Christianity and logic

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i. When we find an "apparent contradiction" we should *try* to resolve it, yes. As Van Til says above, "man should employ this law to the Scriptures.

Just to add my :2cents: to Anthony´s remarks and for further evidence that Paul doesn´t know his history . . . .

A powerful example of Van Til´s vilification of anyone who would dare even to try to harmonize the supposed "œapparent contradictions" of Scripture occurred during the Clark/Van Til controversy. One of the central issues in that controversy was Dr. Clark´s contention that he had harmonized one of the so-called Van Tilian insoluble paradoxes of Scripture, specifically the relationship between God´s sovereignty and human responsibility. What is particularly revealing is the reaction of Van Til and his associates to Dr. Clark´s proposed solution to this problem. (For Dr. Clark´s argument see his article "œDeterminism and Responsibility," or the last chapter of Religion, Reason and Revelation.) As Herman Hoeksema observed in The Clark-Van Til Controversy (which is a very readable account written at the time of the controversy), instead of engaging Dr. Clark´s argument or even attempting to refute it, Van Til and his followers viciously attacked Clark as a "œrationalist." To quote the Complaint Van Til and others filed against Dr. Clark´s ordination:

Here then is a situation which is inadequately described as amazing. There is a problem which has baffled the greatest theologians in history. Not even Holy Scripture offers a solution. But Dr. Clark asserts unblushingly that for his thinking the problem has ceased to be a problem. Here is something phenomenal. What accounts for it? The most charitable, and no doubt the correct, explanation is that Dr. Clark has come under the spell of rationalism. It is difficult indeed to escape the conclusion that by his refusal to permit the Scriptural teaching of divine sovereignty and the Scriptural teaching of human responsibility to stand alongside each other, and by his claim that he has fully reconciled them with each other before the bar of human reason, Dr. Clark has fallen into the error of rationalism [The Clark-Van Til Controversy, 23].

The reason the Complainants slandered Dr. Clark as a "œrationalist" was that he claimed to harmonize two doctrines of Scripture which they, the Vantilians, claimed could not be harmonized. What else could the Vantilians do except slander? If this so-called "œapparent contradiction" could be harmonized at the "œbar of human reason" "“ if Dr. Clark could harmonize doctrines that Van Til and the Westminster Seminary faculty insisted could not be harmonized "“ then Van Til´s entire philosophy, resting on his analogical and paradoxical view of Scripture, would be exposed as a fraud. Yet, as Hoeksema pointed out, the only "œproof" Van Til could provide that Dr. Clark was "œunder the spell of rationalism" was that he mentioned pagan philosophers. Of course, Dr. Clark´s opponents failed to note that he mentioned Calvin´s Institutes as well, which, as it turns out, is central to Dr. Clark´s argument and key to solving this puzzle "œwhich has baffled the greatest theologians in history." Of course, if the mere reference to pagan philosophers warrants the epithet "œrationalist," one doesn´t have to read too far in the Institutes to conclude that Calvin must have been a "œrationalist." Paul himself, who quotes a pagan poet in Acts 17, must have been a "œrationalist," too.

For the Vantilians, at least those true to Van Til´s teachings, like our friends Paul here, apparent contradictions do not function as "œred flags" warning them to go back and check their premises, carefully define their terms, and examine their inferences. Instead, when they encounter an apparent contradiction, they must bow their heads in feigned Christian piety and resignation. Such false humility is sheer arrogance, for they do not even entertain the possibility that they may have erred. The apparent contradictions are due to their "œcreatureliness," not to their stupidity or foolishness. Frame´s answer to the logical paradoxes of Scripture [see "œVan Til - The Theologian"] is "œjust believe," but believe what? How does Frame or any Vantilian know "œthere is no paradox for God"? By an appeal to Scripture? Impossible, since "œall teaching of Scripture is apparently contradictory." Without any reason the Vantilians command us to believe that for God there is no contradiction. Magic "œfaith," divorced from logic and Scripture, becomes the means by which they assert "œthere is no paradox for God." But why wouldn´t it make more sense, even as a matter of simple intellectual honesty, to conclude that if Van Til is right and these so-called paradoxes of Scripture are logically irreconcilable, then perhaps God himself is contradictory? There is and can be no warrant in Scripture "“ since Scripture itself is contradictory "“ for asserting that God is non-contradictory.

ii. I dont know if we *must* resolve it. Should, yes, but not necessarily must.

iii. We can and should embrace it. I had said, what happens if Scripture clearly teaches x and y. Let's assume that both x and y appear to contradict eachother. What do we do?

Try to resolve it, sure. But what if you can't? Do you reject the clear teachings of Scripture, or do you reject one for the other?

Well, it would seem to me that if the Scriptures teach contradictions (at least they are contradictions to the human existent) and it is a matter of principle, as it was for Van Til and his followers including you that "œall Scripture is apparently contradictory," rather than embrace such seeming antimonies, you should be pleading ignorance and confessing confusion. You should be dedicating your lives to searching the Scriptures in an effort to solve such seeming contradictions and vindicate God's Word against His enemies (rather than providing solace and cover for God's enemies as we see in the currently justification controversy). For Jesus said the Scriptures cannot be broken, but the Van Tilian assures us, even as a matter of epistemic principle, that at least for us, broken they must remain. The Van Tilian in his arrogance and false piety (Van Til is the prime example of this sheer arrogance and hubris outlined above in his confrontation with Clark), makes this embrace of nonsense the height of Christian humility and an expression of our "œcreatureliness."

