Presuppositionalism Q&A
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chbrooking
Puritan Board Junior
I asked WHO. You answered WHAT ...
So then, YOU determine what is possible?
You see, I maintain that necessity or contingency is determined by the mind of God. What determines it for you? Whatever it is, it must exist independently of God, which makes it ultimate. Ultimate contingency is precisely what we are telling you this autonomous position yields -- i.e., skepticism.
But you aren't a skeptic. So you can't really be consistent with this notion of free and independent contingency.
So then, YOU determine what is possible?
You see, I maintain that necessity or contingency is determined by the mind of God. What determines it for you? Whatever it is, it must exist independently of God, which makes it ultimate. Ultimate contingency is precisely what we are telling you this autonomous position yields -- i.e., skepticism.
But you aren't a skeptic. So you can't really be consistent with this notion of free and independent contingency.
Brian Bosse
"The Brain"
Hello Gentlemen,
The same person who determined all of the other laws of logic. Who else did you think?
Anything that is not logically incoherent is possible. As such, unicorns, electrons, my computer, a warp drive would all qualify as possible entities. Square circles, married bachelors, etc… would constitute as entities that are not possible. In possible world theory, there is a set of possible worlds. In this set of possible worlds is our actual world. In other words, our actual world is one of many possible worlds. Here are some rough definitions…
Possible World (def.): A world is a possible world if and only if it is logically coherent.
Necessary (def.): ‘X’ is necessary if and only if ‘X’ exists in all possible worlds.
Possible (def.): ‘X’ is possible if and only if ‘X’ exists in at least one possible world.
Ben, in post #87 you said, “Christianity must be true for someone to ask if it can possibly be false.” The only way for this to be true is if Christianity is necessary for rational inquiry. As such, my claim is not false.
Let’s assume that ‘X’ is committed to atheism. Let’s also assume that ‘X’ presupposes the laws of logic. I will even grant that ‘X’ does not have the philosophical foundation to support his presupposition. Nevertheless, ‘X’ is able to properly apply the laws of logic, and when he does he comes up with valid arguments. His use of these laws of logic is no different than your use of them. Both of you will get the same answers if you both properly apply these laws.
‘X’ is able to properly apply the laws of logic and use his imagination even if he is not able to meet some arbitrary requirement that you want to impose.
My pretend atheist friend who happens to be an armchair logician…(What nerve!?! Doesn’t he know that his worldview cannot account for this?)…pointed out to me that premise 3 is a conclusion based on the prior two premises. Since premise 2 is arbitrary, then your conclusion is arbitrary.
My atheist armchair logician friend is telling me that premise 4 is not the contraposition of premise 3. He says that the consequent of premise 3 speaks of “would have to…,” and the antecedent in premise 4 speaks of “able to.” This is more than “getting antsy on the tenses and moods.” Premise 4 should read, “If ‘X’ does not have to prove right now that autonomy is viable…” I tried to convince my atheist friend that he was not allowed to point these things out, but he is so stubborn in his own human autonomy. What is a Christian to do?
I have let you slide on this for several posts now. Let’s clear this up. I know of no worldview called ‘autonomy.’ Now, I know of some worldviews that have as a key feature of their system some type of human autonomy. You need to define what you mean by ‘autonomy’ and ‘human autonomy,’ and then use these terms consistently throughout.
Ouch! There is that pesky ‘can’ versus ‘would’ distinction popping up. Too bad. When you correct your premise 4, then Premise 6 does not follow.
Ben’s Law
I like the fact that you are calling this a given. It goes well with the human autonomy thingy. I remember Bahnsen in a debate with Edward Tabash talking about the silliness of a little child who does not like spinach insisting that because he does not like it, it is not real. This was an illustration Bahnsen used to expose Tabash’s argument as simply being that because Tabash does not like the God of the Old Testament, He therefore cannot be real. Bahnsen was such a good debater. I miss him.
Your premise 7 has a similar form. If 'X' cannot do 'Y', then 'Y' doesn't exist.
We reach the grand conclusion - a conclusion based both on Ben’s Law and a faulty premise 6.
Ben, I really do appreciate you being willing to lay out your argument as explicitly as you did. Not many are willing to do this. In fact, overall I think you did a very good job. I did point out some hic-ups in your argument. If you want to go back through and shore those points up, I would be happy to look at your revised argument.
Warm Regards,
Brian
Clark said:
The same person who determined all of the other laws of logic. Who else did you think?
Anything that is not logically incoherent is possible. As such, unicorns, electrons, my computer, a warp drive would all qualify as possible entities. Square circles, married bachelors, etc… would constitute as entities that are not possible. In possible world theory, there is a set of possible worlds. In this set of possible worlds is our actual world. In other words, our actual world is one of many possible worlds. Here are some rough definitions…
Possible World (def.): A world is a possible world if and only if it is logically coherent.
Necessary (def.): ‘X’ is necessary if and only if ‘X’ exists in all possible worlds.
Possible (def.): ‘X’ is possible if and only if ‘X’ exists in at least one possible world.
Ben, in post #87 you said, “Christianity must be true for someone to ask if it can possibly be false.” The only way for this to be true is if Christianity is necessary for rational inquiry. As such, my claim is not false.
Ben said:
Let’s assume that ‘X’ is committed to atheism. Let’s also assume that ‘X’ presupposes the laws of logic. I will even grant that ‘X’ does not have the philosophical foundation to support his presupposition. Nevertheless, ‘X’ is able to properly apply the laws of logic, and when he does he comes up with valid arguments. His use of these laws of logic is no different than your use of them. Both of you will get the same answers if you both properly apply these laws.
Ben said:
‘X’ is able to properly apply the laws of logic and use his imagination even if he is not able to meet some arbitrary requirement that you want to impose.
Ben said:
My pretend atheist friend who happens to be an armchair logician…(What nerve!?! Doesn’t he know that his worldview cannot account for this?)…pointed out to me that premise 3 is a conclusion based on the prior two premises. Since premise 2 is arbitrary, then your conclusion is arbitrary.
Ben said:
My atheist armchair logician friend is telling me that premise 4 is not the contraposition of premise 3. He says that the consequent of premise 3 speaks of “would have to…,” and the antecedent in premise 4 speaks of “able to.” This is more than “getting antsy on the tenses and moods.” Premise 4 should read, “If ‘X’ does not have to prove right now that autonomy is viable…” I tried to convince my atheist friend that he was not allowed to point these things out, but he is so stubborn in his own human autonomy. What is a Christian to do?
Ben said:
I have let you slide on this for several posts now. Let’s clear this up. I know of no worldview called ‘autonomy.’ Now, I know of some worldviews that have as a key feature of their system some type of human autonomy. You need to define what you mean by ‘autonomy’ and ‘human autonomy,’ and then use these terms consistently throughout.
Ben said:
Ouch! There is that pesky ‘can’ versus ‘would’ distinction popping up. Too bad. When you correct your premise 4, then Premise 6 does not follow.
Ben said:
Ben’s Law I like the fact that you are calling this a given. It goes well with the human autonomy thingy. I remember Bahnsen in a debate with Edward Tabash talking about the silliness of a little child who does not like spinach insisting that because he does not like it, it is not real. This was an illustration Bahnsen used to expose Tabash’s argument as simply being that because Tabash does not like the God of the Old Testament, He therefore cannot be real. Bahnsen was such a good debater. I miss him.
Your premise 7 has a similar form. If 'X' cannot do 'Y', then 'Y' doesn't exist. Ben said:
We reach the grand conclusion - a conclusion based both on
Ben’s Law and a faulty premise 6. Ben said:
Ben, I really do appreciate you being willing to lay out your argument as explicitly as you did. Not many are willing to do this. In fact, overall I think you did a very good job. I did point out some hic-ups in your argument. If you want to go back through and shore those points up, I would be happy to look at your revised argument.
Warm Regards,
Brian
Confessor
Puritan Board Senior
Ahh!!! This is becoming a snippet-reply-repeat type of thread. We must avoid this at all costs. 
Oh, and in your next reply, if you would drop all the "my atheist friend" commentary, I'd appreciate it. I don't mean that sarcastically; but when I am confronted with sarcastic replies to my own arguments, I generally get angry. I'm not saying it's a righteous anger, but I nonetheless would appreciate it if as a brother in Christ you heeded my request.
But let's get down to business:
-Premise 2 is not arbitrary. A claim involving an autonomous notion of possibility would require dealing with the contradictions of autonomy. (I realize you would dispute a difference between a Christian notion of possibility and an autonomous one; I will answer that at the end, as I think that is the main issue here. (I also think we are approaching agreement.))
-There really isn't a problem with premises 3 and 4, for the consequent of 3 can easily be " 'X' must be able to prove that autonomy is viable," in wh
-I apologize for not defining "autonomy" before. I figured you were familiar with it. Autonomy is essentially the belief that man has the prerogative to interpret reality, to self-consciously construct a philosophy or worldview. This is a common feature to all worldviews not based on revelation (for submission to revelation is a belief that someone else has the prerogative to interpret reality).
-I'm not sure that premise 7 is "Ben's law" (because I don't see what it has to do with sincerity), but anyway...yeah, you're right. I spoke of 'X' as if that comprised the totality of rational beings, which is simply false -- the apologist only deals with one unbeliever (usually) at a time, and it's far from a guarantee that this one person is the "ideal" rational being who would know of all possible worldviews. I'm not sure why I would say something so wrong.
Now for the important part:
There is one big thing here: the definition of "necessity"/"possibility." (This issue here affects my error in premise 7, I think.) I wrote out a two-person dialogue to help me understand these problems (you can skip the parts about autonomy and the small universe if you want):
(1) Can one speak of what is possible as what is conceivable and non-contradictory?
(2) Yes, that is the definition.
(1) Therefore, if I were to say that a non-Christian worldview is possible, I must show that it is conceivable and non-contradictory?
(2) Correct.
(1) Okay, I guess that would imply that autonomy is out of the question, then.
(2) Not necessarily, for the universe could be quite a different one where each person knows the whole universe. Imagine a “universe” created by a god which was immensely small (the size of one room). This universe contained one man, and exhaustive knowledge of this room was granted to the man by the creator. Autonomy would therefore be perfectly viable.
