good. But nature is not supremely and immutably good as is the Creator of it. Thus the good in created things can be diminished and augmented. For good to be diminished is evil; still, however much it is diminished, something must remain of its original nature as long as it exists at all. For no matter what kind or however insignificant a thing may be, the good which is its "nature" cannot be destroyed without the thing itself being destroyed. There is good reason, therefore, to praise an uncorrupted thing, and if it were indeed an incorruptible thing which could not be destroyed, it would doubtless be all the more worthy of praise. When, however, a thing is corrupted, its corruption is an evil because it is, by just so much, a privation of the good. Where there is no privation of the good, there is no evil. Where there is evil, there is a corresponding diminution of the good. As long, then, as a thing is being corrupted, there is good in it of which it is being deprived; and in this process, if something of its being remains that cannot be further corrupted, this will then be an incorruptible entity [natura incorruptibilis], and to this great good it will have come through the process of corruption. But even if the corruption is not arrested, it still does not cease having some good of which it cannot be further deprived. If, however, the corruption comes to be total and entire, there is no good left either, because it is no longer an entity at all. Wherefore corruption cannot consume the good without also consuming the thing itself. Every actual entity [natura] is therefore good; a greater good if it cannot be corrupted, a lesser good if it can be. Yet only the foolish and unknowing can deny that it is still good even when corrupted. Whenever a thing is consumed by corruption, not even the corruption remains, for it is nothing in itself, having no subsistent being in which to exist.
From this it follows that there is nothing to be called evil if there is nothing good. A good that wholly lacks an evil aspect is entirely good. Where there is some evil in a thing, its good is defective or defectible. Thus there can be no evil where there is no good.

Edit: Sarah, I know this makes the quote very long but you are of a forebearing spirit; and I had to add this as it deals with the 'surprising conclusion' that must be drawn from such reasoning :-) (I think the whole section is worth reading on this question):

This leads us to a surprising conclusion: that, since every being, in so far as it is a being, is good, if we then say that a defective thing is bad, it would seem to mean that we are saying that what is evil is good, that only what is good is ever evil and that there is no evil apart from something good. This is because every actual entity is good [omnis natura bonum est.] Nothing evil exists in itself, but only as an evil aspect of some actual entity. Therefore, there can be nothing evil except something good. Absurd as this sounds, nevertheless the logical connections of the argument compel us to it as inevitable. At the same time, we must take warning lest we incur the prophetic judgment which reads: "Woe to those who call evil good and good evil: who call darkness light and light darkness; who call the bitter sweet and the sweet bitter." Moreover the Lord himself saith: "An evil man brings forth evil out of the evil treasure of his heart." What, then, is an evil man but an evil entity [natura mala], since man is an entity? Now, if a man is something good because he is an entity, what, then, is a bad man except an evil good? When, however, we distinguish between these two concepts, we find that the bad man is not bad because he is a man, nor is he good because he is wicked. Rather, he is a good entity in so far as he is a man, evil in so far as he is wicked. Therefore, if anyone says that simply to be a man is evil, or that to be a wicked man is good, he rightly falls under the prophetic judgment: "Woe to him who calls evil good and good evil." For this amounts to finding fault with God's work, because man is an entity of God's creation. It also means that we are praising the defects in this particular man because he is a wicked person. Thus, every entity, even if it is a defective one, in so far as it is an entity, is good. In so far as it is defective, it is evil.
 
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