I am thankful for the above. The more the Clarkian shows that his own mind is the authority, the more he brings that system in to disrepute.

You are a very able defender of nonsense Paul. I´m very thankful that there are still Christian men who refuse to impute irrationality to God and His Word as you have.

[Edited on 5-16-2006 by Magma2]
 
Originally posted by Sean
The reason the Complainants slandered Dr. Clark as a "œrationalist" was that he claimed to harmonize two doctrines of Scripture which they, the Vantilians, claimed could not be harmonized. What else could the Vantilians do except slander?
It's not slander if the charge is accurate. You don't need Scripture to see rationalistic methodology. Even Spinoza used the Scriptures for some things. Your history is simplistic and misrepresents the facts. I guess the whole OPC was so stupid as to not see through Van Tils inability to do anything more than just name call. Take comfort that you can trust in your hero over the ruling of the duly appointed authority of elders in God's Church. As long as Clark and his followers insist he wasn't under the spell of rationalism then it must be so.

[Edited on 5-16-2006 by SemperFideles]
 
Originally posted by SemperFideles
Originally posted by Sean
The reason the Complainants slandered Dr. Clark as a "œrationalist" was that he claimed to harmonize two doctrines of Scripture which they, the Vantilians, claimed could not be harmonized. What else could the Vantilians do except slander?
It's not slander if the charge is accurate. You don't need Scripture to see rationalistic methodology. Even Spinoza used the Scriptures for some things. Your history is simplistic and misrepresents the facts. I guess the whole OPC was so stupid as to not see through Van Tils inability to do anything more than just name call. Take comfort that you can trust in your hero over the ruling of the duly appointed authority of elders in God's Church. As long as Clark and his followers insist he wasn't under the spell of rationalism then it must be so.

I don't understand the charge of "rationalism" in this case. Is it the charge of being "too logical?" If so, is there even such a thing?
 
Originally posted by Paul manata
Originally posted by Jeff_Bartel
Originally posted by SemperFideles
Originally posted by Sean
The reason the Complainants slandered Dr. Clark as a "œrationalist" was that he claimed to harmonize two doctrines of Scripture which they, the Vantilians, claimed could not be harmonized. What else could the Vantilians do except slander?
It's not slander if the charge is accurate. You don't need Scripture to see rationalistic methodology. Even Spinoza used the Scriptures for some things. Your history is simplistic and misrepresents the facts. I guess the whole OPC was so stupid as to not see through Van Tils inability to do anything more than just name call. Take comfort that you can trust in your hero over the ruling of the duly appointed authority of elders in God's Church. As long as Clark and his followers insist he wasn't under the spell of rationalism then it must be so.

I don't understand the charge of "rationalism" in this case. Is it the charge of being "too logical?" If so, is there even such a thing?

Clark "escaped" the paradox by denying free will.

Indeed, his own account seems paradoxical.

Clark says men are responsible because God says so and who are we to talk back to God.

Sorry, but I don't find asserting a dogmatic position utterly convincing.

I mean, men are free because God says so, who are we to argue with God. Anyone can play that game.

If desire to make the facts fit, no matter what is denied, just so man can have ease in your epistemic life, is your program, I'd say that's rationalism.

I understand what you are saying, but I guess I really don't see the problem (and maybe you can help me).

If man is free "in a sense" and God is sovereign "in another sense", then how is the paradox not resolved? From my reading of Clark, that is all he is doing, is defining "senses." :candle:
 
Paul, if I remember correctly, Clark would not say man is responsible because God dogmatically decrees it so. You are leaving out the fact that only God is capable of true justice. We are responsible to him because he is the definition and essence and source of justice. Because he is the righteous judge we are responsible to him. You oversimplified the argument.

I loved the dog poop illustration though. Great job!

[Edited on 5-17-2006 by BobVigneault]
 
Originally posted by BobVigneault
I loved the dog poop illustration though. Great job!

It is a good illustration. I've been that dog from time to time. Thankfully, God helps me clean up the mess while holding me responsible.

Praise His Name!!
 
Originally posted by Paul manata
"Man has no free will for salvation is of grace and God is sovereign." RRR p.242

"Man is responsible because God calls him to account; man is responsible because the supreme being can punish him for disobedience." RRR p. 241

If, as you say, Scripture is the ultimate authority - then clearly God does hold man responsible for his sin. And since man has no freedom regarding his salvation according to Scripture, then Clark agrees with Scripture on both counts.

The issue that people get stuck on can be put this way: if (as the bible says) man is totally deprived by nature, and has no capacity to do any spiritual good - how can man be punished for his sins? But the question itself begs the question. It assumes that it is self-evident that the only thing we can be rightly punished for doing, are the things we are free to not do. But there is no argument that you can make that will come to that conclusion. There is not rational link between free will and responsibility. Everyone who runs into that "paradox" brings this presumptions unquestioningly to the table.

Clark's answer was simple - we assume the Scriptures as authority - and the answer is there. We don't bring our own preconceived ideas to the Word, and bend the Word to our ideas of justice and responsibility. We assume the Word itself is the first and final authority.
 
Originally posted by Civbert
The issue that people get stuck on can be put this way: if (as the bible says) man is totally deprived by nature, and has no capacity to do any spiritual good - how can man be punished for his sins? But the question itself begs the question. It assumes that it is self-evident that the only thing we can be rightly punished for doing, are the things we are free to not do. But there is no argument that you can make that will come to that conclusion. There is not rational link between free will and responsibility. Everyone who runs into that "paradox" brings this presumptions unquestioningly to the table.