(1) Ah, but in that case autonomy would not have an accompanying metaphysic of Chance, for there would be nothing unknown to the human. And in such a case, it wouldn’t really be autonomy, for man would become God (for he would have exhaustively comprehensive and intuitive knowledge of God), which is contrary to the essence of autonomy -- and it'd be impossible to have more than one god.
(2) Good point. I guess autonomy, as already defined, is truly impossible. For one to be able to appropriately interpret reality, one must be omniscient, and therefore one must be divine—in which case it’s not autonomy at all.
(1) Exactly. Now, the only hindrance at this point would be another revealed religion. Can another revealed religion be considered conceivable and non-contradictory?
(2) I can conceive that a revelation exists which is identical to the Bible except in having a slight variation, perhaps the omission or addition of a verse or a chapter, or even a book. In such a case we would have a different presupposition that would not be the distinctly Christian God.
(1) I would have to agree with that: it is certainly conceivable that a mild alteration could be made in a revealed worldview that would allow for the possibility of a non-Christian presupposition. Therefore it would follow that Christianity is not absolutely necessary.
(2) True, but such a revealed religion does not exist on Earth, and if it did, we would know nothing about it: it could be buried in some unknown depths of history. Of course, this does not make much sense with a sovereign deity, but it could be nevertheless possible.
(1) But for all intents and purposes, as long as the apologist can defeat autonomy and every revealed religion that unbelievers can offer, then all unbelievers who come into contact with the apologist's arguments are rationally obliged to take Christianity, correct?
(2) Yes. He just has to ensure that he does not overstate his case and claim to defeat worldviews that the unbeliever does not claim for himself. That is unnecessary and can be unprovable, as with the case of possible revealed religions. (Note here my agreement with you.)
(1) Perfect. How then should the apologist state his case? Should he just claim that his worldview is tenable and that he doubts the unbeliever's worldview is tenable?
(2) That would seem appropriate.
(1) Awesome. But I have one last question: what do we make of the fact that Jehovah is the one who makes things possible? Van Til repudiated any probabilistic argument for God because according to him, God was "back of" possibility; possibility was not "back of" God. He asserted that the notion of fate or possibility as ultimate is a pagan notion and should be resisted by Christians.
(2) I have no idea, unnamed person 1. Let's ask Brian.
So, Brian, if you could answer number 1's question, I'd appreciate it. You can also provide commentary on my schizophrenic thought process outlined in the dialogue above.
Thank you for your critiques, and good night.
BEN HAS SPOKEN
-----Added 6/23/2009 at 01:37:49 EST-----
I have a feeling this thread might be of some importance.
Good night furrealz this time.
Oh, and in your next reply, if you would drop all the "my atheist friend" commentary, I'd appreciate it. I don't mean that sarcastically; but when I am confronted with sarcastic replies to my own arguments, I generally get angry. I'm not saying it's a righteous anger, but I nonetheless would appreciate it if as a brother in Christ you heeded my request.
But let's get down to business:
-Premise 2 is not arbitrary. A claim involving an autonomous notion of possibility would require dealing with the contradictions of autonomy. (I realize you would dispute a difference between a Christian notion of possibility and an autonomous one; I will answer that at the end, as I think that is the main issue here. (I also think we are approaching agreement.))
-There really isn't a problem with premises 3 and 4, for the consequent of 3 can easily be " 'X' must be able to prove that autonomy is viable," in wh
-I apologize for not defining "autonomy" before. I figured you were familiar with it. Autonomy is essentially the belief that man has the prerogative to interpret reality, to self-consciously construct a philosophy or worldview. This is a common feature to all worldviews not based on revelation (for submission to revelation is a belief that someone else has the prerogative to interpret reality).
-I'm not sure that premise 7 is "Ben's law" (because I don't see what it has to do with sincerity), but anyway...yeah, you're right. I spoke of 'X' as if that comprised the totality of rational beings, which is simply false -- the apologist only deals with one unbeliever (usually) at a time, and it's far from a guarantee that this one person is the "ideal" rational being who would know of all possible worldviews. I'm not sure why I would say something so wrong.
Now for the important part:
There is one big thing here: the definition of "necessity"/"possibility." (This issue here affects my error in premise 7, I think.) I wrote out a two-person dialogue to help me understand these problems (you can skip the parts about autonomy and the small universe if you want):
(1) Can one speak of what is possible as what is conceivable and non-contradictory?
(2) Yes, that is the definition.
(1) Therefore, if I were to say that a non-Christian worldview is possible, I must show that it is conceivable and non-contradictory?
(2) Correct.
(1) Okay, I guess that would imply that autonomy is out of the question, then.
(2) Not necessarily, for the universe could be quite a different one where each person knows the whole universe. Imagine a “universe” created by a god which was immensely small (the size of one room). This universe contained one man, and exhaustive knowledge of this room was granted to the man by the creator. Autonomy would therefore be perfectly viable.
(1) Ah, but in that case autonomy would not have an accompanying metaphysic of Chance, for there would be nothing unknown to the human. And in such a case, it wouldn’t really be autonomy, for man would become God (for he would have exhaustively comprehensive and intuitive knowledge of God), which is contrary to the essence of autonomy -- and it'd be impossible to have more than one god.
(2) Good point. I guess autonomy, as already defined, is truly impossible. For one to be able to appropriately interpret reality, one must be omniscient, and therefore one must be divine—in which case it’s not autonomy at all.
(1) Exactly. Now, the only hindrance at this point would be another revealed religion. Can another revealed religion be considered conceivable and non-contradictory?
(2) I can conceive that a revelation exists which is identical to the Bible except in having a slight variation, perhaps the omission or addition of a verse or a chapter, or even a book. In such a case we would have a different presupposition that would not be the distinctly Christian God.
(1) I would have to agree with that: it is certainly conceivable that a mild alteration could be made in a revealed worldview that would allow for the possibility of a non-Christian presupposition. Therefore it would follow that Christianity is not absolutely necessary.
(2) True, but such a revealed religion does not exist on Earth, and if it did, we would know nothing about it: it could be buried in some unknown depths of history. Of course, this does not make much sense with a sovereign deity, but it could be nevertheless possible.
(1) But for all intents and purposes, as long as the apologist can defeat autonomy and every revealed religion that unbelievers can offer, then all unbelievers who come into contact with the apologist's arguments are rationally obliged to take Christianity, correct?
(2) Yes. He just has to ensure that he does not overstate his case and claim to defeat worldviews that the unbeliever does not claim for himself. That is unnecessary and can be unprovable, as with the case of possible revealed religions. (Note here my agreement with you.)
(1) Perfect. How then should the apologist state his case? Should he just claim that his worldview is tenable and that he doubts the unbeliever's worldview is tenable?
(2) That would seem appropriate.
(1) Awesome. But I have one last question: what do we make of the fact that Jehovah is the one who makes things possible? Van Til repudiated any probabilistic argument for God because according to him, God was "back of" possibility; possibility was not "back of" God. He asserted that the notion of fate or possibility as ultimate is a pagan notion and should be resisted by Christians.
(2) I have no idea, unnamed person 1. Let's ask Brian.
So, Brian, if you could answer number 1's question, I'd appreciate it. You can also provide commentary on my schizophrenic thought process outlined in the dialogue above.
Thank you for your critiques, and good night.BEN HAS SPOKEN-----Added 6/23/2009 at 01:37:49 EST-----
I have a feeling this thread might be of some importance.
Good night furrealz this time.
chbrooking
Puritan Board Junior
Clark said:
The same person who determined all of the other laws of logic. Who else did you think?
Anything that is not logically incoherent is possible. As such, unicorns, electrons, my computer, a warp drive would all qualify as possible entities. Square circles, married bachelors, etc… would constitute as entities that are not possible. In possible world theory, there is a set of possible worlds. In this set of possible worlds is our actual world. In other words, our actual world is one of many possible worlds.
I'm assuming by your answer, that God is the one who determines what is possible. So why, then, to you go on to determine it by rational consistency? Are you identifying God with rational consistency?...HUMAN rational consistency? Are you putting an equal sign between human logic and God's being? THIS is why it is so essential that we recognize a qualitative distinction between God's knowledge and ours. And this is why divine simplicity is crucial. You cannot abstract God's rationality and then set it over against his existence.
The moment you say "God" in answer to my question, I'm going to make sure that you mean the Christian God, since no other conception of deity accounts for the preconditions of even asking, let alone answering the question. But if, as I think is the case, the Christian God determines what is possible, that which is possible is coterminus with his eternal decree. And by that decree he determines whatsoever comes to pass. So, tell me again what the definition of a possible world is? ... Your definition of possibility does not make sense against a Christian worldview, and yet you need the Christian worldview to offer your definition. My friend, you are not being consistent here.
To be clear, possible world theory itself is an autonomous affront to the living God.
Brian Bosse
"The Brain"
Hello Gentlemen,
Ben, please forgive me. I should not have done this, and will refrain from it in the future. The point I was trying to drive home with my rude sarcasim was that an atheist (or anyone for that matter) can properly use the laws of logic bringing valid arguments to the table even though his worldview may not provide the philosophical foundation for such thinking. As such, it is not rational to ignore his arguments just because he does not have a philosophical foundation to present those arguments. The validity of an argument is independent of the person bringing the argument. Now onto other things.
Because we make so many mistakes in our thinking, it is vital for us to be as precise as possible. The contrapositive of (A → B) is (¬B → ¬A). If one begins to introduce stylistic variances in his interpretation of these symbols he may do so, but he must be very careful that he don’t actually change the meaning in the least. With that in mind, here is your premise 3…
If 'X' asserts that there is a possible worldview that might provide appropriate epistemic preconditions without already having a viable worldview, then 'X' would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable.
A=“‘X’ asserts that there is a possible worldview that might provide appropriate epistemic preconditions without already having a viable worldview.”
B=“'X' would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable.”
Before applying any stylistic variants, the contrapositive of premise 3 (¬B → ¬A) is the following:
If it is not the case that ‘X’ would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable, then it is not the case that ‘X’ asserts that there is a possible worldview that might provide appropriate epistemic preconditions without already having a viable worldview.
