You're absolutely right. John Brown gives a clear statement of the view that I have expressed, which in no way contradicts the definition of death as the separation of soul and body.
That line feels a little ironic!
While I appreciate the explanation about what it would take to get us to "indwelling" in post #54, I haven't used the word. I certainly have no objection if you want to critique positions I haven't argued for, but I don't see why I would need to be involved in that process.
Pastor,
All good at my end, but I would like to say a few things.
My interaction with you began when you posted this:
“According to WLC 86, the bodies of believers "even in death continue united to Christ." What is true of the members, in this regard, is also true of the head. The death of Christ involved the separation of human soul and body, not the separation of divine person from human body.”
My initial response was somewhat exhaustive since I wasn’t clear on what you were trying to say. If you were trying to argue something, then it was an invalid argument. Therefore, I’m
sincerely confident you were not trying to argue but merely stating your position, which of course I have no problem with you doing.
You stated four primary premises, none of which were built upon the others. But for an obvious reason you also invoked WLC 86. As I pointed out in various places (more acutely in a post to Lane), WLC 86 isn’t terribly germane given that any appeal to it doesn’t take into account the lack of mystical union the bodies of unbelievers have in the intermediate state. Accordingly, we can’t use it to make a universal anthropological claim. Nor does it save the hypostatic union, which I’ll try to address in more detail below.
Your post entailed:
Believers’ bodies die in Christ
“True for its members” —> Christ’s body died in Christ
Christ’s body and soul were separated in death
The divine person was never separated from his body
If death entails a separation of a
person from his body, then the Second person did not die
if, as you suggest, the divine person was never separated from his body. More specifically, if death entails a
person being separated from his body, then a person with two natures would have to experience both natures (the totality of the person) being separated from his body. If one objects to the conclusion, then he ought to revise the premise regarding the nature of death.
Regardless, such a conclusion that the divine nature was separated from the lifeless corpse hardly undermines the hypostatic union.
The hypostatic union is not so fragile as to depend upon the human body to keep the union of two natures in one person intact. But some here have suggested as much, which is precisely why the mystical union of dead bodies to Christ was introduced through WLC 86.
It’s rather apparent that some here believe that to remain orthodox in our Christology we must maintain: (i) mystical (yet non ontic) union of body and soul in temporal death + (ii) the divine nature unseparated from the body for those three days. In that way, it’s believed we maintain the hypostatic union, hence the appeal to WLC 86, which supposedly establishes how we might keep intact the personhood of created persons (with an exception for the lost). Hence your, “According to WLC 86, the bodies of believers ‘even in death continue united to Christ.’ What is true of the members, in this regard, is also true of the head.”
As I understand your position, the most you can claim is (a)
only Christ’s humanity was separated from his body and the Second Person did not die, or (b) death doesn’t always entail separation of a person from his body.
[Of course (b) is true for those who remain at the time of the second advent. So, we should probably refine (b) to (b*) the intermediate state between death and resurrection doesn’t always entail separation of a person from his body.]
Therefore, your choices are (a) or (*b), not your (c) “Denying the death of a person would certainly be a significant problem. But I haven't made that denial, nor has Tim.”
Your denial of the death of the Second
Person is certainly implicit unless you embrace (*b), or something consistent with (*b). Your position is indeed salvageable, in which case you’d be predicating to the person that which he does only in his humanity.
Your position is that a Person died, but
only in his humanity. My only point from the very beginning has been, it’s not necessary to qualify the Son’s death in that way. Reason being, the whole Person no longer inhabited the body. The corpse was utterly lifeless, lest the body was not an actual corpse. The Son for three days did not perform divine acts through a body. The body was dead because all life, two natures, one person abandon it in the grave. Notwithstanding, no violence was done to the hypostatic union but we maintain the integrity of death.