:ditto:

The only way this becomes a "paradox" is if you define responsibility as "autonomy" which Calvinists know is false. Responsiblity to these people should be defined as an autonomous person committing sins of their own autonomous free will.

But is this how responsibility should be defined? Does the bible define responsibility this way? Calvinists should say "no." If responsibility does not rest on this, then the paradox suddenly disappears. :2cents:
 
Man has no free will for salvation is of grace and God is sovereign." RRR p.242

"Man is responsible because God calls him to account; man is responsible because the supreme being can punish him for disobedience." RRR p. 241

In other news, my dog is morally responsible for pooping on the carpet because I can punish him and I call him to account.:lol:

You´re dog is not morally responsible because he/she is not a rational creature, which makes you wonder about some people. ;) However, dogs and men have no "œfree will" in the libertarian sense.

Furthermore, God is sovereign even over your "in a sense" freeness that man has. God is soveriegn *over all.* So, God determines, plans, foreordains that "in a sense" free actions of man.

Still tricky.

Now, if you deny man's freedom (Clark) then you have a tidy resolution, or you can deny God's sovereignty (Arminians) and have a tidy resolution.

Or, you can hold both, historic Calvinism

One of the centerpieces of the Reformation was a rejection of "œfree will." I guess for some that no longer applies, yet some still persist in calling themselves "Calvinists." Oh the joys of embracing the paradox. It´s better than petting the dog! :lol:
 
Originally posted by Paul manata
...
Well, we'll be getting in to this, but it's not as simple as you'd like, sorry.

G.I. WIlliamson, in excellant commentary on the confession writes,

"It is all too common to bring the railing accusation against the reformed faith that it denies free will. Many reject the reformed faith out of hand because they assume that divine sovereignty cancels all true human liberty and responsibility. Yet, ironically, no other system of teaching safeguards true human liberty and responsibility as does the reformed faith."

I mean, you guys may be right, but let's not pretend that you're espousing orthodox reformed teaching on the subject, you're not. At least face it and admit it.

Because of G. I. Williamson?? Is he the end-all of "orthodox reformed theology"? And this quote is a conclusion - not an argument. I believe Luther wrote some things on the will, and Jonathan Edwards. Williamson would be wrong if he thought that the reformed faith supports libertarian free will. Before you are regenerated, were you able to do any good works? Were you free to obey and please God? No, you were dead in sin, wholly unable to do any spiritual good works.

I don't know who G.I. Williamson is, but I don't think he wrote the standard on orthodoxy. I think the Westminster Confession is a better measure of othodoxy.

9:1 God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined to good or evil (Deu_30:19; Mat_17:12; Jam_1:14).

9:2 Man, in his state of innocency, had freedom and power to will and to do that which was good, and well pleasing to God (Gen_1:26; Ecc_7:29); but yet mutably, so that he might fall from it (Gen_2:16, Gen_2:17; Gen_3:6).

9:3 Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation (Joh_15:5; Rom_5:6; Rom_8:7): so as, a natural man, being altogether averse from that good (Rom_3:10, Rom_3:12), and dead in sin (Eph_2:1, Eph_2:5; Col_2:13), is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto (Joh_6:44, Joh_6:65; 1Co_2:14; Eph_2:2-5; Tit_3:3-5).

9:4 When God converts a sinner, and translates him into the state of grace, He freeth him from his natural bondage under sin (Joh_8:34, Joh_8:36; Col_1:13); and, by His grace alone, enables him freely to will and to do that which is spiritually good (Rom_6:18, Rom_6:22; Phi_2:13); yet so, as that by reason of his remaining corruption, he doth not perfectly, nor only, will that which is good, but doth also will that which is evil (Rom_7:15, Rom_7:18, Rom_7:19, Rom_7:21, Rom_7:23; Gal_5:17).

9:5 The will of man is made perfectly and immutably free to do good alone, in the state of glory only (Eph_4:13; Heb_12:23; 1Jo_3:2; Jud_1:24).
 
Originally posted by Paul manata
Originally posted by Jeff_Bartel
Originally posted by Civbert
The issue that people get stuck on can be put this way: if (as the bible says) man is totally deprived by nature, and has no capacity to do any spiritual good - how can man be punished for his sins? But the question itself begs the question. It assumes that it is self-evident that the only thing we can be rightly punished for doing, are the things we are free to not do. But there is no argument that you can make that will come to that conclusion. There is not rational link between free will and responsibility. Everyone who runs into that "paradox" brings this presumptions unquestioningly to the table.

:ditto:

The only way this becomes a "paradox" is if you define responsibility as "autonomy" which Calvinists know is false. Responsiblity to these people should be defined as an autonomous person committing sins of their own autonomous free will.

But is this how responsibility should be defined? Does the bible define responsibility this way? Calvinists should say "no." If responsibility does not rest on this, then the paradox suddenly disappears. :2cents:

Well, we'll be getting in to this, but it's not as simple as you'd like, sorry.

G.I. WIlliamson, in excellant commentary on the confession writes,

"It is all too common to bring the railing accusation against the reformed faith that it denies free will. Many reject the reformed faith out of hand because they assume that divine sovereignty cancels all true human liberty and responsibility. Yet, ironically, no other system of teaching safeguards true human liberty and responsibility as does the reformed faith."