Now, take a look at the consequent of our conditional statement. The consequent is an action performed by ‘X’; namely, the act of asserting some proposition. What you are saying in this premise is that ‘X’ does not perform this act unless ‘X’ would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable. But this is absurd. Whether or not ‘X’ asserts a proposition is not tied to ‘X’s ability to prove anything. ‘X’ asserts a proposition by an act of his will. What are the consequences of this? Because this premise is logically equivalent to your premise 3, and because premise 3 is the logical conclusion of premises 1 and 2, then premise 1, premise 2 or both are false.
Here are some thoughts on your conversation…
I am going to remain neutral to the proposition above. However, I want to point out that it is the Christian who asserts that their worldview is necessary. As such, if the Christiain wants to take this beyond mere assertion it is the Christian’s obligation to demonstrate that all non-Christian worldviews are not possible. In other words, if you assert that Christianity is necessary and someone asks you about a potential competitor, (1) to simply say they have no basis to ask this, or (2) to simply say “prove to me that this competitor is possible” is not intellectually honest and is not proof. You should be giving an answer for why the competing worldview is not possible.
Ben, you have a lot in your last post that I want to be sure to cover. However, I think it would be better to take smaller chuncks. As such, I am going to stop here and let you comment on what I have written.
By the way, I loved the Ben Has Spoken . 
The logic of necessity and possibility is like the logic of the syllogism or propositional calculus. They are codifications of rational thought. I believe these codifications come from God. I believe these logics reflect the rationality of God’s mind. So, in this sense it is God who determines what is possible. These models of logic reflect His thinking.
Is it God or man who determines the validity of an argument? If God is the one who determines the validity of an argument, then why do you assume argument forms like Modus Ponens and the syllogism to determine whether or not an argument is valid? My point is this: there is nothing wrong or unChristian with using the rational tools God has given us to draw conclusions about validity and/or possibility.
I am not quite sure where you are going with this (sounds like you want to resurrect the Clark-Van Til debate), but I will answer this. Simply put, the laws of logic are our attempts to create a model of rationality that we think reflects the thinking of God. It is possible that our models are flawed in various ways. But that is the human condition. By the same token, I think our models do in some way accurately reflect the way God thinks. In the end, we have two tools for truth: revelation, and our rationality. We need both - one of which is flawed.
I meant the triune-God of Christianity. However, there remains the pesky quadrinity that seemingly accounts for the preconditions of rational inquiry.
Clark, are you willing to say that God had to create the earth as it actually is? Are you willing to say that all of God’s actions are determined? If so, then there is only one possible world, i.e., our actual world. If you are not willing to say this, and God could have created something different, then that different creation would be a possible world. This latter situation where God could have created something different is considered the orthodox position – but I am sure you were already aware of this - and justifies the logic of necessity and possibilty.
If the orthodox position regarding God’s freedom in creation is correct, then the model of the logic of necessity and possibility is consistent with the Christian worldview.
Sincerely,
Brian
Ben said:
Ben, please forgive me. I should not have done this, and will refrain from it in the future. The point I was trying to drive home with my rude sarcasim was that an atheist (or anyone for that matter) can properly use the laws of logic bringing valid arguments to the table even though his worldview may not provide the philosophical foundation for such thinking. As such, it is not rational to ignore his arguments just because he does not have a philosophical foundation to present those arguments. The validity of an argument is independent of the person bringing the argument. Now onto other things.
Because we make so many mistakes in our thinking, it is vital for us to be as precise as possible. The contrapositive of (A → B) is (¬B → ¬A). If one begins to introduce stylistic variances in his interpretation of these symbols he may do so, but he must be very careful that he don’t actually change the meaning in the least. With that in mind, here is your premise 3…
If 'X' asserts that there is a possible worldview that might provide appropriate epistemic preconditions without already having a viable worldview, then 'X' would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable.
A=“‘X’ asserts that there is a possible worldview that might provide appropriate epistemic preconditions without already having a viable worldview.”
B=“'X' would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable.”
Before applying any stylistic variants, the contrapositive of premise 3 (¬B → ¬A) is the following:
If it is not the case that ‘X’ would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable, then it is not the case that ‘X’ asserts that there is a possible worldview that might provide appropriate epistemic preconditions without already having a viable worldview.
Now, take a look at the consequent of our conditional statement. The consequent is an action performed by ‘X’; namely, the act of asserting some proposition. What you are saying in this premise is that ‘X’ does not perform this act unless ‘X’ would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable. But this is absurd. Whether or not ‘X’ asserts a proposition is not tied to ‘X’s ability to prove anything. ‘X’ asserts a proposition by an act of his will. What are the consequences of this? Because this premise is logically equivalent to your premise 3, and because premise 3 is the logical conclusion of premises 1 and 2, then premise 1, premise 2 or both are false.
Here are some thoughts on your conversation…
Ben said:
I am going to remain neutral to the proposition above. However, I want to point out that it is the Christian who asserts that their worldview is necessary. As such, if the Christiain wants to take this beyond mere assertion it is the Christian’s obligation to demonstrate that all non-Christian worldviews are not possible. In other words, if you assert that Christianity is necessary and someone asks you about a potential competitor, (1) to simply say they have no basis to ask this, or (2) to simply say “prove to me that this competitor is possible” is not intellectually honest and is not proof. You should be giving an answer for why the competing worldview is not possible.
Ben, you have a lot in your last post that I want to be sure to cover. However, I think it would be better to take smaller chuncks. As such, I am going to stop here and let you comment on what I have written.
By the way, I loved the
Ben Has Spoken . Clark said:
The logic of necessity and possibility is like the logic of the syllogism or propositional calculus. They are codifications of rational thought. I believe these codifications come from God. I believe these logics reflect the rationality of God’s mind. So, in this sense it is God who determines what is possible. These models of logic reflect His thinking.
Clark said:
Is it God or man who determines the validity of an argument? If God is the one who determines the validity of an argument, then why do you assume argument forms like Modus Ponens and the syllogism to determine whether or not an argument is valid? My point is this: there is nothing wrong or unChristian with using the rational tools God has given us to draw conclusions about validity and/or possibility.
Clark said:
I am not quite sure where you are going with this (sounds like you want to resurrect the Clark-Van Til debate), but I will answer this. Simply put, the laws of logic are our attempts to create a model of rationality that we think reflects the thinking of God. It is possible that our models are flawed in various ways. But that is the human condition. By the same token, I think our models do in some way accurately reflect the way God thinks. In the end, we have two tools for truth: revelation, and our rationality. We need both - one of which is flawed.
Clark said:
I meant the triune-God of Christianity. However, there remains the pesky quadrinity that seemingly accounts for the preconditions of rational inquiry.
Clark said:
Clark, are you willing to say that God had to create the earth as it actually is? Are you willing to say that all of God’s actions are determined? If so, then there is only one possible world, i.e., our actual world. If you are not willing to say this, and God could have created something different, then that different creation would be a possible world. This latter situation where God could have created something different is considered the orthodox position – but I am sure you were already aware of this - and justifies the logic of necessity and possibilty.
Clark said:
If the orthodox position regarding God’s freedom in creation is correct, then the model of the logic of necessity and possibility is consistent with the Christian worldview.
Sincerely,
Brian
ChristianTrader
Puritan Board Graduate
Clark said:
The same person who determined all of the other laws of logic. Who else did you think?
Anything that is not logically incoherent is possible. As such, unicorns, electrons, my computer, a warp drive would all qualify as possible entities. Square circles, married bachelors, etc… would constitute as entities that are not possible. In possible world theory, there is a set of possible worlds. In this set of possible worlds is our actual world. In other words, our actual world is one of many possible worlds.
I'm assuming by your answer, that God is the one who determines what is possible. So why, then, to you go on to determine it by rational consistency? Are you identifying God with rational consistency?...HUMAN rational consistency? Are you putting an equal sign between human logic and God's being? THIS is why it is so essential that we recognize a qualitative distinction between God's knowledge and ours. And this is why divine simplicity is crucial. You cannot abstract God's rationality and then set it over against his existence.
The moment you say "God" in answer to my question, I'm going to make sure that you mean the Christian God, since no other conception of deity accounts for the preconditions of even asking, let alone answering the question. But if, as I think is the case, the Christian God determines what is possible, that which is possible is coterminus with his eternal decree. And by that decree he determines whatsoever comes to pass. So, tell me again what the definition of a possible world is? ... Your definition of possibility does not make sense against a Christian worldview, and yet you need the Christian worldview to offer your definition. My friend, you are not being consistent here.
To be clear, possible world theory itself is an autonomous affront to the living God.
The problem with creating a gap between human rationality and God's rationality is that eventually you will want to refute someone else's view of God. You will want to say that "such and such is a contradiction and irrational etc." and the response is just "God is higher and has a different rationality than we do".
Even if you want to say that God determine possibility etc. you still need a framework in which to understand what He is telling you and be able to refute erroneous views.
CT
Confessor
Puritan Board Senior
Brian,
Although I think I could offer a stylistic modification of premise 3 to retain that part of the argument, the syllogism still breaks down at a more crucial point (premise 7), rendering the argument as a whole invalid. Therefore, since I see the issue of necessity and possibility within the confines of a Christian worldview as most important, I will deal only with that and with the feedback you provided thus far for the dialogue.
However, I right now am going to do some yardwork, so I'll respond later. Thanks for giving me food for thought during my boring job!
Although I think I could offer a stylistic modification of premise 3 to retain that part of the argument, the syllogism still breaks down at a more crucial point (premise 7), rendering the argument as a whole invalid. Therefore, since I see the issue of necessity and possibility within the confines of a Christian worldview as most important, I will deal only with that and with the feedback you provided thus far for the dialogue.
However, I right now am going to do some yardwork, so I'll respond later. Thanks for giving me food for thought during my boring job!
Brian Bosse
"The Brain"
Hello CT and Ben
I appreciate your observation. This relates to my problem with Van Til's "apparent contradictions". If one is allowed to appeal to this within their worldview, then pandora's box is left wide open. By the same token, I do want to acknowledge that my mind is finite and effected by sin, and as such my judgments are not perfect. If Scripture clearly asserts something that I deem inconsistent, then because of my view of Scripture I will embrace it believing that in God's mind there is no contradiction. I guess Pandora's box is left open afterall. I once cooresponded with Frame about this. He is a gracious man.
No problem, Ben. I might not be able to post anything more until tomorrow. So, take your time.
