God commanding that which we cannot do...

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Those who are going to hell were not purposed for honorable use.

Not questioning this. But are the damned responsible for their own damnation? Are they simply destroyed like a pot, or were they moral agents with real choices for which they were rightly judged?

I think God would be just to command that we fly around the room even though we lack natural ability.

My point is that God wouldn't. God cannot be inconsistent with His own nature and therefore does not command what we cannot naturally do.

Again, would it be rational for you to command someone to do something not in their capacity?
 
Are they simply destroyed like a pot, or were they moral agents with real choices for which they were rightly judged?

Both?

See Romans 9:19-20.
19 You will say to me then, Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will? 20 But who are you, O man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, Why have you made me like this?"

---------- Post added at 01:42 PM ---------- Previous post was at 01:36 PM ----------

Again, would it be rational for you to command someone to do something not in their capacity?

I do think it would be irrational for me to command someone to do something not in their capacity.
 
I think that after the fall God recognized this issue and that is why he sent Jesus. Now for those who have faith they will be saved and those who do not have faith will perish. The reason they do not have faith is because they refuse to believe because they are bent towards sin. They still have the ability but because of being turned inward they would never act outside of the holy spirits assistance.

Romans 5:17 - For if, by the trespass of the one man, death reigned through that one man, how much more will those who receive God's abundant provision of grace and of the gift of righteousness reign in life through the one man, Jesus Christ.

The Arminian view handles this very well but eliminates passages that allude to God's sovereign choice in the matter (Romans 9). Calvanists do not have a direct answer to how it's rational to be accountable and incapable at the same time. Paul didn't seem to think that matter based on Romans 9:21. I obviously hold to the reformed view but must admit I consider this a paradox. I just accept this as it is written in scripture considering that both can be true at the same time (i.e. Ability and Inability).

The verse that I accepted is the fact that God can create whatever he wants (Romans 9:21).
 
No, I am saying he knew this would happen, recognized this, and that is why he sent Jesus. It was in his plans.
 
Calvanists do not have a direct answer to how it's rational to be accountable and incapable at the same time. Paul didn't seem to think that matter based on Romans 9:21. I obviously hold to the reformed view but must admit I consider this a paradox. I just accept this as it is written in scripture considering that both can be true at the same time (i.e. Ability and Inability).

As I said before, I think we get the fundamental idea that it is wrong for God to command us to do something that we cannot do from our faulty perception of his authority. Robert, the problem you bumping up against is that you seem to think that God's purposes and commands must make sense to you in order for you to see them as rational. To look for an extrinsic rational reason to which God must conform I think is the wrong approach. I have a different approach. I think that the mere fact that God does what he does and commands what he wills is what defines rationality. Granted, when we look at this dilemma we begin to wonder about his purposes. Why would he command us to do something that we cannot do on our own. The simple answer is that God does all things for his glory. Note that this is not an extrinsic answer. While it may appear that this answer points to an ideal outside of God, it is, in fact, in accordance with his good pleasure. Calvin, when he comments on Romans 9:15, says this:

With regard to the elect,, God cannot be charged with any unrighteousness; for according to his good pleasure he favors them with mercy: and yet even in this case the flesh finds reasons for murmuring, for it cannot concede to God the right of showing favor to one and not to another, except the cause be made evident. As then it seems unreasonable that some should without merit be preferred to others, the petulancy of men quarrels with God, as though he deferred to persons more than what is right. Let us now see how Paul defends the righteousness of God. In the first place, he does by no means conceal or hide what he saw would be disliked, but proceeds to maintain it with inflexible firmness. And in the second place, he labours not to seek out reasons to soften its asperity, but considers it enough to check vile barkings by the testimonies of Scripture.
It may indeed appear a frigid defence that God is not unjust, because he is merciful to whom he pleases; but as God regards his own authority alone as abundantly sufficient, so that he needs the defence of none, Paul thought it enough to appoint him the vindicator of his own right. Now Paul brings forward here the answer which Moses received from the Lord, when he prayed for the salvation of the whole people, "I will show mercy," was God's answer, "on whom I will show mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion." By this oracle the Lord declared that he is a debtor to none of mankind, and that whatever he gives is a gratuitous benefit, and then that his kindness is free, so that he can confer it on whom he pleases; and lastly, that no cause higher than his own will can be thought of, why he does good and shows favor to some men but not to all. The words indeed mean as much as though he had said, "From him to whom I have once purposed to show mercy, I will never take it away; and with perpetual kindness will I follow him to whom I have determined to be kind." And thus he assigns the highest reason for imparting grace, even his own voluntary purpose, and also intimates that he has designed his mercy peculiarly :for some; for it is a way of speaking which excludes all outward causes, as when we claim to ourselves the free power of acting, we say, "I will do what I mean to do."