I mean, you guys may be right, but let's not pretend that you're espousing orthodox reformed teaching on the subject, you're not. At least face it and admit it.

Whoa Paul...don't jump the gun.

G.I. Williamson (The Westminster Confession of Faith For Study Classes, p. 31) defines freedom thus:

Freedom may be defined as "the absence of external coercion." If a man is not forced by any power outside himself to do that which is contrary to "what he wants to do," then we may properly say that he is "free." The wonder of God's predestination is that God does leave men free in this sense, even though he predstines everthing that every man will ever do. Some people use the word "freedom" in another sense, however, which is false in the extreme. They mean, by the "freedom" of man, that man has the power to do good or evil at any moment of time. To say that a man is able to do good or evil, is very diferent [sic] from saying that a man is at liberty to do what he desires. We believe that man has liberty but not ability to do what is right. For the truth is that man, while free from coercion from the "outside" is not free from the control of his own nature. He who is evil by nature must of necessity do evil (just as a corrupt tree must of necessity produce corrupt fruit, Mt. 7:17-19). Just as we may say that God is good and therefore cannot do evil, so we may say that man (by nature) is evil and cannot (of himself) do good.

Similarly, Gordon Clark writes (What Do Presbyterians Believe?, p. 37-38):

The Scripture references [to WCF Chapter III, Section I] show clearly that God controls the wills of men"¦
This does not mean that violence was done to the will of the creatures. It was not as if the men wanted to adopt Ahithophel´s plan and were forced to follow Hushai against their desires. Their psychological processes issued in a desire to follow Hushai´s plan. But it must be noted that God established psychological processes just as truly as he established physical processes.
This ties in with the next phrase, "œnor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."
"¦He [God] does not arrange things or control history apart from secondary causes.

It would also be profitable to read his commentary on p. 105-107 on free-will, where he essentially agrees with Williamson above.

So you see, that Williamson and Clark agree that there are two types of "freedom" as I indicated in my post.

One is a false view (autonomous) that separates itself from the predestinating work of God. This view poses a clear contradiction (or paradox for you) between God's sovereignty and man's responsibility. In essence, it is a contradiction between the sovereignty of man, and the sovereignty of God. It just can't be both ways. (See the Bondage of the Will by Luther for a rebuttal of the view)

The other (the reformed/confessional view) is that man's responsibility (at least partly) lies within the fact that he always does what he "wants" to do. He never sins apart from desiring to do so. But this view presents no problem for reconciling God's sovereignty and human responsibility. God sovereignly predestines the end (sin) as well as the means (desire). Man is responsible (or free) because he always does what he wants to do. (See the Freedom of the Will by Edwards for a defense of this view)

God´s sovereignty lies in the eternal decree, or what Turretin calls the compound sense. Man´s responsibility lies in second causes, or what Turretin calls the divided sense. These two, far from being incompatible, are harmonious and complementary.

I for one do not see the slightest hint of a paradox without accepting a faulty view of human liberty.
 
Originally posted by Paul manata
Originally posted by Jeff_Bartel
I think there is some equivication of "free-will" on this thread. We must keep them seperate!

I asked for a definition above.

I like Williamson's:

Freedom may be defined as "the absence of external coercion." If a man is not forced by any power outside himself to do that which is contrary to "what he wants to do," then we may properly say that he is "free."

Certainly you are not suggesting that GHC denies this type of free will, are you?
 
Paul,

I don't think that anyone would deny that one can make "apparant contradictions" from scriptural statements. Not all things are clear...at first. Paradoxes do exist.

The difference between Clarkians and VanTillians (as I know it) is not that one denies paradoxes, but in how they treat paradoxes in scriptures.

Clarkians will tell you that in order to believe a paradox, you must resolve it. Since we know that the Bible doesn't contradict itself, don't we owe it to God to give him all we have to understand it that way?

VanTillians will tell you that if we run across a paradox that we don't understand, we should believe both sides even IF we can't resolve it. This is problematic to me.

Question for this person:

If you accept a paradox in scripture as true without resolving it:

How do you know that you are understanding it correctly? Since we know that the Scriptures do not contradict itself, one could easily have a false view of one side of the "paradox" and by modifying it to the correct Biblical view would then eliminate the paradox altogether.

Without resolving the "paradox", you have no idea if it is a paradox, or a contradiction altogether! For all this person knows, he is accepting two completely contradicting propositions, under the guise of it being a "paradox"! What was that about fideism? ;) (ok, just a joke) :lol:

The better method In my humble opinion is to not come to a conclusion until the "paradox" can be settled. To distinguish senses are a must. Am I perfectly consistent? Absolutely not. Should I strive to be? Absolutely.
 
BTW, if anyone hasn't read McMahon's book, The Two Wills of God, it is a must on the subject. It helped me resolve some of my "paradoxes." :book2:
 
Originally posted by Paul manata
Fine, God *determines* that a man will truly do what the man *wants* to do.

*The man* wanted to do it, by his own free agency, yet God determined that it would happen and not anything else.

*The man* chose to do bad. No one coerced him. He really *chose it.* He had *two* (or 3 ...n!) options. He *really* had these options. Yet God determiend that he would have a *real* choice but only choose A rather than B (or c ...z). He *never* would have chosen B, yet his choosing A was free.

Seems paradoxical to me.

Here is where I see you jumping ship Paul. You are fine in your first definition of "freedom" (choose according to your desires), but then you equivicate into the BAD kind of freedom (see Williamson above) in the bold portion of your quote.