Brian
CT said:
I appreciate your observation. This relates to my problem with Van Til's "apparent contradictions". If one is allowed to appeal to this within their worldview, then pandora's box is left wide open. By the same token, I do want to acknowledge that my mind is finite and effected by sin, and as such my judgments are not perfect. If Scripture clearly asserts something that I deem inconsistent, then because of my view of Scripture I will embrace it believing that in God's mind there is no contradiction. I guess Pandora's box is left open afterall. I once cooresponded with Frame about this. He is a gracious man.
Ben said:
No problem, Ben. I might not be able to post anything more until tomorrow. So, take your time.
Brian
chbrooking
Puritan Board Junior
Brian said:
Agreed so far
Brian said:
The difference is that I recognize my limitations. The only reason I have for reasoning at all is the Christian God. This is where CVT's illustration of the little girl on her grand-dad's lap comes from. If she slaps his face, it is only because he holds her up. The idea that we can use an analogue of God's thinking to destroy the ontological foundation of our analogous epistemology is ludicrous.
Yes, the Clark-Van Til debate is relevant here. If you concede that our models are flawed, and you concede that only God can determine what is possible, it is an extreme form of hubris to use a potentially flawed system to rule out, with a potentially flawed possibility, what we have already determined was a perfect necessity. In other words, you could not offer a potential other world except on the foundation of God's revelation.
But it doesn't. In fact, there's no such thing as quadrinity. The only reason it has been proposed is because people recognize the gravity of the TAG, and want to cop just enough of the system to get the tools to destroy the system. If that's not analogous to Van Til's little girl on her grandfather's lap, I don't know what is. But until Quadrinity meets the requirements to be taken seriously as anything but an autonomous speculation, it shouldn't raise its head again. Autonomy leads to skepticism. So Quadrinity leads to skepticism unless and until it can be shown to be theonomous, and even then it will need to meet the preconditions of intelligibility -- but we've gone over this.
Brian said:
Yes, but by that "had to" I do NOT mean that there was some principle existing apart from God which had authority over him such that he was forced to obey it. I have no problem saying that God CANNOT lie. Why? Because that is out of accord with who he is. God is not duplicitous. So, YES, there is only one possible world. And it is the best possible world. How do I know? Because God doesn't make mistakes or settle for second best. How do I know? Because he has revealed himself to us.
brian said:
God being free has nothing to do with this. I am fully persuaded of God's aseity. He did not have to create anything whatsoever. But the moment you appeal to this to prove possibilities of alternative worlds, you make a huge mistake. Any such possible worlds would ONLY have their potentiality in the mind of God. They do not then get separated from God's being such that they can stand opposed to him. This is why simplicity is crucial. You continue to try to use God's rationality against him, as though it stood as a co-ultimate. But as gets demonstrated over and over again in this discussion, if logic is ultimate (and apart from God), then God is no longer ultimate. God is not God. There cannot be two ultimates.
Clark, I think that when we speak of possible worlds, we are speaking of worlds that it is possible that God could have (or has--God knows, He may have created them) created.
I also think we need to define "intelligibility", which I have always understood as being, "the quality of being able to be understood by a rational being." As such, anything that is able to be articulated is intelligible. The idea of a spherical cube is intelligible, if it were not, we would not immediately understand that such a figure is impossible.
"Twas brillig and the slithey toves did gyre and gymbol in the wabe."--this sentence is logical, but unintelligible, because we do not understand it. We have no notion here of whether slithey toves can gyre or gymbol because the terms are nonsense (though delightful nonsense--nonsense has its proper place in the created order, I think).
And I would argue that logic is ultimate because it is part and parcel of God's nature.
Here you assume that God could not have created multiple worlds that are equally good. God created man both male and female--difference in character does not entail difference in quality. It is certainly possible that other worlds have been created and we have simply not been told about them.
Question: are Christian writers of fantasy and sci-fi novels blaspheming (regardless of inclusion of magic)? Is P&R publishing sinning when it publishes L. B. Graham's fantasy novels? If no, then it must be admitted that possible worlds are permissible within the sphere of Christian orthodoxy.
I also think we need to define "intelligibility", which I have always understood as being, "the quality of being able to be understood by a rational being." As such, anything that is able to be articulated is intelligible. The idea of a spherical cube is intelligible, if it were not, we would not immediately understand that such a figure is impossible.
"Twas brillig and the slithey toves did gyre and gymbol in the wabe."--this sentence is logical, but unintelligible, because we do not understand it. We have no notion here of whether slithey toves can gyre or gymbol because the terms are nonsense (though delightful nonsense--nonsense has its proper place in the created order, I think).
And I would argue that logic is ultimate because it is part and parcel of God's nature.
chbrooking said:
Here you assume that God could not have created multiple worlds that are equally good. God created man both male and female--difference in character does not entail difference in quality. It is certainly possible that other worlds have been created and we have simply not been told about them.
Question: are Christian writers of fantasy and sci-fi novels blaspheming (regardless of inclusion of magic)? Is P&R publishing sinning when it publishes L. B. Graham's fantasy novels? If no, then it must be admitted that possible worlds are permissible within the sphere of Christian orthodoxy.
Brian Bosse
"The Brain"
Hello Clark!
Earlier you accused me of not being consistent. I do make that mistake from time to time. In light of this, consider this latest exchange between me and you…
It appears from this that you are saying that creation was necessary. In fact, you even claimed that this was revealed to you on the basis that “God does not make mistakes or settle for second best.” This is an interesting argument that will be fun to get into, but I digress. In the very next paragraph you say…
This seems to contradict what you said before. Can you clarify matters for me? By the way, you might want to consider this quote from Thomas V. Morris’ Our Idea of God...
Do you affirm or deny this?
Lastly, Clark, do you have a proof that establishes the necessity of the Christian worldview for rational inquiry, or are you just asserting it? If you do, can you explicitly lay out the argument step-by-step for all to see? Note: My request does not question the truth of the assertion itself. My question has to do with the basis upon which you hold this assertion to be true. My guess is that you want to say that the basis upon which you hold your assertion to be true is objective and certain. Let’s see.
Brian
Earlier you accused me of not being consistent. I do make that mistake from time to time. In light of this, consider this latest exchange between me and you…
Brian said:
Clark said:
It appears from this that you are saying that creation was necessary. In fact, you even claimed that this was revealed to you on the basis that “God does not make mistakes or settle for second best.” This is an interesting argument that will be fun to get into, but I digress. In the very next paragraph you say…
Clark said:
This seems to contradict what you said before. Can you clarify matters for me? By the way, you might want to consider this quote from Thomas V. Morris’ Our Idea of God...
Do you affirm or deny this?
Lastly, Clark, do you have a proof that establishes the necessity of the Christian worldview for rational inquiry, or are you just asserting it? If you do, can you explicitly lay out the argument step-by-step for all to see? Note: My request does not question the truth of the assertion itself. My question has to do with the basis upon which you hold this assertion to be true. My guess is that you want to say that the basis upon which you hold your assertion to be true is objective and certain. Let’s see.
Brian
chbrooking
Puritan Board Junior
Philip,
To articulate anything requires that the diversity about us be unifiable. That unity is only accounted for by Christian theism.
Brian and Philip,
There is no such thing as bare possibility. I spoke too fast in ruling out possible worlds. I'm certainly not suggesting that fantasy literature is sinful. And I would have to admit that our ability to fantasize is an analogue of something in God's thinking. And, given the CONSEQUENT of consequent absolute necessity, I suppose speculation of what might have been is permissible. But, be that as it may, there is no such thing as bare possibility. Possibility, as a fact, has God as its interpreter.
This is where the Clark-Van Til debate really matters. As you admit, God determines what is possible. But my access to that notion of possibility is analogical. Possibility itself resides in the mind of God. We cannot abstract the notion of possibility, assume that our analogue, itself, has aseity, and use that notion -- which we only have BECAUSE of Christian theism -- and which notion is not equivalent to possibility as thought by God--, to rule out Christian theism. Why is that difficult to understand?
What I'm saying is that you can't just posit something as truly, ontologically possible, simply because it doesn't conflict with human language. And the reason is simple. YOU don't determine what is, or is not, possible. God does. And since God is incomprehensible, you are stuck with what he reveals. And as the scriptures plainly declare, he reveals himself in THIS world.
Beware of the sin of Babel. Man, since the fall, has never been content with the finite. He has always attempted to go beyond his appointed realm. Once you start saying that because you can think it, and it doesn't conflict with your reason, therefore it is possible, you usurp what belongs to God alone. You cannot start with the statement, "The God of Christian theism determines what is possible" and end with the statement, "A quadrinity is possible."
Let me be as clear as 'possible': God could not destroy himself. God could not create a world in which he doesn't exist. God could not create another God to take his place. How, then, does your notion of 'possible worlds' make Christianity anything BUT necessarily true?
-----Added 6/23/2009 at 09:43:36 EST-----
sigh ...
We aren't saying that logic or science or language isn't true or useful. We're saying that, if you reject Christian theism, you have no reason to expect it to be true or useful.
God's rationality is to ours as time is to eternity, or as space is to omnipotence, or as ability is to omnipotence. It is infinite, ours is finite. But without the infinite version, the finite version has no reason for confidence. I can speak of "dogs", because the unifying concept -- the perfect unifying concept, which not only includes all that fit within the category dog, but relates each individual to every other individual and the whole -- I can speak of dogs because that unifying concept exists in the mind of God. I can speak truly of dogs, but not exhaustively. Humility ought to be inherent in finite beings. Since the garden, it hasn't been.
But again, I'm not saying "God has a higher, different logic, so human logic is all wrong and can't be relied upon." Quite the contrary. I'm saying that human reason is a true reflection of God's thought. But two things need to be quickly added. A) it's finite, and therefore cannot delve into the infinite -- that's not its realm. And B) we're fallen. We cannot run rough shod with our minds and think that we will arrive at truth. We need the scriptures to teach us (and to limit our idle speculations).
To articulate anything requires that the diversity about us be unifiable. That unity is only accounted for by Christian theism.
Brian and Philip,
There is no such thing as bare possibility. I spoke too fast in ruling out possible worlds. I'm certainly not suggesting that fantasy literature is sinful. And I would have to admit that our ability to fantasize is an analogue of something in God's thinking. And, given the CONSEQUENT of consequent absolute necessity, I suppose speculation of what might have been is permissible. But, be that as it may, there is no such thing as bare possibility. Possibility, as a fact, has God as its interpreter.