In short, I say the rational reason that Calvinists give for how it is rational that God should require of us what we cannot do on our own is this:

...because God said so...

---------- Post added at 08:23 AM ---------- Previous post was at 08:14 AM ----------

Robert, the problem you bumping up against is that you seem to think that God's purposes and commands must make sense to you in order for you to see them as rational.

Sorry, Robert. I should have said, "The problem you seem to be bumping up against..."

---------- Post added at 08:32 AM ---------- Previous post was at 08:23 AM ----------

Perhaps I should add that our sinfulness IS the fact that we cannot do on our own what God commands. The reason this is sinful is because God IS worthy of our submission to his authority.
 
As I said before, I think we get the fundamental idea that it is wrong for God to command us to do something that we cannot do from our faulty perception of his authority. Robert, the problem you bumping up against is that you seem to think that God's purposes and commands must make sense to you in order for you to see them as rational.

I would agree and that's why I accept this as truth.

However, when Paul addresses this issue in Roman 9 he says, "[SUP]21 [/SUP] Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for dishonorable use? [SUP]22 [/SUP]What if God, desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power, has endured with much patience vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, [SUP]23 [/SUP]in order to make known the riches of his glory for vessels of mercy, which he has prepared beforehand for glory—"

When he says, "What if" doesn't that mean that Paul is even making a guess to the answer because he accepts that God is the creator and does what he wills, but at the same time couldn't wrap his head around this idea of being incapable and accountable?
 
Ok, I'm not wanting to have rehashed the alleged moral/natural ability distinction. I get it. I'm wanting to know from where we get the idea that obligation to do something can only be attributed if there is ability.

It appears that the thinking here is that it is simply "self-evident" that it would be unjust to command what one cannot do.

Ben,
Kant put this idea forward, that the "ought" implies the "can"....
Ought implies can - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
I think that it is the natural reasoning of a person in spiritual darkness.
Jim
 
I think the appeal to Romans 9 takes the discussion off its original course. The "will" of Romans 9 is decretive. Man cannot know what God has decreed until it has come to pass or unless God has specially revealed it beforehand. The original question related to God commanding men, which is usually designated His "preceptive" will, and something which man can and does know. Moving from one to the other is sure to create confusion.
 
I think the appeal to Romans 9 takes the discussion off its original course. *The "will" of Romans 9 is decretive. *Man cannot know what God has decreed until it has come to pass or unless God has specially revealed it beforehand. *The original question related to God commanding men, which is usually designated His "preceptive" will, and something which man can and does know. *Moving from one to the other is sure to create confusion.

I disagree. I commend to you that my contribution concerning Romans 9 was warranted for reasons I will describe. For the question itself mixes the decretive and perceptive wills of God and warrants the use of Romans 9 that supports my point concerning God's absolute authority that is being challenged.

The original question asked, From where do we get the idea that it is inherently unjust to command something which the other is incapable of doing?

First, we see, in the question, God's preceptive will in the words that say that one is commanding something.

Second, we see in the question God's decretive will in the words that say that one is incapable. For instance, the reason men are incapable of believing in Christ is precisely because of God's decretive will. God has not decreed for certain men to believe.