In order for this to work, you must remain consistent!

God determines the act, and the choice and the desire etc. etc.

Man's freedom does NOT lie in the fact that he can choose from ...n! options, it lies in the fact that the option that God sovereignly determined for him to choose, he did so wantingly.

God made it happen....sovereignty.

Man wanted it...responsiblity.

The "wanting" is where the responsibility lies.

I am not sure what you are trying to prove at this point Paul. If you are trying to prove that there is an actual "paradox" between God's sovereignty and human resposibility THAT YOU can NOT solve, then that is one thing. If you are trying to prove that Clark does not allow for "paradoxes" is scripture, that is another. Which is it!!!!!
:candle:
 
Originally posted by Paul manata
We should try to resolve them, if we can.

:amen: Thank you.

Originally posted by Paul manata
Why is it problematic to belive both statement if you can't resolve them? It's not clear to me. Van Til's point was on propositions which *logically presupposed* other doctrines. These, therefore, could not be given up.

Again, I pose the question: If Scripture teaches x and y, and x and y are clear, and x and y appear to contradict, what do you do if you can't resolve it?

Study.

Originally posted by Paul manata
We know it's not a contradiction all together because *there are no contradictions all together.* This should not be brought up anymore.

Anyway, I can throw it back on you: how do you know your modification is correct. Rational consistency does not = truth as shown by this:

1) The moon is made of green cheese.

2) Hitler signed the death warrent for Jews.

These are consistent, but (1) is not true.

More to the point, then:

3) JFK was assasinated in 1963.

4) JFK was not assasinatied in 1963

can be resolved by this:

5) JFK was not assasinated in 1963, he's renting a room from me, next door to Elvis.

Thus (4) and (5) resolved a contradiction, but they're not true.

Therefore, how do you know that because you've supposedly resolved the apparent contradiction you've taught correct doctrine? Resolving apparent contradiction by false propositions does not, therefore, *in reality* take away the original paradox.

The person knows it must be a paradox, his misunderstanding, etc., but the presuppositionalist *knows* (on the basis of Divine revelation, which is a precondition for knowing anything at all) that it *can't* be a contradiction.

I never suggested that it necessarily follows that just because one has "resolved" the apparent contradiction, that they now know the truth. What one DOES accomplish by this is a better hermeneutic. Since God has *clearly* revealed that the scriptures do not contradict one another, shouldn't that hermeneutic be carried across the board to every doctrine that we study??

Ah....but you say "Only if we can...if we can't, give up for now and accept statements that are illogical TO YOU". If it is illogical to you, then how do you know it is not illogical period? Paradoxes are illogical statements (relatively) in the eyes of the beholder. Granted, they may not be ultimately contradictory, but for all practical purposes (practical meaning "as far as your understanding of it") they are.

Originally posted by Paul manata
Lastly, Clark didn't *resolve* the *admitted* paradox by consigning it to God's secret will. You *cannot* resolve it because it's God's *secret* will (He's not told us all, yet). Therefore there are paradoxes in Scripture that you *can't* resolve. So, do you reject that God wills and does not will certain things in his secret council? "But how could God will and not will murder." Clark says, "Deut. 29:29"! That's not a resolution, and it's an admission that God wills and not-wills something. Is going to Deut. 29:29, say, fideism? ;) :lol:

God wills X in one sense and wills Y in another. There is no contradiction, and no paradox (in my own mind at least! :p ). If Clark has the right answer, I do not know (although I do remember him helping...but it has been a long time).

The question is...Is it paradoxical TO YOU??? :bigsmile:
 
Sean, when can I start charging for all the lessons I've been (and will be) giving you?

You equivocate on the word free. But thanks for citing the WCF. Maybe you should read it and then explain what exactly you find at odds with Clark´s denial of free will in the libertarian, or, for your benefit, the common Arminian sense? Nothing in the Confession affirms that man has the power of contrary choice, including your dog as he poops on your carpet. Hence, Clark's argument is sound, biblical and he successfully harmonized one of the imagined biblical contradictions Van Tilians like you love so much.

I´ll send you my bill.
 
Originally posted by Paul manata
The statements are NOT "illogical" to me. They might be "apparently illogical." :lol: :banana:

Seriously, they're not illogical, and I don't see how they have to be. Why, because I know that's it's "in one sense and not another." The problem is, that God has not revealed the different senses. I try to "not go beyond what is written." ;)

This only works if you understand how to resolve the "paradox." What if you don't? Is it subjectively contradictory and objectively not? I think this is the case.

While the statements of the unsolved paradox maybe not be contradictory in and of themselves, as far as this person goes, they are at complete odds. He understands them contradictorily (new word? :banana: ) which reduces itself to absurdity In my humble opinion.
 
Originally posted by Paul manata
Question for this person:

If you accept a paradox in scripture as true without resolving it:

How do you know that you are understanding it correctly? Since we know that the Scriptures do not contradict itself, one could easily have a false view of one side of the "paradox" and by modifying it to the correct Biblical view would then eliminate the paradox altogether.
But the point is that if there is an "apparent" contradiction, then apparently one of the statements is false, and you can not (and do not) believe both. Now, if you mean by "apparent" that it is not a clear contradiction, then you are uncertain if you understand one or the other position clearly, but given some particular readings, they leads to a contradiction. Well whatever those particular readings are, you know they can not both be true - and you certainly do not believe they are both true as you apparently now read them.