This is where the Clark-Van Til debate really matters. As you admit, God determines what is possible. But my access to that notion of possibility is analogical. Possibility itself resides in the mind of God. We cannot abstract the notion of possibility, assume that our analogue, itself, has aseity, and use that notion -- which we only have BECAUSE of Christian theism -- and which notion is not equivalent to possibility as thought by God--, to rule out Christian theism. Why is that difficult to understand?
What I'm saying is that you can't just posit something as truly, ontologically possible, simply because it doesn't conflict with human language. And the reason is simple. YOU don't determine what is, or is not, possible. God does. And since God is incomprehensible, you are stuck with what he reveals. And as the scriptures plainly declare, he reveals himself in THIS world.
Beware of the sin of Babel. Man, since the fall, has never been content with the finite. He has always attempted to go beyond his appointed realm. Once you start saying that because you can think it, and it doesn't conflict with your reason, therefore it is possible, you usurp what belongs to God alone. You cannot start with the statement, "The God of Christian theism determines what is possible" and end with the statement, "A quadrinity is possible."
Let me be as clear as 'possible': God could not destroy himself. God could not create a world in which he doesn't exist. God could not create another God to take his place. How, then, does your notion of 'possible worlds' make Christianity anything BUT necessarily true?
-----Added 6/23/2009 at 09:43:36 EST-----
sigh ...
We aren't saying that logic or science or language isn't true or useful. We're saying that, if you reject Christian theism, you have no reason to expect it to be true or useful.
God's rationality is to ours as time is to eternity, or as space is to omnipotence, or as ability is to omnipotence. It is infinite, ours is finite. But without the infinite version, the finite version has no reason for confidence. I can speak of "dogs", because the unifying concept -- the perfect unifying concept, which not only includes all that fit within the category dog, but relates each individual to every other individual and the whole -- I can speak of dogs because that unifying concept exists in the mind of God. I can speak truly of dogs, but not exhaustively. Humility ought to be inherent in finite beings. Since the garden, it hasn't been.
But again, I'm not saying "God has a higher, different logic, so human logic is all wrong and can't be relied upon." Quite the contrary. I'm saying that human reason is a true reflection of God's thought. But two things need to be quickly added. A) it's finite, and therefore cannot delve into the infinite -- that's not its realm. And B) we're fallen. We cannot run rough shod with our minds and think that we will arrive at truth. We need the scriptures to teach us (and to limit our idle speculations).
chbrooking said:
How is this different from Platonism again? This is exactly what Plato taught.
I would argue that our hypothetical quatrinitarian worldview might be able to account for it. Many things may be able to account for the world around us. The question is whether or not they actually correspond to the world around us.
You see, here's where classical apologetics starts: we say, look we have diversity and yet there is a unity--might there be a more reasonable explanation than the one that the unbeliever has posited? In fact, this reality corresponds to Christian theism, especially in the doctrine of the trinity. In other words, we try to build on truths that the unbeliever is already aware of and we show how they point toward the True Truth of Christianity (and you can't deny that general revelation does point toward it).
So your point is that we really have no knowledge of possibility whatsoever. In fact, though, I do have knowledge of possibility--just not infinite knowledge. My knowledge of possibility extends as far as my conception does. That is, in terms of everything I can conceive, (cars, flying pink unicorns, spherical cubes, etc) I can know which of them are possible (cars are possible, flying pink unicorns are possible, spherical cubes are not possible).
What we cannot know in terms of possibility are things that are utterly beyond our conception--that is, things that only God can fully conceive. Some of these things may be in the realm of the numinous (which is non-propositional), but the vast majority would be beyond it.
God has given man dominion within his realm of conception so that man might better understand God. Of course, in doing this, God allowed man to be capable of rebellion.
That's because the infinite is beyond our comprehension.
Confessor
Puritan Board Senior
Philip,
If you could do me a huge favor and not at the moment argue for the superiority of classical apologetics based on this in-house dispute on possibility, I would deeply thank you. I think this in-house presuppositional dispute is near resolution, and I would really, really appreciate it if we avoid a two-front war presently.
But by all means, please bring up that point if/when we resolve this, or better yet, make a new thread so your argument does not get buried or silenced by my request.
-----Added 6/23/2009 at 11:56:57 EST-----
Brian,
First of all, you are correct in that the apologist would have the onus to establish the impossibility of a non-Christian worldview. I should have made that more clear in the dialogue. However, I don’t think the rest of the dialogue really is affected by that error, for either scenario would result in the same thing: person 2 conceiving of a possible revealed religion different from Christianity—and therefore of a possible worldview different from Christianity. And that is where the issue is.
Now, regarding both of your (i.e. Clark’s and Brian’s) arguments, I will have to say the typical, “You make a lot of good points,” seriously. I am having difficulty reconciling these issues. So I’m going to attempt to lay out both your arguments (and my extensions thereof) and posit a solution.
Brian—You say that modal logic is derived from more basic logic, which is simply a propositional reflection of God’s thought. Therefore discussing possibility and necessity is permissible. Right now, it is conceivable (and therefore possible) that a quadrinity could exist; therefore it is possible that a non-Christian worldview could be viable. I would take this a little further and say that it is conceivable that a single Bible verse (or chapter) could be omitted from the Bible, and therefore it is conceivable that a slightly different god could exist, viz. one with such a nature that he would desire to omit that section of his revelation.
Clark—You say that since the living God (the Triune God of the Holy Bible) alone decrees what is possible, it is nonsense to say that His nonexistence is possible. Doing so would be taking a God-given tool (the concept of possibility) and using that to slap the giver of that tool in the face. It would be not only unwise but morally wrong. You also argue that this world is the only possible one and therefore to speak of other possibilities—especially to consider the “possibility” of Jehovah’s nonexistence—is nonsensical. You argue against the quadrinity because it hasn’t been shown to be sufficient for knowledge yet, but this argument is in my opinion flawed because it’s not the onus of another to prove that; if the apologist claims that Christianity is necessary, then he must himself demonstrate why a quadrinitarian worldview is impossible, not merely unproved. And insofar as it is not proved to be impossible, Christianity is not proved to be philosophically necessary. But this brings us back to the immoral case of using possibility against the God who gave it to us -- and therein lies the dilemma: possibility seems appropriate to talk about in one sense and inappropriate in another sense.
I think the discussion of God's possibly being different can help lead us to our resolution: while we can, as humans, conceive of God being of a different nature, we do not know if God Himself can conceive of that—i.e., our conception of God’s alteration might be due to our ignorance and finitude rather than due to its objective possibility. However, it still stands that we are human, and therefore, as far as it goes, we must not act as if we can prove that it is not possible. But here’s the important distinction: although we cannot necessarily have rational certainty of certain things, we can have infallible assurance of those things (by the Holy Spirit). There are some things you can know but just can’t share. Therefore, although it might be the case that God’s nonexistence (or God’s alteration, same thing) is inconceivable to those who have enough knowledge, it cannot be proven right now by our human arguments. Therefore we cannot claim to unbelievers that we know this by pure rational argument.
Likewise, although we might know that Christianity is necessarily true by the Holy Spirit, it is not necessarily the case that we can prove this by discursive argument. And if we can’t prove it in that way, then we must not claim it is necessary as if we can do so. We can still state that any worldview the unbeliever offers will be defeated, but we don’t want to start making claims about worldviews that the unbeliever does not have to offer—otherwise we will have the onus to provide and disprove all other possible worldviews. We can state that any tenable worldview will be defeated, and only Christianity will succeed; and while we can have an infallible assurance from the Holy Spirit that no contrary presupposition will arise, we simply cannot, as humans, have infallible rational certainty for our position. That belongs to Him who alone has omniscience.
Therefore, Clark, I think this reconciles the correct point you are making about using God-given tools against Him with the seemingly evident case that a competent revealed religion other than Christianity is conceivable. Since the impossibility of a quadrinity (or some other slight alteration in God’s nature) cannot be proven philosophically, the presuppositional apologist cannot state that it is philosophically impossible. We know that it can’t occur because we already have a Spirit-given knowledge that Christianity is true and therefore another revealed religion will not present itself, but we do know that as a rational argument—and therefore we should not state it as if it’s rationally provable. It must remain “in-house.”
As a result, it would appear that the apologist should reduce his claim from “Christianity is philosophically necessary” to “No worldview presented against the Christian worldview can stand,” which for all practical reasons is just as strong. But this does not weaken his view that God decrees possibility; it is just an admission that he cannot rationally prove such a thing. Therefore, the apologist can slightly weaken his claim without betraying some sinful view of possibility.
I really hope that does the trick.
If you could do me a huge favor and not at the moment argue for the superiority of classical apologetics based on this in-house dispute on possibility, I would deeply thank you. I think this in-house presuppositional dispute is near resolution, and I would really, really appreciate it if we avoid a two-front war presently.
But by all means, please bring up that point if/when we resolve this, or better yet, make a new thread so your argument does not get buried or silenced by my request.
-----Added 6/23/2009 at 11:56:57 EST-----
Brian,
First of all, you are correct in that the apologist would have the onus to establish the impossibility of a non-Christian worldview. I should have made that more clear in the dialogue. However, I don’t think the rest of the dialogue really is affected by that error, for either scenario would result in the same thing: person 2 conceiving of a possible revealed religion different from Christianity—and therefore of a possible worldview different from Christianity. And that is where the issue is.
Now, regarding both of your (i.e. Clark’s and Brian’s) arguments, I will have to say the typical, “You make a lot of good points,” seriously. I am having difficulty reconciling these issues. So I’m going to attempt to lay out both your arguments (and my extensions thereof) and posit a solution.
Brian—You say that modal logic is derived from more basic logic, which is simply a propositional reflection of God’s thought. Therefore discussing possibility and necessity is permissible. Right now, it is conceivable (and therefore possible) that a quadrinity could exist; therefore it is possible that a non-Christian worldview could be viable. I would take this a little further and say that it is conceivable that a single Bible verse (or chapter) could be omitted from the Bible, and therefore it is conceivable that a slightly different god could exist, viz. one with such a nature that he would desire to omit that section of his revelation.