Finally, I have drawn attention to Romans 9 for the purpose of supporting my assertion that the idea that it is unjust for God to command something (God's preceptive will) which the other is incapable of doing (because of God's decretive will prevents and does not enable) is really man's problem with God's authority, for it is God's prerogative to do as he pleases. In the spirit of Romans 9:20, Who are you, O man who finds God's ways inherently unjust, to answer back to God?

That the "will" of Romans 9 refers to the decretive will of God does not exclude the text from a discussion concerning God's perceptive will. For it is the decretive will that enables obedience to preceptive will.
 
Second, we see in the question God's decretive will in the words that say that one is incapable. For instance, the reason men are incapable of believing in Christ is precisely because of God's decretive will. God has not decreed for certain men to believe.

This is where the discussion is confusing two different things. Men are not incapable of believing in Christ, all things being equal. They are incapable as a result of the bondage of the will in consequence of the fall into sin. They are to blame, not God, for their incapacity. As soon as one brings the decretive will into it, as if human failure does not admit of a reasonable explanation, the guilt of the sinner is alleviated; and that is a serious error.
 
This is going to go over my very quickly!

I recant the use of the word "precisely." That was a lame thing to say. Men ARE culpable for their sin.

While am at it, allow me to recant the use of Romans 9 as well for the sake of a less confusing conversation.

In the end, my answer to the original question is that man has a problem with God's absolute authority. Does anyone think this is on the right track?

Hey Winzer. Thanks for pointing out my serious error.
 
Here's a thought from Calvin that seems fitting:

"Now what is to be learned from the law can be readily understood: that God, as he is our Creator, has toward us by right the place of Father and Lord; for this reason we owe to him glory, reverence, love, and fear; verily, that we have no right to follow the mind's caprice wherever it impels us, but, dependent upon his will, ought to stand firm in that alone which is pleasing to him; then, that righteousness and uprightness are pleasing to him, but he abominates wickedness; and that, for this reason, unless we would turn away from our Creator in impious ingratitude, we must cherish righteousness all our life. For if only when we prefer his will to our own do we render to him the reverence that is his due, it follows that the only lawful worship of him is the observance of righteousness, holiness, and purity. And we cannot pretend the excuse that we lack ability and, like impoverished debtors, are unable to pay. It is not fitting for us to measure God's glory according to our ability; for whatever we may be, he remains always like himself: the friend of righteousness, the foe of iniquity. Whatever he requires of us (because he can require only what is right), we must obey out of natural obligation. But what we cannot do is our own fault. If our lust in which sin reigns [cf. Rom.6:12] so holds us bound that we are not free to obey our Father, there is no reason why we should claim necessity as a defense, for the evil of that necessity is both within us and to be imputed to us." - Institutes, Book II, Ch.VIII.2

Blessings!
 
From where do we get the idea that it is inherently unjust to command something which the other is incapable of doing?

If I may reword the question I may better be able to jump in.

"From where do we get the idea that it is inherently unjust to hold someone morally culpable for failing to do that which they were at the same time commanded and incapable of doing?"

My best answer is that it is assumed, and justifiably so. Using an example from this thread, if I were to command my daughter to fly across the room to me, that command would not be unjust, it would be unreasonable - and silly. However, if I proceeded to tan my daughter's hide for not flying to me as I commanded, I would be unjust in holding her morally responsible for the very thing that she does not, nor can ever, have the ability to accomplish.

Consider how authority works. Commander -> Respondant / Command -> Response. In this model, the respondant should have the reasonable expectation that the commander's commands will be reasonable and accomplishable. The commander, in turn, should have the reasonable expectation that the respondant's response will accomplish the reasonable command. But, it all starts with the commander commanding. If the commander's command is unreasonable and unaccomplishable then it cannot be reasonably expected that the respondants response will accomplish a reasonable command that does not exist.

Further, to hold the respondant morally responsible for the failing of the commander to give a reasonable command would be unjust. If any correction need be made in this situation, it is the commander that should be corrected.

In comes the distinction between moral and natural ability to the question of God commanding man.
 
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