Resolving the contradiction does not make both statements true, it means determining which statement is false.

Remember, you said the Scripture teaches X and Y clearly, and they are an apparent contradiction. What does that mean? If X and Y is clear, then the contradiction should be clear. But if the contradiction is uncertain, then so too is your understanding of X or Y. But if your understanding of X and Y are unclear, then the contradiction is not apparent. So saying X and Y are clear, and apparent contradictions, is a contradiction. They can not be both clear teachings of Scripture and "apparently" contradictory at the same time.

So maybe you say that there are readings of Scripture that, at first blush, are contradictions. But that apparently means that the immediate reading of X and Y is contradictory. However, we can say that we know immediately that Scripture does not contradict itself, and the initial "clear" reading must be false. We DO NOT embrace apparent contradictions, we must resolve them or admit we do not believe both are true. And if we can not resolve them, then they must be "real" contradictions. And if that is the case, again we know that either X or Y is false. So, again, you can not believe both X and Y if they "apparently" contradict. That's irrational and anti-Christian. God does not contradict himself, and we do not believe apparent contradictions are true.

Originally posted by Paul manata

Why is it problematic to believe both statement if you can't resolve them? It's not clear to me. Van Til's point was on propositions which *logically presupposed* other doctrines. These, therefore, could not be given up.

Again, I pose the question: If Scripture teaches x and y, and x and y are clear, and x and y appear to contradict, what do you do if you can't resolve it?

Admit you don't know which is true. You've already convinced yourself that they can not both be true or you would not say that they apparently contradict - therefore you have to admit the uncertainty of your understanding. You know one or the other must be false or maybe both are false readings because you are uncertain enough to judge them apparent contradictions and not "real" contradictions.

Originally posted by Paul manata

We know it's not a contradiction all together because *there are no contradictions all together.* This should not be brought up anymore.

All together? You mean if we have more information, we can fix the reading. Sure, that means you have determined which reading was false. Before, you just didn't know. Resolving means determining which understanding is false. It does not make both true.

Originally posted by Paul manata

Anyway, I can throw it back on you: how do you know your modification is correct. Rational consistency does not = truth as shown by this:

1) The moon is made of green cheese.

2) Hitler signed the death warrant for Jews.

These are consistent, but (1) is not true.
No one's saying that rational consistency makes all things true. But logical contradiction means something is false.

Originally posted by Paul manata

More to the point, then:

3) JFK was assassinated in 1963.

4) JFK was not assassinated in 1963

can be resolved by this:

5) JFK was not assassinated in 1963, he's renting a room from me, next door to Elvis.

Thus (4) and (5) resolved a contradiction, but they're not true.
So you are saying the (5) showed that (4) is false?

First that is incorrect. You can not use a statement you know to be false to resolve the contradiction. It does not follow.

Second. If statement (5) was true, then it would show that (4) was false. And that's the point, one of the two must be false. You don't believe both are true, even if you don't know which is false. When there is a contradiction, you know one is false. If there is an apparent contradiction, the best you can say is you believe one is false. You can not believe both.


Originally posted by Paul manata

Therefore, how do you know that because you've supposedly resolved the apparent contradiction you've taught correct doctrine? Resolving apparent contradiction by false propositions does not, therefore, *in reality* take away the original paradox.

Nothing takes aways the original paradox, because the paradox is found in the first two statements. These statements did not change with the additional premise. One is still false.

But since we are taking about Scripture, you are assuming that any interpretation of Scripture can be false, and that is correct. But we are not taking about 2 or 3 or 4 premises, we are taking about a whole system. Since Scripture does not contain any contradictions, we know that if our systematic understanding of the meaning of Scripture contains a contradiction, something must be wrong with it. That does not automatically tell us what it is, but that we have more work to do.

In the end, the only way we know the truth is because we have the Holy Spirit to guide us to that truth. We are always, even in matters of reason, dependent on God.

Originally posted by Paul manata

The person knows it must be a paradox, his misunderstanding, etc., but the presuppositionalist *knows* (on the basis of Divine revelation, which is a precondition for knowing anything at all) that it *can't* be a contradiction.
No, he knows that contradictions do not exist in Scripture because Scripture is true, and contradiction by definition mean one of two statements are false and the other true. What he knows is that if it appears to be a contradiction - then his understanding is flawed. And he does not believe he understands correctly the Scriptures the he thinks mean X and Y.

Originally posted by Paul manata
Lastly, Clark didn't *resolve* the *admitted* paradox by consigning it to God's secret will. You *cannot* resolve it because it's God's *secret* will (He's not told us all, yet). Therefore there are paradoxes in Scripture that you *can't* resolve.

No. It means there are things we don't correct understand. The Scriptures themselves do not contain paradoxes - in no shape our form. Only our understanding of Scripture can contain paradoxes. And the ones we think our paradoxes, we don't believe or embrace. We try to determine what the mistake is because we know there must be a mistake in our understanding. We do not embrace what we have determined can not be true - that both statements are true at the same time.

Originally posted by Paul manata

So, do you reject that God wills and does not will certain things in his secret council? "But how could God will and not will murder." Clark says, "Deut. 29:29"! That's not a resolution, and it's an admission that God wills and not-wills something. Is going to Deut. 29:29, say, fideism? ;) :lol:

I think I missed something. Where do you get the idea that God does not will some to commit murder? He declares that it is a sin for us to murder, but that is not the same thing. And this declaration that we sin when we murder, does not preclude God from willing that we commit murder.