Clark—You say that since the living God (the Triune God of the Holy Bible) alone decrees what is possible, it is nonsense to say that His nonexistence is possible. Doing so would be taking a God-given tool (the concept of possibility) and using that to slap the giver of that tool in the face. It would be not only unwise but morally wrong. You also argue that this world is the only possible one and therefore to speak of other possibilities—especially to consider the “possibility” of Jehovah’s nonexistence—is nonsensical. You argue against the quadrinity because it hasn’t been shown to be sufficient for knowledge yet, but this argument is in my opinion flawed because it’s not the onus of another to prove that; if the apologist claims that Christianity is necessary, then he must himself demonstrate why a quadrinitarian worldview is impossible, not merely unproved. And insofar as it is not proved to be impossible, Christianity is not proved to be philosophically necessary. But this brings us back to the immoral case of using possibility against the God who gave it to us -- and therein lies the dilemma: possibility seems appropriate to talk about in one sense and inappropriate in another sense.
I think the discussion of God's possibly being different can help lead us to our resolution: while we can, as humans, conceive of God being of a different nature, we do not know if God Himself can conceive of that—i.e., our conception of God’s alteration might be due to our ignorance and finitude rather than due to its objective possibility. However, it still stands that we are human, and therefore, as far as it goes, we must not act as if we can prove that it is not possible. But here’s the important distinction: although we cannot necessarily have rational certainty of certain things, we can have infallible assurance of those things (by the Holy Spirit). There are some things you can know but just can’t share. Therefore, although it might be the case that God’s nonexistence (or God’s alteration, same thing) is inconceivable to those who have enough knowledge, it cannot be proven right now by our human arguments. Therefore we cannot claim to unbelievers that we know this by pure rational argument.
Likewise, although we might know that Christianity is necessarily true by the Holy Spirit, it is not necessarily the case that we can prove this by discursive argument. And if we can’t prove it in that way, then we must not claim it is necessary as if we can do so. We can still state that any worldview the unbeliever offers will be defeated, but we don’t want to start making claims about worldviews that the unbeliever does not have to offer—otherwise we will have the onus to provide and disprove all other possible worldviews. We can state that any tenable worldview will be defeated, and only Christianity will succeed; and while we can have an infallible assurance from the Holy Spirit that no contrary presupposition will arise, we simply cannot, as humans, have infallible rational certainty for our position. That belongs to Him who alone has omniscience.
Therefore, Clark, I think this reconciles the correct point you are making about using God-given tools against Him with the seemingly evident case that a competent revealed religion other than Christianity is conceivable. Since the impossibility of a quadrinity (or some other slight alteration in God’s nature) cannot be proven philosophically, the presuppositional apologist cannot state that it is philosophically impossible. We know that it can’t occur because we already have a Spirit-given knowledge that Christianity is true and therefore another revealed religion will not present itself, but we do know that as a rational argument—and therefore we should not state it as if it’s rationally provable. It must remain “in-house.”
As a result, it would appear that the apologist should reduce his claim from “Christianity is philosophically necessary” to “No worldview presented against the Christian worldview can stand,” which for all practical reasons is just as strong. But this does not weaken his view that God decrees possibility; it is just an admission that he cannot rationally prove such a thing. Therefore, the apologist can slightly weaken his claim without betraying some sinful view of possibility.
I really hope that does the trick.
chbrooking
Puritan Board Junior
Philip,
With all due respect, you are refusing to listen and really engage what I'm saying.
What I said about intelligibility is indeed found in Plato. The problem is, Plato tried on all three grounds (a priori, a posteriori, and a hybrid epistemology) to find that unity. He was unable to. And the history of philosophy (a footnote to Plato) has failed ever since. Christian theism, and Christian theism alone, provides the preconditions for intelligibility. We couldn't be having this conversation if Christian theism were not true.
I've handled Fristianity. But I'll do this once more. Please pay attention.
1. Autonomy yields skepticism.
2. There's no such thing as Fristianity.
3. If there were such a thing, it would have to be revealed to avoid the charge of autonomy. It is not revealed, so, go back to number 2 or admit that it is autonomous and go back to number 1.
4. If there were such a thing, and it were revealed, and it were vying to be a theonomous system accounting for the preconditions of intelligibility, it would have to have every single component of Christian theism. The lack of any doctrine would destroy the whole.
5. Adding a member to the godhead would certainly alter the doctrine (significantly).
6. So -- IF THERE WERE -- which there isn't, a worldview such as Fristianity, it too would fail have to account for intelligibility. It couldn't.
7. Go back and review our comments on possibility. Or at least answer the question at the end of this response.
You would profit from reading Van Til's Mr. White, Mr. Grey and Mr. Black -- I can't remember where it is found. But I'm sure someone reading this can tell you. The moment you say that Christianity is probably true, you confess that it is probably false.
I notice that you never answered WHO determines what is possible. Is possibility something that has existence apart from God? Is God swallowed up by the possible?
-----Added 6/24/2009 at 12:11:05 EST-----
No, Ben. I believe Quadrinity to be impossible. I'll work on showing you that it's so. But not tonight.
I'll go further and say that Frame is wrong, Van Til and Bahnsen are right. Christianity is philosophically necessary. I suppose it's a pile on now for me to prove it.
By the way, once again, Quick Draw, you beat me to the post
With all due respect, you are refusing to listen and really engage what I'm saying.
What I said about intelligibility is indeed found in Plato. The problem is, Plato tried on all three grounds (a priori, a posteriori, and a hybrid epistemology) to find that unity. He was unable to. And the history of philosophy (a footnote to Plato) has failed ever since. Christian theism, and Christian theism alone, provides the preconditions for intelligibility. We couldn't be having this conversation if Christian theism were not true.
I've handled Fristianity. But I'll do this once more. Please pay attention.
1. Autonomy yields skepticism.
2. There's no such thing as Fristianity.
3. If there were such a thing, it would have to be revealed to avoid the charge of autonomy. It is not revealed, so, go back to number 2 or admit that it is autonomous and go back to number 1.
4. If there were such a thing, and it were revealed, and it were vying to be a theonomous system accounting for the preconditions of intelligibility, it would have to have every single component of Christian theism. The lack of any doctrine would destroy the whole.
5. Adding a member to the godhead would certainly alter the doctrine (significantly).
6. So -- IF THERE WERE -- which there isn't, a worldview such as Fristianity, it too would fail have to account for intelligibility. It couldn't.
7. Go back and review our comments on possibility. Or at least answer the question at the end of this response.
You would profit from reading Van Til's Mr. White, Mr. Grey and Mr. Black -- I can't remember where it is found. But I'm sure someone reading this can tell you. The moment you say that Christianity is probably true, you confess that it is probably false.
I notice that you never answered WHO determines what is possible. Is possibility something that has existence apart from God? Is God swallowed up by the possible?
-----Added 6/24/2009 at 12:11:05 EST-----
No, Ben. I believe Quadrinity to be impossible. I'll work on showing you that it's so. But not tonight.
I'll go further and say that Frame is wrong, Van Til and Bahnsen are right. Christianity is philosophically necessary. I suppose it's a pile on now for me to prove it.
By the way, once again, Quick Draw, you beat me to the post
Confessor
Puritan Board Senior
Clark,
The Fristianity argument in this context is that it is conceivable that a quadrinitarian revelation could exist (therefore it wouldn't be autonomous), and you would yourself have to prove that it is impossible in order to prove that Christianity is rationally necessary. This would require your proving that whatever doctrinal variations can possibly exist in such a worldview are necessarily false -- which I'm not sure you can do without begging the question.
As for letting unbelievers "off the hook" (by claiming that Christianity is only probably true), I really don't think that would happen by lowering the claim the small extent that I am proposing. It still is the case that unbelievers have no choice but to rest on Christian presuppositions, for the apologist can defeat every opposing worldview. And, of course, unbelievers already know non-inferentially that they're condemned (Romans 1).
What's important is that the apologist not claim that he can prove that Christianity is philosophically necessary -- because in that case he would have to prove that any single possibility of a contrary revealed religion cannot be. And there's no way he could do that.
The Fristianity argument in this context is that it is conceivable that a quadrinitarian revelation could exist (therefore it wouldn't be autonomous), and you would yourself have to prove that it is impossible in order to prove that Christianity is rationally necessary. This would require your proving that whatever doctrinal variations can possibly exist in such a worldview are necessarily false -- which I'm not sure you can do without begging the question.
As for letting unbelievers "off the hook" (by claiming that Christianity is only probably true), I really don't think that would happen by lowering the claim the small extent that I am proposing. It still is the case that unbelievers have no choice but to rest on Christian presuppositions, for the apologist can defeat every opposing worldview. And, of course, unbelievers already know non-inferentially that they're condemned (Romans 1).
What's important is that the apologist not claim that he can prove that Christianity is philosophically necessary -- because in that case he would have to prove that any single possibility of a contrary revealed religion cannot be. And there's no way he could do that.
chbrooking
Puritan Board Junior
I disagree. And the reason I disagree is that positing what is possible requires the CHRISTIAN worldview. But I'll try to make this clear tomorrow or so.
Brian Bosse
"The Brain"
Hello Ben,
I just deleted what I wrote after reading your latest post. I really appreciate the thought you have put into it, and at first blush have come to many of the same conclusions you have come to. I will comment in detail soon.
Sincerely,
Brian
I just deleted what I wrote after reading your latest post. I really appreciate the thought you have put into it, and at first blush have come to many of the same conclusions you have come to. I will comment in detail soon.
Sincerely,
Brian
Confessor
Puritan Board Senior
Clark,
Even if you could disprove a Fristian worldview, that wouldn't help your case that much. The problem with asserting that Christianity is philosophically necessary is that it requires proving the impossibility of non-Christianity. And proving the impossibility of non-Christianity would require disproving both (1) autonomy (which isn't really a problem) and (2) every conceivable revealed religion that is not Christianity. (2) entails not only that you disprove everything brought your way, but that you yourself provide every other conceivable variation of non-Christian revelation and disprove all of those. But that is sheerly impossible.
This really shouldn't be a problem, though. I don't know if I'm thinking too highly of myself, but I want to know if I posited a resolution to this issue. Our lowering the claim from "Christianity is philosophically necessary and certain" to "I can defeat any unbelieving worldview offered against Christianity" does not give any hope to the unbeliever either way. But it does help the apologist by giving the onus over to the unbeliever to provide a cogent worldview.
