I've been thinking about this conversation a lot. I am wondering if differences in some of the specifics in regards to understanding God's "desire" actually create a difference in how the gospel is proclaimed in the context of God's "desires"?
Could you say to an unbeliever without qualification:
1: "(God has) no pleasure in the death of one who dies... Therefore turn and live!” (Ezekiel 18:32)
With great desire I am pleased to post how most Christians read Ezekiel incorrectly and this is the medicine that will cure this ailment.
http://www.fpcr.org/blue_banner_articles/murray-free-offer-review.htm
Thank you for the article. I've read it completely. I am certainly not beyond error, but would like to provide a list of objections I have to this article as consistent with my present understanding.
I hold pastor Winzer in very high regard and have benefited from many of his posts. However, on this issue I disagree. In no way do I question his faith or degrade the help he has provided in so many posts on PB. I know from reading reformed theology that he does not represent the only historic perspective, so I would like to offer points of disagreement respectfully.
Proposition 1.
Assigning desire to God for His decree alone superimposes ectypal boundaries on the archetype thereby reversing a proper Creator/creature distinction.
Explanation 1.
The critique against Murray’s Free Offer has some basic assumptions that disprove the validity of the arguments. Particularly, there is not a proper Creator/creature distinction that allows the author to derive necessary “frustrations” concerning a desire in God for what He has not decreed. The critique states:
“If God desires something to be… we are bound to acknowledge that the desire has reference to the will of decree, because it is a desire for the futurition of an action, not the obligation of it.”
Certainly, the author makes a credible attempt to ascribe to God complete sovereignty, of which is true and commendable. However, the presupposition that for God to desire something “to be” that He has not decreed makes him incompetent attempts to understand God through the lens of the rational creature, reasoning that when humans desire something which does not come to fruition, there is frustration and lack of control over the situation. This is true for mankind as the creature, but not necessarily true for God.
Since man was made in the image of God, there is of necessity an ectype/archetype relationship. When we seek to understand God through applying an ectype knowledge and relationship to desire, we impose the copy on the original and force God into the confines of the creature. In this sense, any kind of desire in God is anthropomorphic since the finite mind cannot understand and “know” anything as God knows it. However, to apply anthropomorphism to God and say that the only desire He has is for what “ought” to be done does not account for the many scriptures that the author divorces desire from God through an abuse of anthropomorphism.
Such an attempt to divorce desire from God creates a dichotomy between God’s attributes and His desire for righteousness (Psalm 5:4). Further, because the critique seeks to understand God through the eyes of the creature, it effectively reverses the biblical order and seeks to understand God through our image.
Proposition 2.
Without a proper Creator/creature distinction, God's desire for His decree must of necessity be anthropomorphic similarly to His desire for His precepts.
Explanation 2.
Since the Creator/creature distinction has been reversed by the author and human desire has become the blueprint to understanding God’s desire, by necessity the author seeks to understand God’s desire for His decree through the human lens as has been proposed. Since anthropomorphism is defined as “the attribution of human characteristics or behavior to God,” the author does not have the liberty to argue that God’s desire for His decree is somehow not anthropomorphic while His desire for something that He did not decree is in fact anthropomorphic since understanding any desire in God has been subjugated to creaturely desire.
Proposition 3.
The formulation of desire in God as proper only for His decree speculates upon His secret will and does not focus on what He had revealed.
Explanation 3.
Deut. 29:29 tells us “The secret things belong to the Lord our God, but those things which are revealed belong to us and to our children forever…” The author has sought to reconcile what God has revealed to what we know about His decree. This passage tells us that it is not ours to know or speculate upon. The author has removed any desire of God for the futurition of something that is not decreed and therefore formulates doctrines based on what is secret.
“No man, therefore, will duly and usefully ponder on the providence of God save he who recollects that he has to do with his own Maker, and the Maker of the world, and in the exercise of the humility which becomes him, manifests both fear and reverence. Hence it is, that in the present day so many dogs tear this doctrine with envenomed teeth, or, at least, assail it with their bark, refusing to give more license to God than their own reason dictates to themselves.” (Calvin’s Institutes 1.17.2)
Proposition 4.
A dichotomy between God the Father and God the Son incarnate fails to promote unity in the Godhead.
Explanation 4.
Based on the author's previous conclusions that God's desire is only properly referenced to His decree, there is a necessary dichotomy between the divine and human natures of Christ. This is evidenced in the following:
"It was the human will wishing that which was in accord with the moral principles of self-preservation."
And:
"As the experience in the garden of Gethsemane demonstrates that one may Biblically prejudice the false principle of a perfect harmony between the will of the Father and the human will of the Son, the averment that it is the human will of Jesus which is expressed in Matthew 23:37, is both safe and sound."
However, based on the fallacies already described in propositions 1-3, such problems arise only from a false dichotomy between the decretive and revealed will of God in relation to desire in God. This is a perfect example of where human reason has its limitations for sure, but promoting what the author finds to be reasonable only creates disunity in the Godhead due to seeking to comprehend God through human lenses and finite logic.