If one says God wills that we obey the law, and God wills that we break the law, this is equivocating on the word will unless you clarify that you are using will in two different ways. One means God commands us not to commit sin. But that is not God's sovereign will. God's will may be different than God's commands. God willed that Judas betray him - but Judas still committed a sin by breaking God's law. He followed God's sovereign will.
 
Originally posted by Paul manata...
Lastly, resolve the whole "Clark Paradox." That is, man AND God both take "the first" step, when "first" implies, well, the first.

God "initiated man;s choices *before* man did. man "initated" the choice *after* God di, yet they *both* took the first step. Must be a Det 29:29 thing.;)

Cake.

There are two different first steps. One is God's when He ""initiated man's choices *before* man did. The other is man's when he "initated" the choice *after* God did." They are both first steps, not the same first step. They have to be different because you said one came "*before*" and the other came "*after*".
 
Originally posted by Paul manata
"God wills X in one sense and wills Y in another."

Well, of course. That's why it's not a real contradiction. (btw, I was talking now about Clark's definition of "choice" as something *initiating* and *determining* an action. God initated and determined it and so did man. Seems paradoxical).

But your answer "resolved" nothing.

If x and y are taught clearly, do you believe, disbelieve, or suspend belief? Sounds like "suspend belief." Thus we see that you'll only believe what your mind can rationalize. Thanks for the admission. I think that is a very important stance for people to see the Clarkians taking.

Of course you must be rationalizing too in order to determine that there is an apparent contradiction to start with. Just to come to that conclusion means you have worked out the logical implications of X and Y and determined that they lead to a contradiction. The only way to say it is an "apparent" contradiction is to claim you don't understand X and Y correctly - because they would not contradict if you did. The only difference with a Clarkian is he admits the implications of "apparent" contradictions, and Vantillians remain irrational by claiming to embrace what he does not.
 
Originally posted by Paul manata
...
Hence we can conclude the debate, i think. You've brought up a good point: What do both camps do with the paradoxes:

VT: Embrace the Bible, embrace the paradox.

Clark: Approach the scriptures agnistically, until man's finite, fallen, and sinful mind can "resolve" the paradox. Who cares if the resolution is correct or not, as long as we have cognitive rest. (I'll have to flesh this out a bit in my own thinking, but this may be because of Clark's commitment to the coherence theory of truth - which has many, many problems (e.g., contradictory systems can be deemed *equally* rational, etc).

[Edited on 5-18-2006 by Paul manata]

Ha! Nice try.

VT: Irrationally embraces paradox (self contradicting) at the cost of understanding Scripture and God's truth. Say's he believes X & Y even though it "appears" that they can not both be true.

GC: Rationally rejects paradox - and uses his God given mind to better understand God's Word by God's grace. Does not add to or take away from Scripture, but admits that an unresolved paradox means X or Y is false and both can not be biblical.

:sing:.
 
Originally posted by Paul manata
"God wills X in one sense and wills Y in another."

...
Seriously, they're not illogical, and I don't see how they have to be. Why, because I know that's it's "in one sense and not another." The problem is, that God has not revealed the different senses. I try to "not go beyond what is written." ;)

The Doctrine of the Trinity is beyond the text.

Here's the thing with using logic and Scripture. What is deducible from true premises is also true (for all times places and people). The WCF speaks of those things that we can know from Scripture by "good and necessary consequences". This is nothing less than logical deduction. Logic is the science of necessary inference.

And so we are to use our God given ability to work out the implications of the Doctrines we hold, to determine if we have any false beliefs. This means we must go beyond the text in order to understand the text correctly, or at least determine where we do not understand the text.

It is irrational to hold to an incoherent system, even if a coherent system is possibly false. The difference is that an incoherent system is certainly false.
 
Paul,

I'll give you a day to reply. I hit a lot of points and I'm sure you wouldn't want to skip any. Of course, you could just concede defeat. :lol:

Anthony
 
I never equivocated.

Of course you did. Let´s review:

You said:

Clark "escaped" the paradox by denying free will.

Indeed, his own account seems paradoxical.

Clark says men are responsible because God says so and who are we to talk back to God.

Sorry, but I don't find asserting a dogmatic position utterly convincing.

I mean, men are free because God says so, who are we to argue with God. Anyone can play that game.

If desire to make the facts fit, no matter what is denied, just so man can have ease in your epistemic life, is your program, I'd say that's rationalism.


Per the above, you affirm that Clark´s denial of free will permits him to escape this never ending paradox of Scripture, which, us regular folk, call a contradiction. Clark´s solution, which, For what it's worth, Robert Reymond repeats in even greater detail and arguably with increasing clarity in his systematic theology, is a repudiation of the notion that a free will, or an undetermined choice, is necessary for a man to be called "œresponsible." Further, implied in your remarks is Clark´s use of Rom. 9:20 to solve this problem that Van Til and his associates tell us has "œbaffled the greatest theologians in history. They assure us; "œ Not even Holy Scripture offers a solution." Read that sentence again Paul. Van Til and Co. deny that even Scripture provides a solution, but Clark, drawing an inference from Scripture (and an argument first raised by Calvin), "œescaped" this Van Tilian so-called "œparadox," much to VT´s chagrin and evidently yours.