Even if you could disprove a Fristian worldview, that wouldn't help your case that much. The problem with asserting that Christianity is philosophically necessary is that it requires proving the impossibility of non-Christianity. And proving the impossibility of non-Christianity would require disproving both (1) autonomy (which isn't really a problem) and (2) every conceivable revealed religion that is not Christianity. (2) entails not only that you disprove everything brought your way, but that you yourself provide every other conceivable variation of non-Christian revelation and disprove all of those. But that is sheerly impossible.
This really shouldn't be a problem, though. I don't know if I'm thinking too highly of myself, but I want to know if I posited a resolution to this issue. Our lowering the claim from "Christianity is philosophically necessary and certain" to "I can defeat any unbelieving worldview offered against Christianity" does not give any hope to the unbeliever either way. But it does help the apologist by giving the onus over to the unbeliever to provide a cogent worldview.
chbrooking
Puritan Board Junior
The problem is this, though.
One cannot speak of bare possibility. This line of argumentation is guilty of reification. And unless and until it is determined at what point logic meets reality: "to talk about what can or cannot exist according to logic is but to swing a sword in the sky".
You see, Ben, the problem is in your concession on what is conceiveable. Once we determine that what is conceiveable to finite (and fallen) human reason is determinative for what exists (or what we know), we have sold Christian theism down the river. You can't divide how we know from what we know. Notice that it is unbridled logic that is driving this anti-theistic bus. It isn't the revelation that is going to be proposed. It's an autonomous argument. Positing a non-existent future worldview as determinative of the validity of Christian theism is, itself, autonomous.
Van Til used a microscope illustration. I can't remember it. But let me use an inferior one: You see a piece of rice with micro-writing on it. You put it under a microscope and find that it says, "microscopes do not exist." Are you going to believe it? This isn't really so different from our impasse. Human reason, on the Christian understanding, is founded on the thought of the Christian God. For human reason, then, to will God out of existence, or even posit the possibility of his non-existence,-- is not only irrational, it is sinful. Now the unbeliever will not agree with this. But he cannot rest his logic (and possibility) in some potential future worldview -- as that would envelop everything in chance. To permit this argument is to allow reason to operate independent of God, in which case the human mind becomes the ultimate reference point, the ultimate arbiter of truth.
This line of reasoning is not alternative-theonomous. It is autonomous. I assure you that the notion of bare possibility will say, loud and clear, "God doesn't exist." After all, if possibility exists independent of God, then God is going to be swallowed up by chance. What I'm getting at is that 'brute possibility' requires the very same autonomy we recognizes leads to skepticism.
Here's the problem with refusing to say that Christianity is philosophically necessary: It concedes that sophos itself exists apart from the Christian God and that it may philethenai apart from the worship of the trinitarian God of the scriptures. Christianity is philosophically necessary because only Christianity accounts for philosophy.
So, I'd say you were on a better track when you were arguing for a present worldview. Quadrinity isn't a present worldview. It doesn't, in fact, exist. And since no worldview exists by which the possibility of a worldview arising that could dispatch the necessity of Christianity, Christianity is necessary.
Anti-theistic thought defines possibility by conceivability or consistency or articulability. But they cannot ground their definition. And once you suggest, from a non-Christian foundation, that what is 'possible' speaks to what is, you have at the very least committed the fallacy of reification. Never mind the fact that, on non-Christian grounds, you cannot get from epistemology, where this brute possibility is located, to ontology. You have divided how we know from what we know, and that is, to use Van Til's phrase,--to swing a sword in the sky.
I can appreciate what you are trying to say, I think. You are saying that you cannot construct a reasonably limited number of propositional arguments to establish the truth of Christianity. But you've removed yourself one step from the TAG. Christianity is true (and philosophically necessary) because its alternative cannot construct ONE argument without assuming the truth of Christianity. Yes, that may require us to work for many years demolishing the foundations of anything that is thrown up at us. After all, man is going to be very resourceful in his attack on the truth. But the fact that anti-theistic thought is most vicious in the throws of death does not mean that it isn't mortally wounded.
One cannot speak of bare possibility. This line of argumentation is guilty of reification. And unless and until it is determined at what point logic meets reality: "to talk about what can or cannot exist according to logic is but to swing a sword in the sky".
You see, Ben, the problem is in your concession on what is conceiveable. Once we determine that what is conceiveable to finite (and fallen) human reason is determinative for what exists (or what we know), we have sold Christian theism down the river. You can't divide how we know from what we know. Notice that it is unbridled logic that is driving this anti-theistic bus. It isn't the revelation that is going to be proposed. It's an autonomous argument. Positing a non-existent future worldview as determinative of the validity of Christian theism is, itself, autonomous.
Van Til used a microscope illustration. I can't remember it. But let me use an inferior one: You see a piece of rice with micro-writing on it. You put it under a microscope and find that it says, "microscopes do not exist." Are you going to believe it? This isn't really so different from our impasse. Human reason, on the Christian understanding, is founded on the thought of the Christian God. For human reason, then, to will God out of existence, or even posit the possibility of his non-existence,-- is not only irrational, it is sinful. Now the unbeliever will not agree with this. But he cannot rest his logic (and possibility) in some potential future worldview -- as that would envelop everything in chance. To permit this argument is to allow reason to operate independent of God, in which case the human mind becomes the ultimate reference point, the ultimate arbiter of truth.
This line of reasoning is not alternative-theonomous. It is autonomous. I assure you that the notion of bare possibility will say, loud and clear, "God doesn't exist." After all, if possibility exists independent of God, then God is going to be swallowed up by chance. What I'm getting at is that 'brute possibility' requires the very same autonomy we recognizes leads to skepticism.
Here's the problem with refusing to say that Christianity is philosophically necessary: It concedes that sophos itself exists apart from the Christian God and that it may philethenai apart from the worship of the trinitarian God of the scriptures. Christianity is philosophically necessary because only Christianity accounts for philosophy.
So, I'd say you were on a better track when you were arguing for a present worldview. Quadrinity isn't a present worldview. It doesn't, in fact, exist. And since no worldview exists by which the possibility of a worldview arising that could dispatch the necessity of Christianity, Christianity is necessary.
Anti-theistic thought defines possibility by conceivability or consistency or articulability. But they cannot ground their definition. And once you suggest, from a non-Christian foundation, that what is 'possible' speaks to what is, you have at the very least committed the fallacy of reification. Never mind the fact that, on non-Christian grounds, you cannot get from epistemology, where this brute possibility is located, to ontology. You have divided how we know from what we know, and that is, to use Van Til's phrase,--to swing a sword in the sky.
I can appreciate what you are trying to say, I think. You are saying that you cannot construct a reasonably limited number of propositional arguments to establish the truth of Christianity. But you've removed yourself one step from the TAG. Christianity is true (and philosophically necessary) because its alternative cannot construct ONE argument without assuming the truth of Christianity. Yes, that may require us to work for many years demolishing the foundations of anything that is thrown up at us. After all, man is going to be very resourceful in his attack on the truth. But the fact that anti-theistic thought is most vicious in the throws of death does not mean that it isn't mortally wounded.
Confessor
Puritan Board Senior
Clark,
This is the important distinction I was talking about. Since it is conceivable to the unbeliever that an alternative revelation could exist that rivals Christianity, then make sure that you, the apologist, are not the one who mentions such a notion of possibility.
When you start making statements like this:
You are obliged to prove them. And to prove the philosophical necessity of Christianity is to prove the philosophical impossibility of non-Christianity against any type of doubt, which includes disproving both autonomy and other revealed religions. Therefore, insofar as another revelation apart from Christianity is conceivable, you have to be the one who provides all these possible worldviews and defeat them yourself.
However, if you lower the claim to say that you can defeat any unbelieving worldview offered, then the unbeliever cannot appeal to a possible revelation without showing the revelation. If you don't lower it, then you have to bring up all possible non-Christian revelations and demonstrate how they can't possibly be true. In this case, then, the unbeliever still has no choice but to hold to Christianity; you just give him the burden of proof.
But the best part about this is that it doesn't result in the immoral utilization of God-given tools against Him. It merely recognizes that we can't ourselves philosophically prove the absolute necessity of Christianity. We can give no choice for the unbeliever to accept Christianity, but we can't actually disprove all conceivable non-Christian worldviews. Yet, at the same time, when we have Christians talking to each other who agree on theonomy, we can discuss possibility in a God-honoring way: what is conceivable to God.
And here is where the distinction between infallible assurance and rational certainty comes in. You already know that possibility entails only what is conceivable to God, but yet you can't actually show this discursively; therefore such discussion should remain in-house.
Presumably, you could tell the unbeliever that any claim to a possible revelation does not work, because "possibility" can be asserted only with a Christian presupposition, but in that case you would still be starting with a claim of "I will disprove everything thrown at me" rather than "Christianity is philosophically necessary."
The problem here is that when you state that Christianity is necessary, you mean "necessary" in the sense of "you are forced to do this" rather than "we know this with philosophical certainty." Thus, when you make claims that convey "necessity" in the latter sense, it becomes impossible to prove. That's why you should slightly lower the claim and convey "necessity" in the former sense.
This is the important distinction I was talking about. Since it is conceivable to the unbeliever that an alternative revelation could exist that rivals Christianity, then make sure that you, the apologist, are not the one who mentions such a notion of possibility.
When you start making statements like this:
You are obliged to prove them. And to prove the philosophical necessity of Christianity is to prove the philosophical impossibility of non-Christianity against any type of doubt, which includes disproving both autonomy and other revealed religions. Therefore, insofar as another revelation apart from Christianity is conceivable, you have to be the one who provides all these possible worldviews and defeat them yourself.
However, if you lower the claim to say that you can defeat any unbelieving worldview offered, then the unbeliever cannot appeal to a possible revelation without showing the revelation. If you don't lower it, then you have to bring up all possible non-Christian revelations and demonstrate how they can't possibly be true. In this case, then, the unbeliever still has no choice but to hold to Christianity; you just give him the burden of proof.
But the best part about this is that it doesn't result in the immoral utilization of God-given tools against Him. It merely recognizes that we can't ourselves philosophically prove the absolute necessity of Christianity. We can give no choice for the unbeliever to accept Christianity, but we can't actually disprove all conceivable non-Christian worldviews. Yet, at the same time, when we have Christians talking to each other who agree on theonomy, we can discuss possibility in a God-honoring way: what is conceivable to God.