Proposition 5.
A dichotomy between God the Father and God the Son incarnate fails to acknowledge that Christ's human nature is in heaven.
Explanation 5.
Since not only Christ's divine nature is in heaven but also His human nature (Rom. 8:34, Heidelberg 45-46), it is inconsistent to create a dichotomy between the divine and human natures since they are both present in heaven. Furthermore, if God remains unchanging, is there a difference in the Godhead in heaven now than there was prior to Christ's bodily ascension?
Proposition 6.
An assignment of desire in God to only properly reference His decree and what man "ought" to do creates a dangerous practical dilemma.
Explanation 6.
If I consider my sins, should I think that though I did what I ought not to have done, I did what God desired. No! I should view it as having done what God does not desire, since God is "not a God who takes pleasure in wickedness" (Ps. 5:4). And what of His anger against those who do not obey? Is He angry because they did what He desired? Again, this is beyond the finite mind to fully comprehend, but as truth should be premised on the Word of God, I think we are better off to accept what appears to be a paradox, knowing that it is resolved in the infinite God.
"He makes no pretence of not willing what he wills, but while in himself the will is one and undivided, to us it appears manifold, because, from the feebleness of our intellect, we cannot comprehend how, though after a different manner, he wills and wills not the very same thing... Nay, when we cannot comprehend how God can will that to be done which he forbids us to do, let us call to mind our imbecility, and remember that the light in which he dwells is not without cause termed inaccessible, (1Ti 6: 16) because shrouded in darkness." (Institutes 1.18.3)
Proposition 7.
It is meaningless to argue that mankind is loved generally as creatures but hated individually as reprobates.
Explanation 7.
The scriptures do not represent love and hate as absolute dichotomies, nor do we do this in our own experience. For example, I love my wife, children, neighbors, etc. I am commanded to do so by scripture. However, the love is expressed differently. In fact, if my neighbor desired intimacy with me, I would despise her, though simultaneously I am to love her. We are also told in scripture to hate the enemies of God (Ps. 139:21) as well as our family members (Luke 14:26). Let's not create a one or the other scenario with God or make up so many categories as to say that God loves men generally as creatures and hates individually as reprobates. Such categories only serve to harm a holistic view of scripture.
“Another objection to the doctrine of common grace is that it presupposes a certain favorable disposition in God even to reprobate sinners, while we have no right to assume such a disposition in God. This stricture takes its starting point in the eternal counsel of God, in His election and reprobation. Along the line of His election God reveals His love, grace, mercy, and longsuffering, leading to salvation; and in the historical realization of His reprobation He gives expression only to His aversion, disfavor, hatred, and wrath, leading to destruction. But this looks like a rationalistic over-simplification of the inner life of God, which does not take sufficient account of His self-revelation. In speaking on this subject we ought to be very careful and allow ourselves to be guided by the explicit statements of Scripture rather than by our bold inferences from the secret counsel of God. There is far more in God than we can reduce to our logical categories.” (Berkoff, Systematic Theology 4.3.3. See also Institutes 2.16.4 and further after the Berkoff quote.)
Proposition 8.
Unless God wills the salvation of all, we cannot rightly pray that all would be saved.
Explanation 8.
The article explains “Herein something might be predicated of the genuine expression of earnest desire to be sounded forth to all men without exception: it is by the ministers of the gospel who are sent forth to preach to every creature and to beseech men to be reconciled to God.”
I would suggest creating tension between God’s desire for His decree and His precept is founded only in the finite mind of fallible men. Calvin did not promote tension between them but simply spoke of them both.
“So wonderful is his love towards mankind, that he would have them all to be saved, and is of his own self prepared to bestow salvation on the lost… But it may be asked, If God wishes none to perish, why is it that so many do perish? To this my answer is, that no mention is here made of the hidden purpose of God, according to which the reprobate are doomed to their own ruin, but only of his will as made known to us in the gospel.” (Commentary on 2 Pet. 3:9)
The third petition of the Lord’s prayer reveals what is to be our desire concerning God’s will. Scripture undoubtedly ascribes desire in God for His precepts. To remove that desire from God is to abuse the idea of anthropomorphism and creates tension between Christ incarnate and the Godhead and the believer’s godly desires from God.
Conclusion.
We would all do well to refrain from looking into God’s secret will and seeking understand what He has revealed by what we know of His decree.
“But he still continues his exclamation, and thus the more he elevates the height of the divine mystery, the more he deters us from the curiosity of investigating the Lord, except as far as he has revealed himself in the Scriptures; for otherwise we shall enter a labyrinth, from which the retreat is not easy.” (Calvin’s commentary, Rom. 11:33)
Such knowledge does not promote disunity in the Godhead, but rather exemplifies our “creatureliness.” The proper response? Awe, reverence, admiration, faith.
“To seek to present the Christian position as rationally explicable in the sense of being comprehensible to the mind of man is to defeat our own purposes. To do so we must adopt the standard of reasoning of our opponent, and when we have accepted the standard of reasoning of our opponent, we must rest content with the idea of a finite God.” (Van Til)