But to continue with your equivocation, you might recall this recent post where you ridicule Clark´s denial of free will:

"Man has no free will for salvation is of grace and God is sovereign." RRR p.242

"Man is responsible because God calls him to account; man is responsible because the supreme being can punish him for disobedience." RRR p. 241

In other news, my dog is morally responsible for pooping on the carpet because I can punish him and I call him to account.:lol:


Furthermore, God is sovereign even over your "in a sense" freeness that man has. God is soveriegn *over all.* So, God determines, plans, foreordains that "in a sense" free actions of man.

Still tricky.

Now, if you deny man's freedom (Clark) then you have a tidy resolution, or you can deny God's sovereignty (Arminians) and have a tidy resolution.

Or, you can hold both, historic Calvinism.

Notice, you poke fun at Clark for denying the notion of free will in salvation and for asserting that responsibility, properly defined, implies an authority to which a response must be given. You say it´s "œstill sticky." First, I never thought I would see a "œReformed" man poke fun at the notion that salvation is of the Lord and even the Lord alone. Second, to make fun of Clark´s biblical solution to the problem of God´s sovereignty and man´s responsibility because it rest on the idea that God is ex-lex and is the Lawgiver, belies a lack of understanding of both Scripture and Clark´s argument. Regardless, it is clear from the above that you are using the term free as it applies to the will differently than it has been understood in historic Calvinism, including the Confession chapter nine which you also cite later on. You evidently forgot that the Confession previously asserts; "œGod from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass . . . ." Therefore, while you may have a choice between A, B, and C, your choice, whatever it may be, has been foreordained from all eternity and you will freely choose what God has sovereignly determined you will. Nothing "œsticky" at all. It cannot be otherwise. Further, if you read and understood Clark, he makes it crystal clear that Arminians do not have a "œtidy solution" at all, but, rather, have no solution at all.

Consequently, I think it would have been more accurate, and perhaps a bit less self-revelatory, if you said; "œI don´t think I equivocated."


Regarding choices, I simply said that to "choose" sin freely (free as in Clark's, Confessions, Williamson's term) implies, well, two or more options, or else how is it a choice?

Well, Clark, the Confession and Williamson agree, while men choose between options, their choice can be no other than what God has pre-determined they will choose. Since Clark´s denial of free will in the sense implied by your remarks cited above (otherwise, your ridicule of Clark makes no sense) is that of the Confession and Williamson, then it would follow that Clark has indeed "œescaped the paradox by denying free will." in my opinion your objection rests on your disbelief that God indeed foreordains "œwhatsoever comes to pass," including the where and when of your dog pooping


Regarding "power" to choose, well I can't point that out in the confession but, as Clark says, the confession was not meant to be a technical philosophical treatise. Power can be moral or metaphysical (Clark agrees). Man is not morally able to choose but is metaphysically able. So, you'd have to define what you meant here. At any rate, it wasn't my problem but your lack of knowledge on the subject.

Clark´s solution and view of free will is in complete harmony with the Scriptures and the Confession. in my opinion the disharmony is coming from you. Man is never metaphysically independent in any sense from God in any of his choosing; For in Him we live and move and have our being.

I believe the subsequent posts show the paradox (and even a new paradox in Clark's "answer.") So, sending us to Clark got us involved in more paradox. You can of course *say* that Clark resolved it, just like Jeff says. I, on the other hand, tried to argue for my position. Maybe it's axiomatic that Clark resolved the problem and that's why you think you don't need to argue?;)


It seems to me that you have (unwittingly) vindicated Clark and revealed deficiencies in your own view of the will, which is another subject altogether.

At any rate, make the proper adjustments to your bill.

I already have. But at this point it´s probably smart to ask; will that be Visa, MasterCard, or American Express? ;)
 
Originally posted by Paul manata
I never equivocated, though.

If Clark's position was that of the WCF, et al., then fine.

At worst I misunderstood Clark.

At any rate, though, I've still not seen how he "resolves" anything.

Simply saying man is accountable because God says so, *resolves* nothing. Van Til et al would of course agree with that, but it's trivial.

I still need to pick up Reymond's text, unfortunately.

Fair enough. I confess when I first read "Determinism and Responsibility" I had to read it over and over before I "got it." I did mention that Reymond does a very good job in making Clark's resolution (harmonization) crystal clear and I highly recommend him on this point. I also recommend you read Reymond on the idea of biblical paradox. While not directly addressed, if you don't see the connection between what Reymond says (he has a chapter on the subject) and the Van Tilian nexus in the current justification controversy, let me know. There will be no charge. :D

So:

1) I think my position is clear.

2. I didn't see the paradox resolved.

3) I've shown Van Til is not "irrational" for holding to his view, even if he's wrong.

But if it is possible that you didn't understand Clark, (3) doesn't follow, or at least it is not warranted. Although I do appreciate your devotion.

4) I've brough up some paradoxes that have not been attempted to be resolved.

And some were semantic. That's not to say that there aren't "full bucket" difficulties in Scripture, but I think Jeff is spot on, Van Tilians will "embrace" these difficulties and this embrace of nonsense is held as a sign of Christian piety. Clarkians will say that ignorance, while no sin, is no virtue either. The problem that I see with Van Til and his most able followers, is that they don't see their "embrace" as the equivalent of ignorance. In my mind this is arrogance.

6) I've admitted that God determines the choice man makes, so I've not equivocated.

And I will admit that you have backtracked considerably. While much appreciated, I think you can see by my last post why at least of few of us were led to believe we weren't in agreement on what is meant by a "œfree will."


:handshake:
 
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