And here is where the distinction between infallible assurance and rational certainty comes in. You already know that possibility entails only what is conceivable to God, but yet you can't actually show this discursively; therefore such discussion should remain in-house.
Presumably, you could tell the unbeliever that any claim to a possible revelation does not work, because "possibility" can be asserted only with a Christian presupposition, but in that case you would still be starting with a claim of "I will disprove everything thrown at me" rather than "Christianity is philosophically necessary."
The problem here is that when you state that Christianity is necessary, you mean "necessary" in the sense of "you are forced to do this" rather than "we know this with philosophical certainty." Thus, when you make claims that convey "necessity" in the latter sense, it becomes impossible to prove. That's why you should slightly lower the claim and convey "necessity" in the former sense.
chbrooking
Puritan Board Junior
First, I'm swamped today, and have not had time to adequately read your response. I'll do that, but it will have to be later.
But why are you asking me to prove a negative? By saying "No other worldview works", I don't have the duty to raise up every worldview to prove my point. One exception would destroy my position, but it is not incumbent on me to raise them. I cannot prove a negative. And of all people, those wanting me to be logical shouldn't expect it of me. The onus isn't on me. I can show that Christianity accounts for the preconditions of intelligibility. I can also show that autonomy can't. I can also show that deism, polytheism, pantheism, panentheism or any alternative theism can't. But if someone says, "the speed of light cannot be broken," he does not have to build every imaginable device to attempt to refute his position.
Besides, all this is nonsense, really. We don't operate in 'potential worlds'. If the engineer designing your plane told you, "Well, I didn't use our present rules of physics, because it's quite possible that others exist," I dare say you would not get on that plane.
But I'll give your response a read later -- probably tonight, and respond.
Incidentally, I hope you notice that our method is the same. I just don't have a problem making a clear declaration. And I don't think asking me to prove a negative in order to substantiate it is fair or logical.
But why are you asking me to prove a negative? By saying "No other worldview works", I don't have the duty to raise up every worldview to prove my point. One exception would destroy my position, but it is not incumbent on me to raise them. I cannot prove a negative. And of all people, those wanting me to be logical shouldn't expect it of me. The onus isn't on me. I can show that Christianity accounts for the preconditions of intelligibility. I can also show that autonomy can't. I can also show that deism, polytheism, pantheism, panentheism or any alternative theism can't. But if someone says, "the speed of light cannot be broken," he does not have to build every imaginable device to attempt to refute his position.
Besides, all this is nonsense, really. We don't operate in 'potential worlds'. If the engineer designing your plane told you, "Well, I didn't use our present rules of physics, because it's quite possible that others exist," I dare say you would not get on that plane.
But I'll give your response a read later -- probably tonight, and respond.
Incidentally, I hope you notice that our method is the same. I just don't have a problem making a clear declaration. And I don't think asking me to prove a negative in order to substantiate it is fair or logical.
The Calvin Knight
Puritan Board Freshman
Here is the article on Mr. Black, Mr. White, and Mr. Grey:
A Defense of Reformed (biblical) Presuppositional Apologetics by Cornelius VanTil
A Defense of Reformed (biblical) Presuppositional Apologetics by Cornelius VanTil
Confessor
Puritan Board Senior
That is exactly why you shouldn't claim a negative, then -- or, rather, a negative you can't prove. If I were to say I could prove (with certainty) that unicorns did not exist, I would not be able to prove it. I could establish that it's not reasonable to believe in them, but I could not establish that they do not exist with 100% certainty. And Clark, while you can establish that it's foolish and unreasonable to believe in a non-Christian presupposition -- in fact, you can even establish that unbelievers have no choice but to do so -- you still cannot prove it with certainty.
This has to do with what is reasonable to believe, not what we know with 100% certainty. I do admit that a lot of possible world talk can be useless, but that doesn't change the fact that the presuppositionalist ought not to claim philosophical certainty for his position.
Our disagreements are usually small.
But I think this is important for our methodology, as such a claim will often sidetrack one from actually showing the unbeliever why he is without excuse. The unbeliever will be looking for the philosophical certainty implicit in your claim.----------
By the way, the white, gray, and black conversation does not really touch base on this issue. That has to do with probabilistic evidentialism/classical apologetics, not my current proposal to lower the apologist's clam from philosophical certainty.
chbrooking
Puritan Board Junior
Define philosophical certainty for me.
-----Added 6/24/2009 at 03:17:51 EST-----
It would seem to me that, since we cannot speak without a certain underpinning, by having the debate we prove the Christian position. And unless we claim philosophical certainty, we are stuck with probability. In which case White, Grey and black do apply. This is why I want to know your definition of philosophical certainty. I have to assume that this is where we are hung.
-----Added 6/24/2009 at 03:17:51 EST-----
It would seem to me that, since we cannot speak without a certain underpinning, by having the debate we prove the Christian position. And unless we claim philosophical certainty, we are stuck with probability. In which case White, Grey and black do apply. This is why I want to know your definition of philosophical certainty. I have to assume that this is where we are hung.
Confessor
Puritan Board Senior
Certainty would be established if the contradictory is impossible/inconceivable.
At this point you would probably ask what I mean by "inconceivable," in which case you would say that I am relying on man's perception rather than God's. But then we return to a comment I brought up earlier:
I think the discussion of God's possibly being different can help lead us to our resolution: while we can, as humans, conceive of God being of a different nature, we do not know if God Himself can conceive of that—i.e., our conception of God’s alteration might be due to our ignorance and finitude rather than due to its objective possibility. However, it still stands that we are human, and therefore, as far as it goes, we must not act as if we can prove that it is not possible. But here’s the important distinction: although we cannot necessarily have rational certainty of certain things, we can have infallible assurance of those things (by the Holy Spirit). There are some things you can know but just can’t share. Therefore, although it might be the case that God’s nonexistence (or God’s alteration, same thing) is inconceivable to those who have enough knowledge, it cannot be proven right now by our human arguments. Therefore we cannot claim to unbelievers that we know this by pure rational argument.
Clark, although you would claim (and I would agree) that, for instance, a quadrinity is not conceivable from God's perspective, we simply cannot establish that with rational argument. One must already fully accept Biblical revelation to accept this fact. And the only way to show the unbeliever that he already accepts Biblical revelation is to show him that he has no choice but to do so, in which case you've already lowered the claim.
Another way of stating my argument is that when you say Christianity is necessary, you are appealing to an autonomous notion of possibility (!).
chbrooking
Puritan Board Junior
But he cannot ground his conception. That's the point. I am making a statement of what is true, founded as it is on the Christian worldview. How is he to open his mouth without the Christian worldview, in order to posit something as possible. I will immediately ask him who determines what is possible? Is possibility something that just exists 'out there'? If so, I will show him that not only is God swallowed up by that brute possibility -- an ontology of radical chance, but all hope of knowing or discussing is also swallowed up by it.
This is why I don't have a problem with saying that it is philosophically necessary. Because necessity and possibility are concepts which only make sense in a Christian worldview. If someone wants to claim that they can make sense of them with a different worldview, then they are trying to disprove my claim. In a sense, I don't know what the fuss is about. This is what the TAG has claimed all along -- impossibility of the contrary. Show me a contrary, and I'll show you it is impossible.
If by this you mean that I cannot make such a claim because such a claim will be judged by the canons of logic, then I'm going to ask you to ground your canons of logic. The only worldview which makes sense of logic is the Christian one. And since possibility is a category that only makes sense in that worldview, you can't even raise it with another worldview. If you try, I will show you that it doesn't work.
And before you jump in here, Brian, you haven't explained what Fristianity is. It's not a worldview that presents a challenge, because it's not spelled out. Where is its revelation? In your mind?
I fear that you are still working with the notion of possibility as though it were neutral. It's not. I'm using it, but not in a neutral way. Once someone else uses it in an anti-theistic way, I'm going to attack the underpinnings of his notion of possibility first of all. If he presents me with a revelation that purports to answer the challenge of intelligibility, I'll undercut it. But I have no problem saying that Christianity is philosophically necessary, since philosophy itself depends on it, necessity depends on it. Even this discussion depends on it -- when viewed from my foundation it makes sense.
But I prove them on Christian grounds. If you want to argue that my grounds do not account for the proof, or that you can account for intelligibility on other grounds, or that you can disprove my grounds, go for it. But my proof is sound, once you assume my foundation. And since we all have a foundation, that's only a problem for someone who wants to reason autonomously. TAG has always been about foundation vs. foundation. You're aiming at a flag, when you talk about possibility as if it were brute. I'm not using "possible" that way. I'm using possibility with the Christian theistic reference point. Let's not aim at flags, but foundations beneath them.
-----Added 6/24/2009 at 03:43:29 EST-----
Okay, I think we're on the right track now. I just read your last post.
This is what it comes down to. You think my claim is autonomous. It's not (per my previous post).
I'm claiming that any notion of possibility that is non-Christian is autonomous.
This, I think, is the heart of our disagreement.
I'm not crawling out of the Christian framework to declare the "impossibility of the contrary." I'm assuming it in my claim.
Confessor
Puritan Board Senior
You're right, that is the heart of our disagreement. Really, this has shown to be quite a minor disagreement.
You believe that the necessity of Christianity is nothing more than the fact that an unbeliever, in trying to object against Christianity, must presuppose it. But when you say that Christianity is necessary without making this qualification, then you are in fact "crawling out of the Christian framework." If you just state that Christianity is necessary, then you are obliged to provide and disprove all possible non-Christian worldviews; if you state that Christianity is necessary in the sense that any worldview the unbeliever can offer can be defeated, then he is obliged to provide a non-Christian worldview. Therefore the apologist ought to make this qualification. If you agree that he should make this qualification -- and by all signs it seems that you do -- then we should be in agreement.
Besides, Clark, it appears we're in agreement on the fact that the burden of proof to show a non-Christian worldview is the unbeliever's, hence your statements such as the following:
Now it's just a matter of making this onus evident when we say things such as "Christianity is necessary." When we say that, we don't mean it in an autonomous sense, but in a presuppositional sense; thus the qualification (that the unbeliever will not offer a cogent non-Christian presupposition) is needed.